
Indo-US Partnership: From Estrangement to Engagement



Regional Studies
Vol 37, Issue 3
pp.32-58
© Author(s)

<http://irs.org.pk>
P-ISSN: 0254-7988
E-ISSN: 2959-5459

Date of Acceptance: 4 August 2019

Sabaha Khurshid*

Abstract

South Asian region has a great significance for the world powers and also for regional states because of their strategic interests. It has been more than 50 years since the independence of the South Asian countries but their political and economic situation is uncertain. The United States is considered one of the oldest democracies and India is considered the world's largest democracy. The perception is that if the world's two greatest democracies engage in a partnership, it will ultimately result in ensuring peace and stability in the region. The Indo-US partnership has gone through many ups and downs. This partnership has earlier faced estrangement and after a few years, it transformed into a strong bond based on the convergence of interests. This research aims to analyse the factors that contributed to the convergence of the interests of both states and how far both of them have come. The research also evaluates the security concerns for Pakistan.

Keywords: India, US, strategic partnership, engagement

Introduction

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US started asserting supremacy over a unipolar world militarily and politically. The short-term priorities of US policymakers did not make them lose sight of their long-term priorities and interest. The US is aiming to achieve and then sustain its dominant position in the South Asian region.

The relationship between India and the US has been complex. The relationship between the two countries has been cold for the first

* Ms Sabaha Khurshid is a graduate of International Relations from Bahria University, Islamabad.

few decades since Indian independence. During the Cold War, both countries had taken a ride of a rollercoaster in their relationship, i.e., sometimes at peak and sometimes below the average line. Other than this, there existed a kind of mistrust between both states. Because both the countries have so much in common, they did not succeed in convincing each other for their respective policies. This resulted in the creation of a vacuum between them. The Cold War era gave rise to two factions. One having the US and its allies and the other having the Soviet Union and its allies. India adopted the policy of non-alignment and tried to struggle for new world order. It was done by keeping good relations with both the factions of the Cold War. India, at that time, decided not to be a part of either side and tried to create a world order consisting of countries that were not interested in becoming a part of either side. Referred to as the non-alignment policy,¹ the states pursuing it were termed as non-aligned states. Considering all this and even though India declared itself to be a non-aligned state, it failed to convince and build a level of confidence among the American think-tanks and became a strategic partner of the Soviet Union in 1965. Since then, there has existed an air of mistrust between India and the United States. The reason for this was the Pakistan-centric US policies and its disregard for Indian interests. US mistrust was compounded by the fact that India supported the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, there were some serious efforts from both sides towards strengthening the relationship.

This research paper aims to assess the evolution of the Indo-US relationship. It evaluates how India and the United States moved from estrangement to engagement and the factors that led to the convergence of interests of both states. Besides, it discusses the security implications of the Indo-US engagement for Pakistan.

The Cold War Era

The history of the two states, i.e., India and the United States, has roots in the year 1492. This was the time when Columbus

discovered America during his search for a new route to India. Later on, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour during the Second World War, the President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt realised that the United States could use India as a base for conducting operations against Japan. This made the Roosevelt administration realise that India could only provide them with assistance if they showed interest in the Indian political crisis. Therefore, in 1941, there was an exchange of diplomatic personnel between the United States, India, and the British government.² President Roosevelt wanted a solution to the political turmoil in India but he refrained from any direct involvement in the British colony. President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Sir Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Great Britain, on 10 March 1942 in which he suggested to form a government in India that would represent different religious, cultural, and geographical groups along with the provinces belonging to the British and native princes, and it could be called a temporary 'Indian Dominion Government'.³ In April 1942, Roosevelt appointed Colonel Louis Johnson as an Ambassador to India but, in fact, he was sent as his representative.⁴ While the Cripps Mission stayed in Indian territory, Colonel Johnson held meetings with several political leaders and it was thought that all this was done under special instructions of President Roosevelt. Colonel Johnson also took a part in the Cripps Mission dialogues and negotiations, which was appreciated by India,⁵ as it was the first time that the United States took interest in the Indian problem and tried to make efforts in finding a solution. But later the Cripps mission failed to show any results due to which Roosevelt was quite disappointed. On 11 April 1942, Roosevelt wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister to express his disappointment on the failure of the Cripps Mission.⁶ Although the Mission failed to succeed, it laid the foundations for the future Indo-US political relationship.

The independence of India, however, was the start of the official relationship with the United States. India got independence

from the British rule on 15 August 1947. It was a new beginning for the Indo-US relationship. Despite the vast geographical distance as well as differences in norms, cultures, race, and traditions, there were the following similarities between India and the United States.

- India and the United States had been colonised by the same major power, i.e., Great Britain.
- Both India and the United States got freedom through political struggles. The US got freedom through an armed resistance while India adopted the strategy of getting freedom without violence.⁷

In the Cold War, the United States pursued a policy of containing communism, whereas India adopted the policy of non-alignment.⁸ This was a major difference that obstructed their relationship. India refused to become a part of any alliance and its stand on different international issues was not liked by the Americans. Whereas American support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue along with military aid and support to Pakistan on Bangladesh issue was not welcomed by the Indians.⁹

As India and Pakistan locked horns over Kashmir, India took the matter to the United Nations Security Council on 1 January 1948.¹⁰ India did not appreciate the role played by the US during this time, including at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as it considered it in support of Pakistan.¹¹ The US considered Pakistan strategically important for its future plans in the region. The solution to the Kashmir issue was important for obliging Pakistan in future.¹²

There was serious criticism of India in the US. One of the headlines in a leading newspaper of the US published a story with a title, 'India Hides behind Russia's Veto'.¹³ Furthermore, the US-supported Portugal—a member of the NATO—in the Goa crisis.¹⁴ Later, in 1962, when China invaded India's northern territories, India asked for military assistance from the UK and the United States.¹⁵ They provided aid but with the condition of solving the Kashmir issue by negotiating

it with Pakistan.¹⁶ The aid provided by the US was to restrict Chinese communism.

In 1975, the United States lifted a decade-old ban on the trade of arms in South Asia, which resulted in a hard reaction from the Indian side.¹⁷ This made India cancel the visit of its Minister for External Affairs to the US. In 1977, the Indo-US relationship improved during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who became the 39th President of the United States.¹⁸ Due to the difference in the interests, the US and India had some difference of opinion on global issues. The US saw communist China as a threat, whereas India was somehow in favour of China becoming a member of the UN.¹⁹ Differences over Diego Garcia further embittered the relationship between India and the US. It is an island located in the Indian Ocean, approximately a thousand miles from the Indian coast. The US wanted a naval base on the island, whereas India was against it. India assumed that a naval base in the Indian Ocean will result in a rivalry between great powers.²⁰ In 1968, despite being a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), an action not appreciated by the United States.²¹ These differences did not mean that there was a serious tension between India and the US. These developments were followed by some friendly gestures as well.

The visit of Indira Gandhi to the US in 1982 worked as an icebreaker in the Indo-US relationship.²² Later, her son, Rajiv Gandhi visited the US in 1985, the year he came into power, which further strengthened the relationship.²³ An MoU signed regarding the transfer of technology was appreciated in India.²⁴ The obstacles in the way of Indo-US relationship were further removed in 1986 and the relationship picked further pace in the post-Cold War era.

Initial Stages of Strategic Partnership

There was a great transformation of the relationship between the two states after the Cold War. After 9/11, there was a gradual but purposeful shift in the policies of the US. It tilted its policies, especially

security policies, towards South Asia.²⁵ The disintegration of the Soviet Union converged the interests of both New Delhi and Washington and they came closer. In the 21st Century, there were discussions and negotiations between India and the United States on the security aspects as well as military cooperation. It was a shift from the policy approach of the Cold War years.

The US was then looking at India to help it achieve a regional milestone in the post-Cold War era. The strategy and the policy it made for the post-Cold War era needed to be implemented and that was to strengthen its position in South Asia. To do this, the US had to have India on its side considering that the centre of gravity for the world in this region was going to be China as an emerging power and a challenge to the US. In the year 2000, after coming into power, President George W. Bush changed his policies towards the region and referred to China as a 'strategic competitor' rather than a 'partner'.²⁶ The Bush administration aspired to preserve the US national interest and started assisting India to rise and become a regional power. This Indo-US strategic partnership flourished just because of the US efforts to contain China in the region as they thought it would be a challenger to the US position in the existing world order. So the China factor played a pivotal role in strengthening this Indo-US partnership. In terms of the policy, the US and India have a China-centric policy, seeing China as a common threat bringing them closer.²⁷ India and South Korea in the South and Southeast Asia view China and its economic and military rise as a threat. Both had already been in alliance and started increasing their military and economic ties with a non-Asian military and economic powerhouse, that is, the United States. Considering the countries in East Asia, the US has a good relationship with Japan, as Japan perceives China and North Korea as a major threat.²⁸ As China is emerging in East Asia, it is posing a threat to Australia too. This threat has brought Australia and India closer and they wish to extend their ties to the United States. A Strategic

relationship and a union between Australia, Japan, and India would check Chinese strength in both the pacific region and Asia.

Defence Pact of 2005

On 28 June 2005, India and the United States signed a defence and military cooperation pact in Washington D.C.²⁹ This defence pact became highly beneficial to India for the production of weapons, assistance on the defence of missiles, and transfer of both civil and military technology and equipment to India.³⁰ It has enabled India to get access to US military technology without signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).³¹ This ten-year defence pact was signed for the achievement of two main goals:

- a) To assist India in emerging as a regional power to serve America's strategic goals in South Asia; and
- b) To help India expand its military might beyond its borders.

The Indo-US strategic partnership is based on common interests. It will pave new ways for India and the United States to cooperate on different levels for the coming ten years. Washington has admitted that this defence pact was to counter global security challenges and also to secure its strategic interests in South Asia.³² After a long session of talks, the defence ministers of both states expressed their views in a joint press conference in which they stated that a new era of a strategic partnership between the two countries had started. The Defence Procurement Agreement was formulated on the decision of both countries to keep a check on defence trade, collaboration in terms of technology, joint naval exercises and training, research, and development, as well as evaluation. There was a strong reason for setting up this Defence Procurement and Production Group.³³ The agreement helped the US rise above the criticism that it did not supply high technology equipment and weapons to India and considered its relationship with Pakistan more important.

Indo-US Nuclear Agreement

In February 2006, the then President of the United States George W. Bush visited India. The two sides signed a much-hyped and discussed civil-military energy cooperation pact or agreement during the visit. The deal signed by the two states was one of its kind and created plenty of noise among the non-proliferation lobby. The reason was that the signing of the pact provided India with a shield against not becoming a part of the NPT.³⁴

Different analysts across the globe have analysed a lot of aspects of this deal both inside and outside the South Asian region but still, they are leaving some voids. As all this discussion, analysis, and debate somehow miss the implications of this deal. Some key points have been missed. These key points need to be discussed and analysed holistically. The earlier debates were more focused on the immediate and the first-stage implications that this deal would bring but there was no consideration or strategy for the long run. The key points that were missed in most of the discussions were as follows: first, what impact would this deal have for the global stakeholders? Second, what would be the implications for Pakistan considering its rivalry with India? Third, what this deal signifies in terms of geostrategic alliances in the region? These implications were not considered at the time this deal was signed by the signatories.³⁵

The deal of energy cooperation at that time with India was called a 'significant plum' for the US, which was considered the world's largest democracy and it made India its strong and influential strategic partner in South Asia for the coming years.³⁶ Considering its rivalry with India, Pakistan demanded an expansion of its nuclear power plants and asked the Bush administration to help, which was rejected. Washington's deal with New Delhi for supplying new weapons and establishing an energy deal, along with the rejection of Pakistan's demand for assistance in power production was not a good idea. As speculated, the deal pushed Pakistan and the US farther from one

another.³⁷ Critics in Pakistan were of the view that by signing this deal with India the US made it clear to Pakistan that it would favour India at the cost of Pakistan. The Indo-US deal had implications both regionally and globally.³⁸ Although the implications it had for Pakistan were severe, it still tried to strengthen its relationship with the US and extend cooperation in different fields.

This deal and its consequences right after it got signed exposed the fragility of the global principles in the face of national interests of powerful states. On the one hand, it provided an opportunity to states for engagements outside the NPT. On the other hand, it proved to escalate conflict and tension in South Asia. The nuclear arms race in South Asia has escalated, which has endangered peace and stability of the region and requires preventive measures to defuse tensions and reduce the chances of a nuclear mishap.³⁹

Indo-US Convergence of Interests

National interest deals with survival and protection of different types of entities against the other states.⁴⁰ The foreign policy of a state is always designed keeping in view the national interest.⁴¹ That is why there is a relationship between foreign policy and the national interest and this is evident in international politics.

The strategic partnership between India and the United States showed that there were a lot of fields and arenas that were yet to be explored by these two countries. This strategic partnership holds a lot of potential and strength to be a part of different sectors such as contributing in weapons and nuclear cooperation, economy, supporting GDP growth, fighting for freedom, and enhancing, maintaining, and strengthening democratic values. Their commitment and will to collaborate for the growth of the economy and to help in the growth of GDP and markets made them join hands in fighting against influenza and other viruses including HIV.⁴²

Collaboration on Countering Terrorism

9/11 marks a turning point in the history of terrorism and counter-terrorism.⁴³ Post-9/11, counter-terrorism became the key factor for cooperation between India and the US. As years passed on, the Mumbai attacks, which are also referred to as 26/11, further strengthened this partnership to counter-terrorism and also took it to the level of sharing of intelligence and capacity building.⁴⁴ India and the United States have been a part of an informal partnership since 2000 but they both launched a formal Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) in 2000. This group had to meet once or twice a year.⁴⁵ However, many political critics in India showed concerns and reservations over the US support to India in countering terrorism, which, in their view, poses a threat to India.

It is evident from the history of Indo-US relations that India has been upset over the US giving statements in favour of Pakistan when it came to taking action against terrorists.⁴⁶ India also had reservations over the US not supporting them in getting information related to terrorism and to embarrass Pakistan globally over its linkages with Kashmiri militants who, they alleged, might also have connections with Al-Qaeda. Indians believed that until the terrorism originating from Pakistan did not hit American interests, the US was not ready to act against it.⁴⁷ Both countries, however, worked on their loopholes and tried to work out on their differences to strengthen their partnership. Mutual cooperation among these two on issues of counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and working for democracy and freedom had always been the key points in every Indo-US summits. This shows their partnership for countering terrorism and to get their interests served.⁴⁸

The US support to Indian stance linking the global war on terror and the freedom fighting in Kashmir was a setback for the struggle. Indian strategy of defaming Pakistan as a terrorist state started picking pace after the attacks in Mumbai in 2008, where India started

portraying itself as a victim.⁴⁹ India jumped on the Islamic terrorism bandwagon immediately after 9/11, as it fits together with its propaganda against so-called Pakistani terrorist activities. The US acknowledged Indian efforts on countering terrorism and on the other hand demanded from Pakistan to do more and stop militant infiltration into the India-Occupied Kashmir (IOK).⁵⁰ There was immense pressure on Pakistan on the claims of India that Pakistan supported and gave funds to the Islamic terrorist groups operating on its territory. The presence of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan and his killing further strengthened Indian stance to call Pakistan a terrorist state.⁵¹

Economic Gains


The year 2010 was thought to be a year of development for India. It was said that by the end of that year India would increase its imports and would outpace the imports of European nations and Japan together. The four Asian Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) include China, India, South Korea, and Indonesia. Poland, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and India have crucial significance in terms of world economy already, they constitute nearly 40 per cent of the world population and half the GDP of all the BEMs, this means that by the next 20 years this could mean two-thirds of the total import growth of these countries.⁵² India has outpaced China and South Korea in the field of Biotech as it has shown significant development in this field. Not only this but the preservation of food, telecommunication, and insurance policies in the financial sector have also significantly helped in economic growth. For the optimisation of businesses at a small scale and also for agricultural development, micro-financing schemes were introduced by the banking sector so that green revolution would turn into a reality. All these developments showed that the more you invest in development, the more will be the economic growth of a country. Other regional states have not touched the bar set by India where half of the economy is provided by the service and manufacturing sector

whereas agriculture provides quarter. India has developed itself in terms of technology. Moreover, it gained an international status because of its services as it provides one-fifth of the world's software exports.

The sheer size of the Indian population allows it to utilise its human resource. India has abundant labour. Another factor that provides India with an edge over China is that before becoming rich and strong it will get old sooner.⁵³ The economic growth of India in the local and international market was a dominant factor that made the US think that it should enhance and strengthen its economic ties with India.

Emphasis has been put by India on two significant questions to be answered by the United States. On 21 December 2005, the then Indian Foreign Minister Shyam Saran visited Washington, D.C., and highlighted "closer cooperation with the international market."⁵⁴ Secondly, India stressed the point that development and economic growth will ultimately strengthen democracy. Furthermore, it suggests that economic growth will bring a lot of benefits and outcomes that will help in reducing poverty and suffering for the masses of the country. Ultimately it will make democracy in India successful and that is what the US wants and it will be in favour of the US strategic interests.⁵⁵

Figure 1:
US Economic Aid to India in Every Sector from 2001-2019



Source: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IND>

Chinese Influence

China has shaped the Indo-US relationship since its existence. The US desired to stress and promote the concept of unilateralism worldwide during the post-Cold War era.⁵⁶ The Indo-US strategic partnership has vindicated all the hard work of India to gain the long-awaited regional supremacy endangering the interests of China.⁵⁷

In South Asia, China is countering India’s ambitions to rise as a leading world power and also to have a hold of the region. Besides, the involvement of the US in the South Asian region and the strategic partnership of India and the United States acts as a barrier in the way of its harmonious relations with the region.⁵⁸

Amusingly, India’s main aim is balancing its interests with various states and to become an important player and show its performance in the region as well as across the globe.⁵⁹ Having China as a neighbour in the region and the border issues with Pakistan resulting in war, India began to develop and adopted a nuclear policy. It was done to balance the threat and competition in the region. India gained nuclear weapons and proclaimed the nuclear doctrine in 1974

stating that the weapons were for a peaceful purpose and not a threat. But the friendship of Pakistan and China is old enough and they are on the same page regarding the security concerns and also on the Kashmir issue. That is why China is ambivalent towards India.⁶⁰ Some experts argue that it is China that compelled India to become a nuclear state just to balance the competition in the region.

War in Afghanistan

India and Afghanistan had close ties before the rise of the Taliban. India had always supported and assisted Afghanistan in the initiation of propaganda against Pakistan. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the Indian intelligence agency and government supported the Soviets against the mujahideen. The attacks of 9/11 came as an opportunity for India to make its way back into the Afghan soil. From then on, India has tried to adopt high-level diplomacy for its engagement in Afghanistan. According to Indian claims, their high-level engagement in Afghanistan is because it wants peace and stability along with the development in the country. However, that is so not true. India may have some hidden agenda behind it considering its economic and strategic interests.⁶¹

Following are some of the economic interests of India in Afghanistan:

- Afghanistan provides a gateway to the Central Asian states;
- Afghanistan will provide grounds to India to counter China's growing influence in the Central Asian states;
- After completion of India's Chabahar Port project in Iran, Indian goods will be transported to Afghanistan circumventing the route of Pakistan;
- Afghanistan will serve as a market for Indian goods; and
- India's presence in Afghanistan will help it to become a part of major projects regarding Pakistan.⁶²

The strategic interests include:


- India will have an upper hand in Afghanistan against Pakistan;

- Increasing the presence of India in every field including politics and development;
- Have a pro-India Afghan government;
- To establish a strong opposition against China's growing economic influence in Central Asian Republics (CARs); and
- Establishing an opposite land route against Gwadar Port to Afghanistan and CARs.⁶³

After 9/11, Indians were brought by the United States into Afghanistan for its interests.⁶⁴ Afghanistan's support to India for conducting operations in Pakistan from Afghan territory shows that the US is aware of this collaboration and the jihadi and terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan. 9/11 brought India and the United States closer in Afghanistan along with collaborating on other regional and global issues. The interests of India and the United States converged in Afghanistan at the following points:

- To keep an eye on Pakistan and its activities regarding nuclear capability;
- Using Afghanistan for getting access to the oil/gas enriched states of Central Asia;
- Countering China's growing economic and development progress in Central Asia by increasing its military presence in Afghanistan;
- To have a government in Afghanistan that will serve their interests;
- Diffusing Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan deeply by supporting Northern Alliances;
- To become a part of any great oil/gas project that has something to do with Pakistan;
- To influence the internal issues Pakistan is facing like Balochistan and water issues; and
- India's activities in Balochistan to create hurdles in the way of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Figure 2
Sector-wise Division of Indian Assistance in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2017



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research, Centre for Policy Research

Security Concerns for Pakistan

The strategic partnership between India and the US, which consists of a 10-year agreement and a nuclear agreement, the United States may have made up its mind to give greater consideration and importance to India. This has given rise to doubts and speculations in the US and countries of the South Asian region who were alarmed because of concerns related to nuclear proliferation. The most important difference was that the Bush administration was planning to sign a nuclear deal with a non-signatory state of the NPT. This was a serious distinction. Besides, the agreement did not impose any sort of check on the nuclear ability of India for security and defence motives. It gave rise to serious challenges for the Asian states, especially for those that had outstanding disputes with India. George W. Bush took a

critical yet very unfavourable step by giving nuclear technology to a state that had not yet signed the NPT.⁶⁵

No essential restrictions were imposed on the ability of India to make nuclear arms. The deal had geopolitical implications for the US strategy on Asia.⁶⁶ Pakistan's security is threatened because of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system⁶⁷ in which India has superiority due to the defence deal between the two states. The existence of a nuclear environment would involuntarily give rise to threats, chaos, and turmoil in the South Asian region. In addition to that, activating the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)⁶⁸ is an indication of disparity in the region. The PSI is a fragment of the US concept of 'coalition of the willing', which intends to denounce the worldwide law of the sea by allocating the members of its union the right to cease trading of doubtful transportation of WMD stuff and equipment on the international waters.⁶⁹ Under the Indo-US strategic partnership, maritime security is nothing but a reason to keep safe the maritime region that would induce serious maritime problems between the two arch-rivals in the Indian Ocean, i.e., Pakistan and India, and in the seven seas as well. The world has been coming in contact with the new opportunities along with new challenges for the past so many years. The neighbouring states of India have serious concerns and reservations over the development that is making India play an oversized role in the region. Also, India may assume itself as a regional policeman and it is all because of the support the US is giving to India. Additionally, India has supported insurgencies in Sri Lanka and its evidence of links with Nepal and Bangladesh are also doubtful as mentioned in *Views Differ on JC. U.S. Energy Deal with New Delhi* by Steven Fidler.⁷⁰ The US had been giving a lot of importance to India and considers it to be an important sphere of influence in the South Asian region.⁷¹ The Bush administration praised New Delhi to intensify its already substantial commitment with Kabul.⁷²

The first term of Bush was marked by a conversion when India was forced by the then Secretary of State to limit its communication with the Karzai government and also to limit its support to the post-Taliban establishment as it was disliked by the then President of Pakistan Gen. Musharraf.⁷³ In March 2004, Pakistan was given a status of a major non-NATO ally in appreciation of its support in the war on terror in Afghanistan by the US. In June 2005, however, India was given a status of the 10-year long-term ally, which resulted in a strategic imbalance in the South Asian region.

The tribal areas of Pakistan were affected badly by the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan, which were led by the US. These elements had been a cause of tension between Pakistan and the US. Other than this, the Indo-US partnership without a doubt had been supporting and bracing the involvement of India in Afghanistan. President Bush on his visit to New Delhi in March 2006 stated in a speech that he wanted to thank and appreciate the nation and the government of India for accepting and assisting a newly formed democracy in the region, i.e., in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Furthermore, India has promised aid of about \$565 million for reconstruction and almost \$50 million for the construction of the new building of the Afghan lower house.

The United States has failed to avert the comeback of the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ Pakistan's efforts to address the concern was seen as doubtful by the US. Consequently, India was encouraged to start deadly propaganda against neighbouring Pakistan for providing shelter and assistance to the terrorists. A grave security concern for Pakistan is that the new Indo-US defence cooperation will make India have more authority and presence in Afghanistan. The deal on missile and defence cooperation between the two nuclear allies, i.e., India and the US, is a major concern for Pakistan. These developments in the fields of defence and missile technology were explained by George Koblentz that the accession of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) by India is an

effort to dispossess Pakistan of its guaranteed ability to strike back and it would be a threat to the nuclear balance in South Asia. The Government of Pakistan feared that during a crisis, it would not be able to perceive the first attack by India, which would depend on the ability of its defence system of missiles.⁷⁶

Pakistan had strong reasons to show its reservations over it as it was capable to diminish the retaliation by Pakistan in terms of nuclear war. Also, it would give India an edge against Pakistan and could tangle Pakistan in a conventional war without any threat of strike from Pakistan's nuclear defence. Some gaps in the security balance of the region may have an impact and end up in chaos and restlessness in the region.⁷⁷ India is committed to access more developed and refined arms to decrease the deterrence and nuclear ability of Pakistan giving more strength to India's nuclear defence. The Indo-US cooperation in terms of defence is not maintaining balance in the South Asian region and ultimately it would have chaotic effects for Pakistan's missile defence ability. The undermining results of the advance supply of arms to India for South Asia need to be highlighted. The strategic balance in the region would get dismantled by the supply of the ABM system to India.

There has been a geopolitical shift in the region after the strategic partnership between India and the United States and it has raised some serious concerns for China.⁷⁸ As the newspapers and other sources in Beijing that are the representative of the Communist Party of China have asserted that every nuclear state has its allies according to its interests. The intimate terms between China and Pakistan and China's serious efforts to strengthen Pakistan's military capability had always been seen by the US with suspicion. On the other hand, China is aware of the growing military capability of India and is also keeping an eye on the strategic partnership that is strengthening India. China has been rankling in the hearts of the US policymakers for quite a long time as the US dream of dominating the region is endangered by the

rise of China and it is reasonable according to the US to make India stand strong to balance the weight and counter China in the region.⁷⁹

A talk between the US Under-Secretary and the Indian Secretary was made public by the Daily *Telegraph* in its report, which highlighted that China had been discussed extensively during the conversation and that US aim was not to contain China.⁸⁰

China has not yet come up with any policy against the US supply of arms to India. The partnership may result in a geopolitical shift in the region. This will ultimately challenge the sovereignty of small South Asian states. That is why the US is making India powerful to help in the US imperial outreach and to deal with any kind of crisis in the region. This Indo-US partnership would result in the launching of different ventures in the name of countering terrorism, which would be directly threatening the freedom, peace, and harmony of the world. India and the US will work side-by-side to support each other and grow the military capability of India to counter China on the one hand and to counter terrorism emanating from the 'Muslim World' on the other.⁸¹

Notes and References

- ¹ Non-Alignment Policy means a policy that is adopted by states to not become an ally or enemy of any great power.
- ² "Introduction: An Overview of Indo-U.S. Relations (1947 – 1991)," available at https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/160352/6/06_chapter%201.pdf (last accessed on 11 September 2019).
- ³ "National Archives and Records Service Franklin D. Roosevelt Library," available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0009.pdf (last accessed 11 September 2019).
- ⁴ Kenton J. Clymer, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look," *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. 57, No. 3 (1988): 261–84, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3640705>.
- ⁵ Sidhartha Samanta, *The Final Transfer of Power in India, 1937-1947: A Closer Look*, n.d., 164.
- ⁶ "Roosevelt To Churchill March - April 1942," *National Archives And Record Service, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*, (New York: Microfilmed at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park).
- ⁷ Kumar Dheeraj, "Indo-U.S. Relations: Historical Perspectives," *Center for Contemporary Conflict*, Strategic Insights, viii (August 2009).
- ⁸ Moti Lal Govila, "Indo-American Relations in the Post War Decade," *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1959): 114–31.
- ⁹ Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, "US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars," *Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, South Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (June 2010): 21–37.
- ¹⁰ "Text of India's Complaint to the Security Council," available at https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/complaint_2_security_council_1948.htm (last accessed on 12 September 2019).
- ¹¹ "Un_s_failure_in_kashmira_factual_survey.Pdf," available at https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1965_17/40/un_s_failure_in

- _kashmira_factual_survey.pdf (last accessed on 12 September 2019).
- ¹² Kumar, "Indo-U.S. Relations: Historical Perspectives."
 - ¹³ Tewari, *Indo-US Relations, 1947-1976*.
 - ¹⁴ Oliveira Salazar, "Goa and the Indian Union: The Portuguese View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1956): 418–31, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20031174>.
 - ¹⁵ Surjit Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1994): 285–300, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644986>.
 - ¹⁶ Bhagat Vats, *Foreign Intrigue against India* (Aman Publishers; [distributors: Rama Krishna, 1967]).
 - ¹⁷ Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, "A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977," *IPRI Journal XIII*, No. 2 (Summer 2013): 21–41.
 - ¹⁸ "James Carter | The White House," available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-carter/>. (last accessed 12 September 2019).
 - ¹⁹ Nabarun Roy, "Why Did Nehru Want the People's Republic of China in the United Nations?" *The Diplomat*, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/why-did-nehru-want-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-the-united-nations/>. (last accessed on 12 September 2019).
 - ²⁰ S. P. Seth, "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relations," *Asian Survey* Vol. 15, No. 8 (1975): 645–55, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643382>.
 - ²¹ Muhammad Sadiq, "International Non-Proliferation Regime: Pakistan And Indian Perspectives," *IPRI Journal XIII*, No. 1 (Winter 2013): 13–36.
 - ²² Paul H. Kreisberg, "India After Indira," October 30, 2017, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/1985-03-01/india-after-indira>.
 - ²³ Annex 1 attached.

- 24 Linda de, *Rajiv Gandhi and President Reagan Set Basis for U.S.-India Relations*, n.d., 2.
- 25 Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Indo-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan's Security," available at https://www.academia.edu/991203/The_Indo-US_Strategic_Relationship_and_Pakistans_Security. (last accessed 21 July 2019).
- 26 Muhammad Ishfaq Fani, "The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan," *Diffusion of Information Technology, Pakistan Vision*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (n.d.).
- 27 R. Nicholas Burns, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, no. 6 (2007): 131-46.
- 28 News International, 10 October 2006.
- 29 Zahid Ali Khan, "Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser," *South Asian Studies, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (June 2013): .241-257.
- 30 Khan, "A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977."
- 31 Kathleen H. Hicks et al., "US India Security Cooperation; Progress and Promise for the Next Administration," *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, October 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/161003_Hicks_USIndiaSecurity_Web.pdf.
- 32 Ghayoor Ahmad, "India's Defence Ties with US."
- 33 Kapur, S. Paul, and Sumit Ganguly. "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2007), 642-56. doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.4.642.
- 34 P.M. Kamath, "Civilian Nuclear Deal: Turning Point in Indo-US Relations," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2006): 23-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45073309>.
- 35 Moeed Yusuf, "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: An Impact Analysis," *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, 47-56.

- ³⁶ Mavara Inayat, "US -India Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond," *Regional Studies*, Vol. 24 (2006), 20.
- ³⁷ Mirza Aslam Beg, "Indo-US Defense Pact Challenge and Response", *National Development and Security*, Vol. 13 (2005), 5-6.
- ³⁸ Paul, T. V. "The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime." *International Journal*, Vol.62, No. 4 (2007), 845-61, available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204340>.
- ³⁹ "Ten Years of the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement: Implications for Pakistan," *South Asian Voices*, 31 October 2018, <https://southasianvoices.org/ten-years-indo-us-civilian-nuclear-agreement-implications-pakistan/>.
- ⁴⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), viii, xii, and 283.
- ⁴¹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 2nd edition. (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- ⁴² Muhammad Abrar Ahmad, "Indo-US Strategic Cooperation and Security Concerns of Pakistan," 2014, 10.
- ⁴³ Stephen Marche, "Al Qaeda Won – Foreign Policy," available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/10/al-qaeda-won/>, (last accessed 8 September 2019).
- ⁴⁴ Ahmad Ejaz, "United State-India Strategic partnership: A new course in the Asian balance-of-power politics," *JPUHS*, Vol.29, No.2, July-December 2016, available at http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/HistoryPStudies/PDF-FILES/3-v29_2_16.pdf, (last accessed on 22 July 2019).
- ⁴⁵ Lisa Curtis, "Building a Strategic Partnership: US-India Relations in the Wake of Mumbai," *Testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia*, the US House of Representatives, available at <http://www.heritage.org/testimony/building-strategic-partnership-us-india-relationsthe-wake-mumbai> (last accessed 26 February 2019).

- 46 Sadaf Farooq, Sadia Kazmi, and, Javaria Javed, "Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan." *Policy Perspectives*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2018): 3-20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.15.1.0003>.
- 47 Menon Shivshankar, "What China's Rise Means for India," *Wire*, available at <http://thewire.in/2016/01/04/what-chinas-rise-means-for-india-18511/>, (last accessed 4 January 2016).
- 48 "US India Security Cooperation."
- 49 Saroj Kumar Rath, "26/11 Mumbai Attacks: India Is Hamstrung." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2010): 36-71. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504857>.
- 50 W.P.S. Sidhu et al., "Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Southern Asia", (Stimson Center, 1998), JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10960>.
- 51 Ejaz Ahmed, "U.S. Policy On Kashmir Dispute In The Post-Cold War Period," 2016, 26.
- 52 Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmad, "Growing Indo-US Nexus," *Pakistan Defense Review*, (2005), 7.
- 53 Parag Klianna and C. Reja Mohan, "Getting India Right", *Policy Review*, Vol. 135. (2006): 59. See also <http://www.policyreview.rof/135default.html>, (last accessed on February-March, 2006).
- 54 "Indian Foreign Relations 2005," available at https://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/186_foreign-relations-2005.pdf.(last accessed 9 September 2019).
- 55 Mavara Inayat, "US -India Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond", *Regional Studies* 24(2006): 20.
- 56 Denny Roy, "Current Sino-U.S. Relations in Strategic Perspective," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1998): 225-40.
- 57 Jinghao Zhou, "Does China's Rise Threaten The United States?" *Asian Perspective* Vol. 32, No. 3 (2008): 171-82.
- 58 Ishrat Afshan Abbasi, "China's South Asia Curiosities and Strategies," *Journal for East & South East Asia*, Vol. 25 (2005), 105.
- 59 Mert Arslanp, *Multifaceted Diplomacy in the Indian Foreign Policy*, www.dispollitikaforumu.org/index2.php?option=com.6-2-4-09.

- ⁶⁰ Asma Rashid, "Pak-China Partnership: Us And India's Response," *Margalla Papers*, 2017, https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Paper-2017/18-Pak-China-Partnership-Asma-Rashid.pdf.
- ⁶¹ Dr. Subhash Kapila, "Afghanistan: India Has Legitimate Strategic Interests In Its Stability", *South Asian Analysis Group*, available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpaper3149.html>, (last accessed 15 April 2009).
- ⁶² Afifa Kiran, "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress In Afghanistan And Its Implications for Pakistan," *ISSRA (2009) Papers*. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/issra-paper/ISSRA-paper-vol-i-2009/02-indian-quest-for-strategic-ingress-in-afghanistan.pdf.
- ⁶³ Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, "India," in *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan*, Implications for the United States and the Region (RAND Corporation, 2012), 11–24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1q6105.9>.
- ⁶⁴ Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi, "Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making," available online at www.qurtuba.edu.pk/.../02Indian%20Encroachment%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf.
- ⁶⁵ *The New York Times*, 5 March 2006.
- ⁶⁶ David Snager, "We are (Aren's) Safer with India in the Nuclear Club", *New York Times*: 5 March 2005.
- ⁶⁷ Theater Missile Defense which is also called as Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) is actually a system to deploy the nuclear arms and weapons for security purpose of a state or the region. The main aim of TMD is to deter the threat perception in the region. This system is capable of detecting a ballistic missile before reaching its target and destroys it in the air. It was first designed by United States in the start of 21st century.
- ⁶⁸ Proliferation Security Initiative is an effort at the global level for stopping trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their system of delivery, their making, and the material that is used in their making. This effort was made to put an end to the delivery system

to and from both state and the non-state actor for the concerns of proliferation.

- ⁶⁹ Shireen Mazari, 5-6.
- ⁷⁰ Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Quest for Security and the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 2006): 117–37, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10163270609464109>.
- ⁷¹ Financial Times, March 3, 2006.
- ⁷² Anwesha Ghosh, *Afghanistan from 'Enduring Freedom' to 'Enduring Chaos'? Implications for India*, available at https://www.academia.edu/11352206/Afghanistan_from_Enduring_Freedom_to_Enduring_Chaos_Implications_for_India (last accessed 12 September 2019).
- ⁷³ Nayar K.P., "The U.S. Recognized South Asia as India's Sphere of Influence," *The Telegraph*, 5 April 2005.
- ⁷⁴ *President Discusses Strong U.S.-India Partnership in New Delhi, India*, available at <https://georgewebush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060303-5.html>. (last accessed on 12 September 2019).
- ⁷⁵ *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* / Kenneth Katzman. (University of Arizona Libraries, 2015), https://doi.org/10.2458/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds371_4_k389_2015.
- ⁷⁶ (PDF) *Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix*, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254334658_Theater_missile_defense_and_South_Asia_A_volatile_mix. (last accessed on 12 September 2019).
- ⁷⁷ Muhammad Abrar Ahmad, "Indo-US Strategic Cooperation And Security Concerns Of Pakistan," *JPUHS* Vol. 27, No. 2, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/HistoryPStudies/PDF-FILES/Muhammad%20Abrar%20Ahmad_v27No2Dec2014.pdf. (last accessed December 2019).
- ⁷⁸ Zhou, "Does China's Rise Threaten The United States?"
- ⁷⁹ Steven Fidler, "Views Differ on U.S. Energy Deal with New Delhi," *Financial Times*, 3 March 2006.

- ⁸⁰ Ahmad, "Indo-US Strategic Cooperation And Security Concerns Of Pakistan," December, 2014.
- ⁸¹ Mirza Aslam Beg, "Indo-US Defense Pact Challenge and Response," *National Development and Security*, Vol. 13 (2005): 5-6.