The Road to Pakistan's Dismemberment: 197

Regional Studies
Vol XXXIII, Issue 1
pp.64-99

http//irs.org.pk
P-ISSN: 0254-7988
E-ISSN:2959-5459
Date of Acceptance: 7 November 2015

Maryam Mastoor*

On 16th December 1971, Pakistan got dismembered. East Pakistan became Bangladesh. There are various narratives about the incident. A bulk of literature has focused on "what" happened in 1971.(1) "How" many were killed?(2) Who is to blame?(3) However, little effort and attention have been given to the question of "why". Why did Pakistan get dismembered? This paper shall attempt to answer this pertinent question and try to find out structural flaws in the political system that eventually led to this painful human tragedy in the history of Pakistan.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with an ideological vacuum at the national level from which the call for identity and acceptability echoed from East Pakistan. After the sudden demise of Quaid-e-Azam in 1948, there wasn't any leader of national stature who could determine an appropriate course for the country and ensure national cohesion. Confusion about the founding ideology of Pakistan created a structural flaw right in the beginning, eventually leading to a procrustean rule in Pakistan that tragically ignored the diversity it contained within its borders. The second section discusses the process of indoctrinating autocracy in the political system of Pakistan. Autocracy, which was presumed to suit the 'genius of people of Pakistan', led to its dismemberment. Finally, the last section deliberates upon the events that marked the end of a united Pakistan.

From perplexing ideology to procrustean rule

In the Lahore resolution that was unanimously passed by the All-India Muslim League, the word 'states' rather than 'state' had been mentioned. It stated:

> It is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in North-West and

* Maryam Mastoor is a Research Officer at Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

> Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.[4]

There was an ambiguity in the Pakistan plan. Later, it was suggested that the mention of 'states' rather than 'state' in the Lahore resolution was a 'typing' mistake. In an interview with the *Associated Press of America* in 1940, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah clarified that Pakistan would be a democracy based on the principles of social justice and equality with autonomy granted to its 'component states or provinces.'[5] For having clarity about Jinnah's vision of Pakistan, his interview with the *Associated Press of America* is given as under:

> Geographically — Pakistan would embrace all of the North West Frontier, Baluchistan, Sind and the Punjab province in the North Western India. On the Eastern side of India would be the other portion of Pakistan of Bengal and Assam.
> Politically — Pakistan would be a democracy. All major industrial and public utility services would be socialized. The component states or provinces of Pakistan would have autonomy.
> Economically — Pakistan [would be] divided into two separate zones…would be just as sound an undertaking as if it were a country with all states in one block; its natural resources and population would be sufficient to make it a great World Power.
> Most Powerful States — Pakistan would embrace a population of one hundred million persons…would….become one of the most powerful States economically…. a Muslim League Committee was studying the field for developing the Pakistan State as a nation…. there was a great future for it with its still untouched iron, petroleum, sulphur, coal and other mineral deposits many of which had already been mapped…Punjab was putting up one of the greatest hydro-electric stations in the world which would mean a programme for the rural electrification and industrial development.
> Financial position — There would be ample revenues from "equitable taxation levied in a manner consistent with social justice" to finance good government and to allow the Muslims to have a state as good as any in the world and better than many sovereign countries on the map of the world today.

In the Lahore resolution and the aforementioned interview, Quaid-e-Azam had vaguely put forward the idea of making East Pakistan into a federation of Pakistan. However, at that time in 1940, 'Muslim unity' was increasingly needed. Therefore, it might be assumed that an unequivocal revelation of such a thought was cautiously avoided.

Hence, Pakistan came into existence in 1947. It emerged as a land where people could freely practice their religion, be it Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs or Christians.[6] Pakistan was founded to ensure freedom in practicing religion, to foster equity and to undo discrimination on the basis of religion, caste or creed. Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab, North West Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and East Pakistan, constituted Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisaged the intangible connection of 'faith' between the Western and Eastern parts of Pakistan, powerful enough to keep the country

united. Unfortunately, however, the principles of social justice and equity mentioned by Jinnah as structural fundamentals for Pakistan were forgotten in the very early years of Pakistan's existence.

After independence, the two-nation theory wasn't enough to unify the heterogeneous society of Pakistan.[7] For the nascent state of Pakistan, a unifying ideology to achieve national cohesion was imperative. That unification, however, was quite naively materialized by spelling out 'India's threat' to the existence of Pakistan. From Liaquat Ali Khan to Pakistani leaders of today, India's threat was and is 'considered' as a unifying force for the people of Pakistan. Christine Fair rightly calls Pakistan an insecure state since birth.[8] Hence, Pakistan was configured as an 'anti India' state.

After the partition, the threat from India was there, but it was over-emphasized whereas the imperative issue of acknowledging and managing diversity within Pakistan was left on the back burner. Pashtuns, Balochis Punajbis and Sindhis represented contrasting traditions. East Pakistan envisioned themselves as the custodians of the Bengali culture. Their love for their culture was their identity. Therefore, Bengalis yearned for 'respect' of their identity within Pakistan. It is pertinent to peep into history to gain an understanding of the deep urge among Bengalis for 'respect', prosperity and 'acceptability.'

Aching for respectable acceptability

Before partition, the middle class that emerged in Bengal was Hindu. The 1871 census report indicated that Hindus were, at large, the principal landlords, public officers, men of learning, moneylenders and traders. On the contrary, the majority of Muslims in Bengal belonged to the peasant and daily wager classes.[9]In some areas of East Bengal, 85 per cent of the town buildings were owned by Hindus.[10]Therefore, the Muslims of East Bengal responded enthusiastically to the call of All India Muslim League.[11]

Interestingly, even before the partition, Bengalis identified themselves with culture, rather than religion. In 1944, the President of the Bengal Muslim League, Abdul Mansur Ahmed, declared in his presidential address that:

> Religion and culture are not the same thing. Religion transgresses the geographical boundary, but *tammadun* (culture) cannot go beyond the geographical boundary (…) For this reason the people of *Purba* (East Pakistan) are a different nation from the people of other provinces of India and from the 'religious brothers' of Pakistan.[12]

Ethnicity is a very strong phenomenon in Pakistan. Not only Bengalis, but Balochis and Pathans also adhere to the ethnic identity more than religion. Nawab Akbar Bugtisaid that "I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just fifty."[13]Similar remarks were made by a Pakhtun leader, Wali Khan.[14]

Before the partition, the theory of martial race determined a person's accession to a governmental post. Field Martial Bob Robert (Commander-in-Chief of India from 1885-1893) was a chief proponent of the theory. Robert

argued that people inhabiting in South West India 'lacked courage and possessed the inferior physique.'[15] Other than the martial race concept, it would be interesting to note that in 1857 during the 'Great Rebellion', the Bengal Army provided the bulk of rebel forces against the British.[16] Therefore, in the later years, the British cautiously avoided recruiting of Bengalis in the Indian Army. Whatever might be the reason, Bengalis were scarcely recruited in the British Army, as well as in the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service.

At the time of partition, out of 101 Muslim members of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Service, only 18 had been from Bengal.[17] Later in 1949, a quota of 40 per cent for the inclusion of Bengalis in Civil Service (against 23 per cent for Punjabis) was introduced to make up for their socio-economic backwardness.[18] However, it was not sufficient for enabling Bengalis to be a part of the decision-making cadre of the country. By the mid 1950s, out of 741 top civil servants only 51 were Bengalis.[19]

Table 1

Central Secretariat Elite Posts: 1955

	East Bengal	West Pakistan
Secretary	0	19
Joint Secretary	3	38
Deputy Secretary	10	123
Under Secretary	38	510

Source: Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates Vol 1, 7 January 1956, p.1844. Cited in Ian Talbot, "The Punjabization of Pakistan" in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002), p.55

The representation of Bengalis in the Pakistan Army was severely minimal. By 1955, there was only 1 Bengali brigadier, 1 colonel, and 2 lieutenant colonels out of 308 officers of higher ranks.[20] Bengalis were discriminated for being 'Bengali' by the British. Therefore, they envisioned Pakistan as their dreamland, where they could get respectable acceptability.

Table 2

Military Elite in Pakistan -1955

	East Bengal	West Pakistan
Lt Gen	0	3
Maj Gen	0	20
Brig	1	34
Col	1	49
Lt. Col	2	198
Maj	10	590
Naval officers	7	593
Air Force officers	40	640

Source: Cited in, Ian Talbot, "Punjabization of Pakistan", in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002)p.54

Given this palpable situation of Bengalis, who constituted the majority of Pakistan's population (56 per cent), their representation was essential at the Centre. After Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, Khawaja Nazimuddin (1951-1953) and Huseyn Shaheed Suharwardy (12 September 1956 — 17 October 1957) who were Bengalis by origin, were made Prime Ministers of Pakistan. They, however, could not address the grievances of Bengalis in an effective manner.

The first clash of opinions between West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis occurred on the issue of language. Urdu in comparison with Bengali was a new language. Bengali was incredibly rich in literature. It had a colossal historical value. Its alphabets were complete by the 12th century, while the first verse in Urdu dates back to the 15th century.[21]

The language movement in East Pakistan

Before partition, the All India Muslim League faced fierce opposition from Bengali Leaguers on proposing Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Later, Dacca University became the central hub of political activity of inordinate Bengali nationalism in Pakistan.[22] In February 1948, Direndra Nath Datta and other Hindu members of the Pakistan National Congress were the first to raise the issue of language in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.[23] Quaid-e-Azam, who desired national cohesion, considered the language issue a trivial one, and announced on 19th March 1948:

> Without one state language, no nation can remain solidly together and function …state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really an enemy of Pakistan.[24]

Later, Jinnah did accept that the Bengalis can have Bengali as the language of their province, yet Urdu would be the state language.[25] He said:

> Realizing, however, that the statement that your Prime Minister made on the language controversy, left no room for agitation, in so far as it conceded the right of the people of this province to choose Bengali as their official language if they so wished, they changed their tactics. They started demanding that Bengali should be the state language of the Pakistan Centre, and since they could not overlook the obvious claims of Urdu as the official language of a Muslim state, they proceeded to demand that both Bengali and Urdu should be the state languages of Pakistan. Make no mistake about it. There can only be one state language if the component parts of this state are to march forward in unison, and in my opinion, that can only be Urdu.

It might be argued that Quaid was mistaken in his judgment, as the language of 56 per cent population of a country cannot be restricted to a province alone. Urdu and Bengali both could have been national languages. For instance, Canada has designated both English and French as official languages. Bolivia's 2009 constitution entitled Spanish and all indigenous languages as official.[26]

There was fierce resentment among Bengali students over Quaid's announcement of making Urdu the national language of Pakistan. Later in 1952, when Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin declared again in Dhaka that "Urdu will be the state language", Dhaka University students held a massive demonstration against the announcement. The police and paramilitary forces resorted to the use of force and killed several students.[27] The martyr's column was immediately raised on the spot where the first Bengali student was slain. It is still considered as a symbol of Bengali nationalism in Bangladesh.

One may question at this point, what makes people obstinate enough to adhere to their 'own' language. There might be many explanations of the phenomenon. One logical interpretation might be that naturally humans want ease in their lives. It was difficult for Bengalis to adapt to an altogether new language as there were few people in East Bengal who could speak Urdu. Secondly, the Bengalis wanted to preserve the literature of Bengali language. A struggle by Sindhi nationalists to preserve their language, as it is also rich in literature can be considered in this context. Thirdly, only 21 per cent population of East Pakistan was literate in 1961. Therefore, it was almost impossible for them to learn a new language. Dissension on the issue of language in Pakistan laid the foundation of Bangladesh.

In the early years of Pakistan, there was no national party or leader to promote national cohesion. None of the leaders in Pakistan tried to materialize unity in diversity. Before national integration could have been achieved, Pakistan was confronted by a mass scale ethnic movement based on language. Gradually, provincial politics took root and got strengthened under the strong central government of General Ayub Khan. In this abysmal situation, there was no leader who could make Pakistanis into a nation; hence ethnic diversity of each regional group became their 'identity' and was politicized. This occurred simultaneously around the time when civil and military bureaucracy acquired decision making positions.

The nourishment of 'systemic flaw' — entrenching autocracy

For the heterogeneous society of Pakistan, a system based on representative democracy was indispensable. On the contrary, an autocratic system was installed in Pakistan. Military and civil bureaucracies, which were considerably more organized as compared to politicians, indulged in a power struggle. Much in contrast to those in India, politicians in Pakistan were confronted by anti-politician forces (civil and military bureaucracies). Anti-politicians considered politicians as, above all, incompetent rulers.

'Anti politicians' and the rise of provincial politics

The politicians in the newly born Pakistan were inexperienced and ill-organized to control the 'over-mighty' civil service.[28] Comparatively, the situation in India was altogether different. The Indian National Congress in India was established in 1885. It provided a formidable political structure based on democracy for an independent India. Interestingly, on the other hand, the All

India Muslim League was formed in 1906 in Dhaka. In the early years, the Muslim League was a 'thinkers club' of the Muslim elite. It emerged as a convincing and powerful political player after 1937. Therefore, the Muslim League was profoundly immature to consolidate the political domain of Pakistan. Owing to the inexperience of politicians, the central power was rendered to civil servants, who circumscribed the accountability they owed to the people of Pakistan.

Politicians, therefore, became quite active in the provinces. For instance, the Awami Muslim League was formed for voicing the rights of East Pakistan in 1949 and the Pakistan People's Party was launched in 1967, as a representative party of West Pakistan. However, at the centre, there was no political party to speak for the rights of the entire nation. A few amongst western qualified elite of Pakistan were affiliated to the Communist Party of Pakistan (1948). However, they neither had substantial representation at the central level, nor at the provincial level. The Muslim League was left in the hands of civil servants. There was a continuous struggle for power between anti-politicians, i.e the civil servants at the Centre and the politicians at the provincial level.[29] The delay in the formulation of the first constitution is also attributed to these 'anti-politicians.'[30]

The Rawalpindi conspiracy case

Other than civil servants, the efficient military men of the nascent state of Pakistan were also averse towards political factions in Pakistan. They were overambitious, and in the words of Hassan Zahir, they were 'Bonapartist'.[31] They considered themselves reformers and saviours of Pakistan. Ishtiaq Ahmed in his book, *Pakistan: the Garrison State*, writes that Major General Akbar Khan was displeased by Pakistan's acceptance of ceasefire in the Kashmir war of 1948, and he used to criticize the government quite harshly on this stance.[32] On 9th March 1951, Major General Akbar Khan, Urdu poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, (who was editor of the Pakistan Times), Sayed Sajjad Zahir[33] and several army officers were arrested for the crime of conspiring to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.[34] Pakistan was scared by a coup attempt in just four years of its existence.

Hasan Zahir narrated an interesting event about Major General Akbar Khan, the mastermind of the Rawalpindi conspiracy. He said that on 14th August 1947, at a reception ceremony of Mountbatten hosted by Quaid-e-Azam, a group of armed services officers were also invited. At the reception, Akbar Khan said to Quaid-e-Azam: "Sir, we are very happy at Independence and the emergence of Pakistan. But our hopes of a new system have not been realized. We still have the same colonial structure [referring mainly to British officers]. We should bring about a change in line with the genius of our people." He continued in the same strain. The Quaid gave Akbar Khan a withering look and in his usual style, pointing with his finger, snubbed him: 'Look here, you are a soldier. You have no business to criticize the government. You must concentrate on your profession."[35] This illustration simply revealed the mindset of Pakistan's military officers, who wished for 'more' than their professional duties.

On 16th October 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghan national, Said Akbar, at a public meeting in Rawalpindi. From 1951 to 1958, after the untimely death of Liaquat Ali Khan, seven prime ministers took to office. Such sudden changes in the highest command of Pakistan resulted in the making of an extremely weak and vulnerable political system. There was no nationally accepted constitutional document available to deal with thearduous problems confronted by Pakistan.

Squeezing the 'majority population of East Pakistan' & Constitution making

After Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali, was made the Prime Minister of Pakistan. A senior bureaucrat, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, who was serving as the finance minister, was made governor general. Initially, constitutional matters in Pakistan were being executed under the 1935 Act. Therefore, a nationally accepted constitutional arrangement to address perplexing issues in Pakistan's politics was required.

In 1952, a Basic Principles Committee (appointed on 12th March 1949 for drafting recommendations for the future constitution of Pakistan) recommended a bicameral legislature with parity of representation of East and West Pakistan. The principle of parity was widely criticized in East Pakistan. Khawaja Nazimuddin called it a 'national document with maximum consensus.' It was later learnt that only 16 out of original 29 members of the committee signed the report.

Unrest in the country owing to non-representative constitutional developments, gave the Governor General an excuse to dismiss Prime Minister Nazimuddin. Eventually, Muhammad Ali Bogra assumed the office of Prime Minister. Muhammad Ali Bogra, again a Bengali, was serving as an ambassador to the United States when summoned to lead the country as prime minister. On 7th October 1953, Muhammad Ali Bogra presented a constitutional formula, which he said was acceptable to all the provinces. According to this formula, central legislature was to have two houses, upper and lower. In the upper house, equal representation was given to each province and in the lower house, as per population suffrage, 165 seats were allocated for East Pakistan and the rest of 135 out of a total 300 were allocated for other federating units,[36] so that when both houses meet, both wings will get equal representation.[37]

Amid constitutional disarray, the unexpected election results of the Provincial Assembly in East Pakistan became a source of consternation for the leaders of the country. Jugtu Front (a united political front against the Muslim League in East Pakistan) defeated the Muslim League and became a game changer. Jugtu Front was not allowed to form government and once again, the constituent assembly was dissolved in October 1954.[38] The dissolution of assembly was not unexpected. Mazhar Aziz, in his book *Military Control in Pakistan, a Parallel State*, has mentioned a statement of the British High Commissioner about Iskander Mirza. His Excellency said that, "he (Mirza) told me (the High Commissioner) frankly that if election returns showed that a post elected government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements (he

[Mirza] did not define "undesirability' for this purpose….) he would himself intervene.[39]

After the dissolution of the assembly, the Governor General again reconstituted the cabinet under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Bogra. This new cabinet included the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan.[40] This development paved the way for the army's entrenchment in politics. Right from the beginning, 'vote' remained impotent in Pakistan. Hence government by people's representatives as envisaged by Jinnah remained a distant dream.

The politicians were losing ground and army establishment was taking hold of the political affairs of the country. This was happening when provinces were disgruntled. Awami League was aggressively vocal for the rightful share of East Pakistan within Pakistan. 'Saala Punjabi' was a word on street in East Pakistan. West Pakistan was attributed as a land dominated by Punjabies who were alleged to 'eat' the share of East Pakistanis.

On 15th October 1955, West Pakistan was made One Unit, one province, like East Pakistan, by integrating various federating units into one. Pakistan had now two provinces, West and East Pakistan. Notwithstanding the rightful share of East Pakistan, the first constitution was drafted under the prime minister-ship of Chaudhary Muhammad Ali. It was promulgated on 23rd March 1956. It abolished the office of the governor-general and provided for power-sharing arrangements between the president and the prime minister. It was democratic in nature, and the declaration of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah that "Pakistan would be a democratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice" was included in the preamble of the Constitution.[41]

To ensure equality, East Pakistan and West Pakistan were to have equal seats in the national legislature. While parliamentary and federal in form, the constitution ensured that the president retained supreme powers and the centre was more powerful than the provinces.[42] The first constitution was contrary to the aspirations of East Pakistanis. Introduction of parity in national legislature was like squeezing their mammoth existence, and equating to West Pakistan (all of which constituted 44 percent of the population in Pakistan).

Under the first constitution, the date for elections was set for March1958. In April 1957, East Pakistan passed a resolution calling for provincial autonomy, leaving currency, foreign affairs and defence in hands of the Central Government in Karachi. At that time, President Iskander Mirza had stated that regional autonomy, if granted, would mean complete dismemberment of Pakistan.[43]

This situation led to agitations across the country and eventually taking benefit from the political turmoil, Iskander Mirza, Pakistan's first president, abrogated the Constitution of 1956 and declared Martial Law. He made General Ayub Khan, his close confidant, the Chief Martial Law administrator. It is interesting to note that General Ayub's term as Commander-in-Chief was to end in 1954.[44]

Over centralization[1] under Ayub

Ayub Khan when assumed power declared by his actions that Pakistan was going to be a state with strong centre. As in 1954, he wrote that Pakistan must have a "solid, sound and cohesive nation."(45) "The East Pakistan tragedy can certainly be accounted as a blistering cost of over centralization."(46)

Successive leaders ignored the cultural diversity of Pakistan. Provincialism grew stronger when ethnic groups of Pakistan were not represented in the central government. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said that:

> What we want is not talk about Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Pathan and so on. They are of course units. But I ask you: have you forgotten the lesson that was taught us thirteen hundred years ago? You belong to a Nation now. You have carved out a territory, a vast territory. It is all yours: it does not belong to a Punjabi or a Sindhi or a Pathan or a Bengali. It is all yours. You have got your central government where several units are represented. Therefore, if you want to build yourself up into a nation, for God's sake give up this provincialism.

The Quaid did talk of "giving up provincialism" but before that he said: "you have central government where several units are represented."People's representation at the Centre was not a priority for leaders in Pakistan. Leaders in India, on the other hand, focused their energies on the establishment of a credible Election Commission, which was formed in 1950. Then, through "Peoples' Representation Act of 1951" it was ensured that every section of Indian society is represented in the central government.(47)

Other than installing a controlled political system, which was quite contrary to the aspirations of the people, the defence strategy of Pakistan was also faulty. In 1956, Ayub as the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan said: "the defence of East Pakistan does not lie in that part of the country. So long as the Western base in not strong, it remains indefensible."(48) Eventually, in the 1965 war with India, East Pakistan was left defenceless.

Brigadier (retd) Zahid is of the view that given the highly vulnerable position of East Pakistan, as it was surrounded by the 'enemy state,' the focus should have been on the security of East Pakistan.(49) Lieutenant General (retd) Majeed Malik explained the logic behind this limited security doctrine, saying that the Pakistani military strategy has always been India centric, and due to the proximity of major communication centres like Lahore and the railroad communication being generally close to the border, the entire military planning was focused on fighting a war on the plains of West Pakistan.(50) Some analysts believe that this negligence eventually became the last nail in the coffin of united Pakistan.

[1] Term used by Christophe Jaffrelot in *Nation without Nationalism*op.cit

En route to ethnic divisions

Ayub Khan promoted himself to the rank of a Field Marshal.[51] His disdain for the politicians and the 'coercive understanding' between him and Iskander Mirza owing to which he 'stepped down,' is well explained in Stanley Wolpert's work on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.[52] His self-centred political doctrine shifted an aspiring democracy to an autocratic system, where decision power rests in one man alone. Political parties were banned, the constitution of 1956 was abrogated, politicians were put behind the bars, and public leaders were 'disqualified' for holding any important office.[53] A strong central government was made, whose objectives were to ensure economic progress and a daunting defence in the country. Ayub wanted to consolidate the nation by attracting attention on the notion of 'Indian threat.'

It is imperative in a complex pluralistic society to have strong institutions that can guarantee people's representation in the government and ensure civil rights, regardless of any caste, creed or ethnicity. Otherwise people may attribute their alienation to the difference in their ethnic identity. Therefore, the absence of a representative government in Pakistan compelled ethnic communities such as Bengalis, Sindhis and Balochis to vehemently speak for their rights.

With the passage of time, exclusive preference for Punjabis in the central administrative structure gave rise to cryptic criticism of Punjabis from other ethnic groups of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, everyone who came from West Pakistan was attributed as 'Shala Punjabi'.[54] In the pre-partition period, British preferred to recruit Punjabis. They were considered reliable and non-nationalist recruits who could not bolster a perceived threat from Afghanistan.[55]

Interviews with various army officers, who served in East Pakistan, highlight the fact that West Pakistanis civil and military officers considered East Pakistan as a colony of Pakistan. Ayub Khan has written in *Friends not Masters* that Bengalis are aggressive owing to their prolonged suppression by the ruling elite.[56] Aggression often breeds in the lap of injustice. If one assumes that Bengalis were aggressive, owing to the 'nurture' they had, then they might have been given more importance by the State. Charles Dickens (*Great Expectation)* has rightly said that, "there is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt, as injustice."

From 1960s onwards, East Pakistan's struggle for provincial autonomy became more pronounced. Pakistan was unable to accommodate the centrifugal movement of East Pakistan as it was not democratic.[57] The East Pakistan movement was nothing but a sheer outcry of dissatisfaction from the Centre.

The 'Ayubocracy' – The 1962 Constitution

In 1959, Ayub launched the system of Basic Democracies. He proclaimed that, "it was basic in so far as the whole structure was to be built from the ground upwards."[58] In Ayub's opinion, "it was democratic in the sense that the affairs of the country were to be entrusted to the people within a constitutional framework."[59] Through this system, Ayub revived local

governments as the only representative tier of the government, much like the British colonialists.

The most controversial aspect of this system was its misuse by Ayub to legitimize his essentially presidential constitution of 1962. Habib Jalib convincingly expressed his dissatisfaction with the presidential constitution of 1962 in the following verses,

> *Aisay dastoor ko [This Constitution]*
> *subah e benoor ko [This Lightless Morning]*
> *main nahin manta [I do not accept]*
> *main nahin janta….[I do not recognize]* **(60)**

The constitution of 1962 gave unprecedented powers to the armed forces through the office of the President. In the 1962 Constitution, the newly installed 80,000 Basic Democrats were declared as the Electoral College for electing the president and national and provincial assemblies.**(61)** The Basic Democracies system had been designed to defend the Centre from challenges waged by the political parties at the provincial level.

Thus Ayub became Pakistan in his very being. He was the elected President by himself. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto later called these Basic Democracies as "Basic Fascism."**(62)** Interestingly, soon after the announcement of the 'Basic democracies' system, Ayub Khan propagated his 'democratic' idea by travelling in train throughout West Pakistan. He named his train 'Pak Jamhoriyat Special.'**(63)** Ayub called it 'a blending of democracy with discipline, the two pre-requisites to running a free society with stable government and sound administration.'**(64)** For him, the political system needed to be 'controlled'. He writes in *Friends not Masters*:

> It would be appropriate to reiterate the fact that our eventual aim must be to develop democracy in Pakistan, but the type that suits the genius of our people. Our people are mostly uneducated, and our politicians not so scrupulous. The people are capable of doing great things, but they can also be easily misled. Unfettered democracy can therefore prove dangerous especially nowadays when communism from within and without is so quick to make use of weaknesses. We therefore have to have a controlled democracy with checks and counter checks.**(65)**

Ishtiaq Ahmed in his book, *Pakistan: A Garrison State,* aptly refers to Laswell's observation that "the specialists on violence emphasize their role as custodians of national interest and a political system that sought to control people."**(66)** Ayub Khan appointed Monem Khanas the Governor of East Pakistan on 25th October 1962 (1962 to 1968). He "ruled East Pakistan with a ruthless hand, carrying out the grotesque undemocratic and autocratic plans and policies on behalf of Ayub Khan."**(67)** Monem Khan assumed the office of the Governor from Lt Gen Azam Khan. Ayub Khan felt threatened by Governor Azam Khan as he was highly respected in East Pakistan. "Don't go, Azam! Come back, Azam! … don't leave us like orphans; we had great hope in you", were the

words of people of East Pakistan on Azam Khan's farewell.[68] If only Azam Khan's tenure had been extended, East Pakistan could have been saved.

For an analysis of what exactly is a democratic system and how it protects the rights of citizens of a country, it is imperative to mention here the concept of 'embedded democracy' presented by Merkel Wolfgang in 2003. According to him:

The concept of embedded democracy follows the idea that stable constitutional democracies which are embedded in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/independence of the different partial regimes of a democracy secures its normative and functional existence (Figure) externally these partial regimes are embedded in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from outer as well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies.[69]

The concept of embedded democracy[70]



Source: Adapted from Merkel Wolfgang, *in Defective Democracies*, 2004

Democracy consists of five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives.[71]

The constitution of 1962 established 'Ayubocracy' in the country. Absence of fair elections right from 1947 to 1970 led to an era of non-representative decision-making in the country. In the words of Dr Safdar

Mehmood, President Ayub Khan was solely responsible for the country's administration.[72] The president was constitutionally all-powerful in the appointment and dismissal of ministers, governors and civil administration. Except for judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, all his appointees were directly answerable to him. Pakistan's budget was divided constitutionally between "Committed" and "New Expenditures". The President had 'unfettered' power over the Committed Expenditure. There was another 'Unexpected Expenditure' chargeable by the President on his discretion from the Central Consolidated Fund.[73]

As far as legislation was concerned, the National Assembly was empowered to legislate for the Central Subjects of Pakistan and matters falling under provincial jurisdiction. However, the President was authorized to issue ordinances by having the force of the Act of the Central Legislature.[74] The constitution of 1962 vested dictatorial powers in the president, who "virtually commanded the political system."[75] Ayub's philosophy of 'invincible me' for the country might be judged as "personal" expedition, rather than "societal."[76] Lawrence Ziring calls it a "great leader" syndrome that had permeated society and political life in Pakistan. "Great leaders were not above reproach, but they were great and they commanded obedience."[77] A presidential referendum was staged on 14th February 1960, in which the Basic Democrats were asked to either mark 'Yes' or 'No' on the ballot paper. Not surprisingly, Ayub Khan was 'elected' as the first President of Pakistan with 95.6 percent votes.[78]

The first test of Ayub's system was a presidential election of January 1965. Disgruntled political forces (Council Muslim League being the strongest in Punjab and Karachi; the Awami League strongest in East Pakistan; the National Awami Party strongest in North-West Frontier Province, standing for the dissolution of One Unit Province, and the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami) joined hands against Ayub's dictatorial system. They nominated Fatima Jinnah as their presidential candidate, who was the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and enjoyed deep respect from all quarters of life. She was referred to as "Madr-e-Millat" (Mother of the Nation).

It seemed as if Ms. Fatima Jinnah was representing the entire Pakistan, since she enjoyed support from almost all political forces, even from within East Pakistan. Ironically, Ayub Khan defeated Madr-e-Millat by 63.3 per cent votes.[79] The 80,000 Basic Democrats who were supposed to elect the President for the 'entire' country were easily manipulated.[80] Had the elections been direct, Ms Fatima Jinnah could have won.[81] There was some outcry of rigging as the entire state machinery was run by Ayub's confidants; nonetheless, and albeit timidly, the election results were accepted.

Contrary to what Jinnah envisaged, autocracy was deeply entrenched in Pakistan's polity. The executive branch, the provincial authorities, the legislature and the department of defence were all under the president. There was no democratic electoral system; political rights to participate in the political process were constitutionally withheld; civil rights were restricted and agitation was the only way left for the people to voice their grievances. One man's acumen could not deal with the complicated issues brewing within Pakistan. The

language controversy, which indicated a crevice in the unity of the country, remained unattended. East Pakistan was left in oblivion.

East-west disparity

> *The story of Pakistan is the story of ambitious and adventurist generals denying the people their rights.*[82]
>
> — Former Air Martial, Muhammad Asghar Khan, 1983

It might not be wrong to say that Ayub Khan was neglectful of the development of East Pakistan. Some 2.5 billion dollars earned from export of jute and jute related goods produced in East Pakistan were transferred to West Pakistan. In total, East Pakistan's exports constituted 60 to 70 per cent of the State's revenue, and it received just 25-30 per cent of the country's income.[83] In addition, nearly two-thirds of the US aid was disbursed in West Pakistan.[84] Most of the industrial capitalists from India, who had migrated to Pakistan, were settled in Karachi (West Pakistan).[85] Therefore, Ayub administration's main focus on industrial development was of little or no significance for the highly agrarian society of East Pakistan.

President Ayub, who already had absolute power, also became the chairman of the National Planning Commission. Ironically, he abolished East Pakistan's Planning Board which previously planned for development in East Pakistan.[86] In the period between 1956 and1961, in semi-public institutions like the Industrial Development Bank, the share of East Pakistan was just 20 percent; for House Building Finance Corporation, it was only 12 percent of the total; and for Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation, it was 24 per cent.[87] At the time of Ayub Khan, there was a gap of 30 per cent in the per capita income of East and West Pakistan. By the end of the second five year plan (1965), the disparity of per capita income had risen to 45 percent which eventually rose to 61 percent by the end of Ayub's term.[88]

The Gross Provincial Product of the two wings also showed aggravating disparity. In 1949-50, it was 1237.4 crore rupees for East Pakistan and 1209.1 for West Pakistan. However, in the later years, by 1963-64, it grew to Rs1867.1 crore for East Pakistan while Rs.2009 crore for West Pakistan. It meant that the Gross Provincial Product, which was higher in East Pakistan in the early years than that in West Pakistan, eventually grew in West Pakistan and slumped in East Pakistan in the later years (see table 3).

Table3

Per Capita Income for East and West Pakistan

West Pakistan (Rs)		East Pakistan (Rs)
1949-50	342	293
1954-55	354	290
1959-60	366	278
1963-64	403	313
1964-65	443	301
1965-66	459	303
1966-67	461	315
1967-68	494	320
1968-69	514	325
1969-70	546	321

Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, 1969-70. *Performance Statistics of West Pakistan*, April 1969, Government of West Pakistan.[89]

Table 4

Gross Provincial Product
(at 1959-60 factor cost, in crores of rupees)

	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
YEAR	1949-50		1954-55		1959-60		1963-64	
Gross Provincial Product (Rs Crs)	1237.4	1209.1	138.6	1010.6	1497.2	1646.7	1867.1	2009.0

Source: Khan and Bergan: "Measurement of Structural Change in the Pakistan Economy: A Review of National Income Estimates", *Pakistan Development Review*, 1966

Even in West Pakistan, it was a generally accepted impression that most of the reward of rapid growth was consumed by a narrow economic elite, which constituted 22 families in Pakistan. This feeling of relative deprivation resulted in a mass political movement that demanded peoples' participation in the political and economic life of the country."This sentiment was exploited by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who launched a new political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), promising to bring "Islamic socialism" to the country."[90]

Talking about education, an important indicator of development in a country, the total expenditure on education in united Pakistan increased from less than 1% of GDP in 1947 to 1.2% in 1958 to 2.6% by 1964.[91] However, school infrastructure in East Pakistan sharply declined. For every one thousand school-aged children, there was less than one school in West Pakistan in 1947 compared to three primary schools in East Pakistan.[92] In the first decade after independence, primary schools in West Pakistan increased from 8,357 in 1948 to 16,474 in 1958. School availability in West Pakistan doubled in the primary education sector.[93]

Table 5

Primary education- secondary education in East and West Pakistan number of schools

	Primary Education		Secondary Education	
	East	West	East	West
1948	29,633	8,413	3,481	2,598
1955	26,000	14,162	3,079	2,264
1960	26,583	17,901	3,053	3,043
1965	27,474	32,589	3,834	4323
1970	28,908	38,900	5694	5600

Source: Mohammad Niaz Asadullah, "Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947–71: was East Pakistan Discriminated Against?"Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, *University of Oxford, Number 63, July 2006.*

The table shows inter-regional differences in growth and in the number of schools, which in turn created disparity in school size. Schools in East and West Pakistan were almost of the same size in 1948. However, soon and particularly after the 1950s, the figures began to diverge.

A rapid increase in population (see table 6) in East Pakistan gave rise to rampant poverty (see table on per capita income). This regressive development was not significantly addressed by the central government.

Table 6

Population growth rate in East and West Pakistan, 1950–75

Period	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1950-1955	1.97	1.96
1955-1960	2.25	2.18
1960-1965	2.51	2.32
1965-1970	2.56	2.44
1970-1975	2.57	2.55

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision* and *World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2001 Revision*, http://esa.un.org/unpp

Living conditions in East Pakistan were deplorable. Earlier in the Ayub era, East-West Exchange Programme was introduced in the Civil Service of Pakistan. It was overwhelmingly welcomed by the East Pakistanis, but West Pakistanis did not want to be posted to the 'distant' and underdeveloped wing. Eventually, it was abandoned under pressure from influential bureaucrats in West Pakistan. However, it was again revived in the last years of the Ayub era.[(94)]

Notwithstanding the worsening condition in East Pakistan, the government under Ayub focused all its resources on Defence. In those eleven years, Pakistan allocated 60.69 per cent of its budget for Defence.[(95)] If in today's Pakistan, Punjab gets a lion's share from funds allocated to provinces

owing to its large population, then why was East Pakistan, being the most populous province of the country, deprived of its rightful share?

Towards the end of 'United Pakistan'

War of 1965 to the Six points of Mujib

The war of 1965 blatantly exposed the sheer neglect of East Pakistan by the central government. East Pakistan was left defence-less during the war. It further fuelled their feelings of hatred for West Pakistanis. A Bengali jurist Kamal Housain says that during the war of 1965, the eastern wing had experienced a "sense of isolation; it felt exposed and undefended."[96] East Pakistan had no security arrangement, when India decided to move its armies in the 1965 war.[97]

Within the system, East Pakistanis ostensibly failed to secure their rights of economic and social betterment. The Awami League tried to support a political change by backing Ms. Fatima Jinnah as a presidential candidate, but it was of no avail under the prevalent 'Ayubocracy' in the country. From 1966 onwards, utter dissatisfaction against the central government grew and resulted in a powerful demand for parliamentary democracy and direct elections. Politicians like Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, Mian Mumtaz Doultana and Nawabzadda Nasrullah Khan tried to persuade Sheikh Mujib to join them in their struggle against Ayub, but he preferred to speak 'alone' for provincial autonomy.[98]

Tajuddin Ahmed, the then General Secretary of Awami League, formulated the demand for greater autonomy of East Pakistan. Finally after consultations amongst Manik Mian (Touffal Hossain), Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed, the recommendations for greater autonomy were grouped in a composite 'Six Point Programme.'[99] The English version of the six points were drafted by a Bengali civil servant Rahul Quddus, who was later accused in the Agartala conspiracy case.[100]

The six points called for making Pakistan a federation with a parliamentary system, with supremacy of the Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. The Central government was to maintain Defence and Foreign Affairs, where all other matters would be dealt in federating units. Both wings would have two separate currencies easily convertible in each wing. The formula also called for independence in foreign exchange earnings and capital management of fiscal affairs by each wing, provided the requirements of central government are fulfilled through a mutually accepted procedure. The last point called for maintaining a separate paramilitary force for East Pakistan.[101]

If the points are analyzed with an open mind, they were aimed at humanizing the living conditions in East Pakistan. They were centred on the management of financial resources — a demand that East Pakistan should also get an ample share of its own earnings. Other than that, a provision for maintaining a separate paramilitary force was levelled. It was an even-handed demand as East Pakistan was left defenceless in 1965. The six points did not

mention a separate Supreme Court for East Pakistan, an important pillar of parliamentary democracy, and thus it could have been a federation of Pakistan. In fact, six points, except for the demand of a paramilitary force, were concurrent with the interview given by the Quaid to the *Associated Press of America*.[2]

According to Ayesha Jalal: "the Awami League's six points program was a firecracker in the tinderbox of disillusionments in Ayub's Pakistan."[(102)] The central government and opposition parties perceived the 'six points' as a 'secessionist agenda'. Mulana Bhashni, leader of the National Awami Party, believed that six points would eventually disintegrate the country. He suspected an imperialist intrigue behind the six-point programme.[(103)] He inferred Indian involvement in the so-called conspiracy by indicating the involvement of 'allies' of imperials in the drafting of the six-points programme.[(104)]

In January 1968, a number of Awami League leaders and East Pakistan officials were arrested allegedly for conspiring with India for bringing about secession in the western wing of Pakistan.[(105)] It was known as the Agartala Conspiracy case. The Ayub regime arrested 28 people including a naval officer, three senior civil servants and a number of junior military personnel. The official statement issued by the government alleged that the persons engaged in the conspiracy met PN Ojha (First secretary of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka) and visited Agartala in India to discuss plans with two Indian officers.[(106)] However, R K Yadev, an officer of Research and Analysis Wing of Indian Secret Service (RAW), has indicated in his book, *Mission R&AW*, that Mujib was not an Indian agent but some of the people around him were in contact with the Indian intelligence agency.[(107)]

Sheikh Mujib and some 34 people were tried under the "Defence of Pakistan Rules" Act. Mukarram Hussain, a Bengali academician, said that for East Pakistanis it was another attempt to humiliate the Bengalis by West Pakistanis, as they were "tired" of hearing about the influence of India and Indian culture on the population of East Pakistan.[(108)] He further says that any criticism against the government's policies was attributed as an unwarranted influence of 'infiltrating' Indian agents.[(109)] In Autumn 1969, however, Mujib declared that the six points were not the words of Quran and 'thereby not immutable.'[(110)]

By the end of 1969, the whole country was witnessing relentless resentment against the dictatorship of the Ayub regime. Both wings were on fire. The political cauldron was in the making. President Ayub was still adamant to keep the political parties at bay. Major General Khadim Hussain writes in A *Stranger in My Own Country* that in October 1968, during a meeting with the President, when he asked General Ayub a question about negotiating with political parties in opposition, the president retorted, "Which buffoon do I talk to."[(111)]

In January 1969, the Central Students Action Council was formed. It immediately launched a country-wide agitation for the withdrawal of the

[2] Please refer to reference no 8.

Agartala case.[112] They drafted 11 points on the basis of six points, which also included demands for the emancipation of their leaders. This 11-point movement became popular and asserted enough pressure on the Ayub regime.[113] On the other hand, a mass level agitation started in West Pakistan, by various political parties, most notably by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party.[114] In March 1969, hundreds of students and PPP supporters launched an impressive agitation, bringing the whole province to a halt. Many leaders were arrested and imprisoned in East and West Pakistan.[115] Bhutto lashed out by calling the system 'half democratic, half dictatorial, half a war with India, half a friendship with China and resisting America by half."[116]

Ayub Khan, weakened by his deteriorating health as well, was finally 'requested' to step down. Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad Yahya Khan assumed power of the State. When Yahya became Commander-in-Chief in September 1966, he was 52 years old. He jumped over several officers senior to him. He was more than an occasional drinker and was "accused of womanizing."[117] It is presumed that General Peerzada, the principle secretary of President Yahya, was the real decision maker, as General Yahya was just, occasionally sober.

Another attempt to tighten the noose — Yahya Khan's martial law

Yahya Khan assumed power and proclaimed that he had no political ambitions other than "the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government."[118] Air Martial Asghar Khan, who personally knew Yahya Khan condemned Yahya's proclamation of martial law by calling it a betrayal of democracy. He further said that General Yahya was, in fact, a 'highly ambitious person.'[119]

Yahya Khan restored West Pakistan into the original four provinces and abolished the electoral system and called for direct elections on the basis of 'one person-one vote'. A ban was imposed on all political activities and many leaders were imprisoned. However, in January 1970, the ban was lifted. On 28thMarch, Yahya Khan accepted representation in the National Assembly on the basis of population, giving East Pakistan 169 seats out of 313. He also conceded the federal form of government with maximum provincial autonomy. Yahya Khan provisioned that the National Assembly would prepare the constitution within 120 days of its first meeting.[120]

By the end of Ayub era, before the announcement of elections, the situation in East Pakistan became extremely volatile. Soldiers of Pakistan army were attacked by an angry mob of Bengalis. Therefore, army personnel were instructed to move in groups along with their weapons.[121] Sadly, aggrieved Bengalis attacked Biharis, in order to punish them for being sympathetic to the West Pakistanis (the so-called colonial power). The anger against West Pakistan was at its peak before the elections. In October 1970, Pakistan was to experience its first direct elections. However, the elections were delayed; the coastal areas of East Pakistan had been struck by a cyclone.

The 1970 cyclone: Another Moment of Neglect

In November 1970, East Pakistan was hit by a disastrous cyclone. Some 500,000 people living in the swaths of the coastal areas of East Pakistan were estimated to have died.[122] It was a grave national calamity. Ironically, the central government tardily and ineptly handled the victims in East Pakistan. The help from central government reached after 10 days of the disaster. People were hungry and homeless; many were struggling to survive by eating leaves.

It is important to note that the communication system between the two wings was also inefficient at that time. When the question about delay in sending aid to East Pakistan is asked to army officers of that time, they retort by saying that disaster was not that deadly and casualties were exaggerated for seeking sympathy. It is quite possible that the West Pakistani establishment might have remained unaware of the actual situation of the post-cyclone East Pakistan.

International response to the tragedy was overwhelming. India, US and other countries sent volunteers as well as items of daily usage for the East Pakistanis.[123] Some of the foreign aid that was shipped to Karachi never reached East Pakistan.[124]Yahya Khan half heartedly ordered the military to establish relief camps in the cyclone-hit areas. Shahid Hussain, a civil servant appointed to distribute aid in Bhola island of East Pakistan, is of the view that many soldiers from Pakistan army refused to handle Bengali dead bodies. The culmination of these adverse sentiments in Bengalis resulted in a revolting public verdict. Awami League won a land-sliding victory in the first direct national elections of December 1970.

December 1970 Elections — Poles apart

The first ever direct elections in Pakistan were held in December 1970. In sharp contrast, the first direct elections in India were held in 1951-52. In East Pakistan, the leading political party was Awami League. In the four provinces of West Pakistan, the leading party was the Pakistan People's Party. Other parties like the National Awami Party (led by Molana Bhashani), the Pakistan Democratic Party, the three factions of the Muslim League (Council, Convention and Qayyum), Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan also contested the elections.

None of the political parties were represented at the national level. Both popular parties (the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party) employed province -level politics. Owing to the autocratic system, there was a complete political vacuum at the Centre. The election results were a revolting outcry against the centralized system. Out of 300 general seats, 162 were allocated to East Pakistan. The Awami League won the majority seats (160) in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, out of 138 allocated seats, 81 seats were won by the People's Party.[125] The turnout in the entire country had been 59.8 per cent. The turnout in East Pakistan was 56.9 percent.[126] However, Sharmilla Bose in her book, *Dead Reckoning*, says that as only 56 electorate in East Pakistan voted, it meant that 42 per cent voter voted for Awami League.[127]

Yahya Khan was not prepared for such results; he was briefed by 'secret agencies' that due to differences amongst the political parties, there would be a 'hung' parliament.[128] He thought that he would easily rule the country, given the weak position of the political setup. Major General Raja Khadim Hussain in his book also acknowledges the meddling of secret agencies in political affairs.[129] Lured by the faulty reports of secret agencies, the Yahya administration was a bit loose on setting the stage for first direct elections.

Pakistan at that time was nothing but an embedded autocracy, where every move of the political actors, journalists, media persons was ruthlessly under the sceptical eye of the secret agencies. Crime, in those days, was construed as anything that spoke against the army and 'their' government.

Elections 1970: Were they rigged?

In the general perception, the elections of 1970 are considered as free and fair. Interestingly, the personal account of Raja Khadim Hussain, who was Deputy Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan, revealed that the Awami League had its "hooligan elements" as an effective weapon against the political opponents. They were successful in intimidating Muslim League leaders like Nurul Amin, Abdus Sabur Khan, Fazlul Qader Chaudhry and Maulvi Farid Ahmed.[130] Whenever they organized public meetings, the miscreants of the Awami League disrupted the meetings.

Brig (retd) Bashir Ahmed, who was serving as a Lieutenant Colonel in the 14 Division under Major General Khadim Hussain, seconds the information regarding the 'militant wing' of the Awami League.[131] He is also of the view that elite in East Pakistan was in favour of Awami League.[132] On the contrary, it is also reported that the martial law officers of the Eastern command were asked to weaken the Awami League's support. Lt Col SD Ahmed, a martial law officer, confided to Brigadier A R Sadiq that, 'he had Rs.5 million to play with' before the elections of 1970.[133]

It is also evident that owing to a huge wave of support for the Awami League, none of the tactics of control by the embedded autocratic system could work. The unexpected results of elections perturbed the Yahya administration. Therefore, in January-February 1971, Operation Blitz was conceived. The main aim of the operation was to postpone the convening of the National Assembly, to ensure the reversion of martial rule and impose a ban on all political activity. Bhutto proposed in February that there can be two solutions to the crises: the postponement of the National Assembly session or the removal of the 120-day limit to draft constitution.[134] Ironically, US Ambassador Farland informed Washington on 28th February 1971 about his detailed meeting with Mujib in which Mujib proposed a Confederation between East and West Pakistan.[135] The rulers in Pakistan, however, did not pay heed to the proposed solutions in an attempt to avert the impending crisis.

The National Assembly was to be summoned on 3rd March 1971. Yahya announced on 1st March that following the disagreement of the two main parties, i.e. the Awami League and People's Party, the National Assembly session was being postponed for an indefinite period. Governor Ahsan of East

Pakistan suggested to Yahya Khan that the postponement of the National Assembly session would be devastating; in response, he was ousted from the post.[136] Lt General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the commander of the Eastern Command at that time, was wary of using force against the citizens of Pakistan; he was also replaced by General Tikka Khan, the hardliner. Bhutto, the charismatic one, who was alleged to have implicit support of the military establishment, announced that he would not attend the National Assembly session.[137]

The end result of 'embedded autocracy' — A political rupture

Antagonized by the inflexible and strict attitudes of the military government and adamant stance of Bhutto, Mujibur Rehman called for a Non Cooperation Movement (1st March-25th March) in East Pakistan. He proclaimed six points as the 'property of people' and non-negotiable. Bangabandhu announced a three-pronged agenda: A total strike on 2nd March 1971, a countrywide strike on 3rd March and a public meeting on 7th March 1971.[138] On 3rd March 1971, a mammoth gathering of people responded to Sheikh Mujib's call. Sadly, army personnel opened fire on the procession, killing 7 and injuring 29 people.[139] This opening of fire by the 'occupation forces of West Pakistan' added fuel to the already aggravated situation in East Pakistan.

Administratively, all organs of the state machinery in East Pakistan reported to Sheikh Mujib's General Headquarters for instructions. Amidst quasi-military action, against the rightful demands of East Pakistanis, a series of negotiations started between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto. Mujibur Rehman was wary of the military administration, he proposed to Bhutto that he can have West Pakistan, while East Pakistan should be handed over to him.[140]

By 25th March 1971, a settlement was reached between the two, over the issues of foreign exchange and economic policies.[141] There was some disagreement about the name that whether it shall be 'Confederation of Pakistan' or 'Union' of Pakistan, but it was left for the final round of discussions between General Yahya and Sheikh Mujib.[142] Before the discussions could continue, and become conclusive, preparations for 'Operation Searchlight' were underway.

Operation Searchlight, drafted by Major General Rao Farman Ali and Major General Khadim Hussain, was revealed to General Hamid and General Tikka Khan on 20th March. Kamal Hussain, who was part of negotiating team from the Awami League, writes in his book *Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice* that on 23rd March, President Yahya Khan was supposed to attend the discussion held between Awami League and People's Party, but instead he attended the 'Generals meeting'.[143] It simply showed that the military establishment was not serious in negotiations. Even before the elections in December 1970, a general told his fellow officers that "we will not allow those black bastards to rule over us".[144] How could negotiations have worked in such a context? The military of any country is trained to launch operations alone, and not expected to steer the country out of political crises. In the *Dictionary of Social Sciences*, the word politician is defined as:

> The term politician is most commonly used to refer to a person actively engaged in the struggle for governmental power and/or office, whose success largely depends upon the favour of others and who, to achieve success must therefore be skilled in the arts of persuasion, negotiation and compromise.[145]

The above definition clearly illustrates that it is the politician who negotiates and reaches a compromise; his power lies in his being good with the people. On the contrary, a soldier can only use tactics of fear and intimidation in order to 'resolve' any issue. India, which is far more complexly heterogeneous than Pakistan, cautiously kept its military out of politics. Indian leaders knew that only democracy can keep them united.

Stephen Cohen notes that Indian military plays no role at all in the decision-making process of India. Careful observation of the Pakistan military and US military linkages made Indian leaders more cautious. It is an established norm in India that contacts of Indian armed forces with other countries are 'strictly controlled'. In the Pakistan of 1971, those who were incapable of making a political breakthrough were the decision makers for the entire nation. Therefore, not surprisingly, on the night of 25th March 1971, the Pakistani army launched an operation against its own people, those whom they had once vowed to protect.

Operation Searchlight — when defenders became killers

The product of an autocratic regime, an incompetent Army Chief, Yahya Khan, plunged the country into an intra-state war. Hassan Abbas has rightly said that, "Yahya's disrepute was Ayub's insurance against a grab for power."[146] Military operation against one's own people was a difficult task. Therefore, various Pakistan army soldiers were 'briefed' by their officers that they were dealing with the non-Muslims.[147] The story of fierce fighting against your own people is sad and painful, and calls for repentance.

A bloody fight went on from 25th March 1971 to 16th December 1971.The debate on 'how many were killed' is a callous approach to the biggest human tragedy in the history of Pakistan. Unjust killing of one human is the killing of entire humanity. It is interesting to note that even in November 1971, Mujib through a US Counsel, offered to negotiate with the military establishment.

In November 1971, India jumped into Pakistan's 'internal matter'. Of course the 'chance' to do so, was provided by Pakistan. It is evident that India started its malicious campaign against Pakistan from 1968 onwards when political turmoil in Pakistan was at its highest peak. Mujibnagar, a headquarters for the dissemination of information on the part of the Awami League was established in India. India played the role of a midwife in the creation of Bangladesh.[148] Mukti Bahini received all its training and weapon procurement from India.[149]

India is accused for intervening in Pakistan's 'internal' affairs, but one might ask, were the Pakistani decision makers capable of resolving the issue? When Pakistan was on the verge of collapse, before General Niazi laid down his

weapons, he smuggled betel leaves to his son Habib Ullah in the Western wing on an official aircraft.[150] Brig Bashir (retd) is of the view that General Niazi was not capable of being promoted to rank of a colonel.[151]

Pakistan was dismembered; for many, it was nothing short of amputating one's own arm, but for many of the Generals it was a failed military mission. Even now, rather than debating why this tragedy happened, many discussions are focused on strategic and plan failures in the 'war' of 1971. Embedded autocracy in the heterogeneous society of Pakistan led to this self-amputation. The pain of this tragedy will continue to be felt through the coming generations of Pakistan.

The blame game often highlights Bhutto and Mujib as being responsible for failure in the talks. But it was not an individual, but a systemic failure. Charismatic personalities emerged out of this systemic shortfall. Bhutto and Mujib only voiced the grievances of people emboldened by a non-representative system in Pakistan.

Concluding reflections

On 16th December 1971, when the ruler of Pakistan, General Muhammad Yahya Khan was having a party at his Peshawar residence, Pakistan got dismembered.[152] East Pakistan became Bangladesh. It was a moment of amputation for the nation, but there was no one at the helm of power with whom the people could share the pain. Bhutto alluded in West Pakistan, after the Pakistani army's suppression of East Pakistanis, "Thank God, Pakistan has been saved."[153]

It was certainly not saving. It was nothing short of leaving the people of the country defenceless against the army of that very country. On the eve of 25th March 1971, Operation Searchlight was launched in East Pakistan. Eventually, the dark and merciless night of violence fell upon the eastern province of Pakistan. The Pakistani army opened fire against their fellow citizens, many Bengali women were sexually assaulted and Bengalis in revenge brutally killed many soldiers of the 'occupation forces,' as well as Biharis for allegedly being sympathetic to West Pakistan. Ten million East Pakistanis fled to India.[154] Some analysts believe that the use of force by the State against its own people, who were just demanding their constitutional right, could have been avoided. The East Pakistan tragedy is and will continue to be a tormenting question in academic debates.

However, considering the above discussion, it can be said that Pakistan is bound to dysfunction under the military rule; scathing consequences can occur if it is ever-indulged in autocracy. For maintaining the integrity and solidarity of the 'remaining' country, democratic institutions need to be strengthened, and any misadventure by the military might be strictly opposed. The tragedy of East Pakistan is the result of a systemic failure. Each step taken under the autocratic regime of Ayub led to the secessionist outfall. Some analysts believe that East Pakistan was destined to secede given the geographical distance of a thousand miles. However, it might be argued that if it was to secede, then it could have been a graceful separation. But a political solution could only have been

possible if politicians were the decision makers. Alas, this wasn't the case in the Pakistan of 1971.

The presence of a charismatic leader in dissatisfied East Pakistan resulted in the making of a centrifugal movement. If in the heterogeneous society of Pakistan, the government remains unrepresentative and the provinces are not given their rights, more episodes of secession might occur. All a dissatisfied province needs is a charismatic leader. Dissatisfaction renders solidarity among the deprived and hence, an agitation starts under a leader of the oppressed. It is therefore necessary for a country to concentrate its energies on strengthening the institutions that may fairly address the grievances of the people, without any discrimination.

In the autocratic regime of President Ayub, civil liberties were under strict control, political activity was discouraged, the electoral process was nothing but a sham, and accountability of the powerful military or civil bureaucracy was out of question. The Ayub regime exercised maximum power to govern; though he might have been a nationalist and urged betterment for the country, yet his insistence for strict conformity in the form of centralization led the country to anarchy.

Economic development under President Ayub benefited a few. In his last decade, both the wings — East and West — exalted their extreme disapproval for the economic policies in the country. Poor in East Pakistan became poorer day by day. Bhutto's slogan for 'Roti, Kapra aur Makan' attracted huge crowds in West Pakistan.

In the 1970 elections, the political cauldron revealed itself in the form of contrasting voter aspirations from both wings. The situation was perplexing and needed keen analysis and understanding on part of the authorities to avoid bloodshed. Unfortunately, those who could do that were restricted to the provinces and the Central authority was in the hands of 'soldiers' who were 'trained' to fight. And they fought.

On the merciless night of 25th March 1971, when all the preparation for battle were complete, the military operation was launched. Turning back on all previous efforts on negotiations, a civil war erupted in Pakistan. Defenders became killers and citizens took up arms against their defenders. It is indeed an unforgettable tragedy.

In light of this discussion, one might argue that Pakistan's salvation lies in democracy. In the case of Pakistan, it is quite appropriate to say that even the worst kind of democracy is better than best kind of dictatorship. During dictatorial regimes, Pakistan faced full-scale wars (1965 and 1971) against India, it got dismembered and it got involved in today's war against terrorism.

In Pakistan, every experiment with autocracy (1958, 1970, 1977 and 1999) ended with mass level protest. Therefore, justification of a military coup on the basis of 'threat to national integrity' is retroactively faulty. The secret for national solidarity lies in the doctrine of welfare of the people, and it can only be achieved if democracy effectively functions, public institutions are strengthened and the rights of people are protected. Without changing the plight of the people, national cohesion can never be achieved.

Appendix

THE TEXT OF THE SIX-POINT FORMULA AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED IN THE AWAMI LEAGUE'S MANIFESTO

Point No. 1

Original

The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of the Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.

Amended

The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which election to the federal legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.

Point No.2

Original

Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.

Amended

The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign affairs and, subject to the conditions provided in (3) below, currency.

Point No. 3

Original

A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or B. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West. The Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.

Amended

There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional federal reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another.

Point No. 4

Original

The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the Federal Center will have no such bower. The Federation will have share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.

Amended

Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided and on the basis of ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the Constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that the federal government's revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the governments of the federating units.

Point No. 5

Original

(1) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, (2) earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government, (3) foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed, (4) indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings, (5) the Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and

commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with, foreign countries.

Amended

Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of the federating units. The foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the governments of the federating units on the basis of a ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution. The Regional governments shall have power under the Constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility of the federal government.

Point No. 6

Original

The setting up of a militia or a paramilitary force for East Pakistan.

Amended

The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or Paramilitary force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.

Notes and References

1. See for instance, Raja Khadim Hussain, *A Stranger in one's Own Country*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), Kamal Hossain, *Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), Kamal Matinuddin, *Tragedy of Errors, East Pakistan Crisis*, (Lahore: Majid Ali Pvt Limited, 1994) etc.
2. Sharmilla Bose, *Dead Reckoning, Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (*London: Hurst c & co Publishers Ltd, 2011).
3. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy, (*Lahore: Agha Amir Hussain Publisher).
4. M. Bhaskaran Nair, *Politics in Bangladesh: A Study of Awami League*, 1949-58 (New Delhi: Northern Books, 1990),p.36.
5. Abida Shakoor, *Congress-Muslim League Tussle: 1937-40; a Critical Analysis* (New Delhi: Aakar Books, 2003) p.175-176.
6. "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. … We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one state."—Quaid-e-Azam's address to the Constituent Assembly.
7. Taj M Khattak, "Ghosts of December", *The News*, 6 December, 2014.

   Vice Admiral Taj M Khattak has described the ideological confusion prevalent in Pakistan in the following words:

   "The West Pakistani's notion of Pakistan was inseparable from the Muslim nation of the Subcontinent, a nation locked in combat with Hindus. For them safeguarding the Indian Islamic heritage, exemplified by Allama Iqbal's poetry, in which Urdu played a major role, was what Pakistan meant above all. On the other hand, for the East Pakistani, Pakistan was primarily a place where Muslims would rule and be secure from Hindu domination. Their view of their Bengali identity and language [were also] exemplified by nationalistic poetry of Rabindranath Tagore, would contribute to the Pakistan they believed in, which differed significantly from the perception of their West Pakistani compatriots."
8. C. Christian Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) p.1
9. R. Mukerjee, "The Social Background of Bangladesh', in Kathleen Gough and Hari P Sharma (ed.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp.403-04.
10. Rabindranath Trivedi, "How Hindus Became 'Minority' in East Bengal turned Bangladesh? *Asian Tribune*, 2014-09-05.
11. Kamal, "*Bangladesh: Quest…,"*ref. 1, p.3.
12. Cited in Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, (London: Hurst, 1999), p.90.
13. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: An Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press),p.109.
14. Chapter by Akbar S Ahmed, p.141 in Victoria Schofield, (eds) *Old Roads New Highways, Fifty Years of Pakistan*, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997).
15. Koshick Roy, *The Army in British India from Colonial Warfare to Total War 1957-1947*, (London: Bloomsburry Academy).p.78.
16. George Fremont Barnes, *The Indian Mutiny 1857-58,*(New York: Ospery Publishing), p.90.
17. Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose, *War and Secession Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh*, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), p.10.
18. CJ, *Nationalism without a Nation*, p.19.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

21. Bengali language in Encyclopaedia Britannica and see Laal Waaz, *History of Urdu Language* (Delhi: Mujtabai Press, 1920).
22. For detailed study on language movement see, Mehboob Hussain, "Students as Pressure Groups in Pakistan Politics*", Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol XXXIII, No 2, (2011), pp. 167-171.
23. Constituent Assembly Debates, 24th February 1948, pp.6-7, Cited *in* Sucheta Ghosh, *Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh* (Calcutta: Minevra Associates Pvt Ltd, 1983), p.14.
24. Rafique Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1947-48), (Lahore Research Society of Pakistan, 1980), pp.85-86.
25. Cited in "Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-1948" Millennium edition, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.150 and 158.
26. CIA Fact files.
27. Clarence Maloney, *Language and Civilization Change in South Asia*, (eds) (Netherlands: Brill Leiden, 1978), p.147.
28. Hamida Khuhro*The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969*, by Lawrence Ziring *Modern Asian Studies*, Book Review, Volume 6, Issue 02, March 1972, pp.248-255.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Hasan Zaheer, *The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951 — The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.210- 215.
32. Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Garrison State*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press), p.100.
33. He was a founding member of All India Communist Party and later in 1949, Communist Party of Pakistan.
34. One of Khan's confidants, Ali, who was a police officer, reported the whole plan to the IG Police who, through the Governor of NWFP, brought the plan to the knowledge of the Prime Minister. The case began in the court. According to the law, the conspiracy could only be established if there was an agreement on the plan. Since, no agreement was reached, therefore, it was not dealt as conspiracy. After months of trial, finally, the court declared its judgment. The civilians and the junior army officers were sentenced for four years in jail and Major General Akbar Khan for 14 years. Estelle Dryland, "Faiz Ahmed Faiz and the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case" *Journal of South Asian Literature*, Vol. 27, No. 2, Perspectives on Socialist Realism in Asian Literature (Summer, Fall 1992), pp.175-185.
35. Ibid.
36. Safdar Mehmood *Pakistan, Political Roots and Developments*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.43.
37. 165+10= 175, 135+40=175
38. Ishtiaq, *"Pakistan: The Garrison State",* ref.32, p.107.
39. Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan, The Parallel State*(Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2008) p.66.
40. Safdar, *"Pakistan, Political Roots …,"* ref.36, p.49.
41. Ibid.,p.42.
42. Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's Constitution", *Council of Foreign Relations,* Archives, 21 April 2010.
43. *Manchester Guardian*, 4 April 1957. Cited in Iain Cochrane's *The Causes of the Bangladesh War 2009*, Chapter Two, Economic Disparity, Published by lulu publishers.
44. Ishtiaq, *"Pakistan The Garrison State",* ref.32, p.107.
45. Sucheta Ghosh, *Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates Pvt Ltd, 1983) p.21.
46. Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), "*Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State"*, in *Pakistan : Nationalism without a Nation,* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002) p.18.

47. See for details, ML Ahuja, *Handbook of General Elections and Electoral Reforms in India,* 1952-1999,(New Delhi: Mital Publications, 2000).
48. *The Dawn*, 18 January 1956.
49. Interview Brigadier (retd) Zahid. (He was a Captain posted at Comilla, Chittagong in 1970-71), 5 November 2014.
50. Cited in Feroz Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (California: Stanford University Press,2012), p.72.
51. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, p.35.
52. Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, p.58.
53. Kamal, "*Bangladesh: Quest…,",* ref.1, p. 11.
54. Khadim, "*A Stranger…,"* ref.1, p.15; Interview with Nasir Zaidi, journalist at Jung Newspaper (June 2014).
55. See, Ian Talbot, "The Punjabization of Pakistan" in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation,* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002).
56. Ishtiaq, "*Pakistan A Garrison State*," ref. 32,p.117 and 210.
57. Christophe, "*Pakistan: Nationalism…,"* ref.46, p.20.
58. Ayub's autobiography, pp.233-35.
59. Ibid.
60. Verses by Habib Jalib (Urdu Poet), to express deep refutation for Ayub's constitution of 1962.
61. Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Adnan Qadir, "Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes" in *Harvard Papers*, p 388. Available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ fs/akhwaja/papers/ Chapter8.pdf>.
62. Stanley, "*Zulfi Bhutto…,"* ref.52, p.60.
63. Lawrence Ziring, p.258.
64. Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, p.216.
65. Ibid, p.212.
66. Ishtiaq, "*Pakistan a Garrison State*," ref.32, p.118.
67. Salahuddin Ahmed*, Bangladesh Past and Present*, (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004) p.156.
68. "Learning from Gen Azam's example", *Dawn*, 17 May 2012.
69. Merkel Wolfgang, *Embedded and Defective Democracies*, 2004 Available at: <http://homepage.univie.ac.at/vedran.dzihic/merkel_ embedded_democracies_2004.pdf>.
70. Figure adapted from Merkel Wolfgang, *Embedded in Defective Democracies*, 2004.
71. The electoral regime has the central position among the five partial regimes of embedded democracy, as it is the most obvious expression of the sovereignty of the people, the participation of citizens and the equal weight allotted to their individual preferences. Political rights have the function both of enabling organized democratic elections and of furthering the unorganized pluralistic interests of complex societies. The first two regimes have to be supplemented by Civil Rights. Even more than the institutionalization of mutual checks and balances, civil rights are central to the rule of law. These rights protect the individual against the state executive and against the acts of the elected legislator that infringe on an individual's freedom. For granting civil rights, courts have to serve as an independent authority. They function as constitutional custodians of the legislature and supervisors of executive conformity to law. The forth partial regime of constitutional democracy comprises the division of powers and resulting 'horizontal accountability. It means that elected authorities are surveyed by a network of relatively autonomous institutions and may be pinned down to constitutionally defined lawful action. In presidential system in which the executive and legislators are each independently legitimized through elections, separation between legislature and executive becomes more obvious. The fifth and last partial regime stresses the necessity that the elected representatives are the ones that actually govern. The criterion of the effective power to govern refers to a feature that may be considered self-evident in old democracies but cannot

be taken for granted in new democracies. This criterion prevents extra constitutional actors not subject to democratic accountability like military from holding final decision making power in certain policy domains. —**Internal Embeddedness**

The partial regimes described can only function effectively in a democracy if they are mutually embedded. Mutual embeddedness implies two things. First, some partial regimes support the functioning of another partial regime – for example the partial regimes 'political rights' and 'civil rights' support partial regime 'democratic election'. Second and at the same time, some partial regimes ensure the political actors do not infringe on the functional spheres of another regime, for example the last three partial regimes. Functional and normative interdependence and independence characterize the 'code of communication'40 between the five partial regimes. The balance between them is fragile and varies from democracy to Democracy-Every democracy as a whole is embedded in an environment that encompasses enables and stabilizes the democratic regime. Damage to this environment often results in either isolated defects or destabilization of the democracy itself. The most important of these externally embedding rings are the socio economic context, civil society and the international integration.

72. Safdar, "*Pakistan: Political Roots…,",* ref.36, p.55.
73. Ibid, pp.55-57.
74. Ibid*,* p.56.
75. Ibid, p.59.
76. *Lawrence Ziring, Paki*stan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (London: Oxford University Press, 1997) p.253.
77. Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad An interpretive Study, (Dhaka: University Press, 1994), p.54.
78. Hassan Askari, Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p.98.
79. Khalid B. Sayeed, "1965- An Epoch-Making Year in Pakistan - General Elections and War with India", *Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No.2 (Feb., 1966), pp.78-81.
80. Ibid.
81. Symbol of Democratic Ideals, *The Nation*, 9July 2009.
82. Cited in, Jones Owen Bennet, *Pakistan: An Eye of the Storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p.250.
83. Greg Cashman, Leonard C. Robinson*, Introduction to Causes of War, (*Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2007), p.242.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Mokerrom Hossain, From Protest to Freedom: A Book for the New Generation: the Birth of Bangladesh, p.119.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid, p.120.
89. Arjun Sengupta, "Regional Disparity and Economic Development of Pakistan: The Facts", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.6, No.45 (Nov. 6, 1971), pp.2279-2286.
90. Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan's Economy: Not Quite yet a Failed One", in Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Pakistan Paradox,* Forthcoming.
91. Mohammad Niaz Asadullah, "Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947–71: was East Pakistan Discriminated Against?"Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, University of Oxford, Number 63, July 2006*.*
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Shahid Hussain, *What was Once Pakistan*, p.6.
95. Hasan Askari, "*Military State…,"* ref.78, p 63.
96. Kamal*, "Bangladesh: Quest…,"* ref.1, p 15.

97. Rose and Sisson*, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Pakistan* (New Delhi, Vistaar Publications, 1990), p.19.
98. Kamal, "*Bangladesh: Quest…,"* ref.1,p.16.
99. For text of six points please refer to Appendix 1.
100. Kamal, "*Bangladesh: Quest…,"* ref.1, p18.
101. (See Appendix).
102. Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), p.129.
103. Sucheta Ghosh, *Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh,* p.31.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p.32.
106. Salahuddin Ahmed*, Bangladesh Past and Present*, (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.161.
107. R K Yadav*, Mission R&AW,* (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2014), p.195.
108. Mokerrom Hussain, *From Protest to Freedom: A Book for the New Generation: The Birth of Banglades*h, (Dhaka: Modiful Hoque Publishers, 2010), p.182.
109. Ibid.
110. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, The Army and America's War on Terror,* p.59.
111. Khadim, "*A Stranger…"* ref.1, p.3.
112. Nitish K Sengupta*, Land of Two Rivers: A History of Bengal from the Mahabharata to Mujib,* (New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2011), p.532.
113. Nurana Nabi, *Bullet of 71: A Freedom Fighters Story*, (Bloomington: Author House, 2010), p.118.
114. Richard Sisson Leo E Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan India and the Creation of Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), p.22.
115. Feroz Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (California: Stanford University Press,2012), p.72.
116. Ibid.
117. The American Papers, 2000: 265
118. Cited in Sengupta, *Land of Two Rivers From Mahabharata to Mujeeb* (London: Penguin Book Limited, 2011*)*, p.537.
119. Muhammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics of Pakistan 1958-1982 (*London: Croom helm, 1983), pp14-15.
120. SR Sharma, *Bangladesh Crisis and Indian Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), pp.22-23.
121. Khadim, "*A Stranger…,"* ref.1, pp.15-17.
122. Shahid, "*What was Once East Pakistan*," ref.94, p.15.
123. Ibid, p.15-19.
124. Ibid.
125. Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, *First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Pildat Publications, 2013).
126. Ibid.
127. Sharmilla Bose, *Dead Reckoning,* p.171.
128. Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, pp.124-5.
129. Khadim, "A *Stranger…,"* ref.1, pp 21-22,30.
130. Ibid., p. 28.
131. Interview Brig Bashir Ahmed, June 2014.
132. Ibid.
133. Shahid, "*What was Once East Pakistan*," ref.94, p27.
134. Stanley*, "Zulfi Bhutto…,"* ref.52,p147.
135. BZ Khasro, *Myths and Facts Bangladesh liberation War*, (New Delhi: Rupa Publication, 2010), p.75-82.
136. Kamal, "*Bangladesh: Quest…",* ref.1, pp.75-78.
137. Ibid, pp.76-77.
138. Ibid, p.82.
139. Shahid, "*What was Once Pakistan*," ref.94, p.37.
140. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy*, (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971).

141. Richard Sisson, Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), p.125. And see Kamal Hussain p.102 also.
142. Ibid, pp.122-131.
143. Kamal, *"Bangladesh: Quest…,"* ref.1, p.101.
144. Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), p.35.
145. Gregory Nagy, Jones Professor of Classical Literature and Professor of Comparative Literature Director Center for Hellenic Studies Gregory Nag, (eds) *Greek Literature in the Classical Period: The Prose of Historiography* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 346.
146. Hassan Abbas, op cit. p. 55.
147. Shahid, "*What was Once Pakistan*," ref. 94, p.51.
148. Expression used by Lawrence Ziring, in *Pakistan at the Cross Current of History* (Islamabad: Vanguard Publishers, 2004).
149. R K Yadav*, Mission R&AW,* (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2014) p.195-197.
150. Report of the Commission of Inquiry 1971- War as declassified by Government of Pakistan, *Dawn*, and Karachi(cited in Hassan Abbas, p.67).
151. Conversations with Brig (retd) Bashir Ahmed, July 2014.
152. Interview, Col (retd) Aziz ul Haque, 28 October 2014. He served as a Captain in East Pakistan in early 60s.
153. Stanley, "*Zulfi Bhutto…,"*, ref.52, p.155.
154. Christophe, "*Pakistan: Nationalism…,"*, ref.46, p. 22.