

THE US SMART POWER STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY

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On the day of assuming charge, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled her administration's foreign policy agenda based on 'Smart Power'. Shifting away from President Bush's unilateral military driven foreign policy, the Obama Administration tried to pursue a more balanced approach in the US foreign policy. The 'Smart Power' is an integrated approach that combines the components of 'hard power' or coercive means such as military and economic tools with 'soft power' or non-coercive tools such as public diplomacy, political ideals, cultural and legal aspects of the US power, and transforms them into a successful strategy. Applying a combination of these tools or any tool according to situational requirement is the cardinal feature of 'Smart Power' based foreign policy approach. The 'Smart Power' strategy is an outcome of the realization that the global influence of US military driven foreign policy is shrinking, leading to a rupture in US relations with its key allies. Military power alone cannot maintain the US influence in the world; therefore, the United States should value the international institutions and also make new partners to address the emerging global challenges. The Obama Administration is focused to restore the US global leadership role without losing its vital security objectives and the 'Smart Power' strategy would be the instrument in this regard.

An important aspect in the US 'Smart Power' strategy is its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is arguably the litmus test to evaluate if the US strategy is moving in the right direction. The US has been leading the Global War on

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Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan since October 2001 and AfPak, as enunciated by President Obama, is pivotal in fighting global terrorism. The term AfPak, reflects that the war zone is not only confined to Afghanistan. For the US, Pakistan is the key partner in fighting GWOT particularly in its western tribal areas bordering Afghanistan that allegedly harbour key al-Qaeda and Taliban figures. Pakistan is, therefore, crucial in the US strategy to win war in Afghanistan.

However, the US Smart Power based policies have raised concerns in Pakistan. Applying the defence, diplomacy and development as the US foreign policy strategy in Pakistan to this point has not been a trouble free path. The use of hard power has aroused anti-American public sentiments while reducing the favourable US image despite increased aid and development projects in Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan-US relations have witnessed various setbacks due to increased focus on hard power and diverging interests on key issues such as the end-game in Afghanistan, Indo-US nexus, Pakistan's approach towards domestic insurgency etc.

The US 'Smart Power' approach has numerous security related implications for Pakistan's state and society due to adverse effects of hard power elements in the US policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Obama's AfPak speech on December 1, 2009 on the way forward in Afghanistan articulated the future course in relations with Pakistan. The unprecedented surge in drone attacks, Osama Bin Ladin operation (May 2011), Salala check-post incident (November 2011) and CIA covert activities including Raymond Davis incident (January 2011) inside Pakistani territory, explain the current nature of the US engagement in Pakistan. In the presidential debate of 2012, both President Obama and his Republican opponent Mitt Romney were convinced that the drone attacks and other military measures should continue as vital component in the US approach towards Pakistan. In a unilateral world, the only super power extending its military muscles in Pakistan has serious security implications for Pakistan. Therefore, this paper endeavours to analyze the US Smart Power Strategy in Pakistan and its impact on Pakistan's national security by discussing hard and soft power elements employed by the US over the years.

Conceptual framework

The concept of power forms the basis of political relations between states and is a central feature of political theory.¹ Generally, power is seen as an individual, society or state's ability to exert influence on the other by intimidating or penalizing mainly by the use of force.² According to the most celebrated definition of power by Robert Dahl, power as the potential ability is such that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."³ In this context, Smart Power is no exception; Smart power is also a foreign policy tool that provides the ability to influence an another state, if used judiciously. The conceptual framework of Smart Power has two aspects. The first aspect is its theoretical basis that is derived from the Two-Dimensional View of Power Theory, which stands as a critique of behavioural focus by Bachrach and Baratz.⁴

- Observable (overt or covert) conflict
- Hard Power: *A* uses force/reward to truncate *B*'s agenda (whether *B* likes it or not).
- Soft Power: *A* uses attraction or institutions so that *B* sees the agenda as legitimate.⁵

In the first sense, power is seen as a tool to seek compliance from the opponent either through the threat of sanction or through coercive use of force. This type of power entails coercion, authority and manipulation. The second perspective of power deals with 'influence' that differs from coercion or forceful compliance. Influence is a state in which *B* is convinced that *A*'s command is not detrimental to *B*'s interests rather is mutually beneficial because it has sanction of legitimacy and reasonability. Here complier may not be aware of the intrinsic value of demands placed upon him.⁶ This typology of power now merits an understanding of the coercion and influence that is employed in soft power, hard power and in the amalgamation of both, i.e. smart power.

The second aspect of Smart Power is the operational aspect and the application that incorporates the judicious use of power tools at a state's disposal according to the requirement of a given situation. This aspect entails Rational Choice theory that is mainly an economic theory but now widely used in the field of international relations. Rational Choice is "application of an economic model of human action to the political sphere."⁷ The operational aspect of Smart Power explains rational application of power resources to one's own advantage.

These two aspects: the Rational Choice Theory and the Two-Dimensional Approach of Power underpin the third aspect i.e. the Smart Power Approach by providing a theoretical and logical framework. States are primarily presumed to be rational actors. Their activities are governed by cost-benefit analysis aiming towards maximization of profits during particular interactions or actions. Relative power among states is evaluated in terms of various power tools at a state's disposal known as their capabilities. States can employ these power tools according to their ability and situational requirement. In this context, the Smart Power Approach, a synthesis of hard and soft power components, could be vital power resources at a state's disposal. Joseph Nye's Smart Power is a reflection of Bachrach and Baratz Two-Dimensional view of power that explains that if actor *A* wants to influence the actor *B* then coercion and influence are primarily two methods of securing *A*'s compliance over *B*. The Smart Power, hence, increases the spectrum of choices at state *A*'s disposal giving it unconventional power tools alongside conventional power tools to seek greater leverage over state *B* during their interaction. This conception is reinforced by the contemporary reality of complex interdependence; the soft power brings in the element of consensus during power based interactions by the means of persuasion or charm. This increased diversity of choices augments the utility of Smart Power approach when discreetly employed into action.

The US Smart Power in Pakistan

Pakistan-US cooperation before and after the 9/11 incident projects variation in the US dealings with Pakistan. Before 9/11, Pakistan was mainly a target of the US hard power in the form of sanctions; and after 9/11, the US incorporated both hard and soft power for its short-term policy objectives in Pakistan.⁸ However, the US approach witnessed a paradigm shift in the post-9/11 scenario particularly after 2007. Presently, the smart power strategy guides the US policy objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

President Barack Obama's speech, 'Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,' delivered on December 09, 2009 at West Point (New York) provides the essence of US approach towards both the countries. The so-called AfPak strategy reaffirmed the narrowly defined US goals in Pakistan, i.e. 'to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten US allies in the future.'⁹ Pakistan would be instrumental in the US strategy; however, the economic and military assistance to Pakistan would be subject to its performance against the terrorist groups operating within its territory, particularly in its tribal areas with Afghanistan.¹⁰ The calculus of relations thus trickles down to the US pursuing its policy objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan while employing all available power resources including military, economic, diplomatic and political for the stated policy objectives.

The core of this strategy has been the renewed focus towards eliminating al-Qaeda and its allies, an ambitious nation-building plan, and an integrated military and economic approach of counter-insurgency.¹¹ The US special representative to the region, Richard Halbrooke testified before the Congress in May 2009 that the new strategy is a shift from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency in the AfPak as part of an integrated 'Smart Power' Strategy.¹² In view of his AfPak strategy, President Obama explained that the solutions to Afghanistan's problems lie across the Durand Line.¹³ President Obama declared in December 2008 that "...we need a strategic partnership with all the parties in the region, Pakistan and India and the Afghan government, to stamp out the kind of militant, violent, terrorist extremists that have set up base camps and that are operating in ways that threaten the security of everybody in the international community. And, as I've said before, we can't continue to look at Afghanistan in isolation."¹⁴

The US AfPak strategy explains the linkage of both the countries in the US counter-terrorism strategy. The White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on the US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan states that "the ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan. The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and our allies in Pakistan - including the possibility of extremists obtaining fissile material - is all too real. Without more effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability."¹⁵

President Obama's decision for a troop surge in Afghanistan that topped with 110,000 troops in 2011 brought renewed commitment of the US strategic interests in the region. President Bush's deviation from an unfinished

agenda in Afghanistan to the new conflict in the Middle East, and the 'Transformational Diplomacy' initiated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had left the War on Terror in a limbo. For President Obama, the war in Iraq was a 'war of choice' whereas the war in Afghanistan was a 'war of necessity'.¹⁶ The request of General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for 40,000 additional troops was based on a military solution of the Afghan problem. The Obama administration duly entertained McChrystal's request with an aim to bring military backed political solution to the Afghan war before the planned 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.¹⁷

The US Hard Power in Pakistan

On Pakistan's front, President Obama has toughened his stance as evident from the US policies towards Pakistan. President Obama categorically supported the US drone strikes inside Pakistani tribal areas during his Presidential debate with Republican candidate John McCain.¹⁸ By declaring Pakistan-based Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization and increasing military activities in Pakistan and the bordering areas of Pakistan inside Afghanistan, the US demonstrated a renewed focus on the military option. Pakistan has frequently been alleged to harbour key al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan area of FATA. The US believes that the Pakistani Taliban have been providing sanctuaries to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that are involved in the killing of NATO and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) inside Afghanistan. The US insensitivity to Pakistan's strategic and security interests and frequent attacks on Pakistani troops demonstrate the US approach to tackle Pakistan. The attack on Salala post by NATO forces on November 26, 2012 that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers inside Pakistani border exacerbated the already tense relations and resulted in the blockade of NATO's southern logistics tributary crossing through Pakistan's territory.

Similarly, the CIA cover agents have been operating in Pakistan since 2002 after Pakistan joined hands in GWoT. Jeremy Schill, author of the book 'Black Water', wrote that "from a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Black Water are at the centre of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan."¹⁹

The US aid to Pakistan is subject to various conditionalities and the US has repeatedly placed cuts on aid to Pakistan. Currently, there are two US laws that make aid to Pakistan subject to conditions – the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 has a set of provisions specific to Pakistan. The conditionality is mainly focused on Pakistan's efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan's military counterterrorism measures against al-Qaeda and Taliban especially the Haqqani network and Pakistan military's

apolitical track record. The aid requires a mandatory certification by the US Secretary of State for its disbursement.²⁰

These legislation-related conditionalities, however, are not limited to the US aid. In December 2013, the US Congress passed a defence authorization bill for 2014 containing a clause to suspend \$1.5 billion reimbursements to Pakistan if the NATO supplies to Afghanistan are interrupted amid growing protests against the US drone attacks in Pakistan.²¹ The legislation links Pakistan performance to demonstrable actions against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, such as the disruption of cross border attacks against the US led coalition forces and the ANSF, countering IEDs and the prevention of persecution of ethnic and religious minorities with certification from the US Defense Secretary.²² Such legal aspects of hard power aim at influencing Pakistan's behaviour to seek certain actions according to the US interests.

The US Soft Power in Pakistan

On the other hand, the US also seems committed to strengthen Pakistan's military counterinsurgency (COIN) capability and enhance the civilian government capacity. The US financial and material support during the 2010 floods, as well as the various financial assistance programs of the USAID and Enhanced Partnership Act (EPPA) of 2009 are some important aspects of US support to Pakistani people and government. These are the soft power components in the US Smart power strategy. The US realizes the importance of diplomacy, public outreach, cultural exchanges and the expansion of bilateral trade with Pakistan as a balancing tool through soft power. It is becoming harder for the US to reap the fruits of its soft power amid growing anti-US public sentiments.

The devastating earthquake of October 2005 left thousands dead and millions internally displaced in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and various parts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Alongside spending \$700 million in humanitarian aid, the US also provided air logistics, military personnel and aid workers to help the affected population. Similarly, the US financial help during the seasonal floods of 2010 and 2011 was substantial. These floods displaced nearly 4.8 million people killed hundreds and cost billions to the economy. This was a big challenge for the government. By the end of September 2012, the State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance totalled \$134.6 million. The US flood-relief provided to Pakistan in FY2010 and FY2011 totalled more than \$600 million in funds and in-kind aid and services.²³

The scholarships for the US universities and cultural activities in partner states have been cornerstone of soft power Strategy. The US has invested heavily in this diplomatic tool of soft power in Pakistan. It has enabled the US to create people to people contacts and establish connections with local NGOs and other cultural institution.²⁴ The US Fulbright Scholars, the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), U.S.-Pakistan Professional Partnership Program under the USEFP for Public Administrators-Seeking Women participants and the Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange and Study (YES)

Program along with many other programs have played an instrumental role in projecting a positive US image in Pakistan.

Likewise, the USAID is arguably the most effective component of the US soft power in Pakistan. With an aim towards enduring relationship with Pakistani people in collaboration with the civilian government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and private sector, the USAID programs are focused on five priority areas – energy, economic growth, stabilization, education and health.²⁵ Under the USAID, more than \$3 billion have been spent on various projects in three years from 2010 to 2013. Under the Roshan Pakistan Scheme, various projects have been launched to inject life into the critical energy sector, such as the 17MW Satpara Multipurpose dam, 480MW Gomalzam Multipurpose dam, Guddu thermal power plant, Muzaffargarh thermal power station etc.²⁶ The completion and restoration of these projects will provide about 1,000MW of electricity to the national grid.

Alongside electricity, the education sector has also received generous grants, and since 2009, more than 12,000 scholarships have been provided to the university students from all provinces of Pakistan.²⁷ Similarly, maternal and child care health is a primary focus of the USAID. Under the “Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and Newborns (PAIMAN) project, more than 6,500 lives were spared and newborn deaths were decreased by 23 percent in 26 targeted districts of Pakistan.”²⁸ Along with these projects, various other projects manifest the imperatives of the development aspect of soft power in the US strategy in Pakistan.

Implications for Pakistan’s Security

The US ‘Smart Power’ strategy has multifaceted implications for the state and society in Pakistan varying from security, sovereignty, economic and political challenges. There is continuous threat to Pakistani sovereignty by the US in its counterterrorism approach. The use of arms against other state, irrespective of legal or illegal pretexts, comes under the domain of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).²⁹ On May 1, 2011 the US Special Forces operation in an Abbottabad compound against al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Ladin, triggered serious debate on the issues of territorial sovereignty and consequences of such attacks on the future of Pakistan-US relations. Pakistan Army Chief General Kiani stated that Pakistan would reconsider its relation with the US on the reoccurrence of Abbottabad like incident.³⁰ The Abbottabad attack shows the ability of a super power in violating the territorial sovereignty of another state and it is widely accepted as a global geopolitical norm. Such tactics by the US is a demonstration of its “global reach” and forms a cardinal feature of how the ‘War on Terror’ is fought across borders.³¹ Later, the Salala incident of September 2011, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by US gunships at the Pakistan-Afghan border and the Raymond Davis incident of January 2011 in which a CIA contractor shot dead two Pakistani civilians in Lahore, not only strained Pakistan-US relations but also showed various fronts where Pakistan has to restore its sovereignty.

Likewise, Pakistan has witnessed increased hostility across the Afghan border that has compelled Pakistan to deploy additional troops on its western frontiers. In 2004, Pakistan deployed 80,000 of its military personnel on Afghan border and the figure climbed up to 120,000 by 2009 due to the high percentage of infiltration and the US military operations along the Pakistan's western borders.³² By comparison, since 2009 after the elections of President Obama all indicators that indicate an ongoing conflict on the western front have witnessed a spike. According to the yearly data compiled by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, a visible contrast can be observed in cross border attacks from the Afghan border by the militants, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the ISAF during and before the incumbent US administration.³³ In addition, the lethal drone strikes increased, applying more pressure on Pakistan for augmenting cooperation in the War on Terror.

As a result, Pakistan has faced growing militancy that has spilled over from tribal areas to the urban centres. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, by the year 2013, a total of 49,921 people had lost their lives in this war.³⁴ The attacks on Pakistan General Headquarters on October 10, 2009, the Mehran Base attack on May 22, 2011 and numerous attacks on security installations reflect growing terrorist activities in urban areas. One underlying factor behind the increased terrorist activities in Pakistan has been the troops surge in Afghanistan in early 2010 and the expansion of operation against the Afghan Taliban in Halmand, Kunner and Kandhar provinces bordering Pakistan.³⁵ Resultantly, many Afghanistan based Taliban had crossed the borders into Pakistan, supported by like-minded in Pakistani tribal areas.

Alongside the human loss, Pakistan's economy has tremendously suffered as a result of the War on terror. Pakistan has roughly faced a staggering loss of \$67.93 billion in economy and infrastructure since its participation in the War on Terror. The delays in reimbursements and conditional financial assistance eliminate any real gains to Pakistan's fragile economy, especially is measured against the heavy loss of lives both military and civilian.³⁶ Due to the prevailing security environment, the western countries have imposed bans for their citizens on travel to Pakistan. Such measures have adversely affected the economy in terms of foreign investments, the outcome of which has marginalized economic activity, devalued Pakistani rupee, slowed the privatization process, reduced tax collection, and nearly destroyed tourism industry.³⁷ According to the figures circulated by Pakistan's Ministry of Finance: "Pakistan's investment-to-GDP ratio has nosedived from 22.5 percent in 2006-07 to 13.4 percent in 2010-11 with serious consequences for the job creating ability of the economy. Going forward, Pakistan needs enormous resources to enhance the productive capacity of the economy. The security situation will be the key determinant of the future flow of the investment. Pakistan's economy needs an early end to this war."³⁸

Revisiting the US Smart Power Strategy

In the prevalent scenario, the US strategy in Pakistan requires a prudent review aiming towards recalibrating the existing relationship. With the

scheduled withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan, the US ought to focus on policy review vis-à-vis its “Big Stick” Policy to ensure long term engagement with Pakistan.³⁹ Such an approach requires thoughtful consideration to Pakistan’s security interests, providing space for conflict resolution, and prioritizing the development related activities. This approach should be based upon the realization that investment in Pakistan’s political and economic wellbeing is in fact investment in the future US security interests in the region.⁴⁰ A review in the US strategy would then require a careful reassessment of its objectives that should be thoroughly accomplished without adverse repercussions for Pakistan.

The future of US relations with Pakistan depends upon enhancing the spectrum of engagement to a strategic level. The US Department of Defense and the State Department should carefully analyze and address lapses in the current nature of relations. Dialogue is the best option to probe into common challenges, to explore areas of cooperation and to address the regional complexities. Pakistan’s commitment to fight al-Qaeda and Taliban in the FATA and the urban areas through counterinsurgency is beyond doubt, especially in the context of the ongoing operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in North Waziristan. The nation has alone rendered more sacrifices than any other nation in this fight. Therefore, apart from eliminating violent extremism, the US should also focus on other important areas of cooperation such as the nuclear stability and socio economic prosperity in South Asia as a strategic priority on regional fronts.⁴¹

On the domestic front, political stability and economic uplift should be the primary aim of Pakistan-US engagement. According to a former Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Sherry Rehman, the long term solution to problems of Pakistan “Lies in enhanced trade not aid. It will spur economic activity, generate employment, give the country’s enormous youth cohort an avenue to earn a living, and above all, give ordinary Pakistanis a stake in an enduring Pakistan-U.S. relationship. The U.S. Congress has a leading role to play in this effort.”⁴²

On the tactical level, the US needs to review its drone policy in Pakistan. Various studies on drone warfare have revealed the negative fallout of such campaigns. Pakistan’s apprehensions on drone attacks stems from various reasons. Firstly, the collateral damage and civilian deaths caused by drone strikes have been enormous. In its recent report “*Will I be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan*”, the Amnesty International has seriously criticized the US for civilian deaths in drone strikes killing up to 400-600 civilians.⁴³ Drone strikes are the biggest cause of anti-Americanism in the recent years.

Secondly, another troubling aspect associated with drone operation are suicide attacks which the terrorists believe is the way to avenge their partners killed in drone strikes. Different terrorist organizations find a common purpose to coalesce under the banner of TTP in 2007, following the unprecedented increase in drone attacks. Amid this situation, the violence is likely to prevail in Pakistan unless a comprehensive conflict resolution mechanism is not being channelized with TTP supported by the US. It is rather confusing to understand that if the US seeks Pakistan’s help to end conflict in Afghanistan, why

Pakistan's endeavour to bring an end to conflict inside Pakistan has not been encouraged by the US.

Thirdly, although *Zarb-e-Azb* military operation has been launched in North Waziristan, Nawaz Sharif's government wanted to bring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the negotiation table but the continuity in drone attacks sabotaged the peace efforts between the Government of Pakistan and TTP. In one such event on November 1, 2013, the TTP Chief Hakim Ullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan.⁴⁴ The drones are thus one of the biggest hurdles in making tangible gains towards conflict resolution in war against terrorism, and they need to be ceased for improvement of bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the US should increasingly focus to enhance Pakistan's capability and capacity to fight an unconventional war by focusing on essential training and military tools that would address any shortcomings of counterinsurgency initiatives. Pakistan has also been seeking joint operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for better counterinsurgency operations and intelligence sharing. Likewise, protected mobility vehicles, fire-support helicopters, and anti-IED technology training should also be provided to Pakistani military. Defense cooperation should include the establishment of trilateral forums where the US, Pakistan and Afghan commanders could share their experience from COIN operations. In addition, joint military exercises and training program could be developed for swift COIN operations. The US military needs to work closely with Pakistan's ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) to develop better intelligence sharing mechanism for converging goals that mutually benefit COIN patterns between the US and Pakistan.⁴⁵

The US also remains focused towards investing in the mega energy generating projects such as dams, solar and coal. Likewise, roads carrying the NATO supplies from Chaman and Torkhum borders need repair and refurbishment. The Karachi Port facility harbouring the movement of thousands of NATO containers also requires up-gradation. The US financial and technical support in these areas could be instrumental in improving the US image in Pakistan.

Energy Projects

The shambling energy sector in Pakistan requires immediate attention. It is quite understandable that the US cannot address all the energy requirements – however, it can finance some important mega energy projects such as the Diamer-Bhasha dam for cheap energy provision in Pakistan. The US ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson has announced to finance the feasibility study for the Diamer-Bhasha dam and the USAID has agreed to pool \$20 million for the feasibility study.⁴⁶ The US could also provide consultancy in the better management of energy reservoirs and distribution networks in addition to patronizing renewable energy reservoirs that offer great prospects. Relinquishing opposition to the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline could also reduce Pakistan's dependency on limited gas reservoirs and help in economic integration of the region. With the US-Iran rapprochement on Iranian Nuclear

Program making headways, the US opposition to Iran-Pakistan could gradually recede.

The US-Pakistan Energy Working Group, which culminated as part of the Strategic Dialogue Framework bolstered during Secretary of State John Kerry's August 2013 visit to Pakistan, has been working along the lines to inject lifeline in Pakistani energy sector. The US and Pakistan are in the process of negotiating a \$95 million loan to build a 50MW wind power plant in southeastern Pakistan's Gharo-Keti Bandar Wind Corridor in the Sindh province where Pakistan has huge potential.⁴⁷ According to Pakistan Renewable Energy Society (PRES), Pakistan's 1000km coastline has huge wind energy generation capacity. The Pakistan wind map developed by the United States National Renewable Energy Labs (NREL) has identified 340,000MW of wind production ability and wind (from good to excellent speed) available in many parts of the country. According to this estimate, the Gharo-Keti Bandar Wind corridor has a potential of contributing about 50,000MW to the national grid.⁴⁸

As part of the US commitment towards Pakistan's quenching energy needs, 1,200 megawatt under the USAID will become a part of national grid by the end of 2014 under Kaitu Weir Hydroelectric and Irrigation Project in North Waziristan producing 18.4 megawatts of electricity and irrigating 16,400 acres of land. Since 2009, the US has added 1,000 megawatts in Pakistan's national grid.⁴⁹ The US has also helped Pakistan to diversify its energy supply through the development of domestic natural gas and renewable energy resources, as well as through the import of liquefied natural gas. Meanwhile, the US funding has been instrumental in the construction and rehabilitation of Gomalzam Dam, Satpara Dam, Mangla Dam, and Tarbela Dam and the modernization of Guddu, Jamshoro, and Muzaffargarh power plants.⁵⁰ In avenues of regional energy integration, the US has been advocating the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI); however, this initiative requires peace and stability in Afghanistan. Under the terms of the TAPI project, Pakistan and India will both get 1.365 billion cubic feet of gas per day (bcfd) each and Afghanistan will get 0.5 bcfd.⁵¹ The Roshan Pakistan Initiative telecasted on various TV channels is a projection of USAID efforts in addressing Pakistani energy needs.

Roads, Ports and Borders

According to National Highway Authority (NHA), the damage inflicted on Pakistani roads carrying NATO supplies surpasses Rs.100 billion and Pakistan is yet to receive compensation. Likewise, the 2010 floods that wreaked havoc in the KPK province had severely damaged miles of roads and bridges.⁵² Refurbishing these roads is mutually beneficial and signals the US interests in development projects in Pakistan. According to a study conducted by USAID "Pakistan Trade Project Dwell Time Study", the poor and single road links mainly near the Pakistan-Afghan border have been the primary contributors of logistical delays from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The roads are unsuited for heavily loaded vehicles amid acute security situation.⁵³

Meanwhile, the US has helped the government of Pakistan in developing basic infrastructure like building schools, colleges and hospitals in

militancy affected areas and the USAID has been providing vital support. So far, the United States has invested in the construction and up-gradation of more than 900 kilometres of roads, including the four major trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As part of this effort, on October 14, 2013, the USAID signed a \$90 million agreement with Pakistan's National Highway Authority to rehabilitate 247 kilometres of Kalat-Quetta-Chaman road.⁵⁴ The USAID funded projects contributed \$260 million in building roads and other infrastructure projects in FATA by mid-2012.⁵⁵ These projects have also helped the Pakistan army in counterinsurgency operations in Pakistani tribal areas.

The roads are not the only important area requiring immediate attention. The Karachi Port has been facilitating NATO containers for Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) for over a decade. The US could help in refurbishing these ports in terms of capacity building, development of multipurpose terminal building, provision of specialized cargo handling machinery and supplying tugging and piloting services and setting up of a floating jetty for molasses export handling.⁵⁶ As the time for NATO withdrawal is approaching, some up-gradation works should be immediately undertaken on Karachi Port as an effort to show the US commitment in infrastructure development in Pakistan.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border lack basic facilities like weighbridges and scanner for expedited clearance and verification of consignment. Likewise, the communication and infrastructure related facilities at Pakistani dry ports at Chamman and Tourkham are indeed very poor.⁵⁷ The standard custom procedures for clearance of goods at ports are outdated that need to be modified on modern lines. On the security perspective, the border crossing points are commonly shared between pedestrians and vehicles often causing security related problems.⁵⁸ On an average, the transit time from Karachi to Chaman border is 23 day, whereas, it takes 22 days to reach goods via Torkham into Afghanistan showing the depleted situation of roads carrying logistics. The USAID Pakistan Trade Project Dwell Time Study stressed the need of building two complexes at Chaman and Torkham for avoiding logger jams and handling the cargo facilities.⁵⁹

Trade Activities

Pakistan-US bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), talks have not been concluded but this treaty could pave the way for more Pakistani goods in the US markets. Bilateral Trade Agreements could be followed by Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) beneficial for the businesses in both countries. Pakistan has been unable to upgrade the quality of its textile from the existing level as per the directives of World Trade Organization (WTO). Therefore, Pakistani products have lost demands in the US markets. Thus the barrier remains on low quality Pakistani products. In this regard, Pakistan can seek the US assistance in upgrading its textile industry for production of value added goods as per the US requirements. On BIT, Pakistan and the US can eradicate legal issues because the treaty could be instrumental in creating jobs and business opportunities in Pakistan. The US recognizes the

importance of engaging with Pakistan's private sector for job creation. For instance, the US has been devising Pakistan Private Investment Initiative PPII scheme.⁶⁰ Under the PPII scheme, the US will be providing capital to small and medium business enterprises with an aim to encourage an investment model for sustainable development. The plan is still seeking partner and when launched will be providing \$76 million under the USAID.⁶¹

In the debate above, friction between the two countries at various levels needs to be addressed immediately. The present course of engagement reflects the existing wide gap of interests between the two countries. This gap could only be bridged by balancing the element of hard power with soft power in the US Smart power Strategy. On the part of the US, it requires structural changes in policy formulation and understanding the interest of smaller partner. There is indeed ample room for cooperation between the two countries. As the US engagement in Afghanistan is much likely to continue even after 2014, the US must address the increasing antagonism towards US actions in Pakistan. A variety of areas have been identified starting from reviewing the drone program, ending the special operations and various visible areas where the US can invest to demonstrate long term engagement in Pakistan. Another important aspect at the political level is to play an active role in resolving long-standing problems such as the Kashmir issue for durable peace in the region and not cooperating with any single country that would lead to strategic instability in South Asia.

Conclusion

From the discussion and analysis in the study, it can be inferred that power holds the central feature in the relations among states. Power resources are instrumental in accomplishing the policy objectives pursued by states. However, in this complex interdependent world, mere reliance on traditional power resources, i.e. military and economic power, deprive states to project their true influence in global affairs. Non-traditional power resources such as soft power are making headways vis-à-vis hard power and powerful states such as the US are realizing the importance of these elements in achieving their foreign policy objectives. There is a growing realization that sole reliance on hard power is rusting the US global image as a trustworthy super power.

Pakistan is arguably the litmus test in the US Smart Power based foreign policy agenda. Since 2009, the US has put Smart Power to test in its dealing with Pakistan. Both hard and soft power resources have been significantly employed in seeking Pakistan's compliance in the War against Terror. Fundamentally, this approach supports the US policy objective of defeating and dismantling al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, Smart Power is directed mainly towards establishing and achieving tactical goals through the use of hard and soft power.

Smart Power is not something naïve, without consequences for the host. It comes with its set of implications in terms of the impact of its hard and soft components, respectively. Undoubtedly, soft power such as humanitarian assistance during natural calamities, higher education scholarships, and the provision of various services through the USAID projects form a large part of

the Smart Power Strategy; yet it can fall short of attaining its potential impact owing to the intense use of hard power simultaneously. Hard power invites far more media, public attention and subsequent criticism compared to the positive impact generated by the soft power.

It can thus be inferred that the US needs to revisit its Smart Power strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, particularly the harder components. This could be achieved by halting the drone attacks and OBL like special operations and by persuading Pakistan to channelize its efforts in a more streamlined fashion in order to ensure the effective combat of terrorism. This would enhance trust between the two allies and help in developing a reliable partnership. Moreover, the soft power component of the strategy, moving in the right direction, should be enhanced.

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