
Muslim Women's Support for Fundamentalism: Comparing Iran and Pakistan



Regional Studies
Vol XXXV, Issue 2
pp.73-898
© Author(s)
<http://irs.org.pk>
P-ISSN: 0254-7988
E-ISSN: 2959-5459

Aisha Anees Malik*

Date of Acceptance: 4 February 2017

Abstract

Muslim Women's support for Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan has its roots in the liberation struggles of their peoples against despotic rulers seen as agents of the West and colonial masters. The rise of Islamic feminism in these countries, once again, is perceived as either an outright support for Islamic fundamentalism or as an apology for its misogynist approach—a case of feminist fundamentalism. This paper draws a distinction between the case of Islamic feminists in Iran and Pakistan using the framework of Kandiyoti's 'bargaining with patriarchy' and Jalal's 'convenience of subservience'. It is argued in this study that the feminists in Iran are engaged in an active debate with the republic, bargaining to negotiate concessions for women. Grounding their arguments in the words of the Holy Quran and Hadith, a language that the fundamentalists understand, they have won considerable ground. In Pakistan, however, owing to their own upper and upper-middle-class status, their failure to attack the roots of the oppressive system, or their accommodations and submission to it, has either been convenient or rewarding for them.

Introduction

Muslim women of the South Asian subcontinent have time and again attempted to influence politics through their faith. David Willmer¹ reminds us of the 1913 Cawnpur incident, where parts of a mosque were demolished to make way for a road. This created a furore amongst the Muslim community and the ensuing protest was put down through violent means. Willmer mentions how Harcourt Butler, the lieutenant-governor of the United Provinces in the undivided India, complained against Muslim women and their use of religion to incite men to rebel against the British. He wrote to the Viceroy saying, "My problem is to keep the *Musalman*²

* Dr Aisha Anees Malik is Assistant Professor in the Centre of Excellence in Gender Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. She holds a PhD in gender and social policy from the University of Cambridge and an MPhil in Development Studies from the same university.

women right. If they get a handle, as they did over the Cawnpur mosque incident, they will force their husbands and male relations to do something for Islam. No Government in the East can control a combination of priests and women.”³

Even today, many women in Pakistan are staunch supporters of right-wing radical parties and endorse state policies in the name of Islam that is seen by some as damaging to their own cause. On 5 September 2003, hundreds of veiled women activists of *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI)⁴ protested outside the parliament house in Islamabad against the recommendations of the state-sponsored National Commission for the Status of Women (NCSW) to repeal the *Hudood Ordinances*. Led by the *Naib Nazim* Sakina Shahid of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, the protesters rejected the recommendations of the NCSW and opposed the idea of imposing what they termed as the suggestions of a handful of Westernised women on the nation against the will of a majority of women. The protesters included some prominent women members of the parliament, belonging to the opposition as well as ruling parties, who marched with them as a mark of solidarity.⁵ The country at the time had 200 women parliamentarians sitting in the national and provincial legislative assemblies and 40,000 women in the local governments⁶ who could have turned the tables on the issue of repeal of such discriminatory laws. But instead, they chose to either stay quiet or join the ranks of fundamentalists who uphold them as divine laws and thus sacred.

Iran's case is no different. Women actively supported the Iranian revolution in 1979 that resulted in the establishment of an Islamic state with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran's monarchy.⁷ Women students participating in the anti-Shah campaign willingly veiled themselves with *hijab-e-Islami*⁸ and discarded adornments like jewellery and cosmetics to show their disgust for what they called *gharbzadgi* (Westoxication)—a disease that had afflicted people's minds and hearts, usurping the nation's natural resources, distorting people's identity and cultures, and degenerating the entire moral fabric of the society. Muslim women writers and intellectuals, like Fareshteh Hashemi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Tahereh Saffarzadeh, joined hands with the Islamic revivalists and advanced the cause by denouncing the Westoxicated images of women and reconstructing the Islamic model of womanhood.⁹ Even after the revolution, when the enthusiasm of some of these ardent supporters had

started to wane in the face of the Islamic regime's misogynist policies, some women continued to legitimise its discriminatory practices using the rhetoric of Khomeini's teachings. Shahla Habibi, presidential advisor on women's affairs in 1991 stressed in *Zaneh Rouz*¹⁰ that women, irrespective of their qualification and knowledge, should not overlook the family unit and undermine their obligations as housewives.¹¹ Even those who increasingly objected to the regime's policies and have ever since actively engaged in the debate on the 'woman question' in the Islamic Republic are very much aware of their Muslim identity. They reject Western feminist thought and explore possibilities that exist within Islam, calling themselves Islamic feminists. Examples include Nayarah Tohidi, Afsaneh Najambadi, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Azam Taleqani, Maryam Behrouzi and Zahra Rahnavaard.¹²

Women's support for Islamic revivalism or Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and Iran, as shown above, seems unusual when fundamentalists are seen to be major oppressors of women today. Even more so, Islamic fundamentalism is perceived to be allied with the subjugation of women and curtailing of their economic, legal, and political rights. In such a scenario, then, why have some women in Pakistan and Iran chosen to reject the call of feminisms of all sorts and joined the creed of Islamic fundamentalism?¹³ A number of reasons have been put forward to explain this phenomenon of women's support for Islamic fundamentalism, ranging from identity crises in a rapidly changing post-colonial era to aspirations for the achievement of a higher spiritual and moral order to a fear of divine disapproval.

This paper analyses women's support for Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and Iran within the frameworks put forward by Kandiyoti¹⁴ and Jalal¹⁵ where they place women's seeming defence and accommodation of systems of oppression like 'patriarchy' and 'state-sponsored process of Islamisation' in models of bargaining and subservience. Such an analysis, to begin with, requires an understanding of this particular 'system of oppression', i.e., Islamic fundamentalism, the form it has taken in Pakistan and Iran, and its implications for women. The paper highlights a few possible reasons why women support fundamentalisms in general. The two models, 'bargaining with patriarchy' and 'convenience of subservience' are then explained. The case of 'Islamic feminism' is used to explain whether the belief that the "Islamic

path to women's emancipation [is] the only viable, home-grown and culturally appropriate alternative to [Western] feminism, Marxism and the liberal humanist project."¹⁶ Support for Islamic fundamentalism or strategies is used by women to work within a concrete set of constraints to strike better bargains. To take it a step further are the so-called Islamic feminists merely creating excuses for a system's oppression in the name of religion. By avoiding to challenge its very foundations, they are ensuring a convenient position for themselves. The conclusion, once again, draws out the debate and discusses the contention: Is Islamic feminism a support for fundamentalism? The paper concludes with the argument that it is bargaining with the system in Iran and convenience for some who benefit from it in Pakistan.

Islamic fundamentalism

The term 'Islamic fundamentalism' in its very basic sense means 'returning to the fundamentals of Islam', 'returning to the source', or 'a return to a puritanical Islam' and is widely associated with various forms in which certain groups of Muslims, living in Muslim as well as non-Muslim societies, manifest in their own ways. Islamic fundamentalism thus attempts to motivate the Muslims to follow the preaching of Islam through reaffirmation to the founding principles of the divine doctrine and restructuring contemporary society in light of the same. It also involves efforts to build up confidence and faith to face modern day challenges.¹⁷ Movements involving this attempt 'to return' do not use the term fundamentalist to identify themselves. Instead, they conceive of themselves as 'revivalists'—as people or groups who seek to revive the purity and dynamism of Islam as in its beginnings. Owing to the turbulent times they exist in, fundamentalism or revivalism is one of the means by virtue of which they can cope with the contemporary problems.¹⁸

Rudimentary definitions explaining fundamentalism as an out-moded phenomenon, a desire to return to medieval thinking, or a revivalist movement to bring back the past can, however, lead to an oversimplification of the phenomenon. Fundamentalism is also about political power and as such Islam is undeniably one of the modern political forces competing for power around the globe. Islamic fundamentalism, thus, has great attraction for the high achievers among youth. As Mernissi reminds us that in global metropolises "Islam makes

sense because it speaks about power and self-empowerment. As a matter of fact, worldly self-enhancement is so important for Islam that the meaning of spirituality itself has to be re-considered.”¹⁹ Moreover, we cannot deny the inclusiveness or anti-elitist pull of fundamentalist movements that promise to make governance more accessible to people as well as more attuned to their needs based on moral-religious grounds—the ‘New Religious Politics’.²⁰

Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan

Islamic fundamentalism is not a uniformly homogenous movement.²¹ Individuals as well as groups deemed connected to it vary not only in their understanding of the ends of their movement but also the means to achieve it—Pakistan and Iran being two such examples. Although both are Muslim societies, Pakistan is predominantly a *Sunni* and Iran mainly a *Shi'ite* society. Pakistan is within the South Asian cultural sphere, Iran within that of the Middle East. In Pakistan, fundamentalism stems out of a communal movement whereas in Iran it is categorised as non-communal.²² In Pakistan's case, religious revivalism has been attributed to “the search for identity and reassertion of tradition in transitional societies” in a post-colonial era.²³ Political Islam owes its beginnings in Pakistan to the creation of the state in 1947 as a ‘Muslim homeland’ and to the 1905-06 constitutionalist revolution in Iran.²⁴

The fundamentalists in Iran represent the state and are all-powerful in their domain. In Pakistan, they are only a part of the ruling coalition and must compete for political and electoral power with other political parties and interest groups. Their interpretation of the role and status of women, marriage, and family law is much more contested than that of their counterparts in Iran.²⁵ Iran, then, is a case of ‘fundamentalism consolidated’ and Pakistan a case of ‘fundamentalism in flux’.²⁶

Where there are differences, there is also much common ground. Fundamentalist movements, in general, are believed to have “patriarchal views regarding gender, family relations and social mores.”²⁷ The Islamic fundamentalist agenda, both in Iran and Pakistan, in the 1980s and the 1990s included veiling of women, segregation of sexes, control of female sexuality, opposition to women's autonomy, and a literal interpretation of the *Shariah* (the Islamic law). Fundamentalists

react against the liberties gained by women in the post-colonial era, viewing them as a consequence of the Western hegemony in their societies and as a deviation from the sacred rights and obligations. They attribute the ills of their societies to these 'un-Islamic' changes in male-female relationships, perceiving them to be against the divine and accepted laws. They concentrate their energies in bringing three areas of their lives, namely: status of women, marriage, and family law, in line with the 'pure' teachings of Islam.²⁸ This has had grave implications for women in both countries, legally relegating them to second-class citizens in matters of inheritance, marriage, and divorce.

A woman in Iran needs her husband's permission if she is to travel abroad. She can only join limited fields if she wishes to work, like teaching and nursing. Women's participation in agriculture, mechanical/electronic engineering, metallurgy, chemistry, computer programming, civil engineering, and accounting/commerce have been restricted. Veiling is mandatory for women and they can be legally punished with 74 lashes and internment for rehabilitation if they appear publicly either unveiled or 'badly-veiled'. A man in Iran has the unilateral right to divorce and polygamy. He can keep up to ten wives—four permanent and the rest temporary. In Pakistan, since the fundamentalists do not solely represent the state, their inroads have been limited to the changes they have been successful in making to the otherwise secular legal system in the form of *Hudood* Ordinances. The fundamentalists never gained any electoral support except once and had to rely on pressure tactics of law and order situation to coerce governments into giving in to their demands. They have also supported the military dictatorships of Yahya and Zia. General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation programme in the 1980s is responsible for the *Hudood* Ordinances²⁹ that make no distinction between rape and adultery, leaving women in a precarious position, reducing their legal status to half that of a man's, and prescribing severe punishments like public flogging and stoning to death of the offender.³⁰ In spite of all this, the veiling of women is not a state law and it is not uncommon to see unveiled women in the cities and villages of Pakistan. There is also no restriction in their joining most fields if they seek employment. However, there is a considerable social pressure on women to conform to the Islamic

standards and on governments to enact and enforce *Shariah* by the fundamentalists.

Women's support for fundamentalism

Men's support for fundamentalist regimes in power or fundamentalist movements in government's opposition is easy to understand as they may gain a divine mandate to exercise unrestrained authority over women with little interference, upward mobility on the socio-economic ladder, and lesser responsibilities towards women limited only to material support and up-keep with much greater rights in matters of divorce and sexual service. Women's support for such movements is, however, difficult to fathom and the reasons for it are varied. In general, women's involvement in fundamentalist movements may have been inspired by anti-colonist or nationalist sentiments. In current times, they, like their men, may feel alienated and deprived in the processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, and immiseration of rural areas. Fearful of change, they stand to lose more than men in the loss of the security of wide kinship links amidst the social changes that frequently accompany the growth of fundamentalist movements. The common ground of acceptance and reinforcement of 'tradition' as the key to counter displacement and disempowerment in such circumstances is as willingly acknowledged by women as by men. Sometimes women support such movements because they wish to be recognised as morally upright members of their religion seriously engaged in addressing contemporary social problems. Fundamentalist networks may also assist women in their efforts to domesticate men, bringing them into the realm of life defined by the family. Alternatively, women might support them out of fear of male reprisal for non-compliance and defiance. Withdrawal of economic support, fear of legal procedures like divorce, taking away custody of children, and various physical punishments sanctioned by religious laws may scare them into obedience. Fear of divine disapproval, excommunication by the religious community, and supernatural punishments may also be added to the list. Finally, many women find that modernity presents them with difficult choices about things they were raised to believe to be inevitable. Freedom in matters of marriage, self-support, and control of fertility all become matters of choice representing revolutionary changes for them. These changes bring on a moral crisis in conceptions of marriage. Fundamentalism's

assertions of marriage's divine origins, a nexus in which women's salvation is achieved, is an answer to the crises. Its call for renewed dedication to the institution in absolutist terms gives such women a programme for moral action imparting religious meaning to the choices they have made in marriage, employment, and fertility decisions.³¹

In Iran and Pakistan, fundamentalism has arisen in conjunction with nationalism, anti-colonialism, and anti-Westernism. Women joined in the battle for liberation from colonial domination, as in Pakistan's case, or Westernised local masters, as in Iran's case, attributing sacred significance to their struggle. They saturated their ideals for the newly-independent nation or the emergent republic with religious meanings. Women saw the domination of the coloniser or a tyrannical ruler, an agent of the West, as a much greater source of oppression than anything inflicted upon them by their own menfolk. As such, they have had the tendency to analyse male violence against themselves as rooted in the greater evil of Western imperialism or colonialism.³² But once liberated from the Westernised despot, women in Iran continued to be oppressed by the Islamic Republic. In Pakistan, the Islamisation policies of Zia haunt women's lives even today. Women have reacted to the oppression in varied ways in the countries, some acquiescing to the pressure and siding with the regimes, some taking up a secularist struggle against it, and some creating spaces for themselves in the system neither bowing to it completely nor going against it outright. Belonging to the elite classes, the women in the first and the last category call themselves devout Muslims and continue to counter the fundamentalist demands as such.³³ The emergence of Islamic feminists, scholars, and activists who struggle for gender justice in light of Islamic principles and readings has to be seen within this context.

Islamic feminism is, however, dubbed by secular feminists as either forthright support for fundamentalist regimes or as an apology for their policies. These oppositional views split Islamic feminists into two types—the 'fundamentalist apologists'³⁴ who support the divinely-determined differences between male and female, and the 'cultural revivalists'³⁵ who have attempted an enlightened interpretation of the Holy Quran, the *Hadith*,³⁶ and of pristine historic Islamic accounts. Islamic feminists are perceived as supporting, strengthening, and licensing the fundamentalist state's gender approach,³⁷ something that is

seen as circumscribing and compromising the goals of their feminist agenda. Their efforts are considered an anti-Orientalist campaign with a union of the apparently radical and anti-representational standpoints with a fundamentalist orthodoxy.³⁸ Scholars like Hale Afshar, Leila Ahmed, Riffat Hassan, Afsaneh Najambadi and Nayyarah Tohidi are accused of being postmodernists and cultural relativists depicting selective representations.³⁹ The attempts of some of these scholars like Fatima Mernissi, Aziza AlHibri, and Riffat Hassan to compose feminist religious studies and woman-friendly hermeneutics of Islamic scriptures are thought to be ineffective, as Islamic feminism is seen as nothing more than an oxymoron.⁴⁰ Are the Islamist feminists apologists for Islamic fundamentalism,⁴¹ or have they simply struck out a bargain that has enabled them to negotiate better terms?⁴² Alternatively, is it simply the ploy of the female elite who can, by bowing down to the regime, gain favours and highly paid positions for themselves?⁴³ The questions can be answered by an analysis of Kandiyoti's 'bargaining with patriarchy' and Jalal's 'convenience of subservience'.

'Bargaining with patriarchy' and 'convenience of subservience': Islamic feminism in Iran and Pakistan

Patriarchy is commonly used as a blanket term for all forms of male dominance. Radical feminists generally allocate patriarchy to the ideological sphere with a material basis in the division of labour between sexes and tend to apply the term to almost any form of male dominance and its subjugation of women. For socialist feminists, it has emerged as a residual category, as exploitation and oppression of women can primarily be attributed to race and class. What cannot be explained through the workings of capital can be justified with the rationale of the system of patriarchy. They, therefore, endorse the association between patriarchy and the class under capitalism.⁴⁴ Such generalisations, however, are problematic as they suggest the monolithic concept of male dominance, which undermines the culturally and historically determined mutual engagements between genders.⁴⁵

Kandiyoti, therefore, suggests investigating different strategies of women, which they adopt to cope with various forms of patriarchy. She argues that women negotiate and strategize within existing societal constraints, which outline the 'patriarchal bargain' of any given society.

This blueprint may exhibit variations according to class, caste, and ethnicity. She asserts that women make accommodations to 'classic patriarchy' and even support it because they have a long-term vested interest in the system that oppresses them. The cyclical fluctuations of power position that involve the subordinate and powerless daughter-in-law growing into the authoritarian mother-in-law ensure that women have a stake in the continuity of the system and become active colluders in the reproduction of their own subordination. Women, knowing their limits and constraints, espouse interpersonal approaches that safeguard their well-being through the favour of their sons and husbands. They, thus, become expert at maximising their own life-chances. Also, without any empowering alternatives, when women perceive the old order slipping away from them, they often resist the processes that can change the system.

Islamic feminism in Iran is a classic case where the Islamic feminists are strategizing within the constraints of the Islamic framework. The use of Islamic discourse by them is a strategic attempt to acquire legitimacy that also serves to broaden the base of support for women's rights in addition to being an expression of their religious convictions.⁴⁶ The alternative of Western feminism is rejected by them as being one of the many instruments of colonialism and they rebuff the liberation offered to women under Western patriarchy.⁴⁷ They believe that by concentrating on the study of the labour market and the experiences of white/middle-class/affluent women as a norm, Western feminists have come up with an analysis totally irrelevant to the lives of the majority of women that live in non-Western parts of the world.⁴⁸ In the absence of any acceptable alternatives, their own path to liberation is the most suitable one. In this worldview then, when women see the old system of classic patriarchy collapsing, they use all the pressure they can to make men live up to their obligation. In Iran, the defenders of faith women took the Republic to task for failing to deliver its Islamic duties. They used Islamic revivalism to fight against their political, legal, and economic marginalisation. Using the language of the Holy Quran, they have, for example, succeeded in removing many of the bars placed on women's education. As Afshar points out, "By deconstructing the Islamic discourse, Islamist women have succeeded in reconstructing an

ideological framework that enables them to make political demands, framed in the language of Islam.”⁴⁹

Pakistan's case, on the other hand, is aptly explained by Jalal who has used the term ‘convenience of subservience’ “for Pakistani women from middle and upper strata in the rural/urban areas who submit to a subservience decreed by a highly inequitable socio-economic order, buttressed by a thin veneer of ostensibly Islamic morality.”⁵⁰ For these women, making such accommodations can be socially rewarding. As long as they do not violate social norms, they are accorded some respect and privilege in the family sphere and depending upon their generational and marital status, also in wider social networks. Jalal claims that the classist composition of the front-runners of the Pakistani movement has had a bearing upon their articulation of women's issues at the state level. They have a stake in the maintenance of the social order as they themselves are its beneficiaries based on their class-based privileges. A radical demand that dismantles the stability of the patriarchal family will also destabilise this social order that lends them class-based social, political, and economic privileges. She asserts, “As beneficiaries of social accommodations worked out over long periods of history, middle and upper class women everywhere have a stake in preserving the existing structures of authority, and with it the convenience of a subservience that denies them equality in the public realm but also affords privileges not available to women lower down the rungs of social hierarchy. So insofar Pakistani women share a common fate, subservience has been relatively more convenient for some than for others.”⁵¹

It is common for women active in right-wing fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan to sit in their party offices and issue statements promoting women's domesticity. “A man's primary duty is to ‘provide’ (or ‘protect’) for his family and that of the wife's is to raise children, take care of her husband, and be obedient to him at all times.”⁵² They themselves sit in parliaments, pursue careers, and participate in political rallies. Jamaat had 215 women's units in 1978, which had grown to 554 by 1989. It also has a very active women's student wing by the name of *Islami Jamiat-i-Talabat*.⁵³ They tend to issue statements that actually do not affect their own lives but present a model to be followed by the “silent and unmentioned majority of Pakistani womanhood.”⁵⁴ Take the example of Fareeda Ahmed who was a member of parliament during the MMA

rule, a member of the NCSW, and an Islamic scholar. As a member of her political party MMA,⁵⁵ she cast a dissenting vote against the recommendations of NCSW for repeal of *Hudood* Ordinances. She reasoned that flawed administrative and procedural measures were responsible for injustices against women, not the laws.⁵⁶ She said that as the *Hudood* Ordinance was strictly based on the Holy Quran and *Hadith*, repeal was out of the question.⁵⁷ On polygamy, the learned doctor asserted that majority of women opposed to it themselves had a status of second or third wives of their husbands but they were defending the American/European laws in which the man had a right to have one wife with the opportunity of having many girlfriends.⁵⁸

Then there is the case of Pakistani Islamic feminists living in the West who have a firm faith in the egalitarian spirit of Islam, are opposed to secularists, and have prescriptions in abundant for their counterparts back home. One such feminist, Riffat Hassan, points out that the "correct reading of the Quran, from a non-patriarchal perspective, leaves no doubt that men and women have been created equal by God and that there is no religious or ethical justification whatsoever for discriminating against women."⁵⁹ She is against the religious extremists who teach hatred, bigotry, and violence in the name of religion, but is no less vocal against the anti-religious extremists who maintain that Islam and human rights are incompatible.⁶⁰ "The only hope of saving Pakistan from religious extremists, the feudal-tribals, the corrupt bureaucrats, and various types of opportunists and fortune-hunters alike is the emergence of an educated group of persons who understand Islam to be a religion of justice and compassion, of knowledge and reason, of openness and peace. It is possible to build a justice-centred society within the ethical framework of the Quran which is the Magna Carta of human rights" she asserts.⁶¹ The support for Islamic laws for one who does not have to live under it in an Islamic state like Pakistan is understandable. In addition, the role of economically privileged and educated women like Farida Ahmed in the reproduction of the gender biases underpinning their subservience has to be acknowledged in the same spirit. In a social setup where a woman's obedience to her husband and to the larger social order is reciprocated with financial security in the family and prestige in society⁶² subservience is for sure a safer option.

Conclusion

Iran and Pakistan are amongst the countries where Islamic fundamentalism has been seen to flourish. In Iran, it has gained state power, whereas in Pakistan it is still struggling to do so in collusion with the state structures. Historically, in both countries, women have supported the religious/nationalist causes like the revolution in Iran and the independence struggle in Pakistan only to have their rights affected as a result of the enforcement of Islamic laws. To struggle against their oppression, however, they have rejected the alternative presented by Western feminism, joined the ranks of Islamic feminists, and used the same revivalist spirit of Islam in their favour as used by the fundamentalist men. But the emergence of Islamic feminism as support of Islamic fundamentalism⁶³ is to be seen within the context of various personal, political, and cultural factors. These factors determine for women in individual countries what is probable, possible, or out-of-bounds for them, who then in the light of their knowledge and experiences devise strategies for survival.⁶⁴

In Iran, to counter the oppression and create spaces for themselves, women have used the language of religion, familiar to the fundamentalists. Working from within an Islamic framework, in the absence of any other empowering alternatives, they have been able to negotiate and strike better bargains for women. In Pakistan, women's struggle has always been led by a handful of educated upper- and upper-middle class women. They come from politically active families and have the protection of their influential kith and kin. Their family status ensures that for them an outright support for Islamic fundamentalism does not entail the application of same laws in their own lives. Submission to the oppressive order means access to the National Assembly and many other prestigious posts for the likes of Farida Ahmed. Therefore, they conveniently ignore the plight of thousands of women whose lives are affected by Islamisation of national laws and try to show that a 'truly' Islamic state is the only road to salvation.

Notes and References

- ¹ David Willmer, "Women as Participants in the Pakistan Movement: Modernisation and the Promise of a Moral State," *Modern Asian Studies*, 30, No.3 (1996), pp.573-590.
- ² *Musalman* is the *Urdu* word for Muslim.
- ³ Harcourt Butler to Chelmsford, 20 April 1919, Chelmsford Papers (22), India Office Library, quoted by Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.294, in David Willmer, "Women as Participants in Pakistan Movement," p.577.
- ⁴ Right-wing radical Islamic party.
- ⁵ *The Dawn*, 6 September 2003.
- ⁶ *The News International*, 22 November 2003.
- ⁷ Valentine M. Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism and its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 27, No.4 (2002), pp.1136-1165.
- ⁸ The Islamic cover consisting of a scarf to cover the head, a long loose tunic with long sleeves, loose pants and flat shoes, all in dark or neutral colours.
- ⁹ Nayereh Tohidi, "Modernity, Islamization, and Women in Iran," in *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies*, ed. Valentine, M. Moghadam, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1994), pp.110-141.
- ¹⁰ *Zaneh Ruz* literally meaning Today's Woman is a women's weekly journal published in Tehran, the capital of Iran.
- ¹¹ Shahla Habibi views printed in magazine "*Zaneh Ruz*" (7 January 1992), as quoted in Haleh Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran," in *Women and Politics in the Third World*, ed. Haleh Afshar (London and New York: Routledge, 1960), pp.121-141.
- ¹² Moghadam, op.cit., pp.1136-1165.
- ¹³ Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran," op. cit., pp.121-141.
- ¹⁴ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining with Patriarchy," *Gender and Society*, 2, No.3 (1988), pp.274-290.
- ¹⁵ Ayesha Jalal, "Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan," in *Women, Islam & the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp.7-114.
- ¹⁶ Haideh Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The limits of Postmodern Analysis* (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1999), p.40.
- ¹⁷ John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan," in *Fundamentalisms Observed* ed. Martin E .Marty and R Scott(

- Appleby), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.347.
- 18 Afshar, *Women and Politics in the Third World*, op. cit., pp.121-141.
 - 19 Fatima Mernissi, "Muslim Women and Fundamentalism," *Middle East Report, Islam and the State*, No. 153 (1988), p.9.
 - 20 Nikki Keddie, "New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do 'Fundamentalisms' Appear?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40, No.4 (1998), p.697.
 - 21 Ibid., pp.606-723.
 - 22 Ibid., p.712.
 - 23 Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Tablighi Jamaat," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.475-530.
 - 24 Mohammad Ayoob, "Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared," *Asian Survey*, 19, No.6 (1979), pp.535-546.
 - 25 Shahla Haeri, "Women and Fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan," in *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.184.
 - 26 Ibid., p.87, p.198.
 - 27 Keddie, op.cit., pp.697.
 - 28 Haeri, op.cit., pp.181-213.
 - 29 For details of the Islamisation programme and its effect on women see Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1987), Fareeha Zafar. *Finding our Way: Readings on Women in Pakistan* (Lahore: ASR Publications, 1991), Rubya Mehdi, *The Islamization of Law in Pakistan* (Curzon Press Ltd, 1994), Anita Weiss, "Women's Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of Islamization," *Asian Survey* 25, No. 8 (1985), pp.863-880, and Shaheen Sardar Ali, *Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal before Allah, Unequal before Man?* (The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1979).
 - 30 Farida Shaheed, "Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the Experiences of the Network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 19, No. 4 (1994), pp.997-1019.
 - 31 Helen Hardacre, "The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, the Family, and Interpersonal Relations," in *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education*, ed. M.E. Marty and R.S. Appleby (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp.140-43.
 - 32 Helen Hardacre, op.cit., pp.140-43.
 - 33 Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran, op.cit., pp.121-141

- 34 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Introduction," in *Women, Islam & the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp.1-20.
- 35 Moghissi, op.cit., pp.1-148.
- 36 The sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.
- 37 Moghadam, op.cit., pp.1136-1165.
- 38 Moghissi, op.cit., 47.
- 39 Moghissi, op.cit., 1-148.
- 40 Shahidian, cited in Moghadam, op.cit., pp.1136-1165.
- 41 Moghissi, op.cit. pp.1-148.
- 42 Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran," op.cit., pp.121-141.
- 43 Haleh, op.cit., pp.121-141.
- 44 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Islam and Patriarchy," in *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. Nikkie R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.23-42.
- 45 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining with Patriarchy," *Gender and Society*, 2, No.3 (1988), pp.275.
- 46 Moghadam, op.cit., pp.1136-1165.
- 47 For such discussions see Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran" op.cit., pp.121-141; "Women and Politics in Iran," op.cit., pp.188-205; and Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992) pp.1-304.
- 48 Afshar, "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran," op.cit., pp.121-141.
- 49 Afshar, "Women and Politics in Iran," *The European Journal of Development Research*, 12, No.1 (2000) pp.188.
- 50 Jalal, op.cit., pp.77-141.
- 51 Jalal, op.cit., pp.79.
- 52 General Secretary Women's Division of Jamaat-i-Islami in Lahore; cited in Haeri, op.cit., pp.186.
- 53 Ahmad, op.cit., pp.457-530. Islami Jamiat-i-Talibat translates as the Islamic Organisation of Female Students.
- 54 Mumtaz and Shaheed, *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?*, op.cit., pp.23.
- 55 Muthida Majlis-e-Ammal (MMA) was an alliance of all religious parties formed for elections to the national/provincial assemblies in 2002.
- 56 *South Asia Citizens Wire*, 13 October 2003.
- 57 *The Harold*, November 2003, p.55.
- 58 *The News*, 18 October 2003.

- ⁵⁹ March 29, 2000 Muslim Students Association of Columbia University in New York available at <<http://inrfvvp.org/documents,columbia.htm>>.
- ⁶⁰ Riffat Hassan, "Extremism on the Rise Again," *The Dawn*, 28 May 2000.
- ⁶¹ Hassan, op.cit., 2000.
- ⁶² Haeri, op.cit., pp.181-213.
- ⁶³ Moghissi, op.cit., Shahidian, Mojab and others cited in Moghadam , op.cit., pp.1136-1165.
- ⁶⁴ Farida Shaheed , "Networking for Change: The Role of Women's Groups in Initiating Dialogue on Women's Issues" in *Faith and Freedom: Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World*, ed. Mahnaz Afkhami (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), pp.78-98.