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OCEAN ECONOMY PLANNING: ADAPTABILITY OF THE "BLUE ECONOMY" MODEL IN BANGLADESH MARITIME CONTEXT

ABUL KALAM*

Abstract

Ocean economy planning has lately acquired urgency and spurred the concept of 'Blue Economy'. Maritime countries like Bangladesh have evinced interest in it to safeguard and advance their oceanic destiny. Following successive international maritime verdicts (2012/2014) largely favourable to Bangladesh, it has embraced Blue Economy as a strategic approach to access the resources underneath its newly acquired oceanic possessions. However, concerns arise whether pertinent conceptual issues are appropriately appraised and managed; whether critical empirical issues are measured, and whether the actions for maritime planning currently underway represent the progression required to overcome the emerging ecosystemic threats or building of what is enshrined under the Blue Economy. With a view to evaluate such issue areas, the paper offers a fuller clarity of a sustainable ocean economy and other pertinent notions, identifies key conceptual issues, and relates them to the developmental thrusts under the Blue Economy that are currently underway. Finally, it reflects on the adaptability of the Blue Economy model, as Bangladesh pursues policies to fix its oceanic destiny. Thoughts are also offered on the challenges that may circumvent successful implementation of the Blue Economy planning in Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the current contexts of Bangladesh's ocean economy planning and the criteria chosen are scrutinised, underlining several cases where the projects embarked under the Blue Economy model seem incompatible with that model's objective features and

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may impede sustainable ocean economy planning towards fixing the country's maritime destiny. Tentative ideas are floated to sensitise Pakistan in its ocean economy planning.

Introduction

The ocean is the largest and most critical ecosystem on earth. It is also the foremost biologically diverse and highly productive system on the planet, and potentially the largest provider of food, materials, energy, and ecosystem services. However, the past and current uses of the ocean are deemed unsustainable. Demand for resources has been increasing, while technological advances, overfishing, climate change, pollution, shrinking biodiversity, and habitat loss, along with inadequate stewardship and law enforcement, emerge as some of the sources of unsustainability. All such phenomena have been contributing to the ocean's deterioration in the ecosystem.[1] It hardly needs saying that ocean economy planning is a pivotal component of sustainable geo-maritime development. It closely interacts with regional and national maritime security and growth planning. In an age of mounting resource scarcities and intensifying struggles for livelihoods, ocean planning looks critical for nations to cooperatively resolve the challenges of living and development. As the world's landscapes encounter enormous challenges to cope with expanding human needs, the earth's broader maritime spaces feature prominently towards meeting the ever-growing human requirements. Ocean economy planning provides scope for cross-cutting multi-sectoral engagements both within and beyond nation-states. It may help identify and resolve potential areas of conflicts, besides providing opportunities to the policymakers and planners for sustainably channelling progressive ideas on ocean economy development towards the wellbeing of all concerned.

Security and sustainable growth of resource-scarce nations like Bangladesh feature prominently in such a prospective scenario of national development. Bangladesh, similar to most other maritime countries, is profoundly dependent on its extensive maritime possessions (see Map 1). These comprise coastal areas, territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf.[2] It is reliant on these open aquatic spaces to its south for food, income, and the well-being of its teeming millions, on top of its expanding trade and businesses, which currently form its life-line. The pressure of dependence would develop

more and more in future as the population booms. It is true that both the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean hold enormous economic potential and abundant marine ecosystems of the country. Following the maritime verdicts that it won in the disputes with the neighbours, Bangladesh embraced 'Blue Economy' as a strategic approach to avail itself of its newly found maritime possessions. In essence, the Blue Economy is projected as an oceanic developmental approach that will lead to improved human well-being and social equity, coupled with a significant reduction in environmental risks and ecological scarcities. Bangladesh has since been working on a Blue Economy action plan to maximise its maritime gains.

There is, however, a growing concern regarding the country's maritime destiny, as it faces the outlook of severe threats to its maritime environment and damages to its oceanic resources. Pollution from chemicals and plastics has begun to choke its coastlines and the bay, destroying ecosystems and prospects offered by the newly acquired maritime possessions. There are also higher frequencies of natural disasters due to climate change and sea level rise. Likewise, ocean ecosystems, such as coral reefs, kelp forests, and mangroves are at risk in many coastal areas. Fisheries overall are either under-performing or are over-exploited with serious ramifications for sustainability. Above all, ocean ecosystems and living beings are severely threatened by the rising phenomenon of climate change due to acidification and ocean-warming. Such impacts envelop from the coasts spreading to the deepest sea. These are threatening to foreclose the future ocean wealth and endanger the prospects of their exploitation. It is critical to strike a balance between harvesting the economic potential of the ocean and safeguarding the longer-term aquatic health and wellbeing, as well as enhancing ecosystemic balance. Regrettably, despite the economic value of these opportunities, the country's marine resources, like those of many other maritime countries are at a serious risk of degradation.[3] In this backdrop, Bangladesh evinced interest in emerging notions like the Blue Economy to safeguard and advance its oceanic destiny.

Map 1
Bangladesh Maritime Territorial Map



Source: Available at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=bangladesh+maritime +territorial+ map s&tbm=isch&tbs=rimg: CRXUiB_1ccmxOIjg2RDrQ0clC0yjCZ-N55bP18Icxw4 BfSe Earaduw 1wid_1_1u63yjQErqu7mc... accessed on 22 November 2016.

However, concerns arise whether relevant conceptual issues are properly dealt with, or the pertinent empirical concerns are appropriately considered. Moreover, whether the action points for maritime planning currently being contemplated represent the right perspectives needed to overcome the emerging ecosystemic threats or building of what is enshrined as the Blue Economy. Although appraising these problematic issue areas seems challenging for operational purposes, the paper seeks to obtain a fuller notional clarity of what constitutes a sustainable Blue Economy and other pertinent notions, relates the developmental thrusts under Blue Economy caption that are underway in Bangladesh, and finally, reflects on the adaptability of the Blue Economy model in the context of the country's oceanic destiny.

With such objectives, the next section considers the conceptual evolution and requirements of sustainable Blue Economy planning. The subsequent section keeps in view the maritime development planning in Bangladesh, as it embraced the Blue Economy principles for the sustainable development of its maritime resources. The next section identifies several challenges facing Bangladesh in its Blue Economy action-planning. The conclusion reassesses the findings and reflects on the emerging challenges that may circumvent successful implementation of the Blue Economy planning in Bangladesh, with added reflections to sensitise Pakistan in its ocean economy planning.

Evolution of Ocean Economy Planning Concepts

Any appraisal of ocean economy planning necessitates a conceptual appreciation of the emerging notions in the field. Apart from Blue Economy, other emergent notions consider the nature of threats facing the global aquatic system. Scholars in the field are not fully in accord about the exact nature of threats and the adaptation and/or mitigation strategies needed to overcome them. Differences exist in the contexts of climate change, sea level rise and mitigation programmes, and the economics of climate change, including the costs and benefits of adaptation strategies already baked into the global ocean systems. Concerns also remain over the financing of adaptation measures, touching on frontiers of the economics of risk and uncertainty, creating models envisioning ocean and coastal economies.[4] It is believed that changes in ocean chemistry and temperature will impact fisheries and coral reefs. In certain cases, the impacts may be dramatic. It is often

projected that sea level rise will alter coastlines, affecting everything from beaches and wetlands to entire cities. Equally important, and perhaps more challenging, is creating models that will permit envisioning what ocean and coastal economies will look like after mitigation and adaptation steps are taken.[5] The coastal areas, seas, and oceans constitute the planet's largest ecosystems, forming the most precious part of nature's heritage. They cover up to 72 per cent of the earth's surface and constitute over 95 per cent of the biosphere. It is well-known that life has begun in the oceans and that natural lifecycle continues to support all life. Oceans generate oxygen, absorb carbon dioxide, regulate global climate and temperature, recycle nutrients, and provide both renewable and non-renewable resources that sustain hundreds of millions of livelihoods in coastal, island, and in inland areas. Approximately around 80 per cent of life on earth is in the ocean and almost 50 per cent of the available oxygen is from the ocean, which is also the largest carbon sink, absorbing about a quarter of the carbon dioxide emitted. It also absorbs 90 per cent of the additional heat caused by greenhouse gas emissions.[6] The oceans serve as drivers of a significant portion of the global gross domestic product (GDP). They drive up economic activity like growth, jobs, and innovation. They also serve as a source of food, jobs, and recreation for a large part of the global population. Most importantly, they account for almost 80 per cent of global trade and 32 per cent of hydrocarbons extracted for world energy supplies. Oceans provide for both domestic and international tourism for almost 200 countries and overseas territories. The contribution of the ocean economy to global value added has somewhat conservatively been estimated to the tune of $1.5 trillion annually, or roughly 3 per cent of the global value added.[7] It is equally important to note that the oceans are critical to the livelihoods and food security of billions of people around the world and to the economic prosperity of most maritime countries.

Furthermore, the global oceans are expected to provide economic opportunities in future. The (lower bound) of the value of key ocean assets is estimated at $24 trillion and the value of its derived services is estimated at $2.5 trillion per annum. These represent some of the positive global gains. These are equivalent to 3-5 per cent of global GDP. Countries and businesses are ever more turning to the oceans to

generate novel industries and opportunities for food, services, and income. The Blue Economy confers a rising focus on better use of ocean resources to feed the hungry of the world. By 2050, the global population will add 3 billion more people, getting to 9 billion. To feed the added populace, food production must increase by 70 per cent,[8] as the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates. But the stark reality is that the rate of growth in yields of the major cereal crops has steadily been declining—from about 3.2 per cent per year in 1960 to the present estimate of 1.5 per cent.[9]

Moreover, the ability of the marine environments to provide jobs and nutrition over the long term is already under strain due to extensive human economic activities. These are also being threatened by development approaches, many of which are fragmented and uncoordinated; very often such approaches seem in conflict with what is physically possible or ecologically sound. In terms of enabling international trade *via* linking sellers/buyers, far and near oceans are increasingly gaining importance. The behaviour patterns of such linking enablers on the oceans are receiving more attention from a regulatory and economic perspective as the relationship between land and ocean is increasingly evolving in a spree of its role and importance.

The conceptual origins of the Blue Economy can be found in the foregoing milieu.[10] It emerges in the backdrop of a vast alternative of an untapped potential via industries, including new food products and pharmaceuticals. Many governments, organisations, and communities worldwide are becoming aware of the need for more coherent, integrated, fair, and science-based approaches to managing the economic development of the oceans. Humanity is an integral part of the marine ecosystem. Therefore, economic activities must be planned and implemented with care, balancing the desire to improve human living standards and wellbeing. It is imperative to have a conscious awareness to sustain ecosystem health of the planet earth. In order to steer the oceanic wealth sustainably, both the public and private sectors need to embrace Blue Economy in a justifiable planned way. It is pertinent to make sustained efforts at all levels so as to ensure that the ocean's economic development contributes to true prosperity and resilience at present and long into the future.[11]

The development of the ocean economy confronts numerous challenges. The strategies must be futuristic, which are indispensable for guiding and coordinating action and regional partnerships in incorporating the oceans in the national income accounts.[12] Such strategies could include new industries in the measurements of the ocean economy, extraction of energy from fossil fuels, generation and transmission of electricity from wind, wave, and tidal energy, or similar processes. There are prospective fronts of generating additional energy technologies, like deriving energy from temperature or salinity gradients. All these may form the future wave, but exploiting their fuller potential needs both coordination and perspective. Towards meeting such objectives, the Blue Economy concept has grown alongside four other inter-related concepts: Sustainable Development, Green Economy, Blue Growth, and finally, the notion of 'Circular Economy', a concept that is more deep-rooted.[13] All such concepts have surged worldwide almost in the chorus or in succession into a common vocabulary of maritime policy. These now feature importantly in international maritime thinking and are being organised to explore how to beckon a sustainable ocean economy.[14]

The contexts and objectives of such emerging concepts require further clarity. Cautionary words are sounded against the emerging train of thought promoting Blue Economy "as a way of deriving greater revenue from the ocean." Such a pattern of thinking carries an enormous risk of abuse or of "even greater over-exploitation of the oceans' limited resources."[15] Despite the conceptual popularity of Blue Economy, it must be stated that no common ground exists on its notional boundary. To some, Blue Economy means the use of the sea and its resources for sustainable development. For others, it merely refers "to any economic activity in the maritime sector, whether sustainable or not." Against this backdrop, efforts are underway to develop a consensus about what characterises a Blue Economy that is sustainable and "to help ensure that the economic development of the ocean contributes to true prosperity, today and long into the future."[16]

Notionally, Blue Economy prerequisites that all concerned must respect ecosystem integrity. However, it is reasoned that a secure pathway to long-term prosperity or the best way forward for a sustainable Blue Economy is to move through the development of a circular

economy. Unlike Blue Economy, the practical applications of the circular economy to modern economic systems and industrial processes have gained momentum since the late 1970s, led by a small number of academics, thought-leaders, and businesses.[17] Underlying the study of ocean and coastal economics is ultimately the desire to understand better the nature of joined socio-ecological systems. The ocean's ecological health is coupled with the economic health of the global, regional, or national economies.[18]

Blue Economy has conceptually gained momentum across the globe since the 2012 Rio+20. That particular event raised the profile of Blue Economy and sought to stimulate 'Blue Growth'. Developing countries and island nations, with significant coastlines and maritime areas, have been under focus since then.[19] The Global Oceans Action Summit for Food Security and Blue Growth, held in The Hague, Netherlands, on 22 April 2014, came as a follow up to what went on at Rio+20 and the notion of Blue Growth and eventually of Blue Economy came in usage. All this sought to bring global attention towards and increase investment into addressing the three key threats to ocean health and food security: overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution. Some of the underlying causes that have led to overfishing, increased marine pollution, loss of critical habitat, and their potential solutions were addressed. It underscored the urgency for coordinated action to restore the health of the world's oceans and secure the long-term well-being and food security of a growing global population. Blue Growth emphasised conservation and sustainable management of aquatic resources and equitable benefits to the coastal communities that rely on them.[20] Blue Economy/Blue Growth, used interchangeably, comprises food, jobs, and opportunities for development provided by ocean and coastal assets. Solutions are required to "restore ocean health and provide food and jobs for communities worldwide;" but for this "the ecological and economic demands on the ocean" must be balanced. Towards these local solutions, public-private partnerships and joint approaches are imperative.[21]

Many land-based economic activities are speciously ocean-related, including shipping or fisheries; yet both have significant non-ocean elements. The challenge in this context is to separate the prospects in the ocean from the non-ocean component. Industries such

as mineral extraction or tourism and recreation can be identified as ocean-related by using the location of their economic activity as a proxy for 'ocean'. This, however, brings into play questions about geography, whether marine/oceanic, coastal and/or land. For other types of economic activities, like the development of new technologies in fields such as search and navigation, observation and monitoring equipment, the 'ocean' component is not always defined in industrial taxonomies and geography. This appears of little help since such technologies can be produced anywhere. The question of industries to be included in the discussion of 'ocean and coastal economics' is also continually evolving. Different approaches to economic data in different countries in such contexts provide a variety of perspectives on industries. Consequently, perhaps the boundaries are kept to a minimum. Such research often employs the theoretical and methodological perspectives of fields like political science, public policy, planning, ecology, economics, finance, and socioeconomic decision sciences.[22]

Returning to the basic conceptual compass towards growth addressed earlier, the Blue Economy in recent international usage was preceded by two other developmental concepts: sustainable development and Green Economy. The former conveys "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[23] It seeks to respond to economic crises—including food, water, and energy—in the developing world arising from greed and careless management of nature. The key concerns identified are increasing economic growth, job opportunities, poverty alleviation, protecting the environment from degradation of natural resources, and pollution. The process required integrated, comprehensive, long-term policies, nature's efficiency, and multiple economic benefits. It wanted to put a cap on damaging nature (atmosphere, water, soil, and living things), reduce pollution and environmental degradation, control the exploitation of natural resources, and promote social equity. All this ensures a process of change in which exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in a state of harmony. It would also increase the potential for the present and the future to meet the needs and aspirations of human beings. Briefly, it aims

at balancing present economic development with equity and environmental protection towards ensuring a sustainable future.[24]

Green Economy is associated with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It is growth-oriented in income and employment, driven by public/private investments: one that would reduce carbon emissions and pollution. It is also intended to enhance energy, prevent the loss of biodiversity, and improve ecosystem services. It aims at improving human welfare and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. Thus, Green Economy is socially inclusive, emitting low carbon and high resource efficiency. Blue Economy and the Green Economy are not incompatible, but interdependent. The oceans serve to sustain "earth's life support systems and the billions of people who are dependent on oceans for livelihoods, food security, and economic development."[25] Both Green Economy and Blue Economy are destined to offer positive support in such endeavours.

As more and more countries look to this maritime economic frontier as the source of their development and growth, the ecosystems upon which many ocean economic activities depend are changing at an unprecedented scale. But this growing interest is not necessarily for the better. Whilst oceans are responsible for generating the oxygen needed for every second human breath and can sequester up to five times more carbon than tropical forests, this important resource is under threat due to climate change and other human-initiated activities.[26] However, maintaining and restoring the integrity of this ecosystem's health have now become synonymous with growing ocean wealth. Sustainably developing ocean spaces for economic growth via Blue Economy while maintaining or perhaps improving ocean health could define a new era of economic opportunity for ocean-facing countries. The oceans undoubtedly are in deep peril due to a host of man-made influences including overfishing, pollution, and climate-change-induced ocean acidification, among others.[27] The underlying blueprint, logic, and principles of the Blue Economy model must be identified. The importance it attaches to nature as a focus of sustainability, its operational logic, and principles must be well-taken for a functional Blue Economy model, as clarified below.

Blue Economy Model's Logic and Principles

The Blue Economy model is the brainchild of Gunter Pauli, a Belgian businessman and former Ecover CEO. He disseminated it in his *The Club of Rome Report* (2010).[28] Based on its 21 founding principles, the Blue Economy offered solutions due to be determined by their local environment and physical/ecological characteristics. The Report, which doubles up as the movement's manifesto, describes '100 innovations' creating 100 million jobs within the next decade. It also provides many examples of winning South-South collaborative projects—another original feature of this approach intent on promoting its hands-on focus.[29] The Blue Economy assessment rests on three inferences: the world economic system has been exploitative and damaging the environment, the waste and the damage caused by the exploitation of nature exceed the capacity or ability of natural support, and—despite a growing emphasis on principles of resource efficiency, low carbon, and social inclusiveness—human greed to exploit natural resources could not be beaten.[30]

The implementation of sustainable development with the concept of green products/services, such as environment-friendly products and services, does not of necessity match expectations, i.e., to buy costlier products and cannot reach the poor. Even investors have to pay larger fees to produce green products and services. The Blue Economy challenges the investors to ensure a business model that is cost-effective, safer environmentally, efficient and cleaner in production systems, offers greater economic value, increases the absorption of labour, and finally, presents benefits to all contributors.[31]

Blue Economy and Nature

The Blue Economy is nature-based, works with nature, and is modelled after nature. It ensures efficiency and enriches nature. It partakes the following 10 presumptions:

1. Nature responds to basic needs, offers more with less, evolving and shifting in the process from scarcity to abundance.[32]
2. In nature, the constant is change. Wealth means diversity, the contrary is industrial standardisation.

3. Nature only works with what is locally available. Any by-product is the source for a new product. Sustainable business evolves with respect not only to local resources but also to culture and tradition.
4. Nature evolved from a few species to a rich biodiversity. Its foundation is ecosystem model, i.e., like water flowing from the mountains carrying nutrients and energy to meet the basic needs of life of all components of the ecosystem. Water is the primary solvent (no complex, chemical, toxic catalysts) and gravity is the primary source of energy.
5. Nature ensures its efficiency, as its system is based on zero waste. Waste simply does not exist. It leaves nothing to waste: waste for one is a food for another and waste from one process is a resource of energy for the other. Thus, waste is used to meet the basic needs of all contributors. It ensures social "inclusiveness: self-sufficiency for all—social equity, more job, more opportunities for the poor," warrants generation "to regeneration and balancing production and consumption" thus multiplying economic benefits.[33]
6. In natural systems, everything is biodegradable, just a matter of time. Everything is connected and evolving towards symbiosis. Water, air, and soil are the commons, free and abundant.
7. "Nature is efficient." A single process generates multiple benefits, including jobs and social capital.[34] It inspires innovations, which take place in every moment, as systems in nature share risks, any risk is a motivator for innovations.
8. Nature is contrary to monopolisation. It looks for economies of scope: one natural innovation carries various benefits for all and challenges offer opportunities.
9. Nature seeks the best possible for all involucrate elements. Business maximises the use of available material and energy, which reduces the unit price for the consumer. In nature, negatives are converted into positives.
10. Natural systems cascade nutrients, matter, and energy. The 100 practical economic innovations follow the workings of ecosystems, always working towards higher efficiency levels to drain the nutrients and energy without emissions.[35]

The Blue Economy thus has nature as its focal point, with an emphasis on nature's efficiency and sustainability. It is *not* simply ocean-based economy, though the ocean is a base. This includes sustainable development of the marine economy, basing upon the Blue Economy principles. Sectors such as marine/water and fisheries, sea transportation, maritime industry, tourism, health and environment, energy, and mineral resources, all sectors are included in Blue Economy strategies. It looks for multiple economic benefits. It has business and investment with innovation and creativity that promote diversification of products and businesses, increase employment, and save the environment. Blue Economy also seeks integration of ocean and land-based economies, of economic development and environmental protection, and of policy integration at all levels of governance: local, national, regional, and international.[36]

Blue Economy and ZERI

Zero Emissions Research and Initiatives (ZERI), with a network of 38 organisations worldwide, represents a global network of creative minds seeking solutions to world challenges whilst harmonising economy, society, and environment (see Figurative Models 1-3). Whereas ZERI sets forth the philosophy, Blue Economy presents the "philosophy in action." Pauli seeks to expose scores of entrepreneurs to portfolios of new business models.[37] The key idea is to ensure that the best and the cheapest are on hand for health and the environment and that the necessities for life are free. It seeks innovative business solutions that are capable of bringing competitive products and services to the market, but solutions must respond to basic needs while building social capital. The model must also be mindful of "living in harmony with nature's evolutionary path." Harnessing and optimising the innate virtues and values connecting untapped local potential form part of competitiveness, unleashing joy and happiness.[38]

The ZERI family's commonly shared vision is to project waste as a resource. Solutions are wanted using nature's design principles as inspiration. Time is right, it is held, to go beyond the global economy, where the focus has been the pursuit of economies of scale and ever lower costs to earn more money. The process needs to evolve into an economy capable of responding to the needs of all. Solutions pursued are based on physics and gravity is perceived as the main source of

energy. Solar energy is offered as the second renewable fuel. Pressure and temperature as found on site constitute deciding factors necessary for production. Emphasis is placed on going beyond the Green Economy, where renewable energy cannot compete without subsidies and whatever is good for global health and the environment costs more. Time has come, it is reasoned, to respond to the basic needs of all that the global system owns, introducing innovations that change the business model to the point that the best is cheap and the necessary for life is free—just like the commons used to be.[39]

ZERI serves as an antenna, as is depicted in a swinging blue-bird symbol (see Figure 2), in the world economy identifying innovations and spotting the high growth industries of the decade next. When there is a crisis and assets are stranded, many businesses suffer, but some do thrive. It locates the platform technologies that will change life for the better. With representations on four continents and nearly 200 projects that have identified opportunities, ZERI offers insights to governments on which sectors to attract, to companies on which market niches to focus on, and to communities on how to secure the continued build-up of social capital.[40]

Figure 1

Blue Economy: A banyan tree model image

Source: Available at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Model+Blue+economy &tbm=isch &imgil, accessed on July 23, 2017.

Figure 2

Blue Economy: A bluebird action model image

Source: Available at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Model+Blue+economy &tbm=isch& imgil, accessed on July 23, 2017.

Figure 3

Blue Economy: A globular model image encompassing society and environment



Source: Available at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Model+Blue+economy &tbm=isch&imgil www.slidesh are.net% 25252Fsunotomes%25252Fblue-economy-towards-a-sustainable-marine-and-fisheries-development-in-indonesia&source, accessed on July 23, 2017.

Sustainable Blue Economy Projects: A Blueprint

From regional and national experiments, 11 key principles are identifiable for guaranteeing sustainable Blue Economy:

1. Set clear, measurable, and internally consistent goals and targets, coupled with a clear direction of planning, management, and activities. To avoid conflicts and contradictions, a logical course must be set for different economic, social, and ecological areas, synchronising related policies and actions and making them integrated and coherent.
2. Public and private actors must steer and manage at every scale, creating a level economic and legislative playing field with adequate incentives and rules.
3. Recognise that the maritime and land-based economies are interlinked and that many of the threats facing marine environments originate on land. Therefore, the land-based impacts on marine ecosystems, the seas, and coastal regions must be addressed.
4. Harmonise the principles with relevant UN agreements, other widely adopted principles for sustainable corporate and organisational governance, and with established understanding concerning related concepts such as Green Economy and circular economy.
5. Communicate and interact with stakeholders in both public and private sectors in decision-making processes and in educational or awareness-raising settings.
6. Make informed assessment processes that track progress.
7. Support stakeholder dialogues with a common definition and frame of reference.
8. Mobilise commitment by government and all relevant stakeholders to the vision of a sustainable Blue Economy planning and act to turn that vision into reality.[41]
9. Build up close cooperation between decision-makers in different sectors at the local and national levels of government and at regional and international levels within and outside the region.[42]
10. Plan, manage, and effectively govern the use of marine space and resources, applying inclusive methods and the ecosystem approach.

11. Develop and apply standards, guidelines, and best practices, with shared information and knowledge and lessons learned. Perspectives and ideas must be directed towards realising a sustainable and prosperous future for all.

Succinctly, a sustainable Blue Economy is innovative, inclusive, accountable, transparent, holistic, and long-term. It cannot but be proactive, constantly looking for the most effective ways to meet the needs of present and future generations without undermining the capacity of nature to support human economic activities and wellbeing. Underlying a sustainable Blue Economy, thus, are three key principles: nature, environment, and low/zero carbon emissions.

Spatial Contexts

Blue Economy closely interweaves with ocean health and ocean governance. Oceans are, however, fluid, three-dimensional, interconnected, and constantly changing environments. Marine life and human-induced changes move easily from one location to another in the oceans without any hindrance of political boundaries. It is imperative to be aware of the ocean governance landscape across all scales. The ocean policy landscape is evolving fast and some efforts regarding Blue Economy sectors are already in place in Africa, Australia and Indonesia, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the EU, and the US. However, current ocean governance frameworks are plagued by fragmented strategies as well as overlapping legislation and agreements, limited ocean governance legislation and scientific knowledge, and insufficient institutional/financial capacities.[43]

The Bay and the Indian Ocean form a vital part of the economies, livelihoods, and cultural identities of all states that lie within their boundaries. Fisheries are already making a significant contribution to the economies of the adjoining states, including Bangladesh. Several countries are also making significant gains from offshore oil and gas exploration, tourism, and maritime-oriented industries. New opportunities are appearing in these established sectors and new emerging sectors will require a cooperative approach to capture and exploit in a sustainable manner. The oceans do not recognise geopolitical boundaries; many of the ecosystems and a lot of its biodiversity are trans-boundary. Hence the countries in the region ought to pursue

continued, coordinated and proactive growth of the blue economies within the oceanic region, both bilaterally and regionally—where extra-regional powers may join in—basing their policies upon the Blue Economy model and the guidelines as well as principles set thereby. The principles include integrated regional planning, adoption of marine-specific policies coupled with coordinated land and marine policies, robust governance for industry and governments to work within and which the community understands and has confidence in its quality and operation, and collaboration between public and private industry drawing upon the skills and capital of both, sharing of skills, data, and knowledge.[44]

Europe in its 2020 growth strategy takes on the contribution of the maritime sector to achieving goals, as mentioned above, for smarter, sustainable, and inclusive growth.[45] The strategy includes: *first,* the development of sectors with high potential for sustainable jobs and growth; *second,* creation of essential Blue Economy knowledge, legal certainty and security, including marine knowledge[46] to improve access to information about the sea; *third,* maritime spatial planning[47] to ensure an efficient and sustainable management of activities at sea; *fourth,* integrated maritime surveillance[48] to give authorities a better picture of what is happening at sea; and *finally*, the sea basin strategies, which are meant to ensure tailor-made measures and to foster cooperation between and among countries of the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific region as a whole, where Bangladesh is also a stakeholder. [49]

Due to the growing demand for marine resources oceans, are under a severe pressure. There are also mounting threats from changing climate. Such situations call for appropriate governance frameworks that can address issues of sustainability and promote sustainable resource use. A strong Blue Economy, backed up by a coupling of ocean and land-based approaches, is seen as an effective answer to all this. Blue Economy traverses across many sectors and provides an opportunity for the development of more integrated and 'whole-domain' governance mechanisms by minimising sectoral barriers.[50]

Blue Economy Planning in Bangladesh

Soon after Bangladesh acquired maritime possessions across its southern shores, it embraced the Blue Economy blueprint as a grand strategy. The idea was to seize the opportunities offered under Blue

Economy conceptual initiatives and speed up the process of maritime growth. It seems, however, that the conceptual prerequisites were not carefully measured in light of the milieu mandatory under the Blue Economy model. Bangladesh perceives Blue Economy as "a suite of opportunities for sustainable, clean, equitable blue growth in both traditional and emerging sectors."[51] The logic presented seems sound, as it carries a sense of direction towards a better maritime destiny. As part of the preparatory process, a well-publicised International Workshop on Blue Economy was held in Dhaka (September 1-2, 2014) with top-level participation from the government and relevant international agencies. The objective was to secure an 'international momentum' for acceptance of Blue Economy as an approach that, though distinct, may be mutually "supportive with the general economy."[52]

Some academic studies done in Bangladesh on sectoral analysis began with high notes but ended in dismal thoughts about the notional view of Blue Economy and on its probable application in Bangladesh contexts.[53] The official studies offered more tangible ideas for reflection, as Blue Economy was viewed as offering a matching set of opportunities for sustainable, cleaner, and perhaps an equitable blue growth in both traditional and emerging sectors of the marine economy. These include shipping and port facilities, fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, energy, biotechnology, and submarine mining.[54] Further along, 26 maritime economic functions were identified from among the fishery, maritime trade and shipping, energy, tourism, coastal protection, and maritime monitoring and surveillance. In each of these functions, full account is taken of the value chains that are developed across a range of sectors.[55] However, one study (done at the "Blue Economy Cell") sought to address 'the ocean economy' in terms of input-output analysis, the focus being on conservation and sustainable use of maritime resources. The specific Blue Economy sectors identified include energy and minerals, fishery and aquaculture, tourism and shipping, port and maritime logistics, and environment and forest research, education, and training (See Figure 4).[56]

Figure 4
Ocean economy: conservation and sustainable use of maritime resources



Source: See note 61. The Caption in the Figure is modified for the current analysis.

The foregoing sectors have also been somewhat regrouped and schematically presented in Figure 5 below). The concern remains, however, that how such models have guided ocean economy planning in Bangladesh.

Figure 5
Prospects of Blue Economy in Bangladesh Context



Source: "Prospects of Blue Economy," available at http://www.iora.net/media/158582/6_khurshed_alam_presentation.pdf, (last accessed on August 19, 2017).

Blue Economy Sectoral Planning

The Government of Bangladesh, in early 2017, has set up a 'Blue Economy cell' under the Energy and Mineral Resources Division with officials drawn from the relevant government agencies, including the Bangladesh Navy. It was established to exploit the country's maritime resources and to make things happen in the maritime sector in the shortest possible time. Apart from hazard assessment, it is assigned with multi-disciplinary responsibilities to chalk out and implement the government's Blue Economy action planning, to explore, conserve, and make sustainable collection and management of natural and mineral resources within the country's maritime territories.[57] Its coordinating works include collecting ocean fisheries and hydrocarbon resources and exploration of tourism opportunities. It was expected to make some

'visible success' towards implementing development projects in the energy sector.[58] It has since been required to make surveys and studies. As the work progresses, the Blue Economy Cell is expected to be upgraded into a Division to minimise the workload, as and when required.[59] The Blue Economy Cell thus would appear as a Blue Economy planning organisation, an advisory organ assigned with objectives, which would form essential components of a successful Blue Economy strategy. [60]

Regional Blue Economy Initiatives

Towards enhancing Blue Economy planning and management at wider levels, it is imperative for Bangladesh to join other adjoining states. As oceans are borderless it is one of the best ways to work out how to meet critical challenges facing the ocean and coastal regions and overcome increasing challenges facing the global commons brought about by pollution, environmental degradation, climate change, and over-exploitation. Being a Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean littoral, Bangladesh is inclined to cooperative regional Blue Economy ventures, as it firmly sees its future economic prosperity, food security, and social well-being as largely dependent on sustainable use of its marine resources. In June 2016, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Bangladesh and India to operationalise Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean Region. Both states have also formed a Joint Working Group in order to find avenues of cooperation. Areas covered for further strengthening the bilateral relationship include wide-ranging cooperation in capacity-building and training, sharing of information and joint research in areas from marine biotechnology, green tourism and hospitality, marine aquaculture, deep sea fishing, and maritime pollution responses.[61]

In Blue Economy contexts Bangladesh also recognises the Indian Ocean as 'the lifeline' of paramount significance for connectivity, peace, and prosperity, as it provides a passage to half of its container ships, one-third of the bulk cargo traffic, and two-thirds of its oil shipments.[62] It is also a 'natural habitat' for efforts to project its aspirations jointly with other nations of the region and beyond, as a part of the larger efforts to transform Bangladesh along with the rim countries. The Blue Economy's role is pertinent as it is in the common interest of all IORA member states to guide the common economics in future then we

should use our seas to promote friendship and curb tension in the region, respect freedom of navigation and cooperate through the mechanism of IORA. Cognisant of such realities, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina attended the 20th anniversary of the two-decade-old forum Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA, 2017), held in Jakarta.[63] As Blue Economy finds a focus in the country's prospective planning, the Prime Minister also proposed setting up in Bangladesh an Indian Ocean Technical and Vocational University to create a pool of skilled mariners for the region.[64] *The IORA* Concord has set out a vision for a revitalised and sustainable regional architecture. It looks poised to raise its profile as a deliberative forum in the region. The first-ever summit has infused IORA with a purpose.[65] However, it is hard to tell to what extent such an agenda, which has a higher priority in Bangladesh's maritime planning, would find urgency in other IORA nations, as other countries do not necessarily have the kind of wide opening and possessions as Bangladesh.

Challenges facing Blue Economy Planning in Bangladesh

Bangladesh's approach to taking up the Blue Economy planning agenda at the wider levels augurs well. Yet the concern remains whether the ecological and environmental causalities in Bangladesh itself are taken into fuller view in its ocean economy planning. The Hague Summit wanted the nations to avail opportunities to align all efforts and bring solutions to scale locally, as emphasised earlier. The linkage components of the country's network of the river system and the seas beyond deserve fuller clarity and precision for all sectors of maritime and development planning. The global climate change itself has already contributed to temperature rise worldwide and melting of ice, the rise of sea levels, and shrinking or perhaps erratic occurrence of winters. Bangladesh is more affected than others because of the country's rapid urbanisation, establishments on wetlands and shrinking water of water bodies, dwindling groundwater level, and surface water reduction. All this has combined with deforestation, exorbitant consumption of surface and river water for irrigation purposes, unabated encroachment and grabbing of the river, abuse of natural resources, etc., which have already impacted upon the country's eco-environmental system.[66]

In any analysis of the Blue Economy planning initiatives undertaken or geared towards cooperation at national, bilateral, or wider

levels, optimistic views do surface. Yet, issues such as outstanding concerns of sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes or means and mechanisms are likely to impede development in Blue Economy areas, affecting traditional and non-traditional areas of security.[67] However, the country itself has to shape a maritime policy that is coherent in approach and relevant to the maritime developmental concerns it confronts, with increased coordination between different areas of policy where it faces multilevel challenges. Such a policy must focus on issues that conceptually do not simply fall under a single sector-based policy and is based on 'Blue Growth' (requiring economic growth with footing on different maritime sectors). It also requires coordination between different sectors, private/public actors, land-based and marine knowledge, and different levels administrative/decision-making units within the country, keeping in view the concerns that transcend beyond national scale.

An integrated maritime policy, thus, prerequisites assembling all the cross-cutting issues towards ensuring Blue Growth, i.e., all marine data and knowledge and maritime spatial planning, inclusive of an integrated maritime surveillance.[68] Bangladesh might consider strategic mapping of the Blue Economy planning, coupled with mapping its ocean health and wealth with a view to promote investment and growth in the ocean-based economy, assess ecosystem services reflecting human-ecosystem interactions, and regional economic realities. Frameworks like the Ocean Health Index and Ocean Wealth Index may provide cross-sectoral coordinating platforms for informing decisions about the integrated management of marine ecosystems. These may also provide cross-sectoral coordinating platforms for informed decisions about the integrated management of marine ecosystems.[69] The drive may include recovery and protection of biodiversity, increased utilisation of renewable energy, and strengthened surveillance of offshore waters by increased maritime awareness and enforcement.

However, the strategy prerequisites 'streamlined implementation' through an overarching system for its success.[70] For Bangladesh, a low-lying delta, facing the Bay and the Indian Ocean, the most crucial factor in its Blue Economy conceptualisation and development planning is to take a holistic and proactive view of the several challenges it faces nationally and how to overcome them.

First is to act on a strategy to manage eco-systemic threats, arising from politics, governance, and development processes. The country to be affluent does need development along its maritime belt and beyond coasts. To these ends, it needs infrastructure, energy, ports, access to resources, and compatible higher technologies. For all that, however, it must harmonise the task of preservation of the priceless ecosystem of the natural maritime zones. In most cases, the Blue Economy appraisal processes are not followed prior to project selection and action-planning, flouting the guidelines and principles underlined in the Blue Economy model. The emerging issues include the challenges arising from the vagaries of nature or the government's relevant development planning strategies due to which natural ecosystems are likely to be at risk. Similarly, the coastal areas of Bangladesh face multiple vulnerabilities due to various forms of pollution, which made the whole coastal and marine environment vulnerable. These include coastal and marine water pollution, mainly caused by direct discharge from rivers, ships, waste oil, and other marine and terrestrial activities, including marine transportation and offshore mineral exploration and production activities. There is a growing concern about ecosystem safety and bigger threats such as climate change, recurrent disasters like landslides, flooding, etc., which are more frequent at present than ever. These require policy actions and adaptation strategies for ensuring safety and sustainable development. The future is uncertain, unknowable, and is subject to speculative projection. Therefore, managing Blue Economy planning in the face of uncertainty will call for an assortment of approaches, short-, mid-, and long-term strategies.

The *second* challenge arises from the flawed environmental legal regime and the absence of effective compliance mechanisms. The efforts made towards identifying the scope, gaps, and constraints of existing legal and policy frameworks in Bangladesh related to environment, natural resource management, climate change and sustainable development are not substantial. Rather, there has been an abject failure to establish an integrated and coordinated policy and legal framework to ensure sustainable use and management of environment and natural resource, considering the climatic impacts.[71] Better environmental laws and compliance systems towards ensuring Blue Economy planning and better oceanic management are an absolute

necessity. Such laws are needed for the country to combat marine pollution and ensure cleaner oceanic system. Bangladesh needs to redraw the country's conceptual map for development, inclusive of both land and maritime waters. Such mapping must begin at the lowest level and must be taken to the upper levels in a continuum. It must plan its actions, based on accountability and transparency, to ensure that the nation's sustainable economic growth is not compromised. It has to provide safety and security, address issues like climate change and rising sea level, pollution and environmental degradation, and land erosion. Those are very tough issues driving people towards urbanisation and to migrate to other countries. There is no single solution, no antibiotic, to heal the longer-term devastation.[72]

Third, the government seems more inclined to focus on the Blue Economy and take the agenda at a higher level, without giving the needed attention at the domestic or national level. It needs to develop a clearer perspective on maritime planning for best utilisation of its marine resources and secure the nation's newly found maritime boundary. With its land constraints and high-density, Bangladesh would naturally have to turn to rich marine resources for its growing food and other needs. The resources on its sea possessions are indeed much more profound than those on land. Since its land-resources are steadily on the decline, Bangladesh is bound to turn its dependence ever more on oceanic resources. The country's private sector has already emerged as the growth engine. But there is a need for greater private-public collaboration and the government has to act as a facilitator so that the country can press ahead with the fulfilment of the development vision of *Sonar Bangla* (Golden Bengal), overcoming the confronting challenges.

The *fourth* set of challenges arises from a variety of Blue Economy concerns, including the country's polluted inland water bodies and the river system, which end up in the seas to the south. The eco-environmental predicament facing the country's capital will illustrate the matter. The rivers around Dhaka—once considered as the city's lifelines, with the gaze of a garland,[73] carrying people, culture, trade, and commerce—have been turned into dark, brown, murky waters seeming, at places, like sheer dirty drainages. Overall, the country now has a high level of polluted contamination and use of chemicals. These eventually are drawn into the coastal water and the sea. All these have tremendous

impacts on the micro-climatic factors.[74] These move up the temperature of the country and affect the aquatic life and marine system in the south. Hence any sustainable Blue Economy planning must consider how the entire inland polluted river and contaminated water flow systems can be rescued.

Fifth is a seeming lack of awareness concerning notional differentials at land and marine contexts. The Blue Economy is a more recently evolved notion in relation to the prevailing conceptual phenomenon of Green Economy, in practice worldwide earlier. The state of Green Economy application in Bangladesh context is nowhere near UNEP's Green Economy planning standard. Yet, for Blue Growth, which comes with Blue Economy, Bangladesh seeks direct graduation into sustainable Blue Economy. The Blue Economy is indeed a more eco-environment-friendly notion, geared towards sustainable development, conceivably enabling Bangladesh to gain an accelerated developmental momentum. Yet, the country's pathway towards a sustainable Blue Economy planning has to be charted in a particular angle so that the challenges emerging may be effectively overcome towards Blue Growth with good organisation, insight, and skill—combining both land and maritime approaches.

Sixth is an ostensible lack of differentiation that prevails at the national and wider levels. Bangladesh is not an isolated delta or an island. It does have serious environmental and ecosystemic lapses, yet its eco-environmental lapses and the accompanying pollution are common regionally and globally. Indeed, marine litter/debris forms a threat to the ocean that has drawn some international attention in recent years. Every year, more than 8 million tonnes of plastic ends up in the ocean, costing at least $8 billion in damage to marine ecosystems and killing an estimated 1 million seabirds, 100,000 sea mammals, and untold numbers of fish. Rivers carry an estimated 1.15-2.41 million tonnes of plastic into the sea every year, an amount that needs between 48,000 to over 100,000 dump trucks to carry it away. The Ganges River, shared by Bangladesh with India, is the second largest most polluted river in the world, after China's Yangtze River. The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres cited a recent study that illustrated how plastic could outweigh fish in 2050 if nothing was done.[75] Countries of the developed world are using proper monitoring mechanisms to maintain an

acceptable level of river water quality. For Bangladesh also, it is imperative to develop the capacity to restore the country's polluted rivers and keep its coastal and territorial waters blue and pure, consistent with the needs of nature.[76]

The *seventh* challenge arises from Bangladesh's development agenda, with a high degree of reliance on power plants-based fossil fuels. One such plant, among others, is 1,320 MW Rampal Power Plant, which has emerged as a pressing maritime concern. It is a coal-fired power plant being set up in an eco-sensitive area of the Sundarbans, the unique mangrove forest that was inscribed in 1997 as a World Heritage Site because of its outstanding universal value as a unique ecosystem. It serves as the biggest natural barrier against cyclones from the Bay of Bengal and saves the country from irreversible damage. The Government of Bangladesh is promise-bound to UNESCO to submit by 2018 a report on technicalities regarding environmental impacts of developmental projects near the Sundarbans and adjacent areas.[77] The Bangladeshi nation does need to have a fuller appraisal of every project sanctioned, including that of Rampal Power Plant, from the sustainable Blue Economy perspective.

Finally, is the issue of sand/sediments sale based on the same reasoning as Rampal Plant? By exporting sand/soil drained from upstream rivers to nearby low-lying countries such as Singapore and the Maldives, Bangladesh wishes to lift its economy through dredging whilst keeping its rivers flowing. The fear is whether the government has done its homework well enough to consider the long-term impact on sustainable Blue Economy maritime planning. No country in the world has such an aquatic identity as Bangladesh. It is unique in its origins, with the river systems flowing through millennia and carrying sediments from the northern landmass to the southern oceanic system. This has been the story of the Bengal delta's formation: how via land accretion it shaped itself over the millennia? Bangladesh cannot sell its history of land accretion process for some short-term monetary gains. It does need sediments for coastal protection, creating artificial islands and greening of its coastal belts, as the country's top maritime policy planner implores.[78] All such concerns need full clarity before continuing with a sediments sale policy that sounds thoughtless from the historical

perspective of land accretion and the more recent embrace of the Blue Economy planning.[79]

Towards meeting the challenges of building Bangladesh ideally on a sustainable Blue Economy model the country must be envisioned, designed, and meticulously planned along the guidelines and principles set in the Blue Economy model itself. All this may sound apparent but there isn't simply any other way out. The country's planners must set aside the mindset of conventional planning models of development and trends that lay bare a lack of understanding of the country's hydrological and ecological landscape and the need for creative responses required under the Blue Economy model. For Bangladesh alone, seen in the global context, it seems implausible to build a model Blue Economy to safeguard its longing for a sustainable national development via a self-framed Blue Economy model of its maritime resources. The planet earth looks blue from space, as nearly 72 per cent of the earth is ocean. Yet, there has been a dramatic decline in ocean health, as the seas are overused and under-protected.[80] Bangladesh and the rest of the international community may feel excited about the potentials of a growing Blue Economy, but for that healthier future, it is imperative to maintain the 'blue' nature of the aquatic system and to keep the oceans healthy.

Conclusion

The concluding remarks are coupled with some reflections on the positive evolution of policies and on the emerging challenges facing Bangladesh's ocean economy planning. Introspective views are also offered on Pakistan's ocean economy planning. Blue Economy is still an evolving concept worldwide, with a range of studies enveloping national, subregional, regional, and international concerns, amidst a range of different drivers and informative ways. The provision, measurement, and use of the ocean and the Blue Economy data are still developing and national accounts are an essential part of this process. However, the keynotes of a sustainable Blue Economy are now known: innovative, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and holistic—cross-sectoral and long-term—with assured low carbon/zero emission. Yet, it has to be proactive, constantly looking for the most effective ways to meet the needs of present and future generations without undermining the

environment and the capacity of nature to support human economic activities and wellbeing. As the Blue Economy is still operationally evolving worldwide, it has limits in the identification of drivers within national accounting, which forms an essential basis for the measurement of sustainable Blue Economy for project-processing and evaluation in all prospective aspects. There are models, but they need to be more functional and operationally transparent for replication. All these provide a basis for improvements in the measurement of the Blue Economy and over time more sustainable and institutionally relevant information systems will hopefully be developed.

Bangladesh has acquired its long-awaited oceanic areas and views Blue Economy as "a suite of opportunities for sustainable, clean, equitable blue growth in both traditional and emerging sectors."[81] However, materialising the Blue Economy vision as a grand strategy in the country's context is still hard to pin down. One Blue Economy Cell study indeed viewed the Blue Economy more as a theoretical than a functional construct: one that sounds presumptive, as it presumes that economic activities would be balanced and would consequently promote a sustainable or a healthy ocean, which could benefit not only the people directly using it but indirectly the entire world community.[82] At an upper echelon of governance, it is acknowledged that the Blue Economy is a complex concept, that the country is yet to reap its benefits, and that time would be needed to improve human resources and technological capacity to discover marine resources in accordance with the concept.[83]

Bangladesh has made some efforts to be in the awareness and learning process. Apart from conferences and symposiums, the efforts include the establishment of a Maritime University, an Institute of Marine Technology, an allocation of BDT 2 billion (around $24 million) for conducting research on maritime resources like fisheries and hydrocarbons, offering of studies of oceanography at two public universities to carry out research in the Bay of Bengal, and commissioning of a survey vessel to conduct study on fisheries in the Bay and to explore resources in the seabed on sustainable means for a better future of the country.[84] Are all these adequate enough to advance the purposes of marine education and scientific research? The challenges it faces are too many. They need a fuller appraisal and follow up remedial steps.

More recently, there has been greater policy awareness about the very many ecosystemic challenges Bangladesh faces, as is indicated in some of the policy decisions publicly placed by the PM. These include: re-christening of the Ministry of Environment and Forests as the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change, instruction issued to strengthen the efforts to keep the four rivers surrounding the capital free from pollution, giving a nod to a "proposal in principle for setting up environment-friendly industries" in Mongla,[85] some credible homework done by the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock towards a sustainable fisheries policy,[86] and projecting the world's largest mangrove forest Sundarbans a Divine gift,[87] even as the concerned officials appear inflexible on proceeding with works on Rampal Power Plant, which, on all accounts of a sustainable Blue Economy planning, appears incompatible. It is, in the long run, likely to be harmful to the 'Allah-gifted' World Heritage site, as the PM prefers to suggest it. A land reclamation project 'Delta Plan 2100' led by a Dutch consortium, targeting existing good practices towards the long-term goals, is also reportedly ready for the government's approval.[88]

However, Bangladesh still has a long journey ahead for the fruition of a sustainable Blue Economy policy agenda. This must be in place to afford potential inputs (as per Blue Economy model) and open the scope for development of nature's capital assets or of identifiable ocean economy sectors under the Blue Economy fashion. Bangladesh, by tradition, offered a rich social community where there was plenty of clean water with its river system and wetlands; all that is fading away. Many of the rivers have the appearances of drains with ash, brown, dark, and contaminated waters. The wetlands look like swamps; worse still, the monsoon resembles a distressing season. Like the capital itself, the country's valued floodplains, wetlands, 'lowlands', and vast in-land aquatic areas are being filled up in the extraordinary fashion of 'urbanistic intervention', using the rubrics of 'modernism and development'. If Bangladesh is to move along the Blue Economy model the rule of developmental planning has to switch over to nature, steering around land and water—taking only the natural route—not tilting in any venture against the course of nature. It must steer its development course around both landscape and aquatic planning. All that requires a simple understanding of nature, a common-sense view of science, as is

required under the Blue Economy model, not a bureaucratic vision of 'development' as a 'rocket science' or of engineering, as is being advanced in the justification for the Rampal Power Plant or of marketing of the country's naturally drawn in sediments. Any move towards a sustainable Blue Economy model of planning the beginning must be made with a recognition of the very fluctuating landscape or aquatic matrix of "the Bengal Delta where water rises and falls, comes and goes, flows and overflows, and constantly shifts boundaries between settlement and land/waterscape."[89]

For fruition of Blue Economy in Bangladesh, it is imperative to frame a new rational position on the nation's ocean economy planning that encompasses both land and maritime possessions. To such an end, it must re-negotiate the traditional developmental vision. Such an approach must be coupled with a renewed focus on the distinctive ecology of an aquatic system offered by nature. That is precisely the way forward for the development of the ocean economy in Bangladesh under a Blue Economy model. A sustainable Blue Economy maritime planning for Bangladesh must *not* be seen as an end but a means to an end: the end is Golden Economy, *Sonar Bangla,* which is the national vision, as enshrined in the national anthem. Blue Economy conveys the human use of the ocean, a rapidly expanding phenomenon *via* a new wave of industrialisation and exploitation of the ocean economy planning. Knowing that the ocean economy offers scope for economic and social transformation, growth, and sustainable development, many Afro-Asia-Pacific and Caribbean countries are set on developing robust national frameworks and enhancing regional cooperation to strengthen inter-sectoral and intra-government planning and coordination necessary to transition to the Blue Economy.[90]

The preceding labours in the process or suggested seem also relevant to Pakistan, should it plan suitable planning measures for sustainable development of its ocean economy, with solemnity to lift its millions from the subnormal trappings of living. Ocean economy planning has several objectives: create clear trails for interested stakeholders in public/private sectors to participate in ocean management, provide a platform that may help inform smarter and more efficient management decisions towards effective use, and balance and mitigate potential ecological risk. The intrinsic idea is to synthesise complex subjects into

maritime resources and facilitate management by providing the tools and knowledgeable forums needed by concerned agencies and policymakers for informed decisionmaking, management, and rallying the infusing process for emerging uses through commitments to coordinate.[91]

Like Bangladesh, Pakistan is also a recipient of enhanced maritime boundaries, with an advantage of an expanded continental shelf following the decisions of the UN Maritime Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf (2015). Its sea boundary has consequently increased by 50,000 square kilometres. By virtue of this, its oceanic boundary has gone beyond 200 nautical miles, reaching 350 nautical miles. Pakistan is now able to have an overall maritime ownership of 240,000 square kilometres with complete access to the in-depth resources as per international maritime law. All this provides immense scope for sustainable socio-economic uplift of its people.[92] As a consequence, apart from the geopolitical/strategic advantages of being a South Asian state, it also features as a Middle Eastern country as a result of its substantial oceanic possessions adjoining both Iran and Oman.

However, like its erstwhile eastern wing with common rubrics of nature, culture, governance, and politics, Pakistan also faces some daunting challenges. Besides, Pakistan also has a swiftly growing population. All these embrace issues like environmental concerns, pollution, sea intrusion, the rise of the seawater level at a rate of 1.3 millimetres per year affecting Sindh and Baluchistan, with seaports of Karachi and Gwadar facing tsunami threats.[93] All this seems perceptibly related to climate change and environmental degradation, impacting aquatic system, temperatures, and weather patterns. Geo-oceanographers require actions like protection of its coastal areas from drowning and conservation of sweet underground water from alarming threats of saline water.[94] The keys to safety include ensuring harmony with nature, pollution-control, and healthier environmental management consistent with the Blue Economy model.

Map 2

Pakistan's extended maritime boundary

Source: "Pakistan Maritime boundary – Pakistan's 5th & largest province gets even bigger by 50,000 Sq. Km, March 21, 2016," http://beyondthehorizon.com.pk/pakistan-maritime-boundary-increases-by-50000-square-kilometers/, accessed on January 30, 2017.

For all this to happen, the country's eco-environmental awareness and knowledge level, together with usual ecosystemic planning, regulatory systems, governance, and politics must change to cope with the mounting ecosystemic challenges. It must act urgently, sooner than later, being mindful of the parting prophetic wish of its first Prime Minister Quaid-e-Millat Liaqat Ali Khan during the last moments of his lifespan about the numerous security challenges facing the nation. Indubitably, like Bangladesh, Pakistan's eco-environmental challenges are more daunting than any other.

Similarly, whilst endeavours at the national level are imperative, it must also act regionally. Since Pakistan's eco-environmental system quite closely interact with the rest of South Asia, its destiny is closely bound up with that of the South Asian people. Therefore, it is pertinent for Pakistan to couple its national eco-management order with an emphasis on the regional level of eco-systemic cooperation, which could then tote up the wide-reaching search for better human destiny.

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TROUBLED INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE PEACE PROCESS

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Abstract

The prospects for peace between India and Pakistan further diminished after their relations entered into a new phase of antagonism in 2016. India stressed the issue of terrorism more forcefully as a principal irritant in bilateral relations after the Uri terrorist attack in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) in September 2016. The growing gulf on core issues between the two countries and attaching peace with a one-point agenda has acted as a disincentive for the peace process. India has refused to engage with Pakistan despite Pakistan's repeated overtures and has continued to blame Pakistan for the turmoil in IHK as well as sporadic terrorist attacks. The existing tense relations between India and Pakistan are a product of longstanding grievances and changing dynamics in Indian power and policy. India's transition from Nehruvian secularism to communal and Hindutva politics has further complicated its political engagement with Pakistan. Since the dialogue process cannot be resumed in such circumstances, the prerequisite for the peace process is normalisation in relations. In the backdrop of the troubled relations between India and Pakistan, this paper attempts to analyse the major stumbling blocks to the peace process. The paper is divided into three sections. After an overview of the troubled relations between India and Pakistan post-2014, the first section analyses the core issues between the two countries. In order to understand why the core issues have become stumbling blocks, the second section examines the contributing factors to the persistence of rivalry. The third section proposes options for normalisation of relations and the peace process.

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Introduction

Historically, tensions have remained a constant feature of relations between India and Pakistan as both states have failed to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. Indian politics have already been influenced by Hindutva, the ideology of Hindu cultural revivalism that has been adopted with the abandoning of the Nehruvian policy of restraint and secularism.[1] India's irresponsible reactions to a host of terrorist attacks following the unrest in Kashmir in mid-2016 unleashed a major shift in India's policy under Modi's leadership in dealing with Pakistan. The two countries had reached a state of a war-like situation on the Line of Control (LoC). The clouds of war hovered over the region in the last quarter of 2016 due to unrestrained public statements from the Indian leadership, which even raised fears of the use of nuclear weapons in response to India's military attack on Pakistan.[2] The war of words and negative propaganda led to a continued deterioration in relations. India launched coercive diplomacy to isolate Pakistan in the world and even tried to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. The relations entered into a new phase of antagonism after India put pressure on Pakistan to change its stance towards support for the Kashmir cause.[3]

Traditionally, the process for the resolution of conflicts between India and Pakistan had never been constructive. The only workable agreement between them was the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, which resolved the issue of their shares in water resources as upper and lower riparian states, even though some disagreements on the distribution of water still exist. Other significant agreements, which include Tashkent in 1966 and Simla Agreement in 1972, were only aimed to settle post-war issues, especially readjustment of territories held during the war and the release of prisoners of war. It was also agreed in the Simla agreement that both countries could resolve all issues through peaceful means. It took them several years to reach an understanding to mutually engage in a composite dialogue process. This idea of composite dialogue was first proposed on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAARC) summit at Male in 1997 during a meeting between the then Indian prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral and the then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Both countries worked out an eight-point agenda that formed the Lahore Declaration in 1999, which was

considered the first step towards initiating a peace process but was derailed after the Kargil war.[4] It was followed by the Agra Summit in 2001, which also failed to culminate in an agreement between the two countries. The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in October 2001 escalated tensions between India and Pakistan to a military stand-off which ended in 2002 and relations were normalised after the cease-fire agreement on LoC in 2003. The de-escalation in tensions was the result of the diplomatic efforts by the United States to convince both nuclear neighbours to reduce tensions and resolve issues through negotiations.

The formal Composite Dialogue process commenced in 2004 on an 8-points agenda in which the then prime minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to discuss all issues including Kashmir. The peace process that began was short-lived. India accepted to include Kashmir in the dialogue process and Pakistan also agreed not to make it issue-specific. The rounds of composite dialogue from 2004 to 2008 helped both countries to make progress on multiple fronts including the Kashmir issue. But the process was suspended after the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 and relations between the two countries have remained strained since then.

Methodology

Over a period of time, the environment for building peace deteriorated with the growing assertiveness in India's attitude due to changing dynamics in their power and policy and also the changing environment in the region. Terrorism became pervasive in the region and dominated the discourse in South Asia by adding a new dimension to the relations between the two countries.

Since the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008, both countries have not engaged in a constructive dialogue process to normalise relations. Although contradictory positions on Kashmir dispute remained central to their conflict, India insisted on terrorism being the core issue. Pakistan once again demanded the resolution of Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations resolutions.

India's one-point agenda after the Mumbai attack also strengthened the position of the hardliners in Indian politics. Under their influence, India resorted to an offensive-defence policy in 2016, instead of restoring the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) for risk reduction.

Relations did not normalise even a year after the Uri attack in 2016 and the situation on the LoC remained volatile. The persistent tensions in relations not only obstructed the peace process but also posed the threat of a nuclear war. With this background, the main question addressed in this paper is how the core issues between the two countries have become major stumbling blocks in their peace process.[5] The traditional ways of conflict resolution become ineffective in such a hostile environment.[6] In order to kick-start the process for peace, the prerequisite is creating a conducive environment through normalisation in relations. Relations could only be normalised through reactivating the existing CBMs[7] and also working on low-hanging fruits.[8] In case the two countries maintain the status quo, a vicious cycle of security and competition would prevail in their relations with destabilising consequences. The peaceful means of conflict resolution are illustrated in comparison with the hostile means in Table 1 in which war and competition are inevitable.

Table 1

Peaceful Means	**Hostile Means**
CBMs	**Troubling Relations**
• Military and Political CBMs • Economic CBMs • Media CBMs • Building trust through low-hanging fruits	• Diplomatic stand-off • Cross-border firing on LoC • Boycotting or withdrawal from joint summits of regional institutions • No restraint in public statements • Building alliance with other countries with negative agenda • The impasse in the peace process • Maligning each other's leaders and blame game • Psychological warfare, spreading false news, diplomatic offensive,

	antagonistic educational curriculum • Economic sanctions, trade-embargoes, flooding markets • Strict visa policies, no interaction among civil society organisations, no collaboration on art, common problems and shared culture
Structural Peace Process	**War**
• Composite Dialogue Process • Comprehensive Dialogue Process	• Conventional warfare, nuclear warfare, cross-border firing on LoC, surgical strikes, Indian Cold Start Doctrine, Arms race, • Using subversive means of destabilisation, state-sponsored terrorism,

The paper is divided into three sections. After an overview of the troubled relations between India and Pakistan post-2014, the first section analyses the core issues between the two countries. In order to understand why the core issues have become stumbling blocks, the second section examines the contributing factors to the persistence of rivalry. The third section proposes options for normalisation of relations and the peace process.

Overview of Contemporary Relations

It took more than two years after the Mumbai attack to revive the dialogue process in 2011. But there was no major breakthrough and the efforts were disrupted by sporadic skirmishes along the LoC in the disputed territory of Kashmir in January 2013.[9] The prospects for building peace through the dialogue process seemed uncertain during the election campaign of the BJP led by Narendra Modi. He was a strong advocate of responding more forcefully to supposed cross-border attacks from Pakistan while he was in opposition.[10]

The starting point in relations after the victory of the BJP was unexpectedly good despite the fears associated with Modi's election victory and his anti-Pakistan rhetoric. As the history of relations between India and Pakistan is generally devoid of golden moments,[11] Modi's invitation to former prime minister Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony on 26 May 2014 was regarded as a good gesture that also got appreciation across the border.[12] Moreover, Modi surprised everyone by paying an unannounced visit to Pakistan, when he stopped in Lahore on 25 December 2015. It was the first visit of an Indian prime minister to Pakistan in 10 years.[13] This development instilled a lot of hope amongst the people of Pakistan because it was not expected of Modi after his tough stance against Pakistan during the election campaign.

Despite attaching hopes to the increasing warmth in relations between the two premiers, the issue of terrorism gained prominence. The terrorist attack on an Indian airbase at Pathankot on 1 January 2016, which India blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups, torpedoed the goodwill generated by Modi's surprise visit within no time. It happened two weeks before the scheduled foreign secretary-level meeting between India and Pakistan in January 2016 in Islamabad.[14] As a result of the Pathankot attack and due to mounting domestic pressure, Modi tied negotiations to progress on Pakistan's commitment against terrorism.[15] India demanded the arrest of Masood Azhar, the chief of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), for his alleged involvement in the attack. The foreign secretary-level talks were postponed until India's demands were fulfilled.[16] Once again, the efforts made for resuming the dialogue process with India halted and progress was reversed to the post-Mumbai terrorist attack situation.

The second half of 2016 witnessed another upsurge in tensions between the two countries over unrest in IHK after the death of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen leader Burhan Wani in July 2016. The killing of Burhan Wani resulted in widespread and unprecedented protests across Kashmir.[17] Dozens of peaceful protesters were killed and hundreds were injured by pellet guns. Pakistan strongly condemned India's atrocities in IHK. This led India-Pakistan relations to another low when Pakistan dedicated Independence Day to Kashmir and, as a response, Narendra Modi gave a reference to human rights violations in Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir during his Independence Day speech. Many

hawks in India endorsed his move on the pretext that if Pakistan internationalised Kashmir they would do the same with Balochistan in response.[18] Some observers also argued that his reference to Gilgit and Balochistan was meant to upset the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It was also the reason that his comments generated furore in Pakistan and India received a tough response from Pakistan's military leadership.[19] India boycotted the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Summit in Beijing on 15 May 2017 mainly due to concerns over CPEC, a key part of the initiative, running through the disputed territory of Kashmir.

India's reaction to the terrorist attack on the IHK Uri Army camp on 18 September 2016, in which 18 soldiers were killed, was more severe because of the continued tension between the two countries and resulted in a steady decline in India-Pakistan relations after the Pathankot attack. The biggest reason for India's aggressive reaction to the Uri attack was the ongoing unrest in Kashmir and Pakistan's explicit concerns over the use of force against Kashmiri protesters. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Ram Badan Singh called Pakistan a 'terrorist state', and warned that "there will be no joint investigation team (JIT), no forbearance in public statements, and little faith in Nawaz Sharif."[20] Hardliners like Ram Madhave, Secretary General of the ruling BJP, went on to say, "For one tooth, the complete jaw. Days of so-called strategic restraint are over." This echoed India's plan to retaliate forcefully and to increase costs to Pakistan disproportionately. It showed a major shift in India policy and pushed the relations between the two countries to their lowest point after the Mumbai terror attack.[21] In the backdrop of this new phase of antagonism, the core issues between India and Pakistan can be analysed, which have become stumbling blocks in the peace process.

Core Issues

Adversarial Perceptions and Insecurity

The conflict between India and Pakistan is not only the product of physical factors such as territory and resources but also of ideological factors based on opposing identities. The trust deficit between the two countries keeps the environment tense and unfavourable for the peace process to develop. The origin of mistrust and adversarial perceptions between India and Pakistan has been traced to pre-partition differences in the political aims and ideologies between the All India Muslim League

and the Indian National Congress.[22] The post-partition experiences, including the unjust Indian annexation of Kashmir, violent mass migration, the controversy over asset sharing, stoppage of water, and the war in 1948 provided reasons to strengthen the belief in Pakistan that Indian National Congress was against the creation of Pakistan.[23]

Pakistan would not survive, was a dominant view held by the Indian National Congress. But the Hindu conservatives were staunchly against partition.[24] The discomfort of secular democratic leaders on the creation of Pakistan created room for a radical class of Hindus in India to develop the strategic culture and dominate the political landscape of India. The concept of Hindutva gradually intruded into the strategic thinking of India.[25] The militant Hindu revivalist group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) under the leadership of Veer Savarkar "had opposed partition on the grounds that India was a cultural and religious entity with a Muslim minority that did not merit the privilege of becoming a separate state. Although he agreed with the 'two-nation' theory, he did not believe Muslims deserved any such reward."[26] Nehruvian secularism started to erode in the 1990s with the rise of Hindutva within India and with the rise of revivalism in other parts of the world and its reverberations in India. In the present case, Hindutva presents a real blow to the reconciliation of historical narratives between India and Pakistan. [27]

The national identities and policies developed along a singular concept of rivalry[28] have been transferred and legitimised through educational curricula in both countries. The conflicting national narratives have promoted ill-will against each other to the extent that many political and religious forces exploit them for their vested interests. Widening differences give rise to religious and political intolerance on both sides of the borders.[29]

Apart from hardline beliefs of the RSS, generally Indians detest Pakistan's reference to its different culture and civilisation, the notion on which the sub-continent was divided between the two nations: Hindu and Muslims.[30] Mostly, their fears stem from Pakistan's belief that the partition was imperfectly carried out and its unwavering claim for Kashmir that would probably upset the integrity of India.[31] According to Pew Research Center, Pakistan is the least favoured nation in India, with only

18 per cent seeking better relations with the neighbouring state, while 64 per cent wanting to stay away from it.[32]

The lack of contact in such a situation augments the misperceptions and hinders the process of trust-building for peaceful resolution of conflicts. The continuous mistrust, adversarial perceptions, and opposing national identities have given birth to a 'security dilemma' in Indian and Pakistani relations. This dilemma emerges out of the socially constructed realities, especially the mutual negative perceptions. "The interpretation of one state action as hostile due to the unknown intentions of the other state leads to negative expectations and tends to fear for the worst."[33] And so according to John Herz, due to this dilemma, which is uncertainty and fears about the other state's intentions to do harm under anarchy, states accumulate more and more power. It leads to a cycle of power competition.[34] This vicious cycle of security and competition is visible in both India and Pakistan. The security dilemma has led both countries to engage in a nuclear arms race and tough military postures.[35]

The severity of the security dilemma has been witnessed in Indian and Pakistani relations many times. Most recently, after India's resort to an offensive-defence approach after the Uri attack in September 2016, the threat of nuclear war was high. The systematic offence-defence theory by Robert Jervis, argues that the security dilemma and the risk of war become doubly severe in an offensive era in the state system.[36] India under the BJP hardline policies has resorted to an offence-defence policy against Pakistan which in the absence of basic CBMs can lead both countries to an all-out war.

Conflicting Positions on Kashmir

The dispute over Kashmir is central to the conflict between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir conflict was a product of the demarcation of borders and division of territories between the two newly created countries when British rule came to an end. The controversy over India's annexation of Kashmir is keeping the hostility alive to-date.[37]

Despite the Indian move to the UN Security Council, after a war with Pakistan in 1948 and the subsequent UN resolution calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, India has denied of even considering it a disputed territory. Pakistan accepted the UN resolutions and considered them a

viable solution to the dispute. India initially accepted, but now proclaims that Kashmir is an internal problem of India and blames Pakistan for interference.[38]

India itself did not consider the accession offered by Maharaja Hari Singh during the time of crisis as conclusive enough to affect the formal inclusion of Kashmir into the Indian Union. It was the reason that India had accorded a special status to IHK through article 370. With the passage of time, India embraced the status quo. Pakistan repudiated the accession because Maharaja, who had first asked for a standstill in the decision of joining any of the dominions, offered accession to India in return for assistance against the invasion of the tribal people in Kashmir. Hence, he did not represent the sentiments of the majority of the people who were Muslim. The people of Kashmir had strongly resented accession to India, therefore, Pakistan also talked about a referendum in Kashmir. India, by refusing the dispute, also contradicts India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's initial promise of giving the people of Kashmir their right to self-determination.[39]

India revisited its policy on handling Kashmir issue over the period of time.[40] India now abhors the fact that it once had sought UN intervention in Kashmir that designated it an internationally disputed territory.[41] Pakistan accepts the disputed nature of the territory, therefore, the part under its control is called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), which means independent Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan considers Kashmiris to be a third party to the dispute, which should be given the right of self-determination according to the UN resolutions. On the other hand, the Indian government has also miserably failed to accommodate Kashmiri separatists and pro-Pakistani factions to calm down the internal dissent politically through negotiations.[42] It also rejects outside support or mediation in the matter of Kashmir since the signing the Simla Agreement in 1972 in which India and Pakistan agreed mutually to resolve all outstanding issues bilaterally through peaceful means. However, its strict interpretation is continuously used by India to confine the differences to bilateral negotiations. In such a case, a perpetual stalemate is maintained each time India refuses to negotiate.[43]

For a long period of time, India refused to negotiate on Kashmir by considering it a threat to its integrity and secularism that they argue would foment similar separatist movements demanding secession based

on ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines.[44] India tries to diminish the indigenous dissent of the Kashmiri people by drawing attention to terrorism.[45] However, the anti-India sentiment is strong throughout the IHK, where it is evident that the Indian state's survival in Kashmir depends on using its army to maintain law and order. It is the reason, according to Sumati Panikkar, a New Delhi-based left-wing activist, that the people are no longer scared of the bullet.[46] The resentment among Kashmiris against the deployment of hundreds of thousands of Indian troops also helps in garnering support for rebels who have been fighting since the 1990s to demand independence or a union with neighbouring Pakistan. Keeping in view the mistreatment of the Kashmiri people by the Indian forces, it can be established that the discontent among in the new generations of Kashmiris is embedded in India's own policies of suppression. Instead of addressing this problem, India vindicates itself from responsibility by accusing Pakistan.[47]

India's refusal to accommodate the interests of reasonable Kashmiri stakeholders in a peace process has also become a source of more resentment. By only talking about terrorism and neglecting the core issue of Kashmir, India is instigating the militant elements to attack India to invite international attention to the grievances of Kashmiri Muslims.[48] According to experts, Pakistan cannot take on the proscribed militant groups under Indian pressure because it would create internal divisions. However, improvement in relations will increase the options for the government to deal with such terrorist groups. Without India's flexibility towards the Kashmir issue, action against militant groups would be dangerous to both India's and Pakistan's security.[49] Moreover, India's resolve to use force to fight threats against India only adds to the dangers of escalation in conflict with Pakistan.[50] In such an uncertain environment, the chance of potential terrorist attacks will have devastating implications for Pak-India relations in the future.[51] In order to deal with such a situation, military and political CBMs between the two countries can play a significant role in averting an unrestrained response to such incidents. Also, a normalisation in relations and an improved environment would bring flexibility in the positions of both countries on the issue.

Blame-Game over Terrorism

The issue of terrorism is complex and multi-dimensional in the regional and global context. India started presenting it in a more simplistic way after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US. It used it as an opportunity to wilfully project itself as a long-standing victim of terrorism by presenting links between international terrorism and the freedom struggle in IHK. Since then, India has remained very successful in convincing the world to assess the struggle for independence in Kashmir in a different light.[52]

Although Pakistan joined the US in the fight against terrorism soon after 9/11, the US remained suspicious of Pakistan's sympathies towards the Taliban. This belief of the US also helped India in gathering international support against militant activities in IHK. As a result of India's labelling of Pakistan as a terrorist-sponsoring country after 9/11, Pakistan's support for Kashmir has been greatly undermined. US support to India during the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 led to the blacklisting of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM. This also led Pakistan to ban jihadi organisations and revisit its foreign policy. In addition to several diplomatic initiatives, such as proposing new options to resolve the conflict, Pakistan also significantly reviewed the Kashmir policy in 2004.[53] Pakistan's commitment to not let its territory to be used by militant groups against India and subsequent proposals on the resolution of Kashmir resulted in the commencement of the dialogue process. Former p*resident* Pervez Musharaf had even proposed a 4-point formula that proposed a non-territorial solution to Kashmir by making the LoC irrelevant.[54]

Frequent interaction and diplomatic ventures helped both countries make progress in relations. The peace process initiated with India in 2004 during former prime minister Vajpayee's government was also pursued by the newly elected government of Congress. However, the goodwill created was not carried forward after the terrorist attack in 2008. Rather it gave rise to nationalist fervour against Pakistan in India. Consequently, the anti-peace process elements succeeded in keeping the conflict alive between the two countries.[55] Terrorism was highlighted as the major flashpoint in their troubled relations after the Mumbai terrorist attack. It also provided a good reason to many hardliners in India

to depict the peace process as futile and the BJP capitalised on it to revive public support in favour of its Hindu nationalist ideology.

Pakistan was ranked third on the Global Terrorism Index in 2014. It was reported as the most affected country by terrorism after Iraq and Afghanistan.[56] Despite Pakistan's undeniable losses in terrorist attacks in the last 15 years, India continued to paint Pakistan as a terrorist country and dismissed the actual problem between the two states which is rooted in their mutual mistrust and the Kashmir dispute. By associating all problems between the two countries with terrorism, India wanted to change the narrative on Kashmir. This dismissive attitude of India also strengthened Pakistan's suspicions about India's involvement in Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Karachi in terrorist activities.

India could not provide any substantial evidence for Pakistan's involvement in the Pathankot attack. They accused non-state actors of perpetrating these terrorist attacks with inadequate evidence.[57] On the other hand, Pakistan's security forces arrested the Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav shortly after the Pathankot attack who confessed about his involvement in subversive activities in Pakistan.[58] Pakistan has on several occasions raised the issue of India's involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan.[59] Prime Minister Modi's public references to Balochistan, FATA, and Gilgit-Baltistan in August 2016 substantiated Pakistan's allegations. It was a confirmation for many Pakistanis about India's strategy to employ covert means to destabilise Pakistan.[60] The blame game over terrorism is further instigating the misperception and fears in both countries. It also gives rise to the perception that there is a lack of will on the Indian side for the resolution of all outstanding issues.

Domestic Politics and Lack of Will

Electoral politics and competing interests between major institutions also play a major role in affecting the peace process between India and Pakistan. Mostly religious hardliners and the political far right in both countries influence decision making. They have serious misgivings about the other side and, therefore, oppose the normalisation process on ideological grounds. Most of the time, the leaders in both countries submit to the demands of these groups for their own political interests.[61] This state of affairs is the outcome of the antagonistic culture that has been cultivated in both countries for a long time. The presence of

hardliners as admirers of this culture strengthens the position of forces who have an interest in the persistence of conflict rather peace.[62]

In the present case, the tides of extremist elements could be identified as real obstacles to the peace process between the two countries. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in his book Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove described the current situation in India as more complicated. Despite the fact that Vajpayee belonged to the BJP and had started the peace process, the Congress under former prime minister Manmohan Singh carried it forward with equal passion. According to Kasuri, the shift in India's politics at the centre happened when Modi was in the opposition in the Lok Sabha. It was found politically advantageous to raise the Pakistan issue for his elections.[63] The most troubling obstacle to the viability of the solution of the Kashmir dispute according to Stanley Wolpert, was the election in India of another BJP-led government after 2008, especially because it was dominated by Narendra Modi.

It was assessed from Modi's strong opposition to former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with his Pakistani counterpart in Sharm-el-Sheikh Egypt in 2009. Modi was against any talks with Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks. He had even demanded that Pakistan confess to its role in launching terrorist attacks against India. Wolpert had predicted that the possibility of Modi's coming into power would diminish the prospects of permanent peace between India and Pakistan without which the solution of the Kashmir dispute was not possible.[64] Only a statement by the then Pakistan's prime minister Gilani and Manmohan Singh in Sharm-el-Sheikh on delinking terrorism and Composite Dialogue invited severe criticism for the Indian prime minister. The BJP had opposed this move to the extent that Manmohan Singh had to backtrack from his earlier statement.[65]

Unlike India, there is a consensus among politicians of all major parties in Pakistan on improving relations with India. But the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is close to the heart of all major political parties in Pakistan. Kashmir issue also plays a dominant role in Pakistan's domestic politics. The omission of Kashmir in their public statement during the meeting of Nawaz Sharif with Modi on the sidelines of SCO in 2015 had drawn a lot of criticism from the opposition for Pakistan's prime minister.[66]

According to many political analysts, Modi's reaction to terrorist attacks in 2016 was aimed at satisfying internal demands to punish Pakistan. Due to his angry rhetoric and hawkish views against Pakistan, the public in India had attached high expectations from him to take on terrorist groups decisively. On the other hand, the situation in Pakistan compelled it to retaliate. Modi's tough stand on Pakistan in the form of the international demonisation of Pakistan, the purported surgical strikes across the LoC, and the continued belligerent statements was also aimed at his electoral gains in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, and Uttarakhand in early 2017.[67]

Besides from domestic politics, the primacy of military in the foreign policy decision making in Pakistan is widely debated as an obstacle to peace with India.[68] Indians allege that Pakistan's military is inherently against peacebuilding with India.[69] It is *because* Pakistan was ruled by the military for most of its history. The lack of cohesion in Pakistan and its troubled neighbourhood necessitated a strong defence system for Pakistan and the military has always earned public admiration for it. In the absence of strong institutional foundations, Pakistan's political development was slow as against the fast growth in strength and size of the military. Over a period of time, the civilians' role in decision-making has either reduced or they have failed to gain relative balance in power.[70] Therefore, the military served both functions: the defence of the borders as well as defining national interests of the country. It is for this reason that the hawks in India consider it futile to engage in any dialogue process with civilian governments in Pakistan who they think have little say in policy-making regarding India. On the basis of this basis, many in Indian policy circles preach coercion and compulsion to dictate terms to Pakistan.[71] Currently, India has now once again blamed Pakistan's armed forces for derailing the peace process. India substantiated its claim by giving references to the internal build-up of pressure on Nawaz Sharif after his elections. India projected the army's opposition to Nawaz Sharif in formulating India policy.[72]

The power imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan and the military's dealing with India and Afghanistan is criticised for many reasons. But India has also missed opportunities for making peace with Pakistan and did not reciprocate with a similar spirit to the peace initiatives by former Pakistani president Musharaf. Despite Musharaf's

urge for making peace, the Agra summit in 2001 failed because of non-flexibility at the summit by Indian leadership.[73] L.K. Advani, veteran Indian political figure, admitted in his book *My Country, My Life* that he derailed the process because of Pakistani president's prioritisation of Kashmir issue.[74] Likewise, it was the inconsistency in approach and lack of desire for peace on the part of the Indian government that the massive progress made on Siachen and Sir Creek issues and Musharaf's joint mechanism formula for Kashmir could not proceed in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008. Musharaf had made considerable concessions on Pakistan's decades-old stance over Kashmir at that time. The domestic political interests and lack of will to make conditions for peace favourable is becoming a major stumbling block in the peace process between the two countries.

Instability in Afghanistan

Instability and conflict in Afghanistan is another dimension in the troubled relations between India and Pakistan. India had supported and maintained good relations with all Afghan governments except the Taliban. Pakistan has always been concerned about the Kabul-New Delhi nexus. Over the past decade, the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan and the strategic partnership agreement between them gave rise to reservations in Pakistan. Indian coercive diplomacy launched in 2016 against Pakistan was also joined by Afghanistan, exacerbating Pakistan's apprehensions. After the Uri attack, India and Afghanistan together opened a front against Pakistan on many multilateral forums, which also resulted in deterioration of relations with Afghanistan. During the Heart of Asia conference on Afghanistan in Amritsar in December 2016, both India and Afghanistan used the venue to embarrass Pakistan on terrorism.[75]

Both Pakistan's internal and external security complexities are linked to neighbouring Afghanistan. Friendly Afghanistan has long been considered crucial for Pakistan's internal cohesion and security as well as defence against India. On the other hand, strategic alliance with Afghanistan serves India's strategy to contain Pakistan from the western side. India has long been accused of using Afghan soil to hurt Pakistan.[76] It is due to these adverse strategic objectives in Afghanistan that the existence of a proxy war between the two has always been speculated. Over the last decade, Pakistan's fears against India's influence in

Afghanistan were increased because the US-installed Karzai government was India-friendly.[77]

Due to the planned pullout of the US forces from Afghanistan, India was concerned about the return of the Taliban with the backing of Pakistan. Therefore, India has accelerated its diplomatic, economic, and strategic relations with Afghanistan in the last few years. Under the guise of economic and infrastructural development of Afghanistan, India succeeded in establishing close relations also with the new government there. Apart from investment in Afghanistan, Modi capitalised on the issue of terrorism between Afghanistan and Pakistan. By joining the Afghanistan government, Modi believed that India would earn more credibility for its claims about Pakistan's mothership of terrorism. Modi also took advantage of the growing differences between Pakistan and the US over the Afghan issue to drive Pakistan into international isolation.[78]

It went in favour of Modi's hardline approach that Afghanistan shared negative views of Pakistan with India. By adding the Afghan issue to the bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan, the chances of creating a healthy environment for initiating a peace process between the two countries have further decreased.

Contributing Factors to Persistence of Rivalry

Impact of Power Asymmetry on Indian Policy Towards Pakistan

According to T. V. Paul, power asymmetry also becomes a causal factor in the persistence of rivalry. In the case of India and Pakistan, the peculiar power asymmetry that prevails between them makes the trajectory towards conflict resolution difficult.[79] India's expanded manoeuvring space and assertiveness after Modi ascended to power is the result of growing disparity in the strengths between the two countries. According to defence analyst Moeed Yusuf, India due to this leverage can forego benefits of improved ties with Pakistan and its dismissive attitude can allow it to keep the Kashmir dispute off the table in relations with Pakistan.[80]

The growing disparity in diplomatic, military, and economic strength between India and Pakistan has been witnessed in the post-1971 war period.[81] Indian diplomacy moved to consolidate its regionally dominant position during this period when the morale of Pakistan's

armed forces was shattered after the break-up of Pakistan. Indira Gandhi pioneered the tough, uncompromising, and assertive approach towards neighbours.[82] Indian domestic politics, over the next two decades, witnessed a steady departure from the early commitment to secularism.

Pakistan, after becoming a nuclear power, challenged the conventional asymmetry as a sole determinant of setting terms with India. However, India's policy towards Pakistan experienced tremendous change under the BJP government from 1998 to 2004. The BJP gradually deviated from the Nehruvian policy tradition, which believed in peace diplomacy and localised self-defence, engagement with rivals, and a policy of restraint.[83] This policy was replaced by a new and more self-confident and assertive approach based on India's growing economic and military strength with a more strategic and pro-Western orientation. As war was not an option due to nuclear parity, by adopting 'assertive and offensive' policies with regard to Pakistan, India believed that it would be successful in enforcing its will on Pakistan. India would maintain status-quo in case of Kashmir and gradually find strong grounds to make it irrelevant in its adversarial relations with Pakistan. This policy was also aimed at increasing costs to Pakistan of its demand for the resolution of the Kashmir issue.[84]

The continued threat perception from India has always kept Pakistan busy in search of security against India. Pakistan was facing both security threats from India and also suffering from a weak economy. But security was preferred over economic growth. India continued developing militarily as well as aspired to strengthen the economy. Pakistan has been spending substantial funds on its domestic and foreign arms procurements while losing the battle on economic grounds.[85]

India's domestic economic policies have yet to meet the needs of its masses. About 21.25 per cent of Indians live at or below the World Bank's poverty line of $1.90 as compared to 8.3 per cent in Pakistan.[86] Although it shows Pakistan in a better position than India in terms of poverty, India is reaping many advantages based on its economic potential. India leverages many favours from the US and Europe in international affairs due to its potential to stand parallel with China as the fastest economy on the Asian continent. According to the UN's *World Economy Report*, India is predicted to be the fastest growing economy at

7.53 per cent in 2016 that would improve further to 7.5 per cent in 2017.[87] Apart from Pakistan's smaller size and population than India, its GDP is eight times smaller than India. In the past two decades, Pakistan's growth rate has been only half that of India and China. If current trends continue, by 2050, India's economy will be 40 times larger than Pakistan.[88]

According to the *Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2014-15*, by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the market size of India is one of the best in the world with an overall ranking of 3 against Pakistan's 30.[89] India's defence budget has seen a tremendous rise from $11.8 billion in 2001 to $52 billion in the year 2016 and $ 63.9 billion in 2017.[90] Pakistan raised its defence budget to $8.78 billion in 2017.[91] India was ranked 6th largest military spender in 2016, while Pakistan was ranked at number 27 on the Global Index of Defence Budgets.[92] India has overtaken France and Germany in military spending. By the year 2020, India is expected to emerge as the third-largest country in terms of defence-related expenditures, behind the US at number 1 and China at number 2. India is expected to spend $70 billion in the year 2020 on military power projection that would leave Pakistan far behind.[93] According to these projections, even if Pakistan spends more under the best economic forecasts, it would not be able to compete with India for long. So the conventional military balance would continue to shift inexorably in India's favour.[94]

By spending a large portion of its limited resources on achieving military parity with India, Pakistan neglected the economic dimension of security.[95] According to Owen Bennett-Jones, the economy alone is a country's true strength because economic growth can not only benefit citizens but also earn respect for the country all over the world.[96] This gives India a substantial advantage over other small South Asian countries. The recent episodes of escalating tensions between India and Pakistan show that the rising disparity with Pakistan is going in favour of Modi's belligerent policies against Pakistan. Modi wants to keep Pakistan stuck in its current India-centric security paradigm that would keep increasing its threat perception against India. This could be better achieved by keeping Pakistan worried about India's military strength, doctrines, and periodic actions such as on the LoC and its collusion with Afghanistan.[97] When a country is in a strong position, it becomes difficult

to convince it to resolve disputes on equal terms or on a win-win situation. This further empowers India to maintain the status-quo regarding the Kashmir conflict and intimidate or humiliate Pakistan whenever there is a chance.

Asymmetrical International Interests

Over the period of time, the world's response to the conflict between India and Pakistan has also been shaped by India's diplomatic, military, and economic advantage over Pakistan. The world is ready to believe India's portrayal of any dissent in Kashmir as terrorism. Pakistan's former ambassador Munir Akram calls it discriminatory treatment on the part of the Western countries with regard to the Kashmir issue for their vested interests attached to appeasing India.[98] The appeasement of India is driven by a convergence of interests between New Delhi and the global powers because India offers the world's military-industrial complex the single largest market and its economy has largely locked in Western business and investment interests. In addition to that, India also offers to play a counterweight to China for the West. Narendra Modi is able to cash more on the two real advantages that are power disparity and the world's support to him in his narrative on terrorism.[99]

There was a time when the US was concerned about maintaining a balanced approach towards disputes between India and Pakistan. In the past, the US had played an important role in promoting a broad and balanced agenda for Pakistan-India talks. In 1998, when Pakistan achieved nuclear parity with India, the US pursued identical agenda of dialogue with India and Pakistan that also included Kashmir along with concerns about nuclear and conventional arms control. However, Washington decided to 'de-hyphenate' US policies towards India and Pakistan because of the China factor. It gave India unanticipated concessions from the US. The prime examples are the US formal defence pact and a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India in contradiction to the principles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which prohibits such cooperation with a non-party to the treaty.[100] The US went a few steps forward during Modi's government despite his previous unpopular reputation in the US. Modi paid frequent visits to the US after assuming power, which resulted in key defence

pacts between the two countries. To further strengthen their strategic partnership, both governments signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in the second half of 2016 that would allow the militaries of the US and India to share their facilities.[101] Moreover, the unconditional support of the US to India's bid for membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), even if it is at the expense of Pakistan, indicates the outsized political importance of India in US policy circles.

Both military and economic terms further accelerated between India and the US with the change of administration in the US in January 2017.[102] US President Donald Trump, during his election, only informally expressed a desire to mediate between New Delhi and Islamabad over the Kashmir issue. His desire to seek Indian help in countering Pakistan's nuclear programme was alarming. It showed that India's NSG entry would get further momentum during Trump's presidency.[103]

The special treatment from the US in nuclear affairs not only enabled India to expand its nuclear programme but it also changed India's behaviour with its neighbours other than China. The US policy ignored Pakistan's concern about an arms race in South Asia.[104] It is barely observed by the US that India's growing military power is heightening Pakistan's strategic vulnerabilities. It also indicates that the asymmetric capability between India and Pakistan would continue to widen. Pakistan, in search for parity with India, is heavily relying on its military and strategic relations with China.[105]

As against the growing economic and strategic relations between India and the US, China and Pakistan also made rounds in the media because of their ongoing mega economic and infrastructure project, CPEC. Due to a convergence of interests and healthy relations that have developed between the two neighbours, China comes to Pakistan's support against India's moves to harm Pakistan internationally. China resisted India's unconditional entry into the NSG because that would have been discriminatory. Moreover, China repeatedly blocked India's moves to declare JeM Chief Masood Azhar as a terrorist in the UNSC in 2016 without adequate evidence against him proving his involvement in Pathankot attack.[106] India-US and China-Pakistan add a global dimension to their conflict that is giving rise to strategic competition between India and Pakistan and search for global alliances. The

outsiders' response to the conflict is also influenced by their evolving relations with the two countries.

The persistence of rivalry between the two countries and the inequitable approach of the world towards India and Pakistan also affected Pakistan's political and economic growth. As a consequence, Pakistan would continue diverting resources disproportionally to its defence that will keep on distracting it from its more pressing internal needs.[107] This can give rise to a power imbalance in Pakistan's political system. But this factor has been widely ignored by India that stability in Pakistan is also vital for peace and security of the region. Internal stability also comes from a stable and flourishing economy that, along with other measures, is crucial to eradicating violent extremism and terrorism in the region.

Lack of Potential Economic Cost of Rivalry

South Asia has been the least integrated region in the world. Political tensions between the two neighbours have also plagued their economic relations. The absence of substantial economic relations also does not give a strong reason to both countries to avoid conflict[108] No two countries can afford isolation in this globally interdependent marketplace. It has been debated in the last few years that increasing trade relations between India and Pakistan would be instrumental in lowering political tensions between the two countries and would eventually be a tool for conflict resolution between them.[109] Currently, the trade between them is far from its potential and remains extremely vulnerable to political fluctuations. In 2012-13, the recorded trade between India and Pakistan was $2.4 billion.[110] In the years 2015-16, the trade between the two countries was $2.61 billion.[111] This small size of trade does not play a significant role in making both countries worry about the cessation of trade activities during political tensions. Following the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, India-Pakistan trade fell drastically and came to a near standstill for almost nine years in the aftermath of the 1965 war. More recently, India stopped trade via land and air routes following the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001. In 2013, trade was blocked following cross-border firing.[112]

There is a potential to raise bilateral trade to $ 8-10 billion. Even after increasing volume to this level, it would only account for 3 per cent

of their total trade volume. Both countries ship $300 billion worth of goods to all parts of the world.[113] According to experts, economic cooperation has the potential to significantly shift the paradigm of cross-border relations in South Asia. “If healthy trade relations are built up between India and Pakistan—and the potential is immense—it can integrate the lives of millions of people in both countries. With livelihoods at stake, both India and Pakistan will be forced to stay engaged and find alternate means of dispute resolution.”[114]

Economic interests and monetary risks associated with disruption of trade relations can immensely influence the political decisions in both countries. Fierce economic engagement can create new stakeholders and interest groups benefiting from the engagement. The hawks in both countries would be confronted by this interest group that can also act as a strong lobby to nurture, preserve, and promote peaceful bilateral relations. The significant economic gains attached to normalcy in relations can serve as a powerful means to induce conflict resolution between India and Pakistan.[115]

Despite political differences between China and India, the trade volume between the two nations, which was just $1 billion in 2000, reached $70.73 billion in 2016. It can serve as an example for India and Pakistan.[116] Even in the face of bilateral political disputes, it is possible to promote trade within the region. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and the creation of stakeholders in countries can eventually defuse tensions and soften the ground for peaceful resolution of disputes and disagreements.[117] The EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also examples where trade and economic relations were instrumental in conflict resolution between neighbours. A large amount of export and import flows in economic sectors influence decisions to initiate military conflicts. India could become a larger market for Pakistan’s textile products. The beneficiaries of trade could pressurise politicians to maintain cordial bilateral relations. Therefore, if both governments make trade their top priority, they can achieve mutuality of interests.[118] The unresolved disputes and strained relations have also been a major drain on the resources of the two countries. The serious energy shortages faced by both countries are hampering their economic development. India cannot maintain a healthy economic growth rate if its energy resources remain inadequate. In Pakistan, normal public life has

been badly disrupted by chronic electricity outages for many years and the scarcity of energy has also adversely affected industrial output.[119] Geopolitical conflicts could be reversed to geo-economic benefits. The strategic location of Pakistan could better be used for regional connectivity as a corridor to energy-rich Central Asia. By exploring the economic dimension of cost and opportunity between the two countries, India and Pakistan can also understand the need for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Local Narratives

In the age of information technology, the media is a powerful tool to influence public opinion. The media has a profound impact on the sentiments of the people in both India and Pakistan, especially at times of crisis or any positive development in their relations. It could be an agent of change if it adheres to an objective analysis of the conflict. However, negative reporting has so far dominated the India-Pakistan relationship.[120] Highly inflammatory rhetoric is promoted against the other side. Instead of playing as a neutral observer of the situation and focusing on objective and balanced reporting, which are norms of journalism, the media goes on a bashing spree during a crisis situation.[121] There is a lot of potential to replace the discourse of acrimony with the incentives of peace between the two countries. The role of the media can be instrumental in influencing public opinion towards mutual commonalities between the two neighbouring states. By highlighting economic dividends of good relations it can help in creating a positive environment to hold talks. If the media shows the potential benefits of trade normalisation and the possible impact on the common man in both countries, it would pave the way for stronger bilateral ties and regional integration.[122]

Removing Stumbling Blocks to Normalise Relations

Peaceful Means Versus Hostile Means

The normalisation of relations requires a secession of hostilities through building trust.[123] Both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states, putting in place CBMs become indispensable for managing the conflict during a crisis situation, as “crisis is an intermediate zone between peace and war.”[124] This process ensures the co-existence of

belligerent states where organised violence does not enter into the mental equation of the policymakers.[125]

In order reduce the risk of war, the existing military and political CBMs between India and Pakistan include the following:

1) Communication measures:
   - Hotline between Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs);
   - Direct Communication lines between Sector Commanders across the LoC;
   - A hotline between prime ministers;
   - Hotlines between Foreign Secretaries[126]
2) Transparency Measures: Nuclear CBMs, exchange of lists of nuclear facilities, prohibition of attacking nuclear facilities, information exchange before nuclear tests, nuclear doctrines.
3) Atmospheric measures: the release of prisoners as a goodwill gesture, border security measures, etc.[127]

In order to increase the cost of rivalry between the two countries and to increase the incentive for peace, both countries need to broaden the scope of CBMs to economic relations. Economic CBMs can include Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, visa liberalisations for business, increasing trade and investments, and joint economic ventures and cooperation. Both countries can also work on media CBMs which can include objective and balanced reporting, shaping public opinion through highlighting commonalities and highlighting economic dividends of good relations.

As part of the structured peace process, the Composite Dialogue process is an eight-point agenda which includes the following:

1. Peace and Security
2. Jammu and Kashmir
3. Siachin
4. Wullar Barrage
5. Sir Creek
6. Terrorism
7. Commerce

8. Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.[128]

The Comprehensive Dialogue process, proposed in 2015, included the following:

1. Peace and security
2. Jammu and Kashmir
3. Siachen, Sir Creek
4. Wullar Barrage
5. Tulbul Navigation Project
6. Economic and commercial cooperation
7. Counter-terrorism
8. Narcotics control
9. Humanitarian issues
10. People to people exchanges and religious tourism.[129]

This was comprehensive because it also included humanitarian aspects other than the conflicting issues.

Hostile Means

Under the status-quo and the pervasive security dilemma in the case of India and Pakistan, the vicious cycle of security and competition would continue between the two countries. This would include destabilising components, such as a nuclear arms race, tough military postures and nuclear doctrines, volatile border security, and the fear of the unknown.

However, in the nuclear age, the presence of nuclear weapons prevented the two hostile super-powers, the US and the Soviet Union, from engaging in a military conflict. Nuclear deterrence (the fear of retribution with the same destructive weapons) as a concept was developed during the Cold War when nuclear weapons kept peace for 40 years between the two powerful adversaries. The fear of inflicting an unacceptable punishment had lowered the chances for war.[130]

When war is not an option due to nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, other hostile means can be trade embargoes, economic sanctions, or economic warfare. Even if both countries avoid a direct military conflict, other hostile means would also have a

destabilising impact on the welfare of both countries. India can forego peaceful resolution of the disputes with Pakistan because of the increasing gap in power between the two countries. Still, this would have little incentive for India if it wants to become a developed country. Reliance on hostile means to manage the adversary is costly and dangerous to both countries.

Bridging Trust Through Low-Hanging Fruits

The Track II Diplomacy concept considers those conflicts intractable which are related to survival, identity, or fears. It is argued that these conflicts can only be addressed in a process that works directly to change the understanding of human relationships, promoting mutual understanding and acknowledgement of people's concerns.[131] In intractable conflicts, the threat is so powerful that the traditional mediation and negotiations are not adequate to address this kind of conflict. [132]

Keeping in view the core factors of rivalry and the factors that are contributing to the rivalry, the major stumbling blocks can be seen against the facilitators in Table 2. It is important to focus more on the facilitators and common problems for conflict resolution and removing the stumbling blocks in the peace process.

Table 2

Major Stumbling Blocks	**Facilitators**
Security dilemma because of adversarial perceptions/ mistrust/fears	Shared history, shared culture, shared language, common cuisine
Inflexible and conflicting positions on Kashmir dispute	Common social problems: extremism, intolerance, gender discrimination, lack of social cohesion, corruption, underdevelopment, poverty, common diseases
Domestic politics and division of society on the resolution of conflict Competing Institutional	Common structural and economic problems: underdeveloped infrastructure, energy shortages, lack of basic human facilities e.g. health, education etc.

interests	Common environmental problems: Depletion of water resources and soaring air pollution (smog)
Terrorism as an excuse and lack of will for engaging in a dialogue process	Delinking terrorism from the peace process
Afghanistan a new battlefield	Regional Platforms for cooperation (SAARC, SCO)
Minor Stumbling Blocks	
Lack of contact	Religious tourism, medical treatment, common educational institution (SAARC University) Academic interactions (exchange of academics, students and literature)
Lack of economic relations	Untapped economic opportunities, the potential of increasing trade up to $ 30 billion
Asymmetric interests of global powers	Regional development/connectivity projects for shared benefits (TAPI, CPEC) third-party mediation of UN, US, UK, China
Media war	Exchange of art (Films, drama, theatre, comedy and joint projects)

Keeping in view the stumbling blocks in the way of the peace process between India and Pakistan, both countries need to take an initiative for normalisation of relations through issues that are of common interest. This would pave the way for generating good-will through non-conflictual issues. Instead of restricting the dialogue process to a one-point agenda, both countries should work on identifying common threats and common challenges. The proposal of a comprehensive dialogue process in 2015 also focused on humanitarian issues, which can be resumed in a separate framework. The framework for working on common challenges will give the impression that the relations are not held hostage to the status quo of hostility and progress can be made towards normalisation of relations.

Some of the low-hanging fruits[133] on which cooperation is possible include soaring air pollution (smog), endemic diseases like dengue, easy visa process for medical treatment and religious pilgrimages, and academic exchanges. Smog-filled Indian and Pakistan cities can turn into unhealthy snow globes according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).[134] Among other endemic diseases, dengue fever is driven by complex interactions among host, vector and virus that are influenced by climatic factors. It is also a common problem in both India and Pakistan. With the changing patterns in rains, especially in the monsoon season, at least a 25 per cent increase in dengue cases has been reported in India.[135] Moreover, the process of visa application for religious pilgrimage and medical treatment has been further tightened after diplomatic relations between the countries deteriorated with India's reaction to the passing of the death sentence on Kulbhushan Jadhav in May 2017.[136] Promoting good-will through showing flexibility on humanitarian issues can help in bridging the trust-deficit and can lead both countries to start a peace process.

Institutionalisation of the Peace Process

In order to avoid the negative influence of ideology, change in power and policy, and distractions through terrorist attacks, the peace process between India and Pakistan should be institutionalised. After creating a conducive environment for peacebuilding, the structured peace process can be resumed and institutionalised by dealing with each issue separately. Normalisation in relations will bring flexibility to each party's stance. India would be flexible in delinking the peace process from the issue of terrorism and Pakistan would also be willing to find a mutual common understanding on the Kashmir issue. Once the environment for peace becomes favourable, both governments would be able to avoid the actions of spoilers. As the chances for distraction in the peace process by them is always high when trust levels are low. In order to make the framework for dialogue on all outstanding issues in a comprehensive dialogue process, the two states can also do away with the previous conditions for peace. The UN resolutions that India opposes and the Simla Agreement that rules out third party mediation should be replaced with another framework. The framework may include Kashmiris

as a third party. This would pave the way for political settlement of the conflict.

Conclusion

India has adopted both assertive and offensive measures to overrule the option of resolving issues through dialogue and mutual understanding with Pakistan. Through coercive diplomacy, covert operations, and limited use of force in retaliation to terror attacks, India wants to rule out the possibility of even discussing the Kashmir issue. Linking the peace process to terrorism would serve Modi's firm position on the Kashmir problem and also earn him political gains, but it would raise the risks with its nuclear neighbour. India's hardline *approach* will further raise Pakistan's sense of insecurity and strengthen the positions of militant groups. It would weaken the position of democratic governments in Pakistan to make bold moves with regard to peacebuilding with India. The contradictory perspectives on issues, inflexibility, and mistrust would always spare room for spoilers to disrupt any effort for normalisation in relations. Many would reap political gains at the expense of millions of poverty-stricken communities in both countries.

In order to build peace, the leadership in both countries would need to be bold enough to take political risks by compromising their domestic political interests. Instead of giving space to hawks and spoilers, by understanding responsibility towards millions of their populations, the leadership would need to demonstrate maturity in dealing with the conflict. It would require a people-centric approach rather than overplaying a single issue. Moreover, they need to understand that efforts at building confidence and trust and seeking resolution of disputes can only bear fruit if the peace process is sustained and uninterrupted.[137] It requires a systematic approach and institutional mechanisms to outgrow the influence of character, attitudes of the individuals, and the attempts of spoilers.[138]

If India thinks that it can enforce its will on Pakistan based on its military, economic, and diplomatic leverage, it would put nuclear South Asia on a very dangerous path. After becoming a nuclear power, experts believe that the possibility of a major war is slim. India and Pakistan would continue depending on covert operations and proxies if the

relations do not normalise. But in future, the situation could take a turn for the worse because militant extremist elements can go out of control, which can become a reason of nuclear war between the two countries.[139]

In order to create a healthy environment for the resolution of conflicts, both countries would need to understand and reverse the major irritants in their relations and their conflicting perspectives over issues. They would need to shed the negative historical narratives against each other. Both countries would need to rewrite their history books and reverse the public discourse of ill-will by promoting commonalities between the two countries. Many experts believe that the resolution of the Kashmir issue would be difficult. Therefore, both countries should look for low-hanging fruits first. In their political conflict, both countries should not ignore the economic and cultural dimensions in their relations. Both countries should explore areas in which mutual interests could be developed. Increasing interdependence in economic and trade relations would give them a strong motivation to resolve all outstanding issues. Moreover, India would never become a great global power if it shoulders enmity with its neighbours.[140] It would be in the larger interest of the region if both countries seek only legitimate interests in Afghanistan and avoid playing the Afghan card in their bilateral relations. Moreover, both countries can craft policies through sharing best practices for alleviating poverty.

On the other hand, India's coercive measures can bring both countries close to a nuclear war. In order to avoid any misadventure in a troubled and uncertain environment, both states should continue their engagement through dialogue and renewed CBMs. In order to normalise relations and creating a conducive environment for dialogue, terrorism should be delinked from the peace process. It suggests that both states should regulate their relations through developing institutional mechanisms and also work on institutionalising the peace process to overcome the possibility of distraction and to offset the anti-peace forces.

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THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

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Abstract

Indian nuclear policy has evolved over time through different phases of nuclear weapon development. This process has been slow but consistent. Prestige and technological factors, as well as domestic politics, have been the core drivers of Indian nuclear development along with security. These drivers have been operational during different phases of Indian nuclear development. Decision-making about Indian nuclear policy has been restricted to the top leadership, bureaucracy, and scientists. Its evolution has fluctuated between the ideologies of these actors. Nehru was a Gandhian at heart but he was pragmatic in a sense that he started the peaceful nuclear programme in India with a view that it would help India in making a nuclear weapon at a later stage when required. Although the scientists have been staunch supporters of nuclear weapons, the political leaders had been hesitant to endorse them until the perception changed about nuclear weapons and they started to be considered as a source of national prestige. The aim of the Indian nuclear policy is to correspond to the overall worldview of India as a great civilisation and its projection as the largest democracy.

Introduction

Indian nuclear policy has evolved from a stance of non-indulgence to a nucleus-loving country. Indian foreign policy as a whole has been characterised by a struggle for developing an independent foreign policy. Although the evolution of nuclear policy has been slow and to some extent introverted, the process has been undergoing constant evolution. Indian nuclear policy has been labelled as humane and peaceful, but nuclear development by India illustrates its 'uneasy

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relationship' with nuclear weapons. India has been the torch-bearer of arms control and non-proliferation on the one hand and has developed as a progressive nuclear weapon state on the other. Indian nuclear policy represents a distinct disconnect between the vision and reality in relation to nuclear development. This paper analyses the basic rationale behind the nuclear development in India and explains the evolution of Indian nuclear policy over time. The paper also explores the motives behind the shift from the Gandhian tradition of non-violence to the concept of nuclear deterrence in its policy.

The Theoretical Basis for Evolution

The international system is anarchic and characterised by a struggle for power and hegemony. Every state strives to protect its national interest and sovereignty at any possible cost. Collectivity is at the heart of realist thinking while describing the social life that forms the basic unit of the international system, i.e., the state. The state is sovereign in its relations with other states.[1] Realism has retained its relevance in the international system due to the fact that right from the system of empires to the nation-state system, the struggle for power and interests has been the central theme of events. Continuing from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the intellectual roots of realism have developed and evolved over centuries through the writings of Kautilya, Machiavelli, Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, E.H. Carr, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Reinhold Niebuhr.[2] It is as applicable to international politics now as it was in that era.

The power struggle has always been complemented by wars and it is measured by the military capabilities of a state. So the states seeking power, primarily seek military superiority over others. The revolution in military affairs has subsequently given power-seeking states an impetus for achieving their objective. Consequently, nuclear weapons have become a source of military power that bestow a country with the ultimate defensive and offensive power against other states. So the states seek nuclear weapons to guarantee their security and to increase their value in the overall power structure of the international system. Although the ultimate goal is power projection, states have certain other motives behind seeking nuclear weapons.

The Rationale for Nuclear Development

Every country has a rationale for nuclear development, which outlines the reason for the development of nuclear weapons. Security is the most relevant objective that motivates a country to go for nuclear weapons. Many scholars have suggested several concepts to explain the nuclearisation of states. For reference here, Joseph Cirincione has given his thesis on why states want nuclear weapons and why they don't. It lists five models to explain this, i.e., the national security model, prestige model, technological model, domestic political model, and economic model.[3] By analysing all the models given by Cirincione, the Indian model for nuclear development can be understood.

The 'national security' model purports that states acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their security. Therefore, nuclear weapons are considered the ultimate defence against any rival. Nuclear deterrence has the ability to overpower every conventional advantage of one state over the other. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by one state compels other states to acquire the same because of their immense power value that gives a greater advantage over conventional superiority.[4] The realist paradigm in international relations focuses on the security model of nuclear proliferation. Indian nuclearisation fits well into the national security model and it is the primary driver of nuclearisation of India. The strategic environment of the region was tense after the Indo-China war and the subsequent nuclear weapons tests by China in 1962. The national security situation for India was further challenged by the Pak-China nexus in the region and Chinese support to Pakistan in the 1965 war. So India had to go for nuclear weapons owing to its security imperatives.

The prestige model argues that nuclear weapons make states perceive themselves as more relevant in international politics and as having much more power than other states on the basis of which they acquire respect.[5] States are tempted to perceive that their stature in the international system will increase with nuclearisation and they will enjoy greater negotiating leverage at the international level. Scott Sagan is of the view that "nuclear weapons may serve important symbolic functions—both shaping and reflecting a state's identity."[6] In the Indian case, the country sees itself as a great civilisation with a proud history and international identity. The civilisational aspect establishes the soft

power of India while the nuclear weapons are aimed at making it invincible in the world's hard power structure. Furthermore, India has aspired to have a greater say at the international level and nuclear capability can render such prestige.

The bureaucratic structure of a state and its political actors influence the decision-making regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[7] Domestic politics is shaped in such a way that it is able to influence public opinion in favour of nuclear weapons. In such a scenario, the political parties have their basic leanings towards a certain philosophy, according to either leftist or rightist ideologies. The political leaders have their own vested interests in gaining popularity to sustain power in the country or to re-establish their declining credibility. In the Indian nuclear policy dynamics, the domestic political system has played a vital role. In the initial years after independence, the Nehruvian thought descended from the Gandhian ideology of non-violence. So Nehru emphasised peaceful nuclear development. But his ideology seems to have faded away with the realist nature of international relations and the emergence of a realist pattern in the Indian foreign and security policy. For example, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had a radical nationalist ideology, which culminated in its 1998 nuclear tests. Additionally, the influence of domestic pressure groups and bureaucracy on the political leaders also played a role in the development of Indian nuclear policy. For instance, even though Lal Bahadur Shastri was a Gandhian by ideology, Homi Bhabha, the nuclear physicist who is considered the father of the Indian nuclear programme, exerted pressure on Shastri to go for the nuclear option. Bhabha succeeded in getting public support behind him by projecting the vitality of nuclear weapons in ensuring national security. In the end, Shastri had to let go of the Gandhian ideology and cave in to Bhabha's pressure.

Cirincione contends, "If a state has the technological ability to develop nuclear weapons, then it will do so; the awesome power of nuclear technology and arms is too much for most leaders to resist."[8] Despite the cost tagged to nuclear weapons, states do go for the ultimate source of security attached to the nuclear weapons. In the Indian case, it was possible to think about going nuclear because India had developed the wherewithal for nuclear technology through the Atoms for Peace

programme and, of course, the possibility of acquisitions from the underground nuclear black market cannot be undermined.

If a state has economic resources, it always has the option to go for nuclear weapons. Nuclear enthusiasts believe that nuclear weapons bring affordable and assured national security cheaper than the management of conventional forces. It is pertinent to mention that it is not necessary that a state having economic affordability would essentially develop nuclear weapons. However, economic stability does offer an option available to a state.[9] In the case of India, however, the security imperative reinforced the need for nuclear weapons so much so that it set aside economic considerations and went for nuclear weapon development.

This theoretical base helps explain the contours of Indian nuclear policy with the dynamics of the events and with the changing strategic environment of the region. The models discussed above do find application in the Indian development of nuclear weapons. We find that Indian nuclear policy has evolved over time with the qualitative and quantitative developments in its nuclear weapons. Nehru's period was the stage of laying the foundations of Indian foreign policy as well as nuclear policy.

Nehruvian Philosophy

Jawaharlal Nehru was the only Indian Prime Minister to hold the office for around 20 years, from 1947 to 1964. He was a leader with a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. His daughter Indira Gandhi writes about him that his thoughts were driven by both East and West and that he was at the same time a socialist who had an abhorrence for discipline and a democrat who believed that individual freedom was the key to eradicate social and economic division.[10] Nehru is regarded as the founder of Indian foreign policy at the nascent stage of Indian statehood and during the difficult period of the Cold War. When the world was divided into two poles, he stood strong to be one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He aspired for an independent foreign policy for India devoid of any pressure and influence from the two world powers leading the two blocs in the Cold War. His policy has been both introverted and extroverted at times. Introverted in a sense that he somewhat isolated India from the world, according to socialist designs,

while extroverted in a sense that he had carried forward the slogan of greater India. Admittedly, in the opinion of international relations analysts, the emergence of India as a major power has made it an aspirant of great power status at the world level. This confusion or contradictory strand is quite clear in the nuclear policy as well. Continuing the Gandhian tradition of nuclear opposition, Nehru also opposed nuclear weapons. However, he was also not oblivious of the importance of nuclear technology in national development. His worldview about nuclear weapons was that they may play a role in future for national defence if the efforts for nuclear disarmament fail.[11]

Nehru declared in 1945, "The revolution caused by discoveries having to do with atomic energy can either destroy human civilisation, or take it up to unheard levels."[12] Despite such a stance, he never foreclosed the nuclear option forever. To his credit, he brought about the infrastructure for research and development of nuclear technology in India. The nuclear option was kept alive. He realised the connection between great power status and modern military wherewithal, as well as the fact that the atom bomb was the new standard of international power. He also understood that if India was to realise its ambition of becoming a great power, it had to have the capability to construct a nuclear weapon. Other than his own deep understanding of history, he also understood the connection between the strategic attributes of the country and its nuclear imperatives.[13] Nehru controlled the foreign office and the Department of Atomic Energy and stressed that the programme had to be kept secret. He declared himself and the team designated for nuclear development as immune from public scrutiny.

The evolution of Nehru's strategic thinking regarding nuclear capability originated from the concepts of three Englishmen: Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, Lt Gen Francis Tuker, and Professor P. M. S. Blackette. Nehru came across these ideas in the transition phase to the independence of India when he met these three persons as the interim Prime Minister of India. The former two English army men gave him ideas about the utility of nuclear weapons and advanced conceptions about modernising the nuclear weapons usability. But he was more impressed with the ideas of Professor Blackette, who wove three themes—the usefulness of nuclear weapons, the politics of nuclear disarmament at the international level, and the peaceful use of nuclear

energy in the form of electricity—into his argument, which, it turned out, were dear to Nehru. He admitted that nuclear weapons were the decisive weapons that had revolutionised warfare, but that these were not weapons of war but 'weapons of mass destruction'. Further, he appreciated the deterrent value of even a small number of nuclear armaments. He made the case that India needed 'cheap power' considering the economic conditions and technological capabilities of India and a small weapons capability rather than a heap of bombs.[14]

Descending from the Gandhian tradition, another aspect of the Nehruvian policy was that he was conscious of the world image of India. India was a supporter of NAM and supported the finalisation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), so the Indian reputation at the international level would have been damaged had it gone for the nuclear weapons at that stage. In 1961, when research reactor Zerlina became operational, it became obvious that India could develop the bomb within two years if it so desired. However, India did not choose to do so at the time.[15] Nehru has had a very strong impact on the foreign policy of India. His successors have in one way or the other stuck to his ideals of having an independent foreign policy for India.

Nuclear Development

The legendary pacifism of Mahatma Gandhi did not deter Nehru from embarking on an ambitious nuclear programme because he was familiar with the adoption in 1921 by Mahatma Gandhi—the father of the nation—of the 'doctrine of the sword' justifying the use of violence in self-defence and for national security, alongside the latter's articulation of the ideology of nonviolence.[16] This philosophy forms the strategic culture of India and India's nuclear development has been closely associated with the dynamics of its strategic culture. This influence of strategic culture on the development of Indian nuclear weapons has been threefold:

1. Indian nuclearisation has been slow due to the restriction of Nehruvian thought;
2. The pre-requisite of Indian nuclear weaponisation was the weakening of the Nehruvian philosophy of nuclear pacifism;
3. The strategic concept that was represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was a crucial reason for India's overt nuclear deterrence concept.[17]

If we go through the history of the development of the nuclear weapons of India, we learn that although Nehru's political idealism did not put a halt to India's nuclear development, it did slow down its progress. The changing threat perception of India in the region helped change this concept and a more realist approach crept into the nuclear policy of India. But it would not be fair to say that Nehru lacked strategic thinking; rather he misread the speed of events that changed the strategic environment of the region.

The basis of the nuclear programme was laid in Trombay at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) under Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace programme. The main focus of this programme was to utilise the large deposits of thorium in India.[18] Nehru trusted the Cambridge University-trained physicist Homi J. Bhabha and handed him the charge of structuring and running a versatile dual-use nuclear programme.[19] Under the Atoms for Peace, India built its first nuclear reactor named Apsara in 1955 with the help of the British. Next year, CIRUS, a 40 MW research reactor was given to India by Canada.[20] Two other projects were associated with the reactor, which involved materials that could have been used for nuclear development. These materials were eventually diverted to nuclear weapons development.

Strategic Environment and Evolution of Indian Nuclear Policy

Indian nuclear policy evolved according to the evolving strategic environment of the region. The relevant threat perception of India vis-à-vis China and Sino-Pak alliance imparted a realist outlook to the Indian nuclear policy. Owing to the economic and technological constraints, the strategy of credible minimum deterrence was adopted.[21]

China Factor

Lal Bahadur Shastri was a Gandhian by thought and did not consider nuclear weapons necessary. This was, in fact, quite a point of contention between Bhabha and Shastri. Bhabha advocated for nuclear weapons but Shastri was somehow not ready for it. He could not, however, resist the public pressure generated after Chinese nuclear tests. The strategic environment of South Asia was changing and India was aware of Chinese nuclear development in 1961. This was coupled with the Indo-China clash at the Tibetan border. The border dispute led

to troops deployment by both sides in early 1962, which resulted in a war. The thumping defeat to India at the hands of Chinese in this war was an eye-opener for Indian policymakers. This gave a considerable impetus to India's efforts to go for nuclearisation. Meanwhile, Bhabha gained popularity among the public for his rhetoric in favour of the bomb. He stated in a speech aired on All India Radio that nuclear weapons were cheap to develop. He cited the cost estimates provided by the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as $600,000 for a 2 Megaton yield and $350,000 for a 10 kiloton bomb. Furthermore, according to him, the cost for 50 warheads would be around $21 million and $31.5 million for a 2 Megaton hydrogen bomb.[22] This was the actual amount to be spent on warhead development. While explaining so, however, he totally ignored the huge cost on the overall research and development during the Manhattan project.

This instigated a motion in the Lok Sabha by the Jana Sangh party, which was a vocal advocate of nuclear weapons. Shastri lost support for his 'no weapon' policy in his own Indian National Congress, as the majority favoured the weapons programme. Shastri formally approved the nuclear explosive development programme in April 1965. The approval came after the US refused to sell India the Plowshare device. This refusal by the US President Johnson came after the report of Gilpatric Committee in 1965, which recommended to the US President to tighten the US arms control policy. Shastri, thus, approved the Study for Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) after the nuclearisation of China in 1964 and the formation of China-Pakistan nexus in 1965.[23]

The China factor aside, Pakistan and China alliance also caused suspicion among the Indians. The 1965 Indo-Pak war showed India that in the anarchic international system states must ensure their security by all means. This resulted in a change in the foreign policy of India when it sought an alliance with Russia. India lost both Shastri and Bhabha in a short period of time. India was left with no direction. Indira Gandhi succeeded the premiership of the country after Shastri. She appointed Vikram Sarabhai as a successor of Bhabha who was a nuclear pessimist Gandhian and did not buy the idea of nuclear weapons. But the people after Bhabha at BARC, Raja Ramanna and Homi Sethna continued the effort to develop the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives programme.

Furthermore, in the 1971 India-Pakistan war, it became clear to Indian policymakers that Pakistan-China alliance was a serious threat to Indian security. This situation strengthened the Indian resolve to test the bomb.

The 1974 so-called peaceful nuclear explosion was the culmination of a hesitant Indian advance to nuclear weapons development behind the cover of the so-called peaceful nuclear programme.[24] The peaceful nuclear explosion was termed peaceful to avoid the sanctions of the international community. India, being one of the leaders in slogans for arms control and non-proliferation, could not afford to have the tag of an overt and aggressive nuclear weapon state at the time. The international reaction was negative and culminated in escalating efforts for non-proliferation. The Canadian support to India disappeared four days after the test. As a result of the loss of Canadian support, the working of Rajasthan-II and Kota reactors stopped.[25] Indeed, it was the Indian nuclear test that resulted in the formation of the so-called nuclear non-proliferation regime.

For India, the most to suffer was the civilian nuclear programme because it was totally dependent on foreign assistance, which stopped following the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion. The atmosphere after the Indian nuclear test indicated that when the dust of domestic fame and appreciation settled down, Indira realised that the decision to break away from the Nehruvian foreign policy principles had been for no gain and her interest in the programme decreased. This could be either due to the international sanctions or the feeling that this came long after China had tested its nuclear weapon. If India had a threat perception vis-à-vis China and this peaceful nuclear explosion was for China, it was a rather late response to that. But what it did was that it instigated the Pakistani nuclear programme.

Bharat Karnad writes that Indira fell to the US realism when she refrained from further testing after 1974. He says that Henry Kissinger pleaded with Indira after the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion not to undertake further nuclear tests and in return for recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Quoting Robert J. Einhorn, Karnad says:

> In 1974, if Indira Gandhi had gone ahead with a weapons programme, it would have been a different non-proliferation order because NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty] came into being in 1970 and in 1974 many states were still undecided

> about it. By not weaponizing then, India, in effect, supported the NPT and ensured its success.[26]

Another development that brought a lull in the Indian nuclear weapons development was the turf war between the two stalwarts of the Indian nuclear programme, Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna. Their disagreements over the programme were because of their different styles. Sethna was not a nuclear enthusiast and tried to demoralise the supporters of Ramanna. Their differences increased to an extent that they did not even speak to each other. This was compounded by the fall of democracy and subsequent accession of Murarji Desai to the premiership of India. He was not that active in pursuing the weapons programme, yet he gave verbal authorisation for improvements on the 1974 device design. Desai tried to end the feud between Ramanna and Sethna and for that he appointed Ramanna as the scientific advisor to the Ministry of Defence and later he was appointed as the Director General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Pakistan's Nuclear Programme and Missile Development

Pakistan's nuclear programme started soon after the so-called Indian peaceful nuclear explosion. Former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Bhutto initiated the military nuclear programme on priority basis considering the security dilemma posed by the Indian nuclear weapons programme.[27] It was during the period of the late 1970s and start of 1980s when India realised the scope of Pakistan's nuclear programme, which had by then gone under the military control when Z. A. Bhutto was hanged by General Zia ul Haq. Furthermore, the dynamics of the strategic environment were such that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in closer ties of the US with Pakistan, as the former sought support from the latter to wage its proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union as a containment strategy. With aggressively anti-Soviet Reagan in power, India had figured out that Pakistan would get away with nuclear development as a barter for fighting US proxy war in Afghanistan.

Comprehending the situation, after her re-election, Indira Gandhi started the nuclear pursuit with a new resolve. She reappointed

Ramanna as the director of BARC. The decade of the 1980s saw the dawn of the missile race. Considering that missile production would take some time, she cleared a programme in 1982 to prepare an aircraft to deliver India's nuclear bomb. Moreover, it was for the first time in the history of India when she overtly advocated the development of nuclear weapons.[28] A.P.J. Abdul Kalam initiated the missile programme in 1983 under the project named Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). This project was done at the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL).[29]

The long pause in further tests continued while Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister after Indira was killed by her bodyguards on 31 October 1984. This pause can be attributed to a number of reasons: First, Rajiv was not in favour of further tests because he recognised that India needed access to the advanced technology of the US so, for that, any detectable progress towards nuclear weapons would have slammed many of the doors shut.[30] Second, the strategic environment in that period saw many twists and turns. A crisis that nearly accelerated to war was developed with the Brasstack exercises of 1986, the largest in Indian history planned by Gen. Sundarji. Pakistan responded with force mobilisation also but the crisis was controlled when an indirect signal was given that Pakistan had the bomb in the basement.[31] Third, the domestic situation had put India on the back-foot as the Khalistan movement gathered strength and later India's involvement in supporting the Tamils in Sri Lanka brought a bad name to India too.

The end of the Cold War brought two major developments: first, the disintegration of Soviet Union, which created an environment of confusion and uncertainty because it was not clear that what shape the Cold War-era Indo-Soviet alliance would take, and second, Gen Zia died in an air crash. Congress won the elections in 1991 and Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister of India. His focus was more on development, which was evident from the economic reforms that he introduced.[32] The 1995 NPT review conference was an important development because it gave lifetime extension to the NPT. In addition to that, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also being negotiated. The international pressure on India against nuclear tests was enormous. Rao was caught in a dilemma to test or not to test because

he thought economic fragility did not allow India to bear sanctions that would follow the tests.

A change came about in 1996 elections when the coalition government of Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) was established. Atal Bihari Vajpai was very enthusiastic about nuclear tests because he made this the prescript in the elections to come to power and his credibility was at stake.[33] India, Pakistan, and Israel were singled out on CTBT voting and, subsequently, a condition was applied that the treaty would not enter into force until they ratified it. The BJP government managed to withstand the pressure and finally, the tests were conducted in May 1998 termed as Pokhran-II. The main objectives were to gain legitimacy as a powerful government at the domestic level, to propagate power at the regional and global level, and to counter the Chinese threat.[34] It can be argued that most of these objectives were partially fulfilled, but with the Pakistani response to the tests, the overall security situation of the region became uncertain.

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), a group of non-governmental experts, documented and released the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999. This doctrine stated that India followed the policy of minimum credible deterrence. Neither is the minimum for the deterrence specified in the document nor is credible. Additionally, the document states that India would follow the 'no first use' (NFU) policy, which implies that it will refrain from using nuclear weapons first. However, the official nuclear doctrine that was announced in 2003 was much briefer than this and showed three major variations from the previous one: addition of massive retaliation, dilution of the NFU, and the NSA.[35] This revision was done after the failure of 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02. Indian nuclear policy after this represented a more proactive stance.

Changed Geostrategic Scenario

After the initial phase of worldwide condemnation, the South Asian strategic environment represented India as a potential counterweight against China in the foreign policy of the US. The US foreign policy underwent a major shift with the initiation of strategic cooperation with India through the 2005 joint statement, symbolising the Indo-US nuclear deal. The deal served the economic as well as the

strategic interests of both the countries. It provided India with access to dual-use technology. The deal was done with the necessary changes in the domestic law of the US to allow nuclear trade with a non-NPT country. This was followed by the separation plan by India to separate its civilian facilities from the military ones that would be under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The most important development was the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to India, which was advocated by the US. According to this, India could have nuclear trade with NSG countries without being a party to the NPT. Furthermore, the US is actively pursuing India's full membership of the NSG. The US circulated a discussion paper *Food for Thought on Indian NSG Membership* prior to the NSG plenary meeting held in June 2011 for feedback from the participant governments. It suggested that in order to allow India to join NSG, the group could adopt the following two options:

1. 'Revise' the existing criteria for membership in the NSG; or
2. Only 'consider' the existing membership criteria when making judgments about membership rather than making the criteria a requirement.

However, the subsequent NSG plenary brought about more stringent guidelines and adopted a new paragraph 6 specifying the objective and subjective criteria a recipient country must meet before an NSG member sells Enrichment and Reprocessing Rights (ENR) to it. India is taking its case forward and lobbying for support in the NSG. The membership of NSG will grant India the licence to enhance its nuclear capability at a much higher rate and greater credibility at the international level. India's nuclear policy shows a clear progressive trend in the 21st century through greater cooperation with the US.

The Disconnect Between Vision and Reality

Rajesh Basrur attributes the following four major characteristics of the Indian strategic culture:

1. India accords a low level of importance to nuclear weapons;

2. India sees nuclear weapons as a political tool and does not have a military approach towards it;
3. Indian emphasis is on minimum deterrence; and
4. India is strongly committed to arms control.[36]

However, history shows a disconnect between the nuclear policy of India and the actual situation with regard to these considerations.

India has had an uncomfortable relationship with nuclear weapons.[37] Initially, it opposed nuclear weapons on humanistic grounds. Subsequently, however, the concept of the minimum number of nuclear weapons was adopted, stating that nuclear weapons were not weapons of war but merely political tools. The development of Indian missile defence system itself contradicts Indian policy of minimum credible deterrence. Furthermore, India asserts that its nuclear weapons are merely political and not for actual use but the missile defence system enables it to seek war, which fails its logic of minimum credible deterrence. So the purpose of missile defence is to create an opportunity to fight a nuclear war. Furthermore, the security imperative of Indian nuclear development is contradictory if we analyse the Indian claim to have developed a know-how about nuclear weapons before even China had tested its nuclear weapons capability. Secondly, it is not easy to understand why it took India 34 years to respond to the Chinese nuclear threat.

Going further into contradictions, Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine offers some caveats about the notion of 'massive retaliation' in response to an attack and dilution of both NFU and NSA fundamentally negates the earlier notion of maintaining a minimum force to ensure the defence of the country. Rather, this stand indicates a more aggressive stance and is in opposition to the global disarmament rhetoric of India. In addition to that, the strategic cooperation between India and the US in nuclear and space technology, particularly with regard to missile defence systems, is practically against the doctrinal notions of India. Furthermore, India has been resisting signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaties as it is not a party to the NPT, the CTBT, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Whether the Indo-US nuclear deal and the probable NSG membership will boost Indian weapon programme or not, only time will

tell, but it does give India an option to multiply its nuclear weapons at a considerable rate if it wants to. But one positive it will bring for India is that it would be accepted as a nuclear weapon state. One of the goals of the Indian nuclear policy is to get a place among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Conclusion

Nuclear policy in India remained in the hands of the prime minister and a handful of advisers and scientists.[38] The dynamics of nuclear policy have been driven primarily by the security concerns vis-à-vis China and the traditional arch-rival Pakistan. Factors like prestige, domestic politics, and technological and economic interests have been playing their part too. Although not dramatic, the evolution of Indian nuclear policy has been consistent and this trend is likely to continue. The ballistic missile defence programme, on which India is working in collaboration with Russia, is aimed to cover a range of about 6,000 km.[39] India is working to develop the triad of nuclear forces. The development of the ballistic missile defence (BMD) system shows a long-term nuclear policy. Furthermore, it is unlikely that India would be a party to either CTBT or FMCT. Indian nuclear policy corresponds to the overall worldview of India as a great civilisation and its projection as the largest democracy. But its scheme of development creates a security dilemma for Pakistan whose threat perception stems from India. This has been and continues to be a source of instability in the region and contributes to the fragility in regional security environment.

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LITERARY PERSPECTIVES ON BEING RICH IN SOUTH ASIA

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Abstract

Economic conditions play a vital role in determining the behaviours of individuals, as well as communities. Marvin Harris and Henry Hazlitt are major theorists who have shown that. Their theory is highly applicable, especially to South Asian literature, which is a reflection of postcolonial as well as trans-cultural societies. This research paper is an investigation into the relationship between economics and social behaviour with reference to Pakistani novelists who have sketched the picture of the class difference in South Asia, especially in Pakistan. Moth Smoke (2000) and How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia (2013) by Mohsin Hamid and The Unchosen (2002) by Riaz Hassan vitally apply to all South Asian countries. The novels reflect gradual changes in human behaviour towards money. Money, especially lack of it, plays a vital role in shaping and reshaping the morality and ethics of different classes of society. The paper also studies the effects of 'alienation' on the economically under-privileged created by a capitalist system and how imaginary identification with exploitative and unnatural social and cultural practices perpetuates class divisions.

Introduction

Archaeologists maintain that man has had a thirst for power since the development of Mesopotamian civilization. For this purpose, humanity has passed through various phases.[1] Human beings have tried to get this power through war, invention, and colonisation.[2] The main aim

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was to dominate all others. Nevertheless, in the present age, there is an economic war across the world rather than physical war. Now money determines the superiority and inferiority and development and underdevelopment of nations. Since the invention and use of money, the wall dividing the rich and the poor is rising day-by-day. Money has become a decisive force in society.[3] One's worth in one's society is decided by the worth of the coins in one's pocket. Money and power are interrelated and are the nuclei of the existing political, economic, and social institutions of the global world, highly connected by super-fast means of communication. Every individual's worth is judged through the lens of these capital-oriented frames. So the real 'self' of every individual is either completely invisible or partially visible in society. The dominant trends keep human beings on their toes and cause a behavioural change at the individual and societal levels. At one time, chivalric and feudalistic traits were the order of the day and people modelled and remoulded themselves according to feudalism. The industrial revolution brought in excessive money and power shifted to the bourgeois class, which began to treat humans as a commodity.[4] This was the turning point that brought an ever-increasing gap between the bourgeois and the proletariat. Both classes have started a marathon race for money, which has no finishing line. The capitalists produce luxuries and accessories of life that need money. Lack of money causes frustration among individuals and their dependents.[5] So how can an individual remain immune to this reality? From dawn to dusk, money runs the wheel of life. If one does not keep pace with money, one's wheel of life is stuck or bursts in the form of escapism from life, resulting in typical South Asian mystical wonderings or worse, religious extremism.

Mohsin Hamid is a contemporary Pakistani novelist who has depicted the effects of money on the behaviour of his characters.[6] His characters belong to the well-off and poor classes in the cosmopolitan cities of Pakistan. He contends that everything is under the thumb of the rich, even the weather. Through the use of air conditioners, the rich enjoy the weather of Sweden in Lahore, while the poor sweat in the scorching heat in the same city.[7] The accessories/luxuries of life determine one's social class.[8] According to Hamid, money is one of the major factors that shape one's behaviour.[9] When people acquire money, their behaviour changes according to their social class. On the other hand, if someone

has fewer coins in their pocket, they will modify or adjust their thinking/aims/desires according to their purchase power. It is also a common observation that the social space of an individual in society is directly related to the person's financial status. Society weighs individuals in terms of financial power. The burden of earning money for securing a safe and sound position in society brings introverted as well as extroverted changes in human beings.[10] Riaz Hassan has also portrayed economic determinism in human behaviour in *The Unchosen,* where the youth joins the British army just for monetary gain. They fight even against their fathers just for economic reasons. Mohsin Hamid's third novel, *How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia* connects South Asian society temporally from colonial to present times. It is also applicable to and a play on words for the Indian slogan of Rising India. Since Hamid does not specify its location, Rising Asia applies equally to most Asian metropolises, if not to all large cities in the developing world.

Research Methodology/Theoretical Framework

This research paper is a textual analysis of three novels: *Moth Smoke* (2000) and *How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia* (2013) authored by Mohsin Hamid and *The Unchosen* (2002) authored by Riaz Hassan. A qualitative research model is used for this research. Post-structural paradigm has been used to explore the relation of money and morality. The theoretical framework of cultural materialism is applied to the aforementioned text. Karl Marx and Henry Hazlitt are the main theorists. Karl Marx's *Economic and Political Manuscript* and Henry Hazlitt's *Economics and Ethics* provide the guideline for fixing the direct proportion between money and morality in this research.[11]

Cultural materialism is an anthropological term coined by Marvin Harris in his book *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*. This term is derived from two words: culture (religion, law, language, politics, art, science, superstition, social structures, etc.) and materialism (materiality rather than spirituality or intellect is considered a fundamental reality).[12] Marvin Harris developed the term cultural materialism by borrowing from existing anthropological doctrine, especially Marx's materialism.[13]

Marxist historical materialism (influence of certain members of society through manipulation of material conditions and foundation of social institutions upon material conditions) and Marxist dialectical

materialism (ideologies and concepts as the outcome of economic or material conditions) are different from cultural materialism in a few ways or keys.[14] Cultural materialism presents that infrastructure always has an influence on the cultural structure of society, while cultural structure imposes very little influence on other institution of society.[15] Marxist Materialism presents that infrastructure and cultural structure influence each other. The class theory is another difference between cultural materialists and Marxists. Marxist materialists are of the view that social change is only beneficial for the ruling class (bourgeoisie) but cultural materialists say that social change is also beneficial for the working class (proletariat).[16]

Cultural Materialism: Its Ideology, Organisation, and Symbolism

Cultural materialism explains ideologies, cultural organisation, and symbolism within the materialistic conditions and framework. Cultural materialists are of the view that societies develop on the basis of trial and error. If someone or something is not fruitful to societies' ability to produce or reproduce, or causes production or reproduction to unacceptable limits, it disappears from society. This is the reason that government, law, religion, social norms, family values, etc. must be beneficial for society. Otherwise, they will completely vanish from the face of society. Materialists pay more attention to the inner side of cultural presentation rather than the superficiality of the culture.

Proponents of other anthropological doctrines criticise cultural materialism for ignoring the societies' structural[17] influence upon infrastructures.[18] Poststructuralists are of the view that reliance on etic (the objective description of a culture) for the study of culture is not appropriate, because science is a function of culture. On the other hand, idealists also criticise cultural materialism because of ignoring variables such as genetics and are of the view that *emic* (description of the language and cultural elements in terms of their internal elements and function rather than existing external scheme) is more important and significant than cultural materialists allow. Moreover, it also seems that materialism is too simple. We also consider the spiritual and intellectual influences upon society, as we human beings are intelligent creatures with a spiritual inclination.

Raymond Williams, a left-wing author, is considered the founder and originator of cultural materialism in cultural studies and literary theory. The theory emerged in 1980 with the emergence of new historicism, which is considered an American approach towards early modern literature. It was used to describe the blending of Marxist analysis and leftist culturalism. Cultural materialism deals with elaboration and critical analysis of a historical movement.

There were changing usages of the term ‘culture’ between the immediate pre-Second World War and post-Second World War periods—the1930s and the late 1940s. The word earlier meant a way of describing and claiming social superiority and as a word that encapsulated various forms of art (painting, writing, filmmaking, theatre, and the like). Two more meanings of the word are now identified. Culture is defined as a way of referring to the formation of some critical values (as in the study of literature). It is also defined in an anthropological sense of a ‘way of life’ (which is closer to the conceptualisation of society).

In the early 1970s, Williams had extended discussions on what Marxism and literature amounted to in an international context. The effort resulted in *Marxism and Literature* (1977). Williams’s individual history was of some significance in relation to the development of Marxism and of thinking about Marxism in Britain during that period. None of these is exclusively a Marxist category, though Marxist thinking has contributed to them. Therefore, he took it upon himself to examine specifically Marxist uses of the concepts and was also concerned about locating them within more general developments. Thus, he was attempting to make Marxist thought interact with other forms of thinking.

The second part of the book discusses key concepts of Marxist cultural theory from which he develops a Marxist literary theory. Through his analysis and discussions, Williams develops a position that he has arrived at over the years and one that, at several key points, differs from the widely known Marxist theory. Williams has established that superstructures are more important.

The Three Novels Under Review

Moth Smoke

Moth Smoke is a story of a character named Darashikoh, who falls from a life of riches to a life of poverty after losing his lucrative job. On top of that, he is accused of killing a child in a road accident that he is witness to and is actually a crime committed by his elite class friend from his old days named Aurangzeb. Darashikoh, or Daru, as he is referred to in several places in the novel, continues to hang out with his elite class friends, including Aurangzeb. He develops an affair with Aurangzeb's wife Mumtaz but she is not as idealistic as Daru to leave the rich Aurangzeb for him. Therefore, the affair goes nowhere and Daru continues to live a disastrous life of an outcast among his elite class friends.

How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia

How to get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia is a different kind of a novel in a sense that it refers to the protagonist as 'you' under the narration of an unseen narrator. Every chapter provides teaching and advice about life. The unseen narrator advises that if you want to become filthy rich, you must move towards a big city because your hometown is a great hurdle in your bright future. The narrator tells the protagonist that falling in love will destroy his future. The protagonist, under the guidance of the unseen narrator, becomes a stonehearted profiteer who makes money out of selling bottled water and uses all sorts of means to fight competition. The protagonist becomes a municipal contractor, builds relationships with government officials, enjoys a rich lifestyle in a palatial house with security guards, and sends his son to the US for studies. Over time, however, the distance between him and his wife grows, business starts to decline, friends turn against him, relatives steal money from his company, he suffers two heart attacks, tries to reconnect with his beloved but she dies of cancer, and he joins her in heaven.

The Unchosen

The story of *The Unchosen* revolves around the colonial experiences of South Asian natives. The protagonist Hakim first fights against his uncle Murad Khan to avenge his father's murder but ends up joining him against the *Ferenghis* (the British colonisers). While fighting

against the British, he is impressed by their weaponry and tries to start his own factory but fails. On the other hand, his son and nephews join the British army. While Hakim's uncle Murad dies at the hands of the British, their next generation is fighting for them to earn a relatively better living. Hakim is unable to reconcile with the cultural shock and falls ill. He continues to fight against the colonisers till the end.

Analysis

The world is in a state of transition all the time. One thing which is impossible today will be possible tomorrow. The same thing is happening in the world of theories and ideologies, which are replacing each other with the passage of time, according to the requirements of the inhabitants of the global world. After Marxism, the theory of economic determinism is not only prevailing in cultural studies but literary studies as well. This school of thought is of the view that not only is the ruling class deriving benefits from social change but poor and middle classes are also beneficiaries of the social change.

Moth Smoke

Mohsin Hamid's novel *Moth Smoke* is the best example of the class difference, but at the same time, it also conveys cultural materialism where classes are not ready to accept each other because of the economic difference and social and cultural values. But on the other hand, the protagonist of the second novel *How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia* (2013) lifts himself up from poverty through hard work and changes his class. The influence of the infrastructure[19] and structure is very important in Pakistani society, one way or another.

Moth Smoke is a reflection of the social and cultural frame of Pakistani society, especially the Lahori way of life. The central character of the novel is Darashikoh who is brought up as an upper-class person. But his lack of connection and misfortune lead him to a bitter life instead of better. He finds a wide gap between the haves and have-nots. He wants all the luxuries of life but it is not possible on his income. His real decline starts when he loses his job. He is deprived of the company of the elite because he has no money. The writer of the novel constructs the real picture of the Pakistani community where class matters more rather than relations. The writer wants to convey the idea that rich people desire the company of the rich. Those who go through any crisis or

become poor are no longer welcome among the rich. The same happens with the character of Daru in the novel. The economy determines relations in Pakistani society.

Hamid portrays that money plays a vital role in the development of personality and attaining a good status in society. Money changes the behaviour of individuals automatically. The mouthpiece of the novelist is extraordinarily brilliant but he does not have a good job. He narrates that money brings good jobs and opportunities. Money always has an upper hand over merit.

Post-modernity is constructing the notion that money determines love because man is going away from nature day-by-day. Mechanicality is promoting superficiality in the life of individuals. Daru has a complicated and rocky affair with Aurangzeb's or Ozi's wife but she does not ditch her rich husband for him. It is a representation of capitalists' society. The novel portrays that money is considered power in the jungle of humanity.

Law is for the poor and the rich are born to make and break the law. Ozi manages to get his friend Daru imprisoned for his crime. The police and the judiciary give favours to the rich and Daru's blemished history (fired from a bank job, selling narcotics, keeping unlicensed arms) is used unjustly against him to the benefit of Ozi and Daru is sent to jail. Daru, jailed for a crime not committed, wins readers' favour to some extent because he stands innocent in the case and also because Ozi's wife Mumtaz still stands on his side with her endeavours to bring the truth to light. She also writes the story of Daru under a pseudonym in her paper and publishes interviews of his professor who affirms that Daru was a brilliant and talented student. She manages access to the family of the killed boy and makes them understand that the boy was run over by an SUV (Ozi's) and not by a small car (Daru's). Mumtaz's writings under a pseudonym in the media keep the readers engaged until Daru is proved innocent in a court of law.

At the end of the novel the following lines are quite striking:

> "It is the story of my innocence. A half story."[20]

At the end of the day, everything seems connected: class, politics, culture, and identities. "I'm a political animal," Moshin Hamid

once said in an interview. Moreover, he said that one should learn how the pack hunts, shares its food and tends its wounded. Hamid wants his readers to learn about the ways of the exploitative elite and its intricate network of cronyism.

How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia

How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia directly deals with the problems and challenges of modern society and especially the developing world. In particular, the novel is focused on South Asia and could be read about "rising India," a catchy slogan of the Indian Government. Most of the South Asian countries have created such business structures where one cannot become wealthy without corruption and bribery. Rising Asia is very symbolic because a communist country is rising but South Asian countries are making progress in corruption. The novel conveys that 'global city' is not only a function of globalisation but also of urban capitalism and industrialisation. The text signifies economic determinism and change in human behaviour along with economic prosperity. Except for economic interests, the characters have few relationships.

This world is materially obsessed. Changing the class is not easy in any community of the world, especially in developing countries like Pakistan. Becoming filthy rich demands sacrifices and one must be ready for them to compete in the capitalist system prevailing across the world. The novel suggests that individual development and progress requires hypocrisy and corruption. Government and most of its institution favour corruption because of the favourable environment, especially in an urban culture as compared to the rural environment.

> "In the history of the evolution of the family, you and the millions of other migrants like you represent an ongoing proliferation of the nuclear. It is an explosive transformation, the supportive, stifling, stabilizing bonds of extended relationships weakening and giving way, leaving in their wake insecurity, anxiety, productivity, and potential."[21]

For the sake of his bright, future the protagonist travels towards the bright lights of the city. He sits on the roof of an overloaded bus and passes not only through metaphysical but also through the physical

space. The family of the protagonist has different emotions and ideological feelings. The rising city around the protagonist bombards him with lights, advertisements, buildings, and bustles, which desensitises him. As Hamid has sketched the picture "a few hours on a bus from rural remoteness to urban centrality [can] appear to span millennia."[22]

The protagonist scarifies his emotional feelings as well love just for his economic interests. He represents a common country boy who travels to the city in search of prosperity. He even knows the importance of money in love that is why he wants a T-shirt "with a psychedelic hawk" to impress his beloved who lives near his neighbourhood.[23] He believes that she will notice him when he has money to buy or purchase a shirt. The author tries to portray here that relations and love are measured through financial status. With the passage of time, the protagonist of the novel gives more importance to money-making than love.

> "She sees how you diminish her solitude, and, more meaningfully, she sees you seeing, which sparks in her that oddest of desires an I can have for a you, the desire that you be less lonely."[24]

The protagonist of the novel establishes his business and leaves his love for the sake of his future. The girl he loves becomes a model and he remains busy in his business because he belongs to a poor family where money is more important than anything else. Marriage is a business, not love.

Even education is shown as a means to the end of prosperity in the novel. The second chapter of the novel deals with education, which the protagonist gets from institutions and from the streets of the city. Learning from the street shows the worth of experience. The novelist gives more importance to experience rather than the bookish education from institutions.

The novelist has presented the story of every individual who moves from the village to the city to get an education. It could be a story about Mumbai, Dhaka, Colombo, Shanghai, Karachi in our region. It could also be about Lagos in Africa or any metropolis in the developing world. He indirectly wants to covey that he has only one option for development, which is education. Through education, he or she can develop himself or herself.

> "Writers and readers seek a solution to the problem that time passes, that those who have gone are gone and those who will go, which is to say every one of us, will go. For there was a moment when anything was possible. And there will be a moment when nothing is possible. But in between we can create." [25]

The Unchosen

The Unchosen portrays that natives become loyal to colonisers and serve in the British army just to fulfil their basic needs. The writer wants to convey that money plays a vital role in changing the loyalty of individuals. The natives forget their culture and social norms and traditions. They adopt the colonisers' lifestyle and start thinking that they are superior from other natives. The soldiers are helpless at the hands of colonisers because their families are dependent on a salary that they get from the colonisers. In exchange for their services, they get clothes, money, and other facilities from the colonisers. The coloniser knows that money is the weakness of the natives. But in exchange, they get good food, clean clothes, an orderly life, and a regular supply of widely valued Ferenghis-Indian money to send to their families.[26]

The author portrays how the promise of a little amount of money can change things. The sons become enemies of their fathers. They not only raise their voice against their fathers but also raise weapons. The youth joins the British army and fights against their own people. Moreover, they project a Western agenda. The old generation works for the protection of their culture but the young generation destroys it just for the sake of money.

Slowly and gradually, the urge for money changes the psychology and behaviour of the natives. They start thinking that they should get educated in Ferenghis' schools if they want to make progress in science and technology. Even some of the elders think that competition with colonisers is impossible until the development of a modern weapon system. They are of the view that the natives must adopt science and technology.

The development of the culture is based on the development of its natives in the field of science and technology. It is also a fact that people adopt the education system of the developed nations. The wife of Abdul Hakim joins the Ferenghis' school for education. There she finds

students of different sects and races. She seems misfit with other traditional women of the region. She is portrayed as a symbol of hybridity. Fatima can speak only a few words of English. She knows the challenges of the modern age and is very conscious about the useless struggle of her husband against the colonisers.

Conclusion

All the characters in the novels are desperate to realise their dreams. All these dreams grow and flow in the capitalist system. The behaviours of people change for making economic progress to fulfil their dreams. A poor class person wants to enter the middle class and the same is the case with the middle class, which has a dream to move to the upper class. Each class has its own code of conduct, behaviour, and social norms and traditions. It is always assumed that everyone should be treated on an equal basis, which is impossible in a capitalist system because this is a self-interest based system.[27] The three novels under examination show the behavioural as well as social change to get a higher position.

Moth Smoke presents the social and economic injustices in a developing country like Pakistan, where institutions are puppets in the hands of corrupt politicians. Ozi commits murder but Daru is a victim of that murder because he is poor. The government puts him behind the bars in place of Ozi. Real life examples of such fictional characters are abundant in South Asian societies. *Moth Smoke* is a reflection of an autocratic system, where there are dual standards for the rich and the poor.

Unlike *Moth Smoke*, the protagonist of the *How to Get Rich in Rising Asia gets* a higher position through sacrificing his love and emotions, also joining the corrupt system of a developing country. This novel not only represents the national economic and political system but also the international economic and political system. It also deals with the global problems and challenges of a city in the developing world. The novel looks at the ‘global city’ not only as a function of globalisation but as a function of urban capitalism and industrialisation. The novel also raises issues such as corruption, population growth, increasing isolation, as well as covering all aspects of human life issues, which must be

raised in order to move forward more morally or perhaps simply less in a devastating way.

The Unchosen also presents a picture of economic determinism in human behaviour. The behavioural change can be seen among colonisers as well. The natives' character seems inspired by the colonisers just because of their prosperity. They are also inspired by the scientific and technological developments of the colonisers.

The protagonist, 'You', is representative of businessmen and politicians of the developing nations who build their businesses along with their politics. They use unfair resources to increase their wealth and power. First, the protagonist of the novel gets an education, then he goes for the business. The protagonist goes to the university, sells water, and meets the bureaucracy, which demands bribery. Not only that the novel's generalities refer to simulation the pluralistic reality, but it seems to be taken from the Hollywood action model film, complete with murder, corruption, and bombings.

The analysis shows that Pakistan, South Asia, and the developing world in general, are amalgamations of so many theories that work at one and the same time but the economy and materialism has an upper hand over all these theories. Deep analysis of the theories from spiritualism to postmodernism shows those material elements were/are present in every society and in every age in various periods of time.

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