
South Asian Security Complex and Nuclear Arms Race

Waqar Hussain,*
Khurram Maqsood Ahmad,**
and Faiz ur Rehman***



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Abstract

South Asian security dynamics are characterised by divergent security goals of India and Pakistan. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons as a power balancer against India, which was at an advantageous position over Pakistan in terms of conventional weaponry and forces. As there exists a balance of power, thanks to the possession of nuclear weapons often referred to as the balance of terror, there is strategic stability in South Asia. However, this strategic stability comes at the expense of continued nuclear armaments and technology development by India and Pakistan. There is a peculiar nature of competition between India and Pakistan, which is different from the Cold War concept of the arms race. The study of historical patterns reveals that Pakistan's nuclear developments are a response to those of India's. On the other hand, Indian nuclear developments are aimed at developing deterrence against China. The result is that as India boosts its nuclear developments to achieve its minimum credible deterrence against China, for Pakistan it no more remains minimum and it has to go for qualitative and quantitative arms build-up. However, this relative pattern of nuclear arms developments is different from the arms race concept of the Cold War, where two great powers spent heavily on arms build-up to achieve hegemony. The strategic stability corresponds to deterrence stability and arms race stability. The purpose of this study is to analyse the trends of nuclear arms development by both India and Pakistan to analyse South Asian security complex characterised by nuclear weapons and foreign alliances. The study also analyses the arms development of India and Pakistan through the concept of the arms race.

* Mr Waqar Hussain is an MPhil student at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

** Mr Khurram Maqsood Ahmad is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad.

*** Dr Faiz ur Rehman is Associate Professor at Degree College Dadyal, Mirpur.

Key Words: *Regional Security Complex, nuclear arms race, South Asia, nuclear deterrence, Indian force postures, Pakistan.*

جنوبی ایشیاء کی سلامتی کی پیچیدگیاں اور جوہری ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ

وقار حسین، خرم مقصود احمد، فیض الرحمن

خلاصہ:-

جنوبی ایشیاء کی سلامتی کے محرکات پاکستان اور بھارت کے ایک دوسرے سے مختلف سلامتی کے اہداف کے ساتھ جڑے ہیں۔ پاکستان کو ایٹمی ہتھیار اس لیے بنانا پڑے کہ بھارت کیساتھ طاقت کے توازن کو برقرار رکھا جاسکے، جو کہ پاکستان سے روایتی ہتھیاروں میں آگے ہے۔ چونکہ جوہری ہتھیاروں کی وجہ سے ایک طاقت کا توازن قائم ہے جس کو دہشت کا توازن بھی کہا جاتا ہے، خطے میں تزویراتی استحکام ہے۔ تاہم یہ تزویراتی پائیداری پاکستان اور بھارت کے مسلسل ایٹمی ہتھیار بنانے اور جوہری ٹیکنالوجی کو فروغ دینے کے مول حاصل کی گئی ہے۔ پاکستان اور بھارت کے مابین ایک خاص نوعیت کی رقابت اور کشمکش کی کیفیت ہے، جو کہ سرد جنگ کے زمانے کے ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ سے بالکل مختلف ہے۔ تاریخ کی ورق گردانی سے یہ حقیقت سامنے آتی ہے کہ پاکستان کی جانب سے جوہری پروگرام میں پیش رفت، بھارتی پیش رفت کے رد عمل کے طور پر ہے۔ جبکہ دوسری جانب بھارتی جوہری پروگرام کا مقصد چین کے خلاف مزاحمت پیدا کرنا ہے۔ نتیجتاً بھارت اپنے جوہری پروگرام کو وسعت دیکر چین کے خلاف اپنی کم سے کم قابل اعتماد مزاحمت قائم رکھنا چاہتا ہے۔ جبکہ یہ پاکستان کے لیے کم سے کم نہیں ہوتی اور پاکستان تعدادی اور معیاری طور پر ہتھیاروں کو فروغ دینے پر مجبور ہو جاتا ہے۔ جوہری ہتھیاروں کی تیاری کا یہ لائحہ عمل سرد جنگ کی ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ سے قطعاً مختلف ہے۔ جس میں دو بڑی طاقتوں نے اپنی طاقت کی دھاک بٹھانے کے لیے جوہری ہتھیاروں کی تیاری پر کثیر سرمایہ خرچ کیا۔ یہ تزویراتی پائیداری، دہشت کی پائیداری اور ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ کی پائیداری کے ساتھ ساتھ چلتی ہے۔ اس تحقیق کا مقصد پاکستان اور بھارت کے جوہری ہتھیاروں کی پیش رفت کے رجحانات کا تجزیہ کرنا ہے جو کہ جوہری ہتھیاروں کی تیاری اور بین الاقوامی اتحادات سے منسوب ہیں۔ اس تحقیق میں پاکستان اور بھارت کی ہتھیاروں کی پیش رفت کو ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ کے تصور کے تحت بھی جانچا گیا ہے۔

Introduction

There is a balance of power between India and Pakistan, which corresponds to strategic stability in South Asia. Nuclear deterrence is central to maintaining this strategic stability in the region. The South Asian nuclear 'balance of terror' does not furnish the kind of stability that was there during the Cold War due to different objectives of relative deterrence postures. Nuclear policies of India and Pakistan have different goals and objectives. India has a larger adversary in the form of China with which it has had an armed conflict and derives security threat from. Furthermore, Pakistan-China cooperation aggravates the Indian threat perception. Pakistan's security threat emerges from India alone and its strategic armament is designed to maintain its credible minimum nuclear deterrence against India alone. As Vipin Narang has rightly pointed out:

What is credible toward China will likely not be minimum toward Pakistan; and what is minimum toward Pakistan cannot be credible toward China.¹

Strategic stability corresponds to deterrence stability and that, in turn, correlates with arms race stability in the region. Any transformation in any of these is bound to affect the others. However, the concept of arms race cannot be applied to the South Asian environment independently because the relative nuclear armaments of India and Pakistan cannot be termed as an arms race. First, India and Pakistan are not world powers competing for global hegemony and, second, Pakistan's nuclear developments are not to match the Indian capabilities, i.e., the Indian triad of nuclear forces, space capabilities, and ballistic missile defence system.

India perceives itself as a global power and pursues its strategic goals in line with this perception. India has embarked upon an ambitious force posture that goes beyond the minimum credible

deterrence posture. In addition, its No First-Use (NFU) doctrine is increasingly diluting with the development of its missile defence capabilities. It builds a perception among Pakistan and China that India is preparing for the first-use posture once it has ensured the second strike capability through developing nuclear triad and missile defence.

Pakistan has to develop fissile material to support its nuclear programme. To help explain why Pakistan has been developing fissile stocks, one can ascertain the interplay of factors responsible for a changing strategic environment in the region. These factors are as follows:

1. The conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, which Pakistan cannot match conventionally;
2. Proactive and offensive military postures of India;
3. The nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan;
4. Discriminatory global nuclear policies and non-proliferation mechanisms; and
5. Special status to India in export control cartels.

The study focuses on the relationship of nuclear power balance with the relative competition between India and Pakistan. It points out the Indian nuclear developments that disturb the power equilibrium, entailing a balancing act on the part of Pakistan. The main objective of the research is to analyse whether the patterns of arms development in South Asia represent an arms race or not? The study is divided into three parts: In the first part, an overall security structure of the region is explained with the help of regional security complex theory. In the second part, the arms race is assessed as per the relative developments of India and Pakistan. In the final part, a conclusion is drawn based on the assessments.

South Asian Regional Security Complex

The regional security complex theory states that geographical proximity is the most important factor while considering the security of a state. Its significance increases when the proximate states share a conflictual relationship among them. Alternatively, the regional security complex may be defined in the following words:

The security of two proximate states cannot be studied in separation from each other if their security considerations are so much linked together that security of one state results in insecurity of the other.²

Accordingly, the regional security complex advocates that political and military threats are more prone to travel quickly over short distances due to proximity. That is why it is quite understandable that inter-regional security threats among states are stronger as compared to the security threats among far away states.

South Asia has been the central case study for the development and advancement of the regional security complex theory.³ It was proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waiver. They are of the view that decolonisation of South Asia is central to the formation of conflict in the region. The process produced proximate adversaries with conflicting social, economic, and security preferences right from the start. In addition to that, the regional states never drew in regional allies; rather they preferred foreign allies who intervened in regional affairs benefitting from the internal splits among the states. However, these interventions did not alter or reshape the fundamental regional dynamics, which were based on conflict.⁴

India and Pakistan are major actors in South Asia. The post-Cold War regional security complex foresaw parallel trends of continuity and transformation in relations of India and Pakistan. The continuity of relationship is represented by three longstanding issues:

1. The conflict over Kashmir;

2. Communal issues that have been there from start and are exacerbated by episodic communal riots; and
3. The classical military rivalry between the two states, which has escalated with the relative development of nuclear and missile capabilities.⁵

The transformation in security dynamics as predicted by the theory of regional security complex is yet to mature. According to the theory, the transformation in security relations would be caused by two factors:

1. An internal transformation in the region due to the collapse of the regional bipolar structure, i.e., one of them ceases to be a regional power anymore; and
2. An external transformation possibly resulting from China overpowering India.

Some strategists believe that the regional security complex may be moving towards uni-polarity due to the fact that Pakistan is faced with challenges of internal security, ethnic issues, and adverse economic conditions, which undermine Pakistan's capacity to sustain itself as a power pole in the region.⁶ Although China is not a regional power, its rivalry with India and alliance with Pakistan would hamper Indian chances of becoming the singular power pole of South Asia.

Nuclear deterrence is the power balancer in South Asia. The security of the region depends upon the stability of deterrence, which is primarily stable until a conflict transforms into war. The possibility of a limited conventional war is not eliminated by nuclear deterrence, however, it retains a conflict as limited. This creates a stability-instability paradox in which states seek to conduct a limited conventional war with the security of not being attacked with nuclear weapons because it also possesses nuclear weapons to deter. This complicates the identification and quantification of factors that correspond to the stability of deterrence.⁷ The advancement of nuclear capabilities may complement deterrence stability.

Interestingly, the deterrence stability and the arms race between India and Pakistan correlate to each other. Further advancements in nuclear weapons and their related technology, on the one hand, indicate an arms race between India and Pakistan, while on the other hand, they also account for deterrence stability in the region. This makes South Asian security dynamics unique and different from the theoretical explanations of the Cold War concepts of power balancing and arms race.

South Asian security situation differs from the Cold War superpower rivalry in the following ways:

1. The dynamic of security in South Asia is formed by India and Pakistan with external powers influencing the strategic balance between them;
2. Unlike the Cold War, there are no great powers in direct conflict with each other in South Asia;
3. Geographically, there is contiguity between the two rival states, which was not there among the Cold War rivals; and
4. The foreign policy goals and worldview of Pakistan and India are different from each other.

The concept of the arms race in South Asia is starkly different from the concept during the Cold War era. Assessing the differences in dynamics of an arms race between India and Pakistan, as compared to those among the superpowers during the Cold War, is essential to analyse because South Asian deterrence is dynamic and has different conditions for stability.

Assessing the Arms Race in South Asia

There is a common belief that India and Pakistan are on the course of a ferocious nuclear arms race between them. The analysis of the arms race between the two countries involves the following three main elements:

1. Analyse the patterns of their respective nuclear policies and development of weapons systems;

2. Analyse the developments that form and contribute to the arms race; and
3. Analyse the technique used to identify and measure the existence of an arms race between South Asian powers.

Explanation of the nuances of the arms race and national security imperatives of a country is essential. Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler argue that national security and arms race are two different things. A state, on the one hand, may be considered involved in an arms race with another state, while on the other hand, it may be merely developing certain weapons sufficient for ensuring its national security.⁸ It is important to see that an arms development that corresponds to assuring national security has an impact on assessing an arms race between two adversaries. This argument holds especially when there are geographical and conventional asymmetries between the two rivals in a nuclear environment, as is the case with India and Pakistan. The nuclear policies of India and Pakistan reflect that they are not in an arms race with each other and that their nuclear developments are according to their national security compulsions. These security compulsions are primarily the result of mutual threat perception and a security dilemma. In the South Asian context, the security dilemma complements the regional security complex and vice versa. As a result, the pattern of arms development further contributes to both the processes of the security dilemma and regional security complex.

The security dilemma, in the regional context, means that the countries with conflictual relationship share a mutual apprehension that the security measures taken by one state would necessarily eventuate in the insecurity of the other state. The terminology was developed by John Herz to explicate that there is a dynamic 'action-reaction' cycle which corresponds to the insecurity of one state breeding insecurity for the other.⁹ This insecurity fosters a threat perception that creates an atmosphere of mistrust.

This threat perception and corresponding security dilemma have been part and parcel of the India-Pakistan relations right from the start. Ayesha Siddiqi, while explaining the relative threat perception and security dilemma, maintains that Indian threat perception is based on a belief that India is a regional power if not a global power. Pakistan, in alliance with China, however, resists Indian rise to that status. On the other hand, the strategic perspective of Pakistan is India-centric. It perceives that India never accepted the creation of Pakistan and wants to make it its small client state under the larger India and will lose no chance to dominate it if not completely destroy it.¹⁰ This security dilemma has resulted in nuclear weapons development and the resulting advancement in the nuclear missiles, which is generally referred to as an arms race between both the states.

Indian Nuclear Policy and Arms Build-up

The Indian nuclear policy has been undergoing an evolving transformation. The Indian strategic culture, as Rajesh Basrur points out, consists of the following four chief characteristics:

1. Low level of importance accorded to nuclear weapons;
2. A political rather than military approach to nuclear weapons;
3. Emphasis on minimum deterrence; and
4. Strong commitment to arms control.¹¹

However, there is a strong disconnect in policy and practicality. These nuclear developments, as explained by the regional security complex theory, cause a feeling of threat perception among the ranks of Pakistani policymakers.

Evolving Indian Force Postures

India had been following a defensive force posture until 2001-02 military stand-off against Pakistan. It transformed its posture from the Sundarji Doctrine of the 1980s with a new rather offensive one called the Cold Start Doctrine, which is essentially based on the limited war concept. According to this strategy, Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) are deployed near the border areas, which can penetrate into

enemy territory within 72 hours and capture some areas before the enemy can retaliate.¹² This strategy is aimed at acquiring the required outcomes by bargain over captured territory without escalation into a hot war. The basis of limited war concept can be traced back to the 19th century. Osgood has given the definition of limited war:

A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purpose for which they fight to concrete, well defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement... The battle is confined to a local geographical area and directed against selected targets - primarily those of direct military importance...It permits their economic, social and political patterns of existence to continue without serious disruption.¹³

However, in the India-Pakistan context, this classical definition of limited war is less relevant owing to the respective perspectives, nuclear doctrines, and force postures of the two countries. Indian perspective regarding limited war has been quite indifferent because, on the one hand, it has been advocating limited war as a possibility under a nuclear umbrella without escalating to a hot war, while on the other hand, it has been considering to retaliate in case of a nuclear attack after absorbing a nuclear strike. This indifference is evident in the two statements of former Indian defence minister George Fernandes following the Kargil crisis. During the crisis, while the aggressive statements were being exchanged, Fernandes stated, "Possibility of limited conventional war between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out; rather it has given a new attribute to the warfare in South Asia."¹⁴ He further stated, "nuclear weapons can only deter nuclear weapons, however, if conflict escalates to war, then India can survive a nuclear strike and hit back Pakistan with a massive

retaliation.”¹⁵ This statement essentially negates the definition and purpose of limited war as it focuses on the negotiated settlement, which is possible only when the conflict does not escalate.

The counter-narrative to this strategy is given by M. V. Ramana who stated that the assertions of Fernandes represented “a reflection of thinking that had been popularised by the US nuclear strategists [or to put it more bluntly, psychopaths].”¹⁶ He has quoted P. R. Chari, also articulating that “considering limited war as feasible is essentially flawed approach because it focuses on knowing precise perceptions and expecting absolute rationality of the adversary, none of which is reliable.”¹⁷ Despite such contradictory views, India has continued to cling on to the idea of limited conventional warfare, which has resulted in increased spending on conventional weapons.

The Pakistani perspective on limited war has also been indifferent. The official stance has been negating the possibility of a limited nuclear war, whereas the Kargil crisis, in practicality, represents the exercise of a limited war under a nuclear overhang. After the 2001-02 military stand-off, Abdul Sattar, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, stated:

There is no concept of limited war between two rival countries. If a country starts a war on a limited scale, there is no guarantee that it would remain limited. Anything can happen.¹⁸

This suggested that Pakistan solely depended upon deterrence based on the policy of ‘no, to NFU’. However, the Kargil crisis indicated otherwise.¹⁹

The consideration of limited war as an option under the nuclear environment is never a feasible idea because it is not based on a singular calculation. The calculation of intangible factors associated with the limited war psychology such as the following cannot be comprehensively calculated:

1. The state of mind during the conflict;
2. Intelligence inputs;
3. Relative uncertainties;
4. Domestic politics; and
5. Nature of crisis.

Rationality and logic recommend that, given Pakistan's conventional asymmetry and strategic constraints²⁰ and India's limitations regarding lesser response times in terms of a nuclear strike, no war between India and Pakistan can be assumed to be limited as it would always have the potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange.

Second Strike Capability: Nuclear Triad and ABM System

Fundamentally, nuclear triad consists of three major components: strategic bombers, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons. This triad substantially reduces the chances for wipe-out of all the nuclear force of a state as a result of the first strike by the enemy. Such a system essentially increases the deterrence potential of the state's nuclear forces.²¹ Indian nuclear policy works on the attainment of this triad.

India has developed the intermediate to long-range ballistic missiles including Agni-V, which has a range of 5,000+ kilometres. India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has declared that the future variant of Agni missile would be able to carry multiple warheads, which, according to a former head of DRDO, will be a "force multiplier."²² Agni-V already puts India there in the list of ICBM possessors.

Indian nuclear second-strike capability rests on its naval capabilities and nuclear submarines. India has joined the club of nuclear submarine operator countries along with the China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US. The development of nuclear submarines has added the third dimension to Indian defence capability.²³ Russian assistance has been vital in developing these nuclear submarines. INS

Arihant was activated on 10 August 2013, which is indigenously built nuclear submarine of India. Previously, Russia had leased INS Chakra for 10 years to India.

In addition to that, heavy investments are being made on the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. The motivations behind developing the BMD system are to provide India with the space for waging limited conventional war against Pakistan²⁴ and to develop the technical expertise relating to space and benefit from the opportunity of technical and political cooperation with the United States after Bush administration abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2001.²⁵ However, the BMD program is yet far from maturation.

It is interesting to note that Indian BMD is not necessarily a defence-based approach because it gives an impression that by ensuring the defence of the Indian cities, it is preparing for the first strike. Considering the notions given by Jaswant Singh in 2011 and Shyam Saran about abandoning the NFU notion and massive retaliation with nuclear weapons in response to tactical weapons further elevate the Pakistani threat perceptions.²⁶

Nuclear Trade and NSG Membership

The watershed developments in the history of nuclear trade and cooperation were the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement and the following Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver. They put India strategically and politically in an advantageous position vis-à-vis Pakistan. They not only allow India to have access to international nuclear trade but also help it in improving its nuclear arsenal qualitatively as well as quantitatively. So a correlation exists between India-US partnership and Pakistan's security considerations.²⁷ Furthermore, the US is supporting India in the NSG for full membership. This special treatment to India not only puts a question mark on the credibility of international nuclear export policies but also adds to the security concerns of Pakistan.

Seeing these developments, Indian nuclear policy gives an impression of confusion. The BMD system, the sea-based missiles system, and the development of ICBMs are neither minimum nor credible. The result is the disturbance of overall deterrence stability in the region. The intricate security dynamics of South Asia cannot afford a single state claiming hegemony over another state having the nuclear deterrent. The strategic imbalance created by these developments has eventuated into countermeasures from Pakistan.

Pakistan's Responses

These developments have a significant impact on the strategic and arms race stability in South Asia. These have added to the fragility of deterrence stability in the region. Pakistan's reaction to these developments has been limited and purely India-centric.

Short Range Nuclear Missiles as a Counter for Indian Offensive War Doctrines

Pakistan flight-tested Hatf-IX, Nasr (Arabic of Victory), on 19 April 2011. It has a 60 kilometres range and has the capability to carry a nuclear weapon with scoot and shoot properties.²⁸ The development of the short-range ballistic missile Nasr was exactly the manifestation of the credibility and communication of threat by Pakistan. This was, first, to counter the Indian limited war option in the form of the Cold Start Doctrine. Second, to cope with the conventional asymmetry of India²⁹ and, third, to introduce a variant in the nuclear arsenal to address the Indian BMD system. India also unveiled its tactical nuclear missile, Prahaar as a reaction to Nasr. Though the development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) is attributed to be risk-prone in terms of command and control, history testifies that if the command and control remained intact in the Cold War, it is less likely to fail today.³⁰

Strategic stability of South Asia has grown more complex owing to the non-state actors involved in terrorist activities across the Indo-Pak border. One can argue that with the introduction of TNWs if a

Mumbai attack-like scenario develops, the conflict would not escalate beyond a limited conventional one. So it can be posited that the strategic destabilisation caused by the Cold Start has been rectified by the TNWs.

Full Spectrum Deterrence

The phrase 'full spectrum deterrence' was used for the first time in the statement after the National Command Authority (NCA) meeting of 5 September 2013. Significantly, the term 'full spectrum deterrence' was used along with 'credible minimum deterrence' indicating that both conveyed different meanings. The apparent difference is that 'credible minimum deterrence' refers to deterrence against a massive attack by the adversary. But with the inclusion of the short-range ballistic missiles in the arsenal, more credibility has been added to the deterrence making it 'full spectrum deterrence'. In other words, Nasr has not only lowered the nuclear threshold of Pakistan but has also reduced the chances of Indian option of a limited war, adding strength to deterrence stability in the region.

Widening conventional arms disparity with India has pushed Islamabad to lower its nuclear threshold. The volatile regional security situation and discriminatory policies within the non-proliferation regime were the determining factors in Pakistan's decision to further strengthen its nuclear programme even though the country is facing a severe economic crisis.³¹

Balancing Against Racing: Analysis of Arms Race Between India and Pakistan

In the context of South Asia, just as an arms race in the region cannot be strictly confined to the developments of India and Pakistan only, the strategic balance in the region also cannot be confined to India and Pakistan either. The China factor is very important to be brought into the analysis. China is dragged into the equation of regional security complex through the alliance of China with Pakistan and its rivalry with India. To evaluate the existence of a nuclear arms

race between Pakistan and India, the following factors are crucial to consider:

First, there is a relative asymmetry in conventional weapons, geography, and economic strength. Based on this asymmetry, Pakistan and India assume different plans of action while developing nuclear weapons. As Tandler and Toby Dalton state:

India and Pakistan are racing toward their respective national security objectives, but they are running on different tracks and chasing vastly different goals.³²

The India-Pakistan arms development relationship cannot be explained by the classic models of arms race of the Cold War because the situation in South Asia is different. During the Cold War, the world was bipolar and no third power was involved to compel either or both of the adversaries to match its power and deter that. The deterrence concept was essentially limited to the Soviet Union and the United States. However, in South Asia, deterrence is not just confined to India and Pakistan. China is also involved in the equation. While Pakistan has to maintain its deterrence against India, India seeks to match power with a bigger power, i.e., China. Agreeably, when India seeks to balance power with China, it has to boost its power, which in turn creates a security dilemma for Pakistan as it has to balance India.

Second, the relative security strategies determine the arms development of India and Pakistan. These strategies are based on requirements rather than unnecessary developments that could correspond to the arms race between them. Regarding the development of missiles, India needs to go for long-range missiles because it has to target China. On the other hand, Pakistan relies on the development of short-range missiles because it only has to cope with the Indian threat. So, if Pakistan follows India in developing long-range missiles, it may mean that it is involved in an arms race with India, which is not the case here. Likewise, regarding the Indian

development of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), Pakistan does not necessarily require to match the same owing to its economic and technological constraints. Rather, it has opted to increase its number of missiles in order to cater to the anti-missile system, which, arguably, does not correspond to the arms race.

The Indo-Pakistani relationship is explained less by classic conventional or nuclear arms race models than by the asymmetries in their security strategies as reflected in the types of nuclear delivery capabilities they are developing.³³

Third, the conventional arms race models cannot be applied to determine the generalised model for the measurement of the extent of an arms race between India and Pakistan. The general estimation techniques include the number of stockpiles, the types of weapons systems, the fissile material stocks, the economic spending, etc. However, these techniques do not make arms race estimations comprehensive in the case of India and Pakistan. The number of stockpiles is never deterministic while types of weapons systems are strictly related to power balancing strategies. Economic spending is based on the overall size of economies, which cannot be matched. And lastly, the arms race estimations cannot be based on the number of stockpiles and fissile material stocks because of intangible factors that are involved in the quantitative as well as qualitative classification of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Pakistan sticks to the doctrine of credible minimum nuclear forces to maintain deterrence vis-à-vis India. Its nuclear forces are India-centric and aimed at balancing the strategic equilibrium in the region. Its nuclear posture is limited and nuclear development is in conformity with the doctrinal assertions. The National Command Authority (NCA), the premier body in Pakistan to oversee the nuclear development headed by the Prime Minister, has reiterated in its statements that "Pakistan would continue to adhere to the policy of

Credible Minimum Deterrence, without entering into an arms race with any other country."³⁴

The traditional techniques to determine the arms race trends are not able to explain the existence of an arms race between India and Pakistan. The complexity of security imperatives of India and Pakistan makes it difficult to develop a general model to ascertain mutual arms race among them. The differences in circumstances are sharp enough in South Asia to make it distinct from that of the Cold War arms race. In the Cold War, the two rivals were not in direct confrontation as is the case between India and Pakistan in South Asia. There is a distinct asymmetry between the relative capabilities of both states. Moreover, there is a difference in the mutual national interests of both. India has to take China into account while maintaining its minimum credible deterrence. This complexity in the South Asian security dynamics is different from that of the Cold War and so is the arms race pattern. And the relative arms build-up of India and Pakistan cannot be termed as an arms race.

Conclusion

The regional security complex theory explains that geographical proximity between India and Pakistan influences the South Asian security structure. The processes of securitisation and de-securitisation of India and Pakistan are interlinked and their relative security issues cannot be analysed separately. The transformation foreseen by the theory about the importance of China in the security equation of India and its intensive conflict seems evident in the current security dynamics of the region. The regional security complex is quite relevant in the case of South Asia in terms of geography and alliances. Geographically proximate rivals, India and Pakistan, are inherently conflicting because they share a common threat perception between them.

The arms race models of the Cold War do not define the arms development in South Asia due to the difference in circumstances and

power dynamics. The relative nuclear developments by India and Pakistan attribute to the complexity of security dynamics in the region. The three major players, India, Pakistan, and China make the security denominators complex to fit the relative nuclear developments into the Cold War models of the arms race. However, these developments do add to the complexity of South Asian security.

The relative force postures of India and Pakistan are different. Indian nuclear developments are aimed at achieving a minimum credible deterrence against both China and Pakistan. However, it is impossible to achieve a credible minimum deterrence against Pakistan and China simultaneously. To the contrary, Pakistan's deterrence is to address the Indian threat only. However, Indian developments force Pakistan to keep the strategic balance intact.

Evidently, there is no unending arms race between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's nuclear developments are to counter the Indian threat, while the Indian developments are to counter the Chinese as well as Pakistani threat. The arms development patterns are more complicated because of the inclusion of the Chinese factor in the equation of regional security complex of South Asia. So, as the strategic requirements of India and Pakistan are different, their relative capabilities are also different and, resultantly, their weapons development is different. Therefore, their relative arms development cannot be termed as an arms race. The schematic definitions of arms race used to elaborate arms race in the Cold War cannot be applied in full to the dynamics of arms developments in South Asia between India and Pakistan.

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