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## CONTENTS

- SAARC and EU: A Study of the Process  
of Regional Integration 3-26  
— *Dr Amna Mahmood*
- India's Red Tide: The Naxalite Movement 27-52  
— *Sidra Tariq*
- Looming Urban Sprawl and its Implications:  
An Overview of South Asian Urbanization 53-68  
— *Syed Imran Sardar*
- SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability  
in South Asia: A Case Study of Nasr and Prahaar 69-101  
— *Zahir Kazmi*



# **SAARC AND EU: A STUDY OF THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION**

**DR AMNA MAHMOOD**

## **Introduction**

Regional organizations are a strong mode of integration and promotion of cooperation among the member countries. They have the potential to facilitate economic and commercial relations which may lead to political cooperation. The level of cooperation depends upon the will of the member nations to address the problems of the region. The post-Cold War era witnessed the strength and growth of regional organizations since the emphasis was shifted from security to political economy.

In Europe, the European Union (EU) has emerged as the most advanced and successful entity in handling economic problems. This experience of EU can contribute immensely to the enrichment of economic agenda in South Asia. For this, there is an urgent requirement to make concerted efforts in the right direction for implementing regional programmes to realize economic goals.

The 1.5 billion people of South Asia are still facing poverty, illiteracy, underdevelopment and unemployment despite having human as well as natural resources. The inability of the SAARC to address these critical problems demands an appraisal of its performance and the need to identify main hurdles in achieving its objective. On the other hand, the EU model has become an efficient model of regional integration which can be followed by SAARC.

The first section of this paper covers the structure and working of the European Union as a model for regional integration. The second deals with the structure of SAARC and the challenges faced by it. The third section compares

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both regional organisations and offers suggestions to implement the EU model in South Asia keeping in view the fact that the economic status, political systems and social set-ups are different in both regions. It also recommends that the bilateral rivalries between the SAARC countries especially between India and Pakistan should be managed if not ended, to consolidate SAARC's role as a regional organisation.

### **Regionalism**

Regionalism is a significant development that marked the post-World War II period, though the notion was already there in international relations. This trend emerged due to the need for pooling national resources in a divided and war-threatened world in addition to other political pressures on the states. "The nation state system...is evolving towards a system in which the regional groupings of states will be more important than the independent states."<sup>(1)</sup>

Before defining regionalism, it is relevant to define the word 'region.' In international relations "a region is invariably an area embracing the territories of three or more states. These states are bound together by ties of common interests as well as of geography."<sup>(2)</sup> In post-World War II, the Cold War rivalry and threat from both superpowers augmented by desire of identity led to the development of regionalism and Western Europe became the most effective example for other regions to follow. In the post-Cold War era this process of regional assembling became more rapid due to unilateralism of the United States as the sole superpower and rising challenges of economic dominance of great powers in the form of globalisation.

The word 'regionalism' is often used in the studies of regional cooperation, regional organisation, and regional integration. In its most accepted meanings, regionalism is about regional cooperation which appears under certain economic conditions and aims to improve economic efficiency through reinforcing market-driven regionalisation. It leads to economic interdependence among geographically adjacent nation states. Regionalisation refers to those state-led projects of cooperation that are the result of intergovernmental discussions and agreements.<sup>(3)</sup> These agreements of economic cooperation lead to a voluntary removal of trade barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, or persons by nation-states. Such type of regionalism tends to shift policy-making in economic sectors from a national level to regional level. Therefore, "regionalism is a recognition of the existence of interdependence as well as enhancing positive interdependence by means of international co-operation or coordination between adjoining state, that can facilitate regional integration at the highest level."

### **Importance of regional organisations**

The world has been moving towards economic globalization since the end of the Cold War. The process involves "the inexorable world integration of finance, market, nation states and technologies within a free market capitalism on a scale never witnessed before, in a way that is enabling individuals,

corporations and nation states to reach around the world faster, cheaper and deeper.”<sup>(4)</sup> Globalization led to the deepening of interdependencies which paved the way for the growth of regionalism and regional organisation.<sup>(5)</sup> While regional organizations became an essential part of world politics, they provided platform to the states to enhance economic and political cooperation and to remove trade barriers by eliminating hostilities in relations. Regional integration focused on pooling together economic strength of a cluster of states located in a particular region and strengthening their economic capabilities.

In modern international system, regional organizations have enhanced unity among states and reduced conflicts between member states by engaging them in economic activities and strengthening their diplomatic and cooperative relations. These organizations provide security to the states from extra-regional interference and help increase trade and investment.

### **The European Union (EU)**

The post-World War II period saw emergence of various formats of economic integration in different parts of world. Under the integration trends a number of regional organizations came into existence like the Arab League of Middle Eastern countries, which was formed in 1945. The European Union (EU) appeared in its initial form in 1958. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967, which united Southeast Asian states into a family. The South Asian states came together in 1985 under South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was signed between Caribbean states in 1995, while in Africa the African Union (AU) was established in 2002.

### **Background of EU**

The EU was the natural outcome of a “strong determination” of the European leaders to eliminate potential conflicts especially in the post-World War II era in international system.<sup>(6)</sup> The war had severely affected the European nations and forced a change in their mindset. Previously these nations used to enter into conflict for territorial expansion, power dominance and utilization of world resources exclusively to their own benefit. History shows that large areas of Europe had previously been built as empires; the Roman Empire, Byzantine, Ottoman, the First French Empire and Nazi Germany were some of the examples. The clash of mindsets and traditional rivalries had resulted in the outbreak of World War I which led to the breakdown of big empires. The World War II and its aftermath left Europe a war-ravaged continent making its leaders realise that war was not a solution to their problems.<sup>(7)</sup>

### **European Coal and Steel Community**

European nations were affected by the World War II not only in terms of human suffering but severe economic losses as well.<sup>(8)</sup> It was realised that peace was not the sole agenda for post-war Europe. They were thinking of

solutions to their economic problems as well and vigorously working for their economic and social uplift. In order to start economic cooperation.

It was suggested that coal and steel resources, particularly those of France and Germany may be put under common ownership and control. It was intended that placing these raw materials, which were at that time the main ones used in the production of weapons, under common ownership would make it impossible for another world war to start in Europe. Moreover, rivalry over the coal and steel producing areas of Europe would be contained and French fear of Germany would be neutralised. It was further intended that the nations of Europe, France and Germany in particular would be bound together in peaceful, economic cooperation.<sup>(9)</sup>

The six founding-member states of European Communities, Germany, Italy, France and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Under this agreement a common market in coal and steel was set up. The significance of the treaty was that it “created supranational institutions, the High Authority, the Assembly, a Council and a Court with powers over the signatory states.” Britain refused to join in due to its “implications for national sovereignty.”<sup>(10)</sup>

The success of the ECSC motivated the European nations to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The treaty created two new institutions, the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The aim of the former was to establish a common market having no tariffs on goods traded among members countries and ensure free flow of labour and goods among them, so as to rebuild their economies and make Europe economically independent of the US.<sup>(11)</sup> The mission of the latter was to create a pool of knowledge regarding atomic energy related issues for the participating nations and place the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose under their common control. The EEC had administrative bodies including a Council of Ministers having powers to make decisions; Common Assembly (renamed European Parliament in 1962) as an advisory body; a Court which could even overrule member states; and a Commission responsible for implementing the EEC policies.<sup>(12)</sup>

### **Steps towards EU formation**

The need for unanimous agreements on major issues in the 1960s resulted into giving member states a veto power. The institutions of the EEC, Euratom and ECSC were merged into single set of institutions during 1967. In the 1970s and 80s, the membership of the EEC expanded. First Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland joined in, followed by Greece, Portugal and Spain. In 1979, the European Parliament arranged first direct elections,<sup>(15)</sup> before that the European Parliament was elected by national parliaments.

In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed which came into force in 1993. It resulted into formal creation of European Union (EU) and facilitated



three pillars of it.<sup>(14)</sup> This treaty provided new cooperation mechanism between member states. European nations formally introduced defence, justice and other issues on the common platform of EU.

EU nations also agreed to form an Economic and Monetary Union while introducing common currency for all European nations to be managed by a Central European Bank. They formally agreed to progress towards single currency within a decade's time frame. With these reforms, the concept of forming 'Single Market' which was formally completed however still much work was needed towards free travelling of their citizens and transferring goods, capital and services.

On 30<sup>th</sup> March 1994, three more European countries, Austria, Sweden and Finland were included in EU. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1995 allowing free movement of people in the countries signing the agreement. More concrete steps were taken towards the dream of single currency during this period. The dream came to reality during 1999 when Euro was formally introduced and the European Central Bank was established.<sup>(15)</sup>

## **EU Charter**

One of the main objectives of the creation of EU was to endorse human rights within nations and around the globe, because they claim that the "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights are core values of the EU."<sup>(16)</sup> For this very reason, Treaty of Lisbon was signed among EU nations and was known as 'Charter of Fundamental Rights,' which bound all the EU nations legally to uphold it.<sup>(17)</sup>

The preamble of the Charter of EU clearly indicated the reason behind the charter and their core values as:

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. The EU contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the member states and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment.<sup>(18)</sup>

This Charter practically established the EU citizenship at the heart of the organisation.

### **Institutional mechanism**

There are three institutions which hold the executive and legislative powers for the EU: the European Parliament which is directly elected by EU citizens; Council of European Union represents the governments of EU member nations. The Presidency of the Council is rotated among the member states. The third institution is European Commission which represents the organizational interests of EU as a whole. It acts as the guardian of the treaties and ensures implementation of legislations.<sup>(19)</sup>

The Council, Parliament or any other party may request for legislation to the Commission. The Commission then proposes fresh laws and policies, and Parliament and Council has to approve and assent them. Once it is approved and signed by both bodies, it becomes law. The European Commission and the member countries are responsible for implementing them. The commission also ensures that the laws should be properly applied and implemented in spirit.<sup>(20)</sup>

Besides these decision-making institutions, a Court of Justice was established for effective implementation of the community laws, a Court of Auditors for the financial monitoring of EU. On key economic, social and regional issues a number of advisory bodies were established. The most important institution that facilitates the financing of projects and promotes balanced development of the EU is the European Investment Bank.<sup>(21)</sup>

### **EU economic cooperation and political integration**

The Treaty of Lisbon proved a landmark in the process of integration of Europe. It was signed on 13 December 2007 and came into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2009. The treaty amended the previous treaties including the Maastricht Treaty. It empowered the already working European Parliament with new prerogatives pertaining to legislation for the EU, budgeting and concluding treaties and agreements with other countries. It also provided more clarity in defining the roles of member states viz-a-viz the European Union. National parliaments of the member states are provided greater involvement in monitoring the Union affairs. Member states can quit the EU, if they desire so.<sup>(22)</sup>

This treaty also empowered the citizens of EU member nations greater voice and enabled them to directly propose new policies to the Commission. Better policies are adopted to ensure protection of European citizens, promoting the EU values and including the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights' into European primary law.<sup>(23)</sup> These steps further consolidated the direct relationship of EU with its citizens.

Economics played an essential role in bringing all the members at one platform. Therefore, the main achievement of the EU is the formation of its Single Market. Starting from the European Coal and (steel) Community (ECSC) economic issues remained at the heart of the EU ever since. This very first community was undoubtedly a project for facilitating economic integration of the member countries. The success of Single Market is demonstrated by the fact that the EU has now become the largest trading area in the world. Its population

has exceeded 500 million with a GDP of more than 12 trillion euro.<sup>(24)</sup> Being the largest economic bloc the EU has significant influence on the world trade. This brings combined benefit to all the member nations and therefore results in greater political integration and unification of the bloc. Any company seeking to sell goods to EU market has to conform to EU rules.<sup>(25)</sup> Economic integration helped bring member nations close enough to join politically.

Political integration facilitated the EU in having its own foreign policy. This single policy for all member states enables them to act as one unit in international matters.<sup>(26)</sup> The office of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is established to look after the foreign policy issues and other strategic policies. It coordinates among the EU member nations to formulate and implement a joint foreign policy. It is assisted by experienced civilian and military staff. Although the European External Action Service and, to some extent the European Commission and European Parliament, are connected with the process, the EU government exercises considerable authority in foreign affairs.<sup>(27)</sup>

### **Achievements of EU countries**

As far as the achievements are concerned, the EU has emerged as the most successful organisation despite some of its limitations. It has established itself as the practical demonstration of functionalism leading to political integration from economic integration and stands as a role model for other regional organisations. The European nations like France, Britain and Germany learning from the material and human losses and suffering of the two World Wars set aside their traditional hostilities and became cordial economic partners later to join hands as a part of European Union to form a greater Europe again. Some of the achievements are:

The common currency of EU, the 'euro' is shared by 17 member nations making up the Euro area. More than 330 million EU citizens use it for all types of transactions. Its benefits would be extended more widely as other EU countries adopt euro. The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a major step in European integration. Initially, the 11 member states adopted it as their official currency replacing the old national currencies since its launching on 1 January 1999, in two stages.<sup>(28)</sup>

Euro was first introduced as a virtual currency for cash-less payments and accounting purposes, while the old currencies continued to be in use for cash payments and considered as 'sub-units' of the euro. It was not before January 2002 that it appeared in the form of banknotes and coins. Denmark and the United Kingdom followed an 'opt-out' clause exempting them from replacing their national currencies with euro. While Sweden along with many of the nations which joined EU recently has yet to meet the criteria required for adopting euro, there are hopes that they would fulfil the conditions soon.<sup>(29)</sup>

In order to make a single EU Market through free movement of capital, goods, services and citizens, the EU took a number of steps. It abolished customs duties to facilitate the circulation of goods produced by any member nation within the internal markets of member states. The exemption also applies

to goods imported into the internal market from third countries since the EU member states agreed on common customs tariffs and duties on imports from outside EU. The aim is to remove all barriers to free movement of goods, whether fiscal, physical or technical.<sup>(30)</sup> EU countries may restrict the free movement of goods only in exceptional cases, i.e. if they have reservations pertaining to “consumer protection, public health or environmental issues.”<sup>(31)</sup>

Along with goods, services are also very important to the internal market of member nations as they account for over 70 per cent of economic activity in the European Union. The central principles governing the internal market for services are set out in the EC Treaty. This guarantees to EU companies freedom to establish themselves in other member states, and the freedom to provide services in the territory of another EU member state other than the one in which they are established.<sup>(32)</sup>

Free movement of capital is the most important step towards the establishment of a single market and is one of its 'four freedoms.' It facilitates EU citizens “to do many operations abroad, such as opening bank accounts, buying shares in non-domestic companies, investing where the best return is, and purchasing real estate. For companies, it principally means being able to invest in their homeland and in other European companies and take an active part in their management.”<sup>(33)</sup> The aim is to ensure more open, competitive and efficient financial markets, bringing more integration among the member countries providing many advantages to all EU citizens.

### **European sovereign debt crisis**

The fiscal integration is not without repercussions. The Euro zone crisis has emerged as a major challenge for the Union. The weak economies of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain are in trouble due to extravagance and overdebiting while the strong economies of member countries refused to bail them out.

The euro was introduced in 2002 as the single currency of the European Union. At that time a number of conditions were laid down for those European countries that wanted to enter the Euro zone. They were required to ensure that their inflation rate did not exceed 1.5 per cent a year, the budget deficit was no more than 3 per cent of GDP and that they maintained a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 60 per cent.

To meet the criteria, many countries had to enforce strict budgetary regulations by cutting public spending and raising taxes. However, governments of weaker economies deferred budgetary measures due to domestic challenges. Moreover, weaker economies like Greece, Portugal and Ireland went on spending sprees creating huge fiscal deficits which became un-sustainable with the onset of global recession. Liquidity dried up and banks were put under major pressure thereby generating strains on stronger economies like Germany to bail out the weaker ones. Imprudent loaning regimes extended to the housing sector by Ireland and pumping of huge funds in pension and wages of public sector personnel by Greece started the rot. A temporary bailout fund called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created in May 2010 which

provided Greece with a \$163 billion loan in exchange for assurance that the country would implement strict standing cuts and tax hikes. In December 2011, EU leaders agreed to the formation of a fiscal union which allowed EU to dictate national budgetary policies to participating nations. They also agreed to introduce \$650 billion European Stability Mechanism; it was a permanent bailout fund which replaced EFSF.<sup>(34)</sup>

There are now 27 EU member states. This represents a sizeable proportion of the states in the world today and comprises the majority of the states in Europe. The EU has developed into an advanced and sophisticated market. The reason for its success is that its members give regional interests priority over their own interests. No work permit, visa or passport is required for the citizens of EU for doing intraregional business. The vision of a common political and economic future has turned former archrivals like France and Germany into strong allies. Their relationship has transformed the continent into a zone of peace. It has ended the old rivalries between member states which have come closer for economic benefits.

The peace, stability, and prosperity delivered by the EU have helped all member states raise the living standards for their citizens. The EU has ensured free movement of capital, goods and services by launching a single European currency and a single Europe-wide market. With the abolition of border controls among all the member countries people can travel freely for recreation, living and working. It has moved much forward from economic integration to political integration.

### **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**

South Asia comprises developing countries which are struggling hard to improve their economies. Most of the population of this region is illiterate. It is the poorest and the most overpopulated region in the world. Due to poor economic conditions these countries have not been able to invest in infrastructure and human resource development. This has resulted in human deprivations and weak economies.

More than one-sixth of world's labour force is in South Asia.<sup>(35)</sup> Despite huge differences in physical and demographic aspects, South Asian nations have some common features as well, i.e. all the countries here have low income, high population densities (except Bhutan), poor health and literacy rates, etc. The economic structures are better in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka which are placed in the developing countries category while the other four — Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives — fall under the category of the least developed countries.

In order to improve the living conditions in the region, the first and foremost requirement is to establish peace so that the huge budgetary allocations being made for defence are diverted to development. And peace can only be achieved through economic and political cooperation among the South Asian countries. For that they need to learn from the experience of the European Union. For ensuring bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the South Asian governments will have to resolve their longstanding disputes and identify

priorities at the regional level. The policy of open borders and removal of visa restrictions as already prevalent in Europe would help the South Asian countries to overcome poverty and illiteracy.<sup>(36)</sup>

### **Establishment of SAARC**

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in the year 1985. It initially comprised seven countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined in 2005. The idea behind creation of SAARC was to foster enduring peace, economic progress and social development by having good-neighbourly relations among the member states. It was believed that countries trading with one another would become economically interdependent and thus avoid conflicts. It would help reduce defence spending and promote the welfare of the people of the region. But the realisation of the vision remains painfully slow due to the historical animosities between the two major nations of the region, India and Pakistan.

### **Aims and objectives**

The SAARC was established for economic cooperation so that countries of the region could work together for ensuring and accelerating socio-economic and cultural development. The objectives of the Association as defined in its Charter are:

- To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
- To contribute to developing mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problem;
- To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
- To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
- To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest; and
- To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.

Cooperation among the SAARC countries is based on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states.<sup>(37)</sup>

### **SAARC institutions**

Summit meetings of member states are the highest authority in SAARC in which heads of states or government are supposed to annually or more often as and when considered necessary by the member states. Such summits are not as useful as those of the ASEAN<sup>(38)</sup> and EU because bilateral issues and disputes cannot be discussed at the forum. However, they can be discussed in bilateral informal meetings of the heads of the member states on the sidelines of the SAARC summits. Not very effective indeed, but still these informal meetings

contribute a lot towards reducing tensions between the rival nations like India and Pakistan. In fact, formal SAARC summits provide opportunities to the heads of the states to meet each other once a year and establish personal relations that could be helpful in improving relations between their countries. These summits were postponed or cancelled many times due to the tension between India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, SAARC helped to break the deadlock ultimately.

### **SAARC Secretariat**

The SAARC Secretariat, located in Kathmandu, Nepal, is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of various activities, preparing for and arranging services for meetings. It acts as a channel of communication among the members of the association as well as with other regional organisations. The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers from the member states in alphabetical order for a period of three years. The secretary general is assisted by eight directors who are taken on deputation from the member states.<sup>(39)</sup>

### **Council of Ministers**

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states constitute the Council of Ministers. Article IV of the SAARC Charter provides that the Council would formulate the policies of the Association, review the progress of cooperation under SAARC, take decisions on new areas of cooperation, establish additional mechanisms as deemed necessary and decide on other matters of general interest for member states. The council is mandated to meet twice a year.<sup>(40)</sup>

### **Standing Committee**

The Standing Committee of SAARC consists of all the Foreign Secretaries of the SAARC member states. Under Article V of the Charter, they are responsible for the following functions: Overall monitoring and coordination of various programmes initiated in different areas, approval of projects/programmes, and modalities of their financing, determination of inter-sectoral priorities, mobilisation of regional as well as external resources and identification of new areas of cooperation. The meeting of the Standing Committee may be called as and when considered necessary. Generally, the meetings are held before the sessions of the Council of Ministers.<sup>(41)</sup>

### **Technical Committees**

The Technical Committees consist of the representatives of all member states. The committees are tasked to oversee the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the programmes in their respective areas. Apart from determining the potential and scope of regional cooperation in the agreed areas, these committees are involved in formulating programmes and preparing

projects. Their basic purpose is to provide support to SAARC activities. These committees include those on Agriculture and Rural Development; Health and Population Activities; Women, Youth and Children; Science and Technology; Transport, and Environment.<sup>(42)</sup>

### **Areas of cooperation**

The main areas of cooperation are agriculture and rural development, culture, energy, environment, economy and trade, funding mechanism, human resource development, poverty alleviation, security aspects, social development, education, science and technology, communications, and tourism. The focus of the SAARC is to develop better communication among the member states, facilitate the progress in trade and investment, expand tourism, assist in power and energy sector and endorse the private sector. However, bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the purview of SAARC.

### **SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)**

The Sixth SAARC Summit, held in Colombo in December 1991, constituted an Inter-Governmental Group (IGG). The group was made responsible for establishing SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by the year 1997. The Agreement on SAPTA was concluded on 11 April 1993 and enforced two years sooner on 7 December 1995. In this agreement, the SAARC states desired to promote mutual trade and economic cooperation within the region through exchange of concessions.

- Overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit equitably all contracting states, taking into account their respective level of economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external trade, trade and tariff policies and systems;
- Negotiation of tariff reform step by step, improved and extended in successive stages through periodic reviews;<sup>(43)</sup>
- Recognition of the special needs of the least developed member states and agreement on concrete preferential measures in their favour, and
- Inclusion of all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-processed and processed forms.<sup>(44)</sup>

### **South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)**

SAPTA was considered as the first step towards transition to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) leading subsequently towards a Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union. An Inter-Governmental Expert Group (IGEG) was set up in 1996 to identify the necessary steps for progressing towards a free trade area.<sup>(45)</sup> A Committee of Experts (COE) was assigned the task of working out a comprehensive framework for facilitating a free trade area in the region.



The SAFTA Agreement was signed on 6 January 2004 and enforced on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January, 2006. Afterwards, the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) consisting of the commerce ministers of the member states was established. A Committee of Experts (COE) was also formed to assist the SMC. The COE submits its report to SMC every six months. The SAFTA Agreement provides that “The SMC shall meet at least once every year or more often as and when considered necessary by the Contracting States. Each Contracting State shall chair the SMC for a period of one year on rotational basis in alphabetical order.”<sup>(46)</sup>

The main emphasis of SAFTA is gradually eliminating most of the tariffs and other trade barriers on products and services crossing the borders between member states through creating a free trade bloc among the SAARC countries so that fair competition is promoted in the area and equitable benefits go to all the member states. The SAFTA Agreement provided that special preference be given to the least developed countries (LDCs) among the SAARC nations whereas the developing countries like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were required to bring their duties down to 20 per cent in the first phase of the two-year period ending in 2007. From 2007 to 2011, the 20 per cent duty was to be reduced to zero in a series of annual cuts. It also provided that the LDCs — Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Maldives — would have an additional three years to reduce their tariffs to zero. The treaty was ratified by India and Pakistan in 2009 while Afghanistan ratified it on 4 May 2011.<sup>(47)</sup>

According to the Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP), contracting countries must follow the tariff reduction schedule. However, this scheme is not applicable to the sensitive list, which is to be negotiated among the member states before trade in its items starts. The TLP provided that the sensitive list would involve common agreement among the contracting countries favouring the LDCs. The SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) would reconsider the sensitive list every four year.<sup>(48)</sup>

### **India, Pakistan response on SAFTA**

Initially, there was complete misconception between the two countries. India was of the view that the positive list arrangement for imports from India to Pakistan and non-implementation of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) obligations were acting as barriers to trade. On the other hand, the private sector in Pakistan observed that India was not allowing them a level playing field despite abolition of the positive list due to the travel restrictions, technical standards and regulations, cumbersome and complex import regulations and customs clearance and customs variations problems. Recently, both countries have realised the importance of improving trade relations and signed three agreements, namely the Customs Cooperation Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreement and Redressal of Grievances Agreement. Both have agreed to normalise trade relations, dismantling of non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) and full implementation of obligations under SAFTA. Pakistan has agreed to phase out the negative list by the end of 2012.<sup>(49)</sup>

### **Challenges faced by SAARC**

The path of regional cooperation has never been smooth anywhere in the world. It is difficult for the member states at times to think beyond their national interests. The member countries of the SAARC have remained more concerned about inter-governmental cooperation rather than supranational integration.

- Both India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947 have a serious conflict on the Kashmir issue and have fought three major wars over it. The situation has further aggravated due to differences over equitable sharing of river waters and flood control mechanism. The SAARC has thus not been able to achieve the desired results due to bilateral disputes between the two major countries of the region.
- The Indian economy is growing at a much faster pace as compared to the rest of the member countries of SAARC. India being a big market is a source of attraction for other economies of the world. Due to its big size and booming economy, it is emerging as a regional power whereas other neighbouring countries have been overshadowed. This situation has created imbalance among the SAARC countries hindering progress in the integration process.
- Due to strained relations between India and Pakistan, the defence budget of both countries has been increased manifold. The nuclear race between them has further aggravated the situation and is posing a potential threat to regional stability.
- Some member states fear that interdependence will erode their sovereignty and political autonomy. The sense of insecurity of small states has become a main impediment in the implementation of SAARC agenda. Safeguarding the political independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of small states has become a formidable challenge.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US, South Asia has attracted world attention. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have become a hub of suspicion, political instability and Muslim extremism. Exchange of allegations of supporting terrorist activities in each other's country has created distrust, which is undermining regional cooperation among SAARC countries.

### **Comparison between SAARC and EU**

At the outset, it can be said that comparison between SAARC and EU is not fully justified as there is a huge difference between the environments of both the organisations. The member countries of EU were industrialised at the time the European Union was formed in 1950, whereas SAARC countries were developing countries in 1985, at the time of its creation, and they have not been able to improve this status to date. In the EU, people are well educated and can solve their problems through mutual discussion. On the other hand, SAARC

nations lack such qualities. Despite these limitations, SAARC can be compared with EU in the following areas:

Both EU and SAARC were established to facilitate the economic growth of their regions and promote collaboration by addressing regional conflicts amongst their member nations. In this context the EU has succeeded to a large extent whereas the SAARC is still struggling to resolve basic problems of the region.

There is a growing acceptance in the EU that adherence to unanimity would often result in a stalemate. The notion of qualified majority voting has been accepted in the case of some institutions. This attempts to reconcile the notion of member states being equal in law whilst being unequal in size by using the references both to a majority of the member states and to a majority of the EU population. On the other hand, the SAARC Charter clearly stipulates that all decisions will be taken on the basis of unanimity and that all bilateral and contentious issues will be excluded from discussion. The centrality of India by size, location and important position in SAARC practically rules out any amendment to these provisions.

The opinion-, policy- and decision-makers in the European Union subscribe to the dictum that recognizing the difficulties does not mean surrendering to them. A confident and determined approach marks the working of the European Union. On the other hand, many SAARC leaders have a tendency to highlight the difficulties and constraints, particularly those arising from unresolved bilateral problems.

Establishment of the Customs Union among the EU countries has been an important step in the process of economic integration. It developed trust and paved the way for economic cooperation. It has maximized total economic efficiency by allowing competition among member states. SAARC countries are lacking this confidence which restricts advancement towards a customs union.

In the EU there is an ongoing process of adapting the institutions, i.e. the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice. Whereas in the SAARC there is resistance to the idea of revising its Charter or even the terms of reference of the bodies established under the Charter — the Standing Committee of the Foreign Secretaries, the Technical Committees, the Committee on Economic Cooperation and the Council of Ministers.

Conflicts, wars and arms race in the subcontinent are the prime factors in the ineffectiveness of the SAARC. Its major components — India and Pakistan have spent most of their resources on war preparations and purchase of weapons because of their conflictual relations. They have not learned to live in peace even after three major wars. On the other hand, the European countries learnt the lessons from World War II and have resolved their conflicts through negotiations after joining the European Economic Community (EEC).

The EU, which is a successor to the EEC, has rich experiences in the field of regional cooperation. There are now treaty-based provisions, inter alia, with regard to common foreign and security policies and development policy whereas the SAARC is a fledgling organization less than half of EEC age. It is the most populous regional grouping in the world — though potentially a big

market for industrial and new technologies. It operates in agreement with the SAARC Charter and has no institutions comparable to those of the European Union. Unlike the EU, SAARC has yet to develop institutions like a SAARC Parliament to broaden and legitimise its actions for peaceful resolution of political quarrels. They are still unsuccessful in running the already established institutions.

In SAARC, the process of decision-making is the major hurdle in advancing towards integration. Any proposal submitted by any member country or group of countries could be passed only when approved by all members unanimously. The unaccommodating political culture of South Asia hinders any meaningful progress. On the contrary, the EU has a flexible process of decision-making. In the EU the individual country is allowed to withdraw itself from the treaties and agreements reached by the majority. This provision proved very helpful for it in going ahead successfully. Although some countries opted to drop out of some treaties or policies, most of them generally continued to abide by their commitments with the organisation.

The EU has opened up its borders and the fruits of development generated by integration are transferred to the people of the region, while the SAARC is still working on government-to-government level. This people's participation and prosperity is further strengthening the EU. On the other hand, the inhabitants of South Asia have yet to feel tangible and visible benefits of cooperation.

The European Commission, which is the secretariat of the EU, is mandated to undertake policy initiative, propose legislation as the executive body of the organization and act as the guardian of treaties along with the European Court of Justice. It negotiates trade and cooperation agreements with foreign countries and international organizations. On the other hand, the SAARC Secretariat hardly exercises even a modest role assigned to it by the Charter. It has only occasionally been involved in the preparation of documentation for important meetings.

In SAARC, individual states have entered into bilateral agreements to pursue their economic agenda. This trend of entering into bilateral relations has shifted the focus from regional cooperation to national interests. Even in the bilateral agreements, there is a long negative list of goods which cannot be imported from other countries. Thus the overall trade relations among member states have remained relatively low under SAARC as compared to other regional blocs. On the other hand EU countries have open trade policies and have developed common criteria for imports to the EU region. Such policies helped to enhance not only internal trade among EU countries but also added to the trading partners' list of the EU around the world.

Under the SAARC, political integration has been kept aside whereas the main emphasis has been on economic integration. Although it was considered that economic cooperation and socio-cultural exchanges would build the required mutual confidence in the region, thereby strengthening political understanding. The conflictual issues among the member states have even been haunting the process of economic cooperation. Although Pakistan and other

members of the organization support the idea of using the SAARC forum for raising bilateral and contentious issues, India's resistance remains the major hurdle. On the other hand, the EU has worked on both fronts simultaneously; economic cooperation continues due to managing bilateral conflicts successfully.

The EU has differences in size of economies and power status of its members but there is no country having the status of hegemon. The incomparable size of India, its military power and economy vis-a-vis to all other countries of the region are the major hurdles in SAARC's growth. South Asian countries have a strong desire to attract foreign investment and seek access to each other's markets, but at the same time they share this apprehension that trade relations with India would increase its dominance in the region.

### **What needs to be done**

- SAARC countries in varying degrees have kept a large number of items in their respective Negative Lists (NLs) which cannot be traded. The number of these items should be reduced gradually. Similarly, efforts for lowering tariffs among the SAARC countries must be made. Such initiatives can promote intra-regional trade. For this purpose, SAFTA has provided an effective platform to reduce the NLs but political differences are the main hurdle. India being the biggest player in SAARC should take initiative by injecting dynamism in SAARC trade by lowering or eliminating various trade barriers.
- The trade community of SAARC is already working for the upgradation of existing economic relations and has formulated a SAARC-Trade Promotion Network (SAARC-TPN) which is exploring trade opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Besides that, possibilities of initiating joint projects and investment in high value-added areas must be explored so that even less developed countries can benefit out of it.
- The entire SAARC region is bestowed with rich natural resources. World's highest mountain peaks, long rivers and vast forests are located in the region. Like the EU, SAARC needs to work for a common market. With better trade prospects in the region, all countries would benefit from the low transaction costs and reduction in exchange rate risks. Furthermore, like the EU, SAARC countries should open their borders for free flow of goods, services and capital. This would definitely enhance peace and prosperity in the region.
- If SAARC has to follow EU, then it is imperative for Pakistan and India to work for economic integration and resolve their conflicts. South Asia should use economic diplomacy to resolve political and regional disputes which is considered to

be a prerequisite of integration. The current events in the Euro zone should not cast a shadow on the efforts being made to build a South Asian Union.

- SAFTA would be in a better position to deliver if realistic deadlines are set for implementation, a fund for the less developed member nations is created and NTBs barriers are abolished through a well-defined plan of action.
- In order to enhance intra-SAARC trade, the member countries should reduce the size of their sensitive lists of non-tradable items and liberalize visa regimes as without free movement of people across borders trade would not flourish in the region. A SAARC agreement on trade in services has been signed; however, it is essential that a schedule of specific commitments under the services agreement is finalized and notified.
- It is suggested that the non-tariff barriers should be reduced by 50 per cent and at least two banks should be opened in each country every year.
- In order to promote trade relations between India and Pakistan, there is an urgent need to focus on logistics. For facilitating transportation of goods from either side of the border, road infrastructure needs to be developed. Similarly issues relating to banking, insurance services and visa issuance must be resolved immediately.
- Pakistan and India should develop trade relations by reducing customs duties for their mutual benefit. The economic interdependence between countries would help in resolving the political problems of the traditional rivals. Geographical proximity gives Pakistan an edge over its competitors in the Indian market.
- Fighting over Jihad, extremism and terrorism in Kashmir are not solution to the problems of those millions of people who are crying out for alleviation of poverty and are deprived of basic needs like food, shelter and security. Although Kashmir is a core issue between the two countries, yet it is not appropriate to shun all types of relations with India pending the resolution of this issue. In fact engagement within the SAARC will help to continue the peace process in the region.
- It is essential that Pakistan and India remain engaged in meaningful dialogue, using informally the platform of SAARC, to resolve their bilateral conflicts. Resolution of Indo-Pakistan disputes would transform the region into a peace zone. The main objectives of SAARC are not attainable in the presence of hostility between these two member countries. Their bilateral cooperation can encourage other states as well to actively participate in the SAARC. Keeping

the issue of Kashmir alive, Pakistan must make concerted efforts to increase trade, establish people-to-people contacts and improve cultural relations with India.

## **Conclusion**

The SAARC is still struggling to form its regional identity and infusing any sense of regional belonging among the member states, even after 25 years of its existence. The mistrust among the members, contested national identities and religious animosities did not allow a common socio-cultural heritage to take root on the basis of common regional identity. The irony of the situation is that South Asian countries welcome engagements with powerful states of the world, but are still reluctant to conduct regional engagements. The reason is that their bilateral relations are marked by mistrust and suspicion and that has made the process of regional cooperation stagnant.

The EU is not without troubles. Ethnic divisions, the Catholic-Protestant divide, memories of bilateral and multilateral wars other than the two world wars were there. Difference in size of economies and development level were also a reality. However, a strong commitment to a greater Europe and realisation of economic benefits helped them resolve the issues. A long period of economic cooperation and a desire for enduring peace led to the political integration of Europe. Recently, the sovereign debt crisis has emerged as a challenge for the member states but economic and political institutions helped to deal with the problem. The SAARC can learn from the experience of EU to address the human deprivations of this region, to develop economies of South Asia and to bring the long-awaited peace to the region.

Strengthening SAARC is in the interest of all the South Asian nations. Improved trade and common stakes in the field of economy will help bring peace. People-to-people exchanges and trade relations will help address the misunderstandings about each other and reduce the capacity of political leaders to manipulate the contentious issues. Therefore, Pakistan should focus on building up close ties with all the SAARC countries of the region.

Pakistan and India have strained relations since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. In the shape of SAARC, best the opportunity is available to both to come closer and resolve their conflicts. If European nations like France and Germany didn't allow the EU to be held hostage to their historical hostility, why can't the South Asian states, especially India and Pakistan, overcome their longstanding animosities in the interest of their people.

The SAARC is not only helpful for the smaller countries of South Asia, it is also vital for India to play an effective role at the SAARC platform. On the external side, it will reduce the trust deficit against India prevailing among its neighbours and will open up South Asian markets for it. On the domestic side, it will also help India to cut back on defence spending and use the funds thus made available for the welfare of its over 40 per cent population living below the poverty line and convert them into a productive human resource. The same is true for Pakistan. For improving the human development index and bettering the

economic conditions, it should switch from a security state to a welfare state on the basis of a self-dependent economy.

India is desirous of securing a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Pakistan should work, in collaboration with other South Asian countries, to make India realise that before assuming the role of world's peacekeeper India should work for peace in its own region. It cannot realise its UN ambition without winning the support of its region.

The peace, stability, and prosperity delivered by the EU have helped all member states to raise the living standards of their citizens. The EU has ensured free movement of capital, goods and services by launching a single European currency and a single Europe-wide market. Border controls among all the member countries have been abolished, people can travel freely for recreation, study, business and jobs. In South Asia the internal rifts and external fear of terrorism, unqualified interference by security agencies in each other's country, hostility at peoples-to-peoples level and religious intolerance are matters crucial to open borders at this stage. Greater economic cooperation for a longer period would help overcome these hurdles and South Asia could advance towards integrated economies. But that requires strong political will of the member states and commitment of their leadership towards establishing peace and bringing prosperity in the region.

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# INDIA'S RED TIDE: THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT

SIDRA TARIQ

## Introduction

India's transformation in the past two decades as an emerging global democratic power, with a robust economy and a strong military has been a remarkable achievement. However, in the midst of the 'India shining' dreams, the country is facing increasing schism between the rich and poor and between urban and rural areas. The rampant inequality and mounting number of suicides by the indigent and indebted farmers and the ever-growing terrorist activities reflect an acute sense of isolation of the people involved. The Indian government's failure in addressing the grievances of these classes and groups, coupled with its hard-hitting policies, have further aggravated the divide.

India has had its share of insurgencies. Of these, the Naxalite/Maoist Movement has become its most violent insurgency in the past decade. The Naxalites have established themselves as a rival political faction capable of gaining a great deal of support of the people it maintains it represents. By 2006, the Naxalite insurgency was so successful in exerting its influence in central parts of India that it was attested to by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself as "India's gravest security threat."<sup>(1)</sup> The Naxalite insurgency or 'people's war' is manifest in large parts of India's poorest, tribally inhabited, forest and natural resource rich states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand as well as in smaller pockets in states like Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and West Bengal. These nine Maoist affected regions are also known as the Red Corridor. The revolt originated in 1967 from Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal. The first wave of violence was curbed by the Indian government by the start of the 1970s. However, the insurgency went ablaze after the merger of two left-wing groups — the People's War Group and the Maoist

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Communist Centre — into the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI–Maoist) in 2004.

The Naxalites claim to be supported by the poorest rural populations, particularly Adivasis (aboriginal Indians). The movement symbolizes the fact that majority of India's poor do not enjoy the trickledown effects of the India shining claim. Moreover, the grabbing of land, water, and mineral resources by corporations chaperoned and sanctioned by the state has made the situation shoddier in these areas. The current Naxalite insurgency has emerged as the most dangerous threat mainly due to the movement's aggressive and violent activism and its growing support base in tribal and backward areas along with advanced fighting capabilities.

The paper is divided into four parts. The *first* section offers a theoretical perspective on mass movements. The *second* provides a brief history of the Naxalite movement in India — the factors responsible for the formation and persistence of the insurgency. The *third* discusses the current Naxal rebellion, its key objectives and reasons behind the violence directed against the Indian State. It also focuses on the increased role of women cadres in the uprising. The *fourth* part sheds light on the Indian State (both central and state governments) response to the Naxalite insurgency and the impact achieved thus far. And the *final* section focuses on the policy issues, threats that the movement poses to the long-term development of the country followed by some suggestions and conclusion.

### **A theoretical perspective of mass movements**

Political scientists and sociologists have developed a variety of themes and concepts on social movements. According to Johnson and Freeman, “It (social movement) is not a political party or interest group, which are stable political entities that have regular access to political power and political elites; nor is it a mass fad or trend, which are unorganized, fleeting and without goals. Instead they are somewhere in between.”<sup>(2)</sup>

For De la Porta and Diani, some characteristics of social movements are that they are “involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; [and they] share a distinct collective identity.”<sup>(3)</sup>

There are two schools of thought on the root cause of social movements. First, who think that structural imbalances<sup>(4)</sup> (poverty and social injustice) are the driving force behind the upheaval. Second, who attribute the movement to human motivations (psychological factors). However, both of these theories have inherent deficiencies. For example, the claim of the structuralist theorists that there is a connection between factors of social structural imbalance and rebellion suffers from the fact that the cross-national statistical studies have often reflected puny co-relation between the structural factors and political violence.<sup>(5)</sup> Besides, in many societies, the existence of social injustice did not generate main movements. One can say that widespread poverty and social injustice produced the French and the Russian revolutions, yet a far worse situation obtaining among the oppressed *dalits* (untouchables)

produced no such movement until the Communist Party provided the leadership in the post- independence India.<sup>(6)</sup>

Human motivation theorists also face logical riddle. Self-interest cannot explain or reflect the collective action. Since the fruition of a collective action mellows down while costs remaining specific to the areas who opted to participate in the attainment of a public good.<sup>(7)</sup>

In a nutshell, the structural theories fail to explicate why mass movements do not take place despite widespread frustration and inequalities, while the rational-choice theories (Human Motivation theorists) fall short of providing basis for their occurrence.

Gupta has proposed that we must, in order to resolve the problem, expand the human motivation (rational choice) hypothesis to include factors of group motivations. It is not enough to have widespread frustration and anger. Group motivations are shaped by an actor's collective identity. "Collective action takes place when political entrepreneurs give shape to a collective identity. When a large number of people accept the leader's version of what constitutes a community and who the enemies are, a collective action is born."<sup>(8)</sup>

Collective identities based on ethnicity, language, religion, or national origin can be seen as ascriptive (birth characteristics). And when groups are formed on the basis of environmental or economic causes, they are called adopting groups. Marxist revolutionaries hold that people are often unaware of their class identities. It is the job of the revolutionary leadership to enlighten them on this point.<sup>(9)</sup>

Gupta further argues that the rise and fall of a mass movement depends on the interaction of the two factors (self and the group) of motivation. "At individual level, each person operates from a mixed motive of selfish pursuit of love, pecuniary gains, moral uprightness, power and distinction and an essentially altruistic motivation of enhancing the welfare of the group." The relative strength of these two motivations determines whether a person is an opportunist or an altruist. What is true for an individual is also true for a group.<sup>(10)</sup> A mass movement is the final result of frustration and anger felt by a group and channelized by the leadership into a specific action. Nevertheless, groups vary in the commitment to ideology; and some after having started off with a strong ideological commitment, transform into criminal organizations.<sup>(11)</sup> A mass movement, however, declines when it, inter alia, is divorced from its political base.

### **Historical context of the Communist Movement in India**

In order to understand the contemporary phase of Naxalism, it is important to step back into different characteristics of organizational transformations that have occurred within the Naxal movement, as the origin and current phase of the movement is a manifestation of continuity and change.

During the periods from 1783-1900, due to wide disparities in the ownership and control of land in the rural societies, more than one hundred cases of violent peasant uprisings took place in the rural areas of what

constitutes today's India.<sup>(12)</sup> The unrest and frustration obtaining among peasants in rural India has all along been a classic case of "too much land concentrated in too few hands."<sup>(13)</sup> The highly distorted pattern of ownership of agricultural lands, lack of land tenure reforms along with minimal wages for the rural labour force marginalized the poor farmers in these areas. The tiny land holdings forced the small farmers to borrow money from moneylenders and rich farmers, who charged exorbitant interest rates on loans given to deprived farmers. As a result, small farmers had little choice but to mortgage their meager holdings and eventually sell them off in order to pay the debt.<sup>(14)</sup> This trend turned the small farmers and their families into bonded labourers.

One of the major factors responsible for such a state of affairs was the "Zamindari System" introduced by the British. The zamindars (landowners) were authorized by them to extract agricultural surpluses, which were the main source of revenue for the East India Company.<sup>(15)</sup> This way landownership was made permanent and inheritable in return of fixed revenues to the government.

Despite the fact that the zamindari system was abolished by the Indian government after independence, the legacy of the colonial land lease system continued to generate extreme discrimination in the distribution of arable land. In addition, those populations which were most marginalised by India's uneven caste system continued to face prejudices even after the eradication of the caste of untouchables as a legal classification.<sup>(16)</sup> Therefore, during the 1950s, nearly 60 per cent of the rural households constituted of the landless, marginal holders and sharecropping lessees.<sup>(17)</sup>

Although the first major revolt in independent India took place in 1967 in Naxalbari, its origins could be traced back to two major peasant struggles that took place from 1947-51 — Tebhaga Movement in Bengal and, Telengana struggle in Andhra Pradesh.<sup>(18)</sup> These movements provided the impetus for modern left-oriented revolution in the name of social justice and agrarian reform in India. The Telengana movement in particular was a successful manifestation of the organized use of the Maoist-Marxist-Leninist inspired left –wing ideologies to politically mobilize peasant insurgencies in India. The Telengana struggle was a revolt by peasant farmers, led by the Communist Party of India, against the feudal landlords of the Telengana region. These landlords virtually ruled over all the communities in the village and managed the revenues and owned almost all the land in that area.

The movement made its mark fighting for five years during which it was able to establish control over 3000 villages.<sup>(19)</sup> However, the movement later became a fight against the Nizam of Hyderabad whose favourable treatment towards the local landlords had given them enough liberty to fleece the peasantry. The princely state was attacked and annexed by India in 1948 and was made part of today's Andhra Pradesh in 1956.<sup>(20)</sup>

The Andhra Pradesh government set up a credit finance department in 1956 particularly for the tribal people but it could not produce the desired results due to the greed and corruption by the state officials. During the 1960s, in an attempt to tackle the problem of persistent food shortages in the country, the Indian Government introduced a strategy known as the 'Green Revolution.'

Nevertheless, the strategy proved detrimental to the small farmers since it increased agricultural land value thus raising rents to be paid by tenants. Moreover, it restricted the small farmers for whom advanced mechanized farming was too expensive to be affordable.<sup>(21)</sup> Therefore, the Green Revolution served to add up to the existing disparities between the rich landlords and poor or landless farmers.

### Phases of Naxalbari Movement

The frustration of the aborted movement in Telengana and the perpetual failure of the state's agrarian policies in the *adivasi* regions generated immense resentment. This was also the time when the changing global and regional politics started affecting the communist parties in India. The history of Naxalite movement started taking shape during this period. In the early 1960s, the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) broke up. Simultaneously, the CPC began criticizing the CPSU for turning revisionist and shunning the path of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, Sino-Indian relations also deteriorated, as border disputes between the two countries erupted into the Sino-Indian war of 1962. It was here when the Sino-Soviet ideological split led to a difference of opinion in the Communist Party of India (CPI). The so-called 'right wing' inside the party followed the Soviet path and put forward the idea of joining hands with the then ruling party – the Indian National Congress, whereas, the younger faction of the CPI termed this a revisionist approach of class collaboration. It was this ideological rift which later intensified and ultimately gave birth to the Communist Party of India (Marxist).<sup>(22)</sup>

However, when in the 1967, CPI(M) decided to enter electoral politics and joined a coalition United Front government in West Bengal with the Bangla Congress, it alienated a faction of its cadres who strongly believed in revolutionary politics. This section of the CPI(M), led by Kanu Sanyal and Charu Mazumdar, initiated the Naxalbari rebellion of 1967 in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal after a tribal youth, who had a judicial order to plough his land, was attacked by thugs of local landlords. Local tribals reacted and forcefully started capturing their lands back.<sup>(23)</sup> This revolt constituted the *first phase* of the movement's history.

The CPI (M)-led United Front government cracked down on the uprising. In 72 days of the rebellion, a police sub-inspector and nine tribals were killed. The Congress government at the centre supported the state-led onslaught.<sup>(24)</sup> However, the uprising in Naxalbari increased the pressure on the United Front, which was already beset with numerous other tribulations including a food crisis. Soon the failure to solve the law-and-order problems led the governor to dissolve the elected government in West Bengal. This incident resonated throughout India and Naxalism was born.

Principally influenced by the ideology of Mao Zedong, this group advocated that the peasants and lower classes must drive out the government and upper classes that follow a capitalistic culture in India, putting the proletariat in a predicament.<sup>(25)</sup> The practitioners of Marxist revolutionary ideology — Mao,



Lenin and Ho Chi Minh — strongly believed that “class consciousness must be painstakingly taught to the peasants and the workers through active leadership of the Communist Party.” The hardliners like Sanyal and Mazumdar, after working with the poor peasants for years, were convinced that the “objective conditions” in India were ripe for a mass-level rebellion against an oppressive social-political system.<sup>(26)</sup> He and other like-minded communists saw this uprising as the “spark” that would ignite the Indian revolution. Mazumdar furthered the Naxalite ideology through his writings, particularly the *Historic Eight Documents*<sup>(27)</sup> that attracted a large number of urban middle class and elites to the ideology.

The *second phase* of the movement started in 1968, when the supporters of the ‘Naxalbari path’ formed the All-India Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCR). As more and more organised communists sided with the rebel faction in the Bengal unit, a separate party, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) - CPI(ML) was founded in 1969, which was supported by leaders from different regions.<sup>(28)</sup>

The *third phase* was characterized by the expansionist attempts made by CPI(ML) to form red bases in rural areas, and by adoption of Mazumdar’s “annihilation line” — a motto that promoted assassination of individual “class enemies” — such as landlords, businessmen, university teachers, police officers, politicians of the right and left and others — as the only tactical line for revolution. By 1970s, “entire state units of CPI (M) in Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and some sections in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh”<sup>(29)</sup> got attached to the struggle. Following the path of Naxalbari, another peasant agitation took place in the Srikakulam District of Andhra Pradesh. A small contingent of disgruntled revolutionaries of the Communist Party joined hands with the hill tribes to go on a war path. For some time, the Naxals established an alternative administrative apparatus in Srikakulam and declared “liberated zones” in the remote forested areas, started eradicating the local landlords and moneylenders, embarked upon collecting “taxes” and set up “revolutionary courts.”<sup>(30)</sup>

In pockets of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the Naxalites successfully mobilized the peasantry to regain lands they had lost to the landlords whom they had mortgaged their properties in lieu of money. In Punjab, rich landlords and policemen remained their preferred targets. In Midnapur and Birbhum of West Bengal,<sup>(31)</sup> a number of armed peasants’ struggles broke out.

In the *fourth phase*, the Naxalites took their struggle to urban areas. While campaigns to engage landless labourers and peasants proceeded in rural Bengal, Calcutta became the stage for urban Maoist activities and guerrilla warfare.<sup>(32)</sup> Hundreds of students joined the CPI(ML) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar.

The *fifth phase* began when the popularity and stronghold of Naxalbari Movement alarmed the government of India into setting up a committee for looking into the matter. The committee report exposed weaknesses in the implementation of laws enacted by the state to protect the interests of the poor farmers and tribals. Instead of addressing the problems of farmers and tribals

and restoring their confidence in the state, the government, perturbed over the law and order situation in the Naxal areas, took high-handed measures such as launching strong police action against the Naxalites.<sup>(33)</sup> This policy succeeded in checking their influence in many areas.

The government's success was mainly due to the increasing friction among the Naxal factions primarily against Mazumdar's "annihilation line". In seeking to strictly adhere to the Chinese model, Mazumdar failed to take into account the fact that Mao's revolution did not provide the model for a winning revolution to be imitated in the circumstances of the 1970s India. Although the CPI (ML) under Mazumdar professed to be fighting against the orthodox feudal system that undermined the rights and freedoms of the tribals, they were themselves could be blamed for using the tribals for their own ideological ends. While many Naxalites at the time would justify their strategy as a necessary measure for the achievement of a revolution, it had an alienating affect within tribal areas, a fact that many Naxal leaders like Kanu Sanyal understood well.<sup>(34)</sup>

Moreover, the shift in the organization's area of operation from rural to urban aggravated the divide. Cashing in on the decentralised structure of the movement, the local police successfully established intelligence gathering mechanisms through the young students joining the movement. In 1971, the CPI (ML) was split. Satyanarayan Singh revolted against Mazumdar's brazen policies and formed a new party, CPI (ML) Liberation.<sup>(35)</sup> Thus, the movement was scattered into several competing factions, operating in various regions.

In July 1972, Charu Mazumdar was captured from a Calcutta hideout and died after 12 days of his arrest due to alleged ill treatment in police custody.<sup>(36)</sup> Many left-oriented thinkers and writers wrote about the mysterious death of Mazumdar. The imposition of emergency in India in 1975 resulted in mass arrests of the top leaders as well as grassroots-level leaders and members of the movement. In many areas, Maoist veterans went underground to evade arrest.

At that point in time, it was widely believed that the Indian government had successfully suppressed the threat posed by the Naxalites. Nevertheless, the reality was different. The movement, after a tangible pause, began to revive in the late 1970s. It entered a new phase when post-Emergency new government came into power at the centre after the 1977 general elections.<sup>(37)</sup> The fresh and first non-congress government released Naxal leaders from jails following a nationwide movement organized by various human rights groups in the country and abroad. All these developments proved to be catalyst in carrying the Naxal message to the people at the grassroots' level of Indian society.

Despite many divisions in the ranks of Naxalism, almost all the groups committed to the ideas of the movement traced their origin to the common political forum — the CPI (ML) which was not directly involved in armed rebellion but in disseminating the ideology of Naxalbari movement and mobilizing the people in its favour. The various splits during the 1970s, 80s and 90s generated a process whereby each fragmented bloc sought to increase its individual base of support, thus leading to a growth in organizational development with focus on winning over local populations at grassroots level.<sup>(38)</sup>

Therefore, the Maoists sought to institute control over areas that were extremely poor and were segregated and ignored by state's development and security initiatives. Moreover, these areas were mostly located in hilly or forested terrains, which provided safe havens to the Maoists against the state's security networks.

### **Naxalite movement: A new beginning**

The shortcomings of Indian democracy to deliver the promises of the Constitution to its marginalised populations provided space for an opposing ideology which was able to fill the void created by the failures of the State.

By early 2000, there were more than 30 groups in India which are loosely called Maoists or Naxalites.<sup>(39)</sup> Of these, the People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar were the most significant ones. Believing in guerilla warfare, these two diverse lines of Naxalism, since the 1980s, continued armed rebellion in their respective zones against police force, administration, landlords and business communities.

The PWG emerged during the post-Emergency period in retaliation to the authoritarian repression of the Communist and Naxal leaders by state forces and to the gradual acceptance of the parliamentary methods conceded by the CPI (M-L) Liberation. On the other hand, the MCC was formed in 1969 under the name of Dakshin Desh<sup>(40)</sup> in opposition to Mazumdar's line of action.

During the late 1970s, the PWG first established itself in Telengana, but later successfully spread its influence across the borders of Andhra Pradesh and into Orissa and the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh as early as 1982. Simultaneously, the MCC gained influence when its military line of action became popular among tribals in the central regions of Bihar. These groups set up committees in many areas to assess and address the grievances of the local people. They would identify people like moneylenders and landlords and would kill those responsible for the plight of the poor in these zones. However, unlike Mazumdar's class annihilation policy, these groups used violence as an empowering instrument, and not an end in itself.<sup>(41)</sup> Naxalite groups were able to gain influence by providing an analogous government apparatus in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand. Over time, these parallel governments were able to achieve a high level of sophistication and organization. As armed groups steadily held an area, they went about coordinating economic, political and social reforms based on the needs of the local population.<sup>(42)</sup> In 2000, the People's War Group established the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) while smaller scale militias formed in 1980s continued to flourish.

Since 2000, these groups have greatly extended their influence zone, therefore, the Naxal movement in India is now considered as a part of the global Maoist activism. In 2001, organizations like the PWG, MCC etc. established a network with ideologically similar organizations in Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka under the aegis of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). This South Asia Maoist

network also became a member of an international organization called the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).<sup>(43)</sup>

The emergence of CCOMPOSA saw a series of mergers between Indian Maoist groups. In 2004, CPI (ML) and its factions — Party Union, MCC and PWG — merged to form a unified command structure under the title of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (Maoist).<sup>(44)</sup> After the merger, the CPI (Maoist) announced that the newly formed party would follow Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its "ideological basis guiding its thinking in all spheres of its activities." Included in this ideology was a dedication to "protracted armed struggle" to emasculate the State and seize power. The strategy also incorporated building up bases in rural and remote areas and converting them first into guerrilla zones, and then into "liberated zones", in addition to encircling cities.<sup>(45)</sup> Under the new unification, PWG's armed group PGA was renamed PLGA. Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy was named the general secretary of the organization.<sup>(46)</sup> Since then, the Naxalite Movement has unleashed its power to become the most dangerous internal security threat to India.

In a comprehensive 2004 document entitled *Strategy and Tactics*, CPI (Maoist) has recognized major contradictions in the Indian society:

- "The contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people;
- The contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses;
- The contradiction between capital and labour; and
- The internal contradictions among the ruling classes."<sup>(47)</sup>

They argue that these inconsistencies are "a result of India being a semi-feudal, semi colonial country, under neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control."<sup>(48)</sup> The organization contends that the "comprador bureaucratic capitalist classes of India are tools in the hands of imperialists". With the "introduction of liberalization, privatization, globalization" (LPG) in the 1990s, these classes increasingly shape national policies that synchronize with the interests of their imperialist masters. Furthermore, the party considers the Indian caste system as "obnoxious" and holds that the allegiance to and the role of other left wing parties in the government is nothing but mockery. The organization contends:

Support of the so-called Left parties to the present Congress government with the fake posture of opposing its economic policies is a new fraud (on) the Indian people...Dalit question is essentially a class question. Hence, the Maoist forces should carry on the struggle against caste oppression as a part of the NDR [New Democratic Revolution] and also fight for their equal place in society in all spheres by abolishing the caste system. They should also fight for equal rights and special privileges, including, reservations for Dalits and other backward castes, while exposing the hollowness of the ruling class politics in this regard. The struggle against casteism and

untouchability should also be carried on in the ideological, political and cultural spheres.<sup>(49)</sup>

What makes the Naxalite insurgency different from others in India is that rather than seeking to challenge the power of the Indian government to exercise its sovereignty over a given area based on racial, religious, or territorial claims, the movement seeks to defy the sovereignty of the democratic state by undermining the basic principles, such as justice, governance and monopoly of violence, which underscore its authority.<sup>(50)</sup>

Since the merger, Naxalites have fused their front organizations into 'Revolution Democratic Front' (RDF) to strengthen their mass contact programme. In 2007, it was estimated that Naxalites were active across roughly "half of India's 28 states" which accounts for about 40 per cent of its geographical area.<sup>(51)</sup> In 2011, 83 districts<sup>(52)</sup> across nine states of the Red Corridor were declared as Naxalite-hit areas, out of which Chattisgarh is the most-affected one.<sup>(53)</sup>

Throughout the "liberated zones," the Naxalites have been able to establish their own system of governance and justice and have made a determined effort to straighten out law and order issues. They have successfully instituted *jana adalats* or people's courts and systems of "tax" collection. They are very well organized with a military-like chain of command that has leaders at the national, regional and local levels.<sup>(54)</sup> They have established different zonal committees with efficient coordination mechanism. For instance, "they have three zonal committees in Orissa like Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC), Jharkhand-Bihar-Orissa Special Zonal Committee (JBOBSZC) and Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DSZC). In Andhra Pradesh, three special zonal committees look after the Maoist operations."<sup>(55)</sup>

The Maoist movement has identified three steps of warfare — organization stage, the guerrilla warfare stage and finally the mobile warfare stage. All these stages can be witnessed at different levels with varying intensity all over India.<sup>(56)</sup> During the organizational phase of the movement, the rebels do not resort to violence in order to institute a popular support base. The nature of their activities usually remains peaceful, and essentially political (strategic defensive). Once they achieve a firm hold in their targeted areas, they enter the guerilla warfare phase, wherein they confront the state on equal footing by targeting police forces, police informants, and civil and political leaders. As a result of targeted killings and intimidation by the Naxals, a power vacuum is created in these areas. The space is then filled in by the insurgents through a parallel system of government in the form of 'gram rajya' and 'gram raksha' committess. The Naxals then enter into a more open conflict with security forces, called mobile warfare phase.<sup>(57)</sup>

For example, if Dantewada and Bastar are going almost into the mobile warfare stage, Delhi is perhaps at the organization stage.

The Maoists keep on creating new fronts and continue merging the groups into their fold in order to escape from police action and political antagonism. This has made the situation more complex for the police and the governments, who find it difficult to curb the growing problem of insurgency.

The Maoist military machine, PLGA, continues to remain a potent defence against the state militia. According to Dr, P.V. Ramana:

“PLGA consists of three types of forces, viz. primary force (platoons), secondary force (guerrilla squads) and base force (people’s militia). The people’s militia comprises of people who otherwise have a vocation in life and are imparted rudimentary military training for barely a fortnight.”<sup>(58)</sup>

Under new banners, the PLGA and other small Naxal groups are making regular recruitment of cadres as “armed naxals, techie cadres, informers, etc., on salary basis”. News sources claim that “an armed cadre joins at a monthly remuneration between 6000 and 10000 rupees whereas a qualified techie cadre starts at a salary between 8000 and 15000 per month depending on their qualification, expertise and area of operation. Unlike other regular jobs, they have set an effective and lucrative system of incentives and cadre promotion based on the performance and capability in handling different operations.”<sup>(59)</sup>

According to estimates, the PLGA since its inception has trained around ten to twenty thousand professional cadres, armed with around 7,300 highly sophisticated weapons. Its informal militia, which is numbered 50,000 approximately, spreads across villages under Maoist control, comprising of tribals equipped with traditional arsenal.<sup>(60)</sup> This wide collection of weapons include “home-made *tapancha*, the older .302, SBBL and, DBBDL rifles, SLRs, LMGs, AK series assault rifles, INSAS rifles, mortar and lethal IEDS such as claymore and directional mines.”<sup>(61)</sup>

These armed cadres and militia are supported by a large number of women and children. The PLGA is also involved in “propaganda war and providing assistance to the people in establishing and smooth running of ‘janta sarkars’ (people’s governments) established by the Maoists in their areas of domination like in the areas of Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC).”<sup>(62)</sup>

The government alleges that Naxals have gradually come to harbour an extortion economy in the guise of a popular revolution, wringing huge amounts of money from local branches of mining companies and other businesses. They have been involved in several cases of destroying public property by blowing up schools and railway tracks. They are known for staging dreadful attacks against police and the tribals as well as dalits who either oppose the Naxalites or favour the police and government. Moreover, they have been accused of keeping the areas under their control away from modernity and development, so they can impose their will on the uneducated rural populace.<sup>(63)</sup>

Keeping pace with the technological advancements, the PLGA has been acquiring hi-tech weapons and ammunition through their links with the insurgent groups from India’s Northeast, Nepal and Myanmar. In their areas of control, they have established “specialized technical wings, which employ IT experts on monthly payment, to draw up plans to develop more potent explosives, tap governmental messages and get the latest on techniques on guerrilla warfare. The experts also draw maps of different government

installations and sketches of jails. The Maoists have developed technology to prepare dangerous landmines.”<sup>(64)</sup> Their presence in the rural suburbs of urban centres, industrial hubs, sections of Northeast India and even in Punjab has increased tangibly.<sup>(65)</sup>

### **Naxalism and the women revolutionaries**

The involvement of women in Maoist activities has been there since the Naxalbari Movement of 1967. In 1986, the PLGA formed a women’s wing — Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (AMS) — which evolved into the Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (Revolutionary Indigenous Women Association) — KAMS and now has 90,000 enrolled members, nearly 45 per cent of PLGA’s armed cadres. Many women have joined KAMS to escape the discrimination against women in their own patriarchal societies. It is so because KAMS very presence has brought a fundamental change in the traditional attitudes of people by eliminating many of the conventional forms of discrimination against women.<sup>(66)</sup> Then there are those who join the Naxalites due to the continued physical and economic exploitation of women and the rest of the adivasi community at the hands of police and other outside forces. The commitment of the Maoists towards the ideology and understanding about new feminine concepts is also one of the motivational factors behind the increase in the number of women in the movement.

Many of the Maoist squads operating in jungle areas have women as their commanders. There is no gender bias with respect to the military struggle. Like men, the women *dalams* (armed squads) are trained for the field, with the same exercise and diet routine. It is obligatory for all new Maoist recruits to “take a nine-point oath that declares, inter alia, that he or she would not discriminate on the basis of religion, caste, gender, race, or ethnicity.”<sup>(67)</sup>

Women are active in almost all the Naxal-influenced regions. For example, in a survey conducted in Maharashtra, “74 women are part of the approximately 290 hardcore Maoists operating in the worst affected areas.” Besides, being soldiers, women take up the roles of “doctors, propagandists and tutors.” Each day, they teach Maoist philosophy in their communities, informing them how the “imperialist forces have oppressed them, looted their forests and destroyed their way of life.”<sup>(68)</sup> There are women who have not only vowed to give their lives to the movement, but have also pledged their children to serve the organization following their footsteps.

### **State’s counter-Naxal strategy**

In September 2009, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh while talking to the mediapersons said:

“I have consistently held that in many ways the left-wing extremism poses perhaps the gravest internal security threat that our country’s faces... I would like to state frankly that we have not achieved as much success as we would have liked in containing this menace. It is a matter of concern that despite our efforts the level of violence in the effected states continues to rise.”<sup>(69)</sup>



In 2009, India's United Progressive Alliance-led government banned the CPI (Maoist) under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) as a terrorist organisation. However, since 2004, as the Naxalite movement's influence multiplied, the government took stern measures to curb it. In comparison to the Naxalite movement, the state has vast resources and enjoys greater legitimacy to deal with the Naxal issue, but they consider the insurgency solely as a law and order problem. With this approach, the State has adopted a policy of extensive use of force and is only focused on targeting insurgents who they consider the principal obstacle in the way of restoration of law and order and a threat to the writ of the State.<sup>(70)</sup> This tug-of-war between the State and the Naxalites has isolated the tribals and the general public living in these areas. In addition, it has resulted in deterioration of public rights and welfare programmes.

The first grand initiative secretly sponsored and armed by a state government against the Naxalites was *Salwa Judum* (Purification Hunt). The central government fully supported the programme. Chhattisgarh has been the heart of Maoist activities since 1980s. The idea of forming Salwa Judum was presented by Mahendra Karma, the opposition leader in the Chhattisgarh Legislative Assembly, in summer 2005. During the same year, due to the state's crackdown against the Maoists in the state of Andhra Pradesh, a lot of Naxal members had fled to Chhattisgarh. The Salwa Judum was a ground-clearing operation wherein the local people were moved out of their villages into roadside camps, where they could be policed and controlled. The Indian government used the military tactics of "strategic hamleting" that the US had used during the Vietnam War.<sup>(71)</sup>

Salwa judum is primarily an informal organization comprising around 10,000 members. The Chhattisgarh state government appointed thousands of young men, some of them still teenagers, as special police officers, supplied them with weapons and pushed them to fight the Maoists. The state's rationale for doing so was that it would be a back-up to the military, make the mineral-rich areas safer for big industrial corporations, and allow for official deniability of any violence committed against civilians and the alleged Naxals in the name of restoring control.<sup>(72)</sup>

Many people and social activists believe that the cause of contention between the two warring sides is the control over the mineral-rich region of India which is abundant in limestone, iron ore, coal, magnesium and bauxite deposits. In an interview given to Awi Lewis of Al-Jazeera TV, famous writer Arundhati Roy observed:

"Why did the Maoists suddenly become internal security threat? Because, in 2005, a few things happened simultaneously. In April, the BJP government in Chhattisgarh signed two MoUs to set up integrated steel plants (the terms of which are secret). One for Rs 7,000 crore with Essar Steel in Bailadila, and the other for Rs 10,000 crore with Tata Steel in Lohandiguda. That same month, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made his famous statement about the Maoists being the 'Gravest Internal Security Threat' to India."<sup>(73)</sup>



The conflict's epicenter is the heavily forested and underdeveloped district of Dantewara. Salwa Judum herded villagers and tribals in makeshift camps, where human rights abuses were rife. Salwa Judum became increasingly violent and out of control. Reportedly, since 2005, Salwa Judum burnt and evacuated 644 or more villages.<sup>(74)</sup> For instance, the village of Kortrapal caught special media attention because it was "burnt 22 times for refusing to surrender."<sup>(75)</sup> With the rise in the conflict, Human Rights Watch in 2008 reported atrocities at both ends. In a report, the HRW highlighted large-scale displacement of the civilian population caught in the conflict between the Naxalites and Salwa Judum militia with at least 100,000 people moving to various camps in southern Chhattisgarh or fleeing to neighbouring Andhra Pradesh as of early 2008. That is why, in the absence of access to employment or land, lack of food, water and shelter, people resorted to raiding nearby villages. There were also extensive reports of rape and other abuses against women by the Salwa Judum.<sup>(76)</sup>

On their part, the Maoists continued with their attacks specifically targeting Salwa Judum leaders and security personnel. By early 2009, Salwa Judum as a counterinsurgency measure was largely seen by most analysts and security experts as a failure. The number of people living in the camps dropped from former 50,000 to 13,000 and public support for the Judum dwindled away.<sup>(77)</sup> On 5 July 2011, the Supreme Court of India declared the militia as illegal and unconstitutional. The court directed the Chhattisgarh government to recover all the firearms given to Judum members along with the ammunition and accessories. It also ordered the government to look into all cases of alleged criminal activities of Salwa Judum.<sup>(78)</sup>

Along with the state government-led Salwa Judum operations the central government started a paramilitary offensive against the Naxalite rebels in November 2009 along the borders of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, known as 'Operation Green Hunt' OGH. Most operations conducted by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) have targeted Sanghams, the village-level bodies installed by the Naxals in areas under their control. Sangham members are considered to be sympathetic to the Naxal cause but are not necessarily armed. In such a state of affairs, the loyalties of local tribesmen stand divided between the Maoists and the state. Drawn into a web of complexities, the state adheres to use of violence as the only tool to draw maximum number of native people on its side. In this context, quoting an example of Chhattisgarh, *The Hindu* reported:

Chhattisgarh does not keep any record of civilians killed by the security forces. Police sources cite this as validation of the state's efforts to minimise civilian casualties, but sceptics see this as tautology where all those killed by the police are retrospectively termed Naxals.<sup>(79)</sup>

In the process, the government forces have also suffered a series of devastating losses as a result of Maoist counterattacks against 'Operation Green Hunt.' The deadliest among these has been a Dantewada ambush that saw 76

jawans die at the hands of the Maoists.<sup>(80)</sup> The OGH attacks were greatly criticized by the Indian public.

On the whole, the government's counter-insurgency operations have led to estrangement and disillusionment towards the state amongst both the populations affected by the uprising and the state's own security forces. Despite the fact that the Maoists' increased recourse to violence has damaged their own political targets, the reality remains that their work in most of the tribal areas during the past three decades have consolidated their support and control over these regions.<sup>(81)</sup> On the contrary, the government's excessive use of force has done little to reinstate its control.

What is most tragic in this fight for legitimacy and authority between the two sides is the increased number of civilian casualties in the past years. As shown in the Table below, since 2005 the number of civilian casualties outnumbered the deaths of security personnel and Naxalites.

**Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism in India: 2005-2012**  
**Year-Wise Breakup**

Years	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	LWE/ CPI-Maoists	Total
2005	281	150	286	717
2006	266	128	343	737
2007	240	218	192	650
2008	220	214	214	648
2009	391	312	294	997
2010	626	277	277	1180
2011	275	128	199	602
2012	119	99	90	308
<b>Total*</b>	<b>2418</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>1895</b>	<b>5839</b>

(State wise incidents and fatalities can be viewed at South Asian Terrorism Portal

Source for this table: <[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data\\_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-11.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-11.htm)>

### **A catch-22 situation for all**

While dealing with the Naxalite issue, the Indian government claims to have followed a proactive and calculated approach. However, in reality, its policies have largely remained reactive. It created a power vacuum by ignoring the people of the poorest regions of the country and has failed to recapture its authority. Moreover, the state so far has remained unsuccessful in providing physical and legal protection to those who are affected by the insurgency. In a 2008 report of an expert group set up by the Planning Commission of India, it was noted:

As the responsibility of the State for providing equal social rights recedes in the sphere of policymaking, we have two worlds of education, two worlds of health, two worlds of transport and two worlds of housing, with a gaping divide in between. With globalization of information, awareness of opportunities and possible life styles are spreading but the entitlements are receding. The Constitutional mandate (Article 39) to prevent concentration of wealth in a few hands is

ignored in policy making. The directional shift in Government policies towards modernization and mechanization, export orientation, diversification to produce for the market, withdrawal of various subsidy regimes and exposure to global trade has been an important factor in hurting the poor in several ways.<sup>(82)</sup>

On the other hand, the Maoists too have a lot of issues to deal with. Firstly, no matter how remarkable their support base and military capacity is, their goal of overthrowing the Indian government seems to be a distant reality. Besides, it is not in the better interest of the disaffected people they claim to be fighting for. This is because the aim of the Naxalites is to pursue their project of protracted people's war by transforming the guerrilla zones into liberated zones. Nevertheless, once an area under Maoist control is declared liberated, the interests of the tribals become secondary to the Maoist political agenda.<sup>(83)</sup>

Secondly, the movement is attracting youth from the poor as well as upper-class families. Some experts think that the inclusion of the middle to upper classes could be one of the reasons that the fundamental aim of defending the rights of the tribal and dalit communities and the peasantry seems to have fallen second in the list of priorities.

Thirdly, in many zones of their influence, the Naxal outfits "have imposed illegal taxes; demanded food and shelter from villagers; abducted and killed 'class enemies' and hindered the delivery and utilization of funds meant for the development of isolated countryside."<sup>(84)</sup> In the Naxal areas, those who refuse support to the Naxalites are often harassed and at times killed with brutality. All these actions have adversely affected the lives of the people they claim to stand for.

### **The road ahead**

Over the last 40 years, India has remained unsuccessful in implementing institutional changes at the local level, thus leaving landed proprietors and rich farmers to gain most in rural areas through maximizing short-term profit, disregarding the needs of tribal populations. A study of the whole trend would suggest that the problem is deepening despite all assurances given by the state governments.<sup>(85)</sup> It is essential to examine the causes of the continuing economic exploitation and social discrimination in the adivasi and dalit-inhabited areas of India.<sup>(86)</sup> Indian government has been focusing on treating the symptoms through arrests or killings. Neither the state nor the army has sincerely tried treating the root cause of the problem, i.e. poverty and inequality.

In most of the Naxalite-affected areas, unbridled corruption is one of the major reasons of state's failure. Unless the state dedicates itself to identify and punish those who are embezzling the money meant for development of these areas, it is not going to be able to deal with the problem.

The use of the Salwa Judum is highly counterproductive and has made things worse. The Supreme Court ruling in July 2011 on the Salwa Judum also

stated that their deployment amounts to a resignation of responsibility on the part of the state.<sup>(87)</sup>

Counterinsurgency measures in the absence of targeted developmental projects are bound to fail. People will stop supporting violent movements if their primary needs are met. Therefore, only a multipronged policy addressing issues related to security, health, education, agriculture and irrigation, public works, generation of employment opportunities for the masses and formation of a comprehensive task force for the affected areas is required.<sup>(88)</sup> Such measures will be able to restore the confidence in the local population regarding dedication of the government in addressing their basic problems. What is immediately needed in Naxal-influenced zones is conceptualization to carry out operations with clarity of aim, strategy and resolve. It is important that the government learns from past mistakes and works towards development rather than just resorting back to use of force.

There is a gap in accountability between the central and state governments affected by Naxalism. While the central government has maintained that Naxalism is a threat to national security, it has frequently reaffirmed that state governments are responsible for their law and order and development matters. This has resulted into uneven strategies and responses across the affected states.<sup>(89)</sup> Thus, it is vital for the state governments to coordinate and cooperate with the support from the central government to launch an efficient strategy.

The problem of Naxalism should be understood from the point of the people involved. It is important to understand their perspective of the Naxal movement and its strategy. The government needs to focus on a third aspect of the problem: the ideology in the minds of people. The government should come up with a superior idea that is viable. The counter- ideology should not only appeal to the deprived population in rural areas but also to the urban supporters of Naxalism.<sup>(90)</sup>

The naxal problem cannot be controlled until the Indian government makes major changes in its policies. The disparity between the laws made and laws enforced has to disappear. In terms of development, the political process and the commercial interests need to be balanced, taking care of the requirements of the local tribal people.<sup>(91)</sup> It is generally seen that there is a lack of understanding on the part of the government towards local workers. The only way of attaining a common ground would be to make the tribal people part of the entire process.

On the issue of sharing the natural and mineral resource, the government needs to work on a policy wherein the local people and their representatives including the Naxalites are involved. Carving out a policy only to suit the interests of the government or that of the involved or aspiring industrial organizations, will never work. In fact, it will further exacerbate the problem.

As is widely believed, the Naxalite Movement is not all about guerrilla warfare; 70 per cent of it is revolutionary politics. Revolutionary politics is a

combination of info-political warfare. Unless the Indian politicians understand the concept, they cannot hope to defeat the Naxals.

Dialogue is a key to any peaceful settlement; nonetheless, in many circles in India, a lot of negative connotation has been attached to the term regarding Naxalites. For long lasting peace, the representatives of the government and those from the conflict-hit states will have to enter a dialogue with the Maoists.

## **Conclusion**

Naxalism in India has evolved as a strong political ideology over time. India's long history of peasant rebellion can be ascribed to the economic repression and social humiliation that India's poor peasants, tribals and dalits faced for centuries. Even after independence, the Indian State failed to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of the oppressed and ensure that the benefits of its agrarian reform policies were spread more equitably across rural society.

Therefore, Naxalism emerged as an alternative ideology to cater to the needs of the poor masses. Over the years, the negligence of the State, corruption and faulty development policies, which displaced millions of tribals and peasants from their land without giving them proper compensation, only heightened the sense of disaffection that the deprived felt towards the State<sup>(92)</sup> and pushed them further into the fold of the Naxalite Movement.

Cashing in on the power vacuum left by the state and central governments, the Naxalites established a parallel system of government in their areas of operation. They undertook a range of development activities, including infrastructure building, maintenance of law and order and provision of social goods, in these areas. More recently, the Naxalite Movement has established links with regional and international insurgency movements. Today, it is more organized, well-structured and equipped with hi-tech weaponry. The advanced face of the movement and their success in running an analogous system of government has placed a question mark on the legitimacy of the State.

The Naxalite Movement continues to pose a major challenge to India. For some, it is a socio-economic problem, while others describe it as a law and order issue. Though the movement has not reached the point to be able to overthrow the State, yet if the situation continues to aggravate, that would hamper all progress and affect the social fabric and internal cohesion of the country. The root of the problem lies in poverty, inequality and the failure of credible governance in Naxalite-influenced areas.

The strategic intent of the Left-wing movement has been to instigate a revolution to overthrow the state through violence or a protracted people's war. They expect to achieve their stated goal by 2016. The increasing gravity of the Maoist issue in India has been accepted by the top authorities, as the most serious security threat. India's anti-Naxal policy has been criticized by different sections of society. Its counterinsurgency measures like 'Salwa Judum' and 'Operation Green Hunt' have backfired. The lack of comprehensive development planning, delayed and faulty implementation of the schemes, lack of coordination among all Naxal-affected states, deficiency of finances, and

infinite administrative loopholes have complicated the situation in the Red Corridor zone. The combination of the state's malfunctioning and the Naxalites ability to grab the opportunity has produced a situation in which the state and the insurgency are stuck in a violent impasse. Millions of people are caught between the Naxal ideology and the state's response to it. The global economic pressures have forced India to reform its policies in order to tackle the domestic and international interests. Nevertheless, such policies have a negative impact on the tribals, who were never made part of such a process in the first place. If India wishes to limit the Naxalite insurgency, it needs to seriously work towards it. And continuing with the status quo is certainly not the option.

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
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Annexure-I

Map showing areas affected by the Naxalite Movement in India

(Source: <http://pacificempire.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/naxalite-affected-areas-in-india.jpg>).

# LOOMING URBAN SPRAWL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH ASIAN URBANIZATION

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## Introduction

South Asian economies are at a crossroads today; rapidly transforming into manufacturing and services economies. Such transition is leading to the rise of urban population with every passing day. Population statistics reveal that the level of urbanization in South Asia has risen from 15.6 per cent of the total population in 1951 to 30.1 per cent in 2010. In line with this perturbing pace, South Asian urban population would cross 800 million by 2030 and nearly half of Asia's total population would reside in urban areas before the dawn of the new century.<sup>(1)</sup> Cities with larger population undoubtedly have larger contribution in the overall development of the country. In fact, the level of urbanization and the level of development are closely related. As the proportion of population increases, so does the GDP per capita. However, such a huge population also poses overwhelming management and financial challenges.

The developed countries have been able to stem the tide of challenges emanated from urban sprawl. However, South Asia's response to this fastest urbanization is deplorable; squalor, slums, traffic congestion, crimes, pollution, deficient infrastructure, shortage of water and power issues are haunting South Asia. Moreover, environmental infrastructure of cities, including solid waste disposal system, drainage and sewerage is not keeping up with the fast urbanization and posing serious environmental hazards. The subject of urban development both in theory and practice has been neglected in this region. As a result an individualistic and haphazard development is taking place which is even more life-threatening. The region is lagging behind in reaping full economic benefits of urbanization and has to go a long way. The situation

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demands comprehensive development plans to address the onslaught of problems to make the cities serve as the engine of growth of national economy. The study argues that if the rapid urbanization is not managed properly, it will certainly accelerate urban poverty, spawning slums. Thus, meeting the millennium goals by 2015 would be a pipedream.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first, “State of Urbanization in South Asia: Population Growth” presents urban population growth trends in South Asia. The second section, “An overview of urban issues,” provides a brief analysis of issues and the final section, “The way forward” offers some suggestions vis-à-vis urban development.

### **State of urbanization in South Asia: Population growth**

We begin with portraying the whole Asian urban population growth scenario. In this regard, a study by Brian Roberts and Trevor Kanaley on urbanization is worth mentioning. It highlights an unprecedented rise of urban population in Asia. It shows that in 1950, some 232 million people, or 17 per cent of the population, lived in urban areas. In 2005, the figure was estimated at 1,562 million, or 40 per cent of the population. By 2030, it is estimated 2,664 million people, or almost 55 per cent of the population in the Asia region will be urban. In the next 25 years the population of Asian cities will increase by over 70 per cent or 1,100 million. These trends are dominated by the impact of the two most populous countries — China and India — that account for 31 per cent and 25 per cent respectively of estimated urban population growth in Asia over the next 25 years. In terms of annual urban growth rates, the Asian city populations are growing an average 2.5 per cent. However, growth of suburban areas is ahead of city populations running at around 5.5 per cent. According to a UN estimates, the process of urbanization will lead to the conversion of more than 10 sq. km of fertile land to non-agricultural use every day in Asia.<sup>(2)</sup> Over the next 25 years, the land area for cities in Asia will be doubled or maybe tripled, posing huge environmental, economic and social challenges.<sup>(3)</sup>

As far as South Asia is concerned, its countries were predominantly rural, particularly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh at the time of independence. By and large it is still a rural region, yet it is passing through a phase of rapid transition, where more and more people are migrating daily to the urban areas in pursuit of life-changing opportunities. This fast migration trend can be observed from the urban population statistics that reveal a steady rise. In terms of percentage, the South Asian urban population has increased to 30.1 per cent in 2010 from 15.6 per cent in 1950 of the total population.<sup>(4)</sup>

The annual rise in urban population has been 9-10 million and is expected to increase to 14-15 million in the next decade. South Asia’s share in world’s population has also increased to 14 per cent from about 10 per cent in 1950 and is likely to touch 18-19 per cent by 2050.<sup>(5)</sup> A closer look at the data on population trends shows that Dhaka’s population which stands at 13.5 million today is projected to increase by 31 per cent by 2020, and that of Karachi by 29 per cent. Mumbai’s population, which currently stands at 19.7 million, will

increase by 32 per cent till 2005.<sup>(6)</sup> According to UN population estimates, Ahmadabad, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Poona, Surat of India, Dhaka of Bangladesh, and Karachi and Lahore of Pakistan are rapidly expanding. These cities have become centres of new wealth generation through improved knowledge and technology. Apart from megacities, a number of cities with large populations are emerging. (See table 2). In 2000, 38 per cent of South Asia's urban population was living in cities with over one million population which has increased to 42 per cent in 2010 and the number of cities (over a million population category) has also increased to 58 as compared to 42 in 2000 and expected to cross 73 cities by 2020.

The urban population of India alone in the entire region is expected to touch 627 million by 2031, equivalent to 40 per cent of the Indian population. Megacities — with population above 5 million — will also double in size over the same period, from 61 million to 133 million people. Indian cities with population between 1 and 5 million will register the highest absolute increase in urban population, from 46 to 126 million, equivalent to an increase from 15 to 20 per cent in their share of India's urban population. The average annual population growth rate for urban India is expected to stabilize at 2.5 per cent per annum, in line with the population growth rate recorded over the period 1995-2000, although below the record growth of 3-4 per cent registered in the previous decades.<sup>(7)</sup> According to Indian Census authorities, the urban population of India will exceed 300 million by the year 2016.

Pakistan, too, is urbanizing rapidly. It is considered the most urbanized country in the region. In 1981, around 24 million people were living in urban areas, constituting 28 per cent of the total population. Now, the total population has reached 173.5 million in which urban population share has risen to around 36.3 per cent with 63.1 million. If that continues, it would surpass 121 million by 2030 and the level of urbanization would be 45.6 per cent — highest among South-East Asian countries.<sup>(8)</sup> The situation in Bangladesh is not much different. The country has a very large urban population, estimated at 38 million in 2005. The urban growth rate is around double the overall population growth. If it continues with this pace, half the population — around 90 million — will be living in urban areas by 2030.<sup>(9)</sup>

According to Om Mathur,<sup>(10)</sup> over the next year, over 345 million people are expected to be added to the already 486 million living in South Asia. It constitutes 25 per cent expected increase in world's urban population. Such a massive demographic challenge and its implications have not been realized by the South Asian governments.

The cost of ungoverned urbanization is even higher for the South Asian region. The urbanization process is posing dual impact on South Asian economies. Firstly, through a growing 'rural-push' factor in which large numbers of rural people are being forced out to seek employment opportunities in mega cities. Such a rural-push can largely be attributed to the fact that people in rural areas are not being fully integrated into the village economy. Consequently, rural unemployment and poverty is on the rise. Secondly, it generates unprecedented urban financial and management challenges.<sup>(11)</sup> Owing

to this rural-development failure, the share of urban population is inexorably growing and will continue to grow until rural-governance improves. Bert Hoselitz, principal proponent of the rural-push idea, observed that “urbanization in South Asia has probably run ahead of industrialization, and the development of administrative and other service occupations which are characteristically concentrated in cities.” This pattern of development emphasizes the disproportion between the cost of urban growth and the maintenance of required facilities for urban dwellers and the earning of the people living in urban areas. He also maintained that in developed countries, cities have developed because of the ‘pull’ of urban facilities, however, in Asia (south) urban growth has resulted from the ‘push’ of poverty-stricken rural population.<sup>(12)</sup> Although Hoselitz made these arguments in the late 50s, yet today’s situation is, to a large extent, not different particularly with reference to the ‘push’ factor. According to the United Nations estimates, this rural-to-urban migration and reclassification of areas are responsible of about 50 per cent rise in the urban population, particularly in the case of Pakistan. Apart from this ‘push’ and ‘pull’ phenomenon, there are numerous challenges the region is facing today. The next section deals briefly with urban issues such as governance, urban poverty and slums, traffic congestion, pollution and climate change.

**Table 1**

**Comparative Urban Demographic Transition (South Asia and the World)**

Year	Urban Population (million)		Level of Urbanization %		Annual Exponential Change %	
	South Asia	World	South Asia	World	South Asia	World
1950	73.95	729.32	15.63	28.83	-	-
1980	200.85	1727.24	22.41	38.92	3.33	2.94
2010	485.79	3486.33	30.08	50.46	2.87	2.34

**Source:** World Urbanization Prospects, 2009, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN.



Table 2

## Emergence of Mega Cities in South Asia

City	Country	2009	2025	World Ranking 2009-2025
Agra	India	1.7	2.3	232-219
Ahmadabad	-	5.6	7.6	47-45
Allahabad	-	1.3	1.7	336-301
Amritsar	-	1.3	1.8	331-297
Asansol	-	1.4	1.9	298-266
Aurangabad	-	1.2	1.6	352-320
Bangalore	-	7.1	9.5	36-34
Bhopal	-	1.8	2.5	212-199
Chandigarh	-	1.0	1.4	411-360
Delhi	-	21.7	28.6	2-2
Dhaka	Bangladesh	14.3	20.9	9-5
Dhanbad	India	1.3	1.8	323-289
Durg-Bhilainagar	-	1.1	1.6	360-328
Faisalabad	Pakistan	2.8	4.2	129-101
Gujranwala	-	1.6	2.5	243-206
Gauhati	India	1.0	1.4	407-358
Gwalior	-	1.0	1.4	415-362
Hyderabad	-	6.6	8.9	40-37
Hyderabad	Pakistan	1.5	2.4	258-215
Indore	India	2.1	2.9	180-165
Jabalpur	-	1.3	1.9	314-279
Jaipur	-	3.1	4.2	114-100
Jamshedpur	-	1.4	1.9	307-274
Jodhpur	-	1.0	1.5	402-356
Kanpur	-	3.3	4.5	101-86
Karachi	Pakistan	12.8	18.7	11-10
Khulna	Bangladesh	1.6	2.5	237-198
Kochi	India	1.6	2.2	251-230
Kolkata	-	15.3	20.1	8-8
Lahore	Pakistan	70	10.3	38-29
Lucknow	India	2.8	3.9	124-115
Ludhiana	-	1.7	2.4	225-214
Madurai	-	1.3	1.9	313-281
Meerut	-	1.5	2.0	282-254
Multan	Pakistan	1.6	2.5	242-204
Nagpur	India	2.6	3.5	147-125
Nashik	-	1.6	2.2	256-233
Patna	-	2.3	3.1	166-148
Peshawar	Pakistan	1.4	2.1	300-238
Pune (Poona)	India	4.9	6.6	55-49
Rajkot	-	1.3	1.9	318-282
Ranchi	-	1.1	1.5	378-342
Rawalpindi	Pakistan -	2.0	3.0	192-158
Solapur	India -	1.1	1.6	373-340
Surat	-	4.1	5.6	75-67
Vadodara	-	1.8	2.5	208-196
Varanasi (Benares)	-	1.4	1.9	293-265
Visakhapatnum	-	1.6	2.2	247-229

Source: Adapted from UN Population Estimates

### **An overview of urban development issues**

Urban Management is all about delivery of public goods and services at its best. In relation to South Asia, the concept of urban management both in theory and practice has been neglected. The culture of power politics in this region has gradually undermined the legitimacy of governments which is considered a fundamental aspect of urban development. Discontinuity of development projects is a serious concern. The governments in power, whether they come through the democratic way or a military coup, discontinue or slow down the implementation of policies and projects of previous government. This practice has gravely hampered the progress of institutions; resultantly, it takes a very long time for the institutions to become mature.

Good governance is a key to urban development. Unfortunately, South Asia's progress in managing urban problems and delivering goods and services to its people has been disappointing. The region's progress can be seen from a report on Humane Governance Index (HGI), published by Dr Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Islamabad, in 1999. The Centre worked out governance assessment of 58 countries using the HGI later published in its annual report. According to the report, South Asia was one of the most poorly governed regions in the world with lowest HGI values. Out of 58 countries, India was ranked 42, while Pakistan 52, Sri Lanka 53 and Bangladesh 54. In 2002, a pilot testing of 16 countries was conducted under the new governance indicators by the World Governance Assessment (WGA) Project. Only two countries, India and Pakistan, were taken from South Asia. On a scale of 7 points, India scored 3.27 and Pakistan got only 2.17. There was no sharp difference observed in these two findings, from 1999 and 2002. The progress remained poor.

The recent World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) is a more refined form of assessment criteria. It measures the governance of any country on the basis of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The WGI analyses voice and accountability by capturing the perception of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in electing governments, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the media. Political stability and absence of violence is measured through the perception of the likelihood that government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. The third indicator, government effectiveness, analyses through perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of government. Regulatory quality is measured from perceptions of the quality of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The rule of law in any country is measured by capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The last indicator,

control of corruption, is judged by capturing the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. In all of the abovementioned indicators, the region of South Asia is lagging behind. The following table adapted from the WGI shows rankings for the year 2009.

Table 3

### South Asia Governance Indicators

Country	Ranking						Average
	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability & Absence of Violence	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	
Bangladesh	35.1	75	167	233	278	167	211
Bhutan	294	71.2	648	138	594	75.2	523
India	602	132	543	443	557	467	457
Maldives	44.1	392	424	37.1	528	295	408
Nepal	308	52	181	238	179	252	201
Pakistan	209	05	19	333	193	133	177
Sri Lanka	322	118	49	433	533	448	39

Source: *World Governance Indicators (WGI)*, 2009.

Any country's progress in delivering good governance can also be judged by its ability to reduce poverty. Unfortunately, misgovernance in the region has resulted in failure to alleviate poverty, which is widely considered a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism. South Asia's share in the global income is only 7 per cent while its share of global poverty is about 43 per cent and the share in the world population is 22 per cent. Per capita income is \$594, which is the lowest in comparison with any other region in the world — even Sub-Saharan Africa has a bit higher figure (\$ 601) than South Asia. South Asian countries, which have the largest concentration of the poor in the world, have little to no safety net. Human development balance sheet for this region, 1993-95 to 2004, shows that South Asia's share in world population remains the same 22 per cent as it was in 1993-1995, but its share in world's absolute poor has increased from 40 per cent in 1993-95 to 47 per cent in the year 2004. In education, South Asia has shown a little progress though; the literacy rate has increased from 47 per cent to 58 per cent. However, the pace is slower compared to other developing countries including Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, 212 million people are without access to safe water and the number of people without access to basic sanitation has even increased from 830 million to 897 million. And though the percentage of malnourished children has declined to 46 from 52 per cent, South Asia still has the highest proportion of malnourished children in the world. Maternal mortality ratio rose to 510 per 100,000 in 2004 from 430 per 100,000 in 1993-94.

The urban societies are much more difficult to govern than the rural ones. The fast urbanization, coupled with inadequate investment and management, is multiplying the enduring urban problems. A recent study by

Johannes F. Linn of the Brookings Institute highlights the urban issues confronted by the developing countries including those of South Asia. Linn compared the current situation with the year 1979. He presented his findings in a matrix format which categorized the new issues, the old issues rediscovered, and the old issues that seem to have forgotten. (see Annex). He argues that today's situation has become much more complex as large numbers of urban challenges have cropped up over the last 32 years. They range from a greater focus on the spatial dimensions of urban poverty, particularly on slums, to new definitions of urban poverty and inequality; to problems faced by specific demographic groups to crime and insecurity; to the impact of global challenges; and to governance and political economy.<sup>(13)</sup>

Above all is the issue of rising urban poverty and underserved settlements. The ungoverned migration is the primary factor contributing to the rise of urban poverty and slums. According to International Housing Coalition IHC<sup>(14)</sup> estimate, there are about one billion people living in slums in the developing world including South Asia and their numbers are constantly on the rise. The slum population is projected to increase to 2085 million by 2030; this huge population will multiply the housing as well as basic infrastructure and services needs. The magnitude of this slum challenge is even higher than other challenges. According to Asian Cities Report, 2010-2011, about 40 to 60 per cent of the region's population living in cities and towns do not have access to tap water and nearly 60 per cent urban households lack sanitary facilities. The report also reveals that slums account for nearly half (42.9 per cent) of urban population in South Asia; Nepal 69 per cent, Bangladesh 69 per cent, Pakistan 47 per cent and India nearly 50 per cent.

**Table 4**

**Comparative Urban Poverty Estimates (South Asia and the World)**

Region World Bank definition	Urban Population (%) Below Poverty Line \$2 a day	Poor living in Urban Areas (%)
East Asia-Pacific	18	15
Europe- Central Asia	11	10
Latin America	28	66
Middle East- North Africa	12	29
South Asia	76	25
Sub-Saharan Africa	68	31
Total	34	26


Source: "The Challenge for an Urban World", IHC Report

The emergence of slums in mega cities shows the incompetence and poor governance on behalf of the South Asian countries. In this region, the proportion of urban people living with shelter deprivation is highest in the world excepting Sub-Saharan Africa. (See figure 1). Slums are the most visible manifestation of urban poverty and reveal the failure of urban development and housing policies. In Colombo, Sri Lanka's capital, home to 30 per cent of entire country's population, one in every two people is a slum dweller. Dhaka,

Bangladesh' capital, home to 34 per cent of the total population, around 40 per cent are slum dwellers. In India, 93 million people are estimated to be living in slums. In Delhi, around 50 per cent of the population lives in slums. The situation in Mumbai is even worse where around 60 per cent of the total city population is slum dweller.<sup>(15)</sup> These overcrowded, highly vulnerable and self-regulated slums are faced with acute problems of sanitation and drainage, safe drinking water and health. The majority of migrated people, particularly from the poor and low-income class, is living in informal settlements in cities. These informal settlements are often built in high risky areas such as steep hill slopes, deep gullies and flood-prone areas and completely unable to withstand the effects of extreme weather conditions. For instance, in Mumbai alone, home to some 20 million people, around 7 million people live in 3000 slums across the city, having grabbed public lands. These slums often thwart vital infrastructure construction such as roads, railway tracks, airports, storm-water drains, and markets.<sup>(16)</sup> Besides these slums, progress in managing urban water and sanitation in the region is highly unsatisfactory.

**Figure 1**

**Proportion of Urban Living with Shelter Deprivation: A comparative View**



Source: United Nations, 2009

No city in India has round-the-clock supply of water, which is limited to some hours of access per day and, in some cases, alternate day access. In the case of sanitation, the national average for sewerage network coverage is only

33 per cent with some states receiving virtually no service.<sup>(17)</sup> Although 300 urban centres have sewerage systems, most of these only partially cover their estimates based on UN population forecasts. More than one third of the urban population relies on unhygienic tanks as a form of sanitation. Additionally, sewage treatment facilities exist in only 70 cities and the services are rudimentary at best. The existing level of solid waste management is similarly dismal. There is no public system of waste collection from the source in Indian cities. Consequently, street sweeping of waste has become the primary de facto method of waste collection. Furthermore, barring a few exceptions, there are no sanitary landfills in India, posing serious public health and environmental concerns. Uncovered solid waste is instead dumped haphazardly within or outside cities.<sup>(18)</sup>

In Pakistan, owing to inadequate investment and management, the quality of urban infrastructure has deteriorated. Less than one per cent of water-waste is being treated; the rest is thrown into streams and rivers turning them into sewers and seriously affecting downstream users. The city governments remain unable to recover and dispose of all the solid waste. Less than 50 per cent of the solid waste generated in the cities is being recovered. The rest is dumped mostly in open fields, polluting the groundwater and creating air pollution.<sup>(19)</sup> In Bangladesh, over six million of the urban population have no access to drinking water from an improved source. Urban sanitation too has remained a serious problem in all cities and towns. Local flooding occur frequently and is a constant threat. Drainage works are insufficient, which leads to waterlogging and water pollution. Raw sewage and industrial pollutants continue to be discharged into the rivers and contaminate groundwater and ponds. A serious garbage pollution is also a serious problem, with garbage collection just beginning to be organized. Urban solid waste management is mostly absent.<sup>(20)</sup>

Another problem plaguing South Asian cities is the overcrowded network of public transport. The growing vehicle utilization has resulted in increasing traffic congestion, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and deteriorating air quality, particularly damaging at street level where people live and work, including the poor and vulnerable groups such as the young and the elderly who have limited mobility. Ranjan Kumar's paper on urban transport vis-à-vis South Asia says that the fast urbanization and even faster growth in motor vehicle ownership and utilization have exerted heavy pressure on the urban transport system in South Asian cities. One noticeable feature about the growth of vehicles in virtually all cities in the region is the explosion in the number of two-wheelers (motorcycles and scooters), cars, and three-wheeled auto-rickshaws. Admittedly, the motorization revolution has brought immense benefits; it has remarkably enhanced mobility of people, goods, and services and consequently helped boost economic progress. However, such revolution has not been without deleterious effects. The switch from two-wheelers to cars and multi-utility vehicles has triggered a sharp increase in energy consumption, pollution, road space demand, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Even though the local impacts are serious, there are significant implications for global issues such as energy

security and climate change.<sup>(21)</sup> The study also projects that motor vehicle use particularly in Bangalore, Colombo and Dhaka would roughly be doubled by the year 2020, carbon emissions would triple and pollution loading would increase exponentially.<sup>(22)</sup> In global terms, the whole region accounts for nearly 7 per cent of the world total CO<sub>2</sub> emission and the level of emissions is constantly on the rise. Beside carbon dioxide, pollutants of main concerns are particulate matter, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons. The climate change, on the other hand, is serious concern in urban development discourse.

The intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is apprehensive that climate change would affect the urban population more through rising sea levels, increased hazards from tropical cyclones, flooding, landslides, heat and cold waves, as well as challenges of urban water quality and storage.<sup>(23)</sup> Cities around the coastlines are more under threat from extreme weather events. If the sea levels rises a bit, say just one metre, many large cities such as Karachi, Mumbai and Dhaka will be threatened.<sup>(24)</sup> As for Sri Lanka, many of its cities are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Floods, landslides, coastal erosion, drought, and cyclones are the main hazards in which flooding is the most recurrent one. In 2010–11, Sri Lanka had four major floods in less than a year. In May 2010, flooding hit 672,000 people in southern and western Sri Lanka, leaving 22 killed and about 900 homes damaged. In November the same year, the densely populated western plains had their second flood in less than six months, affecting more than 315,000 people. In January and February 2011, low-lying areas on the eastern coast saw the worst flooding yet, as torrential rain forced more than 1.2 million people from their homes.<sup>(25)</sup> Besides addressing the challenge of poor water and sanitation and basic infrastructures in slums, the South Asian governments require to deal with the long-term risks arising out of climate change.

### **The way forward**

The South Asian governments direly need to invest in basic infrastructure otherwise the goal of integrated economic growth can never be achieved. Moreover, if urban slums are left ungoverned, they would become more and more threatening to national and international security, health and environmental sustainability. Governments must learn from other countries' experiences. For instance, the Foshan city of China successfully implemented a development strategy for urban infrastructure; the Kaantabay sa Kauswagan, a result-oriented Urban Poor Programme in Naga city, and Cebu Urban Basic Services Programme of Philippines; and effective waste reduction strategy of Inchon, Korea. The international community's assistance in both financial and technical terms is highly appreciable. Numerous foreign-supported projects are underway for addressing overwhelming urban development challenges. However, the ultimate responsibility lies upon the South Asian governments to provide their best.

In a framework of good governance, the maximum participation by the people needs to be ensured. In this regard, decentralization of power is one tool among others. It can shift real power, legislative, financial and administrative,

from the bureaucracy and narrow interest groups to the people.<sup>(26)</sup> Quality of governance could be improved if governance is brought closer to the governed. In South Asia, despite advances both in terms of devolution and delegation, the local government system is generally weak. Its effectiveness right down from district to the village level is compromised owing to its dependence on the province, even the centre, for resources. The local government system lacks managerial expertise, appropriate knowledge and information and resources to perform within their domain. Approaches to decentralization usually come only in the delegation of some administrative functions, and often tend to be declaratory in nature or are implemented with no great determination. Apart from reluctance over power delegation, governments of South Asia, given the nature of ethnic, religious and regional variety of their countries, seem to fear that decentralization may smooth the path for centrifugal forces or secessionist movements.<sup>(27)</sup> The problem lies in dealing with these forces not in the system at all. Moreover, the system of good governance cannot be completed without the accountability of elected representative. Government institutions, private sectors and civil society organizations, all must be accountable to the public and their respective institutional stakeholders.<sup>(28)</sup> Unfortunately, South Asia continues to carry its imperial legacy where the government was not answerable to the people but to the colonial power.<sup>(29)</sup>

Urban development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, and hence requires a multi-dimensional approach. The following are some key suggestions that should be taken into account in policy formulation vis-à-vis urban development.

- The primary focus should be on improving infrastructures to stop the rise of urban slums.
- Improving slums must be a part of city development plans.
- Improving the already weak infrastructure instead of just focusing on building new mega structures. This is a great South Asian dilemma. City planners tend to ignore proper management of the already built infrastructure; often there is a heap of wastage and drainage mess adjacent to the new buildings.
- There must be proper land and housing development to ensure improved urban conditions.
- Ensuring social safety nets.
- Decentralization, if it gets implemented in its true sense, can serve as one of the chief instruments of people's participation for advancing development and inclusive growth. For effective management, it is essential to grant adequate powers and responsibilities to the local governments
- Improving the law and order situation and ensuring justice on equitable basis.
- Making sure easy access to safe drinking water, health, sanitation and education facilities.



- Ensuring safety measures for the highly vulnerable urban areas.
- Altering city development planning in the context of climate change.

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***Annexure***

	<b>Challenges</b>
New Issues	Slums and MDG Target 11 (urban poverty related)
	Poverty and Inequality
	Gender perspective/Women (urban poverty related)
	Early Child Development/Youth/Old Age (urban poverty related)
	Crime and insecurity
	HIV/AIDS
	Climate Change (CC) mitigation and adaptation
	Compound global crisis (financial, food, energy)
	Cultural heritage preservation
	Governance (supply and demand driven)
	Political economy of urban policy
Old Issues Revised	
	Urbanization as an opportunity (as well as problem)
	Scaling up
	Urban land management
	Urban housing finance
	Investment climate
	Employment and labour market
Old Issues Forgotten	
	Managing urban transport/automobiles
	Small and medium city development

**Source:** Adapted from Linn's paper "Urban Poverty in Developing Countries"

# **SRBMs, DETERRENCE AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF NASR AND PRAHAAR**

**ZAHIR KAZMI**

## **Introduction**

During the times of crises, Indian and Pakistani leaders have claimed that their countries eschew nuclear “war-fighting,”<sup>(1)</sup> implying that their nuclear weapons are meant only for deterrence. Hence, Pakistani and Indian policy to develop short-range ballistic missiles, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or non-strategic weapons, raises the question whether it is a volte-face. The Western retrospective thinking of the Cold War holds that short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are the sinews for nuclear war fighting whereas the so-called strategic nuclear weapons have just the opposite function. Pakistan flight-tested Hatf-IX — Nasr (victory)<sup>(2)</sup> on 19 April 2011 and some considered it provocative.<sup>(3)</sup> Three months later, India unveiled Prahhaar<sup>(4)</sup> (strike) through a flight test on 21 July 2011 but the debate remained muted. Consequently, several questions have come to the fore, which are either partly explained or left unanswered. What prompted Pakistan and India to develop the short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles?<sup>(5)</sup> If India enjoys conventional supremacy to “draw out [a] war and eviscerate Pakistani military capabilities,”<sup>(6)</sup> why would it secretly develop Prahhaar for almost two years and react to the Nasr test within three months? How would the SRBMs affect deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia? Is the South Asian situation similar to the Cold War competition involving the TNWs, which has hitherto dragged on between Russia and the US?

This paper attempts to answer these questions by offering and validating the South Asian perspective as an alternative. For instance, the notion

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that nuclear weapons can be ‘tactical’ or non-strategic would be challenged.<sup>(7)</sup> In the first part, a detailed profile of Nasr and Prahaar weapon systems has been given. The content analysis of available information on Nasr and Prahaar offers some unique inferences about the developmental trajectories, technological limitations, technological spin-offs, and command and control issues regarding these weapons. For instance, while Pakistan may exercise assertive control over deployment and employment of Nasr, analysis indicates that India may exercise delegative control over Prahaar, thereby increasing the possibility of inadvertent or unauthorised use.

In the second part of the paper, an attempt is made to establish the impact of these SRBMs on deterrence and regional stability. The assessment is based on the causal relationship of short-range ballistic missiles with deterrence and regional stability variables, using the assumptions of deterrence and rational choice theory. Effects of South Asian politics, economic factor and military developments on deterrence and strategic stability have been debated in detail.

### **Profiling Nasr and Prahaar**

This part is a collection of declared specifications and assessments made on Nasr and Prahaar ballistic missile systems. A technical and technological assessment of these systems would assist in ascertaining their effect on the stability of deterrence between Pakistan and India. Incidentally, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate issued a prompt, short and rather ambiguous press release after the first flight test of Nasr. In obvious contrast, India flight-tested Prahaar on 21 July 2011 and a delayed, though less ambiguous, official statement appeared on the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) website in August 2011. Other details on the test were, however, instantly available in the Indian media. This degree of ambiguity about the results of missile flight-tests is understandable as the states do it to maintain technological advantage and to hide operational details that might reveal the trajectory of progress.

Experts were quick to amplify the officially released information on the Nasr flight-test to make technical and other assessments. While Nasr remains in the spotlight, there was muted response or analysis on the implications of the Prahaar test. The Western assessments on Nasr carried strains of disbelief in the technological feat of miniaturising a warhead that could fit into a missile of about 300-mm diameter. Since primary sources and academic work on Nasr and Prahaar is scant, all available information has been considered for a swift content analysis of both weapon systems. Appendix I provides a comparative chart of the technical specifications of the two missiles.

### **The Nasr**

Soon after the Nasr test, Rodney Jones, the noted US expert, made a comprehensive analysis about its implications. The ISPR Press release and Jones’ assessment have been compared below. Rodney Jones wrote:

Pakistan has either developed or acquired nuclear warheads small enough to fit inside [a thin 300-mm diameter missile] and possibly of relatively low-yield [warhead]... Pakistan probably produced significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium only after the May 1998 tests and has not test-detonated any weapons systems since then. Hence, the Army would be averse to using untested weapons...Making a plutonium-based implosion device for a 300 mm diameter missile would be a real feat.<sup>(8)</sup>

The above assessment is circumspect about Pakistan's capability to miniaturise the warheads and might imply that the weapon system could be a bluff and the army would resist its induction at the operational level. These aspects have been addressed in the following paragraphs. The ISPR's partly ambiguous press release on the Nasr test<sup>(9)</sup> offers various points of analysis. It reads:

Pakistan today successfully conducted the 1<sup>st</sup> flight test of the newly developed Short Range Surface to Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf-IX (NASR). The missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan's Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges. NASR, with a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes. This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats.

The test was witnessed by [DG SPD], Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Chairman National Engineering and Science Commission (NESCOM) Mr Irfan Burney, senior officers from the strategic forces, scientists and engineers of strategic organisations.

On this occasion, the [DG SPD], Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said that the test was a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of threat spectrum. He said in the hierarchy of military operations, the NASR weapon system now provides Pakistan with short-range missile capability in addition to the medium and long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.

The successful test has also been warmly appreciated by the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, who have congratulated the scientists and engineers on their outstanding success.<sup>(10)</sup>

If the available information on Nasr is analysed in the backdrop of Pakistan's cold and hot tests of nuclear weapons in March 1983 and in May 1998, seven important inferences can be made.

One, the extent of missile's accuracy cannot be ascertained since the circular-error-probable has not been publicised and the statement only identifies that the missile is "highly accurate." This ambiguity looks pronounced once compared to similar information about Prahaar. There is also no information about what kind of navigation system has been used in Nasr. If Nasr can carry a

nuclear warhead of “appropriate yield,”<sup>(11)</sup> accuracy becomes a secondary issue. The explosive and destructive power of nuclear weapons would compensate for accuracy. Use of the word “appropriate” in the press statement appears deliberate. The yield can also indicate the type of device tested, i.e. plutonium- or uranium-based, or a device that is a combination of the two, with added tritium. The information available immediately after Pakistan’s 28 May 1998 tests gave a combined yield of devices at 40 kilotons only.<sup>(12)</sup> Likewise, the device tested on 30 May 1998 was of 12 kilotons yield, which indicates that it would have been a boosted fission device that used a mix of uranium, plutonium and tritium.

Two, emphasis that it was the “first flight test,”<sup>(13)</sup> indicates the desirability of more tests to further improve accuracy and validate other design parameters. While Nasr’s flight parameters can be improved, the yield and other technical parameters of the nuclear warhead can only be effectively validated through hot testing.

Three, out of the six tests on 28 and 30 May 1998, four were reported to be of sub-kiloton yield.<sup>(14)</sup> This shows that Pakistan had kept its options of making all genres of nuclear weapons – including the low-yield warheads – open. That said, the desirability of hot-testing of warheads and missiles should not be ruled out. While Pakistan continues to flight-test its missiles, it remains to be seen how it would develop appropriate and reliable warheads for each delivery system without further testing. It may be recalled that even after conducting 1032 tests and having developed other means to test reliability of warheads, the US is still reluctant to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as it may need more testing.<sup>(15)</sup>

Four, notwithstanding the sceptical view that Pakistan could not achieve technological mastery of miniaturising the warheads to fit a short-range ballistic missile, there are indicators that it had cold-tested<sup>(16)</sup> and then hot-tested such state-of-the-art warheads by 1998.<sup>(17)</sup> Almost 14 years on, it might be safe to assume that Pakistan would have developed highly sophisticated plutonium-based warhead designs to suit [short-range ballistic missiles].

Five, the above arguments lead to the issue of employment, as to when, if at all, and which land forces would induct Nasr. As Rodney Jones alluded to the fact in the above-cited article, the militaries are usually cautious about inducting weapons without proven reliability. Hence, if they forego hot tests to validate the reliability of low-yield warheads for Nasr, the land forces would opt for a series of flight tests in all probability. Nasr would most likely become Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command (ASFC) asset. As indicated in the press statement, only the senior members of the “strategic forces”<sup>(18)</sup> were present to witness the flight test. An implication of Nasr going to ASFC could be that Pakistan would exercise assertive control over short-range ballistic missiles and would preclude the likelihood of pre-delegation. Though, assertive control would be a factor of stability, it would create the attendant ‘use them or

lose them' dilemma that Pakistan will have to delicately balance by further augmenting the delivery system survivability.

Six, since Nasr is mounted atop the AR1A/A100-E Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), it was presumed to be of 300-mm (11.8-inch) diameter.<sup>(19)</sup> The MLRS is a two-round system believed to be carried atop Chinese-origin 8x8 high-mobility truck chassis. Its shoot and scoot attributes mean that the launchers can quickly fire (shoot) and change location (scoot) to avoid counter-targeting.<sup>(20)</sup> Rodney Jones thinks:

This system is probably a four-tube<sup>(21)</sup> adaptation of a Chinese-design [MLRS], possibly the A-100 type, on an eight-wheeler truck, capable of carrying four, ready-to-fire 20-foot ballistic missiles of about 300 mm (11.8-inch) diameter...The truck-launcher otherwise may be a Chinese knock-off of the Russian 300 mm Smerch [MLRS] sold to India.<sup>(22)</sup>

Seven, stretching the idea of miniaturising further, some analysts have contemplated that Pakistan could now forge ahead to make multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) for ballistic missiles, make submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or re-model these to fit the torpedo bays of existing submarines and improve the cruise missiles designs.

### **The Prahaar**

Unlike Pakistan's prompt press statement, within hours of flight-test, Indian official and measured stance appeared on the DRDO website a month after the test.<sup>(23)</sup> Before that, the Indian media carried excerpts of the statements made by Dr. VK Saraswat, DG, DRDO, and other unnamed scientists. By then several experts had vented all their intellectual steam against Nasr's test and were probably not inclined to critically evaluate Prahaar by reconsidering their expressed positions. A gist of the DRDO statement and other statements on Prahaar is given below:

DG Indian Artillery also witnessed the test besides others. Developed in a short span of less than two years – support from Indian industry and quality assurance agency MSQAA...will be the battlefield support system for the Indian Army: cost-effective, quick reaction, all weather, all terrain, and highly accurate battlefield support tactical system...Diameter 420 mm...length 7.3 meter...Range 150 km...apogee 35 km...time of flight 4 minutes and 10 seconds...weight 1280 kg...single-stage solid propulsion system...payload 200 kg (carries different types of warheads...terminal accuracy is <10m (high accuracy navigation, guidance, and electromechanical actuation systems, latest onboard computers)<sup>(24)</sup> ...the road mobile system carries 6 missiles at a time...can fire a salvo in all directions covering entire azimuth plane.<sup>(25)</sup>

Some additional information that appeared in the media coverage immediately after the flight test is also worth noting. Prahaar "has high



[manoeuvrability] and [an] excellent impact accuracy."<sup>(26)</sup> The missile has a quick reaction time of launch “within a few minutes.”<sup>(27)</sup> Dr. Saraswat, who is also scientific adviser to the Indian defence minister, said:

It is an all-weather missile that can be launched from canisters. Since it can be fired from a road mobile launcher, it can be quickly transported to different places. It can be deployed in various kinds of terrain such as snow-bound areas or jungles...after a couple of more flights; we will be ready for production.<sup>(28)</sup>

The short-range missile would fill the gap “between unguided multi-barrel rocket system Pinaka with 40 km range and guided missiles like Prithvi, which can strike at 250 km to 350 km range.”<sup>(29)</sup>

Related news items reflected that the Prahhaar system “can tackle multiple targets and allows a mix of different kinds of missiles to be used from a single launcher.”<sup>(30)</sup> “Prahhaar can hit a target 50-150 [kilometres] away,” read the short report in the *Economic Times*.<sup>(31)</sup> The available information on the flight test of Prahhaar leads to seven main inferences:

One, since the Director-General (DG) Indian Artillery — Lt Gen Vinod Nayanar — was specially mentioned in the statement,<sup>(32)</sup> it indicates that Prahhaar may be inducted into the Indian army’s field artillery formations. That opens the inherently risky proposition of this weapon system’s control falling into the hands of junior commanders, delegative command and control and associated risks of inadvertent or unauthorised use. While the concern over command and control risks regarding Nasr remained exaggerated, surprisingly, no analyst has referred to such an obvious risk relating to Prahhaar.<sup>(33)</sup>

Two, the DRDO worked in complete secrecy and in collaboration with the national industry for almost two years, which shows effective civil-military-industrial synergy and cooperation. More importantly, the development time span clearly shows that India did not develop Prahhaar as a reaction to Nasr. India was already developing its short-range ballistic missile even if Pakistan’s Nasr had not come to the fore. The flight test on 21 July 2011 – three months after Nasr – also suggests that development of Prahhaar was not at a very successful or advanced stage. The flight test was initially planned on 18 July but was delayed till 21<sup>st</sup>, probably due to technical reasons. The video footage of the test shows that the flight test was done on an overcast day,<sup>(34)</sup> thus precluding the option of not testing on 18 July due to weather limitation. Like Prithvi I (liquid-fuel missile), Prahhaar (solid fuel) may still have technical glitches to overcome.

Three, since the missile has a maximum range of 150 kilometres and can be deployed even in snow-bound areas or jungles; it can also be deployed against China. If deployed against its 3,380-kilometres<sup>(35)</sup> border with China, it may provoke Beijing and add to the arms race in short-range ballistic missiles too. If India decides to deploy Prahhaar against China, it would require a large number of missiles. It will, nevertheless, have sufficient fissile material to make the required number of warheads — thanks to the pressure relieved on its domestic sources by several civil nuclear energy cooperation deals as well as the

'recently discovered'<sup>(36)</sup> uranium mines in Andhra Pradesh that started production in December 2011.

Four, due to Pakistan's geographical shape, Prahaar can engage both counter-force and counter-value targets. Likewise, Prahaar's range is identical to Prithvi-I. Hence, it can be argued that Prahaar is a solid-fuel-Prithvi I.

Five, since the missile can be launched within a few minutes, it would give the Indian forces good reaction time and quick launch options. If India decides to delegate the control to junior leaders in the battlefield, it will further telescope the decision time and the senior leadership will have little time to reverse the decision.

Six, though the Prahaar weapon system allows a mix of different kinds of missiles to be used from a single launcher, only one missile was fired on 21 July. Hence, more tests would be required to check weapon systems' performance once all missiles are simultaneously fired in multiple directions. The reason that some DRDO scientists suggest attempts to reduce the missile-weight points that launcher will be more manoeuvrable once the load is reduced.

Seven, Dr. Saraswat was intentionally vague about the time Prahaar would reach the production-ready status. If the timeline of the induction of Prithvi-I missile is any guide, it may take up to seven years before Prahaar is actually handed over to the ground forces.<sup>(37)</sup> Given the complexities involved in developing multi-barrel capability, Prahaar would take even longer than Prithvi-I.

Seven, specifying minimum range as 50 kilometres is significant in the sense that a vertically fired missile can fall back at the launch site too. This becomes more important as some Indian missiles have failed at launch in the past. The 50-km minimum limit could be interpreted that the system would be deployed in a way that it is 80-100 kilometres away from the target. Besides, the 50-km limit also indicates the safety distance that would be kept between the Indian troops and the ground zero of the very low-yield explosion.

This argument can be extended to ascertain the yield of warhead and device type. The warhead for Prahaar-type SRBMs can be an enhanced radiation (neutron) bomb. This can be understood from the excerpt of an online source, which offers the following information on the yield and destruction capacity of a 0.01-kiloton bomb:

The smallest warhead at present capable of providing significant tactical effort is .01 KT (10 tons). Deriving its effect from neutron and gamma radiation it produces loss of co-ordination in 1 minute (death in 36 hours) against troops in the open up to a distance of approximately of 70 yards. It can be fired with safety at a distance of 600 yards from our own troops.

At 1 KT (1000 tons) the same effect as above can be sustained up to a radius of nearly 400 yards while the safety distance increases to 1,500 yards.<sup>(38)</sup>

If the information on minimum range is juxtaposed to Prahaar, it can be inferred that India may be using neutron bombs atop Prahaar missile – which

would leave the structures intact and kill only the humans within 36 hours and keep the effects localised. It may be recalled that the US reversed its development of neutron bombs because there were protests over their employment in Europe — these would kill humans and retain the structures.<sup>(39)</sup> A high-energy neutron warhead (atop) Prahaar would theoretically allow India to use it against mechanised forces in an area the Indian forces would want to use for further ingress into Pakistani territory. A fission bomb, due to its blast effect, would render the territory impassable.

### **Deterrence, strategic stability and SRBMs**

This part first provides the theoretical framework regarding the effect of short-range ballistic missiles on deterrence and stability in South Asia. It begins with operationalizing and testing two vague terms – TNWs<sup>(40)</sup> and strategic stability.<sup>(41)</sup> Thereafter, an attempt is made to establish a correlation of deterrence and strategic stability against political, economic and military factors peculiar to South Asia. While this causal relationship is identified between these complex and intertwined factors, the impact of SRBMs — like Nasr and Prahaar — on these factors has been dovetailed into the discussion. This analysis has also been tabulated for a bird's eye view in Appendix II.

The analysis in this part suggests that the Western categorisation of nuclear weapons into tactical (non-strategic) and strategic realms is inadequate, especially in the South Asian environment. Secondly, the so-called TNWs can add to credibility of deterrence if the will-to-use is unequivocally communicated to the adversary. Short-range ballistic missiles affect the strategic stability once a causal relationship is established with the military factors. If history is any guideline and assuming that both India and Pakistan behave as rational actors, then it is likely that SRBMs would only be used as a last resort. By way of causal relationship of likely impacts of these missiles on deterrence, it has been re-established that an assured second-strike capability would enhance the credibility of deterrence amongst these two rational actors. As mentioned in the first part, it may take up to seven years to induct Prahaar and Nasr into the land forces due to production and technical imperatives. The South Asian SRBMs would thus start affecting deterrence and regional stability around 2018 and by that time the new war fighting doctrines of India and Pakistan would also mature. Until then the existing regional dynamics in political, economic and military domains could continue to define the security landscape.

### **Definitional issues**

Given that there is no standard definition of TNWs,<sup>(42)</sup> this paper offers an argument that what constitutes tactical or non-strategic in Western terms does not hold for South Asia, for several reasons. From the Western perspective, the so-called TNWs could be defined as short-range (from as less as 2-4 kilometres<sup>(43)</sup> to a maximum up to 500 kms),<sup>(44)</sup> low-yield weapons (0.4 - 40 kilotons to a maximum of 150 kilotons)<sup>(45)</sup> meant for counter-force targeting in

the battlefield. These can be both surface- — ballistic and cruise — and air-launched weapons.

Available literature on the so-called TNWs shows that the differentiation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is blurred and primarily rooted in American endeavour aiming to target Soviet/Russian mainland and its extended deterrence commitment to the European NATO allies.<sup>(46)</sup> Range, and not the yield, would thus be the primary factor in deciding what constitutes a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in the Cold War parlance. This implies that any weapon that could reach and hit American mainland would have ‘strategic’ effects and would be classified as a strategic weapon. If a weapon remained within the European battleground it could both be tactical or strategic.

“The distinction between what is tactical and what is strategic [is becoming] increasingly vague,” infers a 2010 study by The National Defence University (NDU), Washington, DC.<sup>(47)</sup> This could be illustrated by Israel’s example where one-third of the population is under the threat of tactical ballistic missiles from regional adversaries. Hence, “those tactical missiles are a strategic threat.”<sup>(48)</sup>

Translating these definitional nuances of TNWs to South Asia, the following inferences can be drawn. Unlike the East-West proxy battlegrounds in Europe, which were geographically detached from the American and Soviet/Russian mainland, Pakistan and India have contiguous borders. Several cities and towns along the border and the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir would be within Prahhaar as well as Nasr’s range. Since India cites China as one of its security concerns, it could deploy Prahhaar against it. Contiguous South Asian territory implies that the Indians could easily hit Lahore by Prahhaar. Hence, the range and yield distinction used for SRBMs in a classic sense, would be irrelevant if Prahhaar was used against Pakistan close to the border or LoC.

Hence, if the South Asians are forced to believe that their under-development SRBMs are theatre nuclear weapons in strictly Western sense, only a Kafkaesque definition comes up: Short-range ballistic missiles in 50-150 km range, with a maximum yield of 5 KT that would primarily target armed forces and affect only small border towns in desert terrain.

It is obvious such fine distinction cannot be maintained for the SRBMs. Theoretically, all nuclear weapons in South Asian territory would be strategic because they would have strategic effect in terms of damage, number of casualties, radiation fallout as well as the administrative and logistical challenges long after the weapons have been used.<sup>(49)</sup> This does not factor-in in the dramatic consequences of larger yield weapons, if war escalates to an all-out nuclear exchange. That might be the reason why Pakistan and India did not use the term TNW in their statements for their short-range ballistic missiles. The TNW moniker appeared in the Western analyses and was conveniently bought by experts in South Asia.

### **Theoretical paradigms**

Deterrence theory provides the overarching framework to test the impact of SRBMs on the bilateral deterrence relationship and regional stability

between Pakistan and India. However, two aspects related to the deterrence theory are more applicable to South Asia. These are “credible, minimum deterrence”<sup>(50)</sup> policy and the “stability-instability paradox.” The stability-instability paradox means that the probability of a direct war between two nuclear-armed states greatly decreases due to these weapons, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases.<sup>(51)</sup>

Both India and Pakistan essentially profess a policy of minimum deterrence. The adjective ‘credible’ is used either before or after “minimum” without a comma, hence creating an impression that there is either a doubt in the ‘credibility’ or in the ‘minimum’ nature of deterrence. “Credibility”, Freedman once observed, “is the ‘magic ingredient’ of deterrence.”<sup>(52)</sup> The emphasis on ‘credibility’ is unique to South Asian nuclear powers. The nuance was probably invented to communicate to each other and to the older nuclear powers the ‘credibility’ of their will to use weapons. As and when the South Asians enhance their nuclear weapons capability to deliver an assured second strike, the word ‘credible’ might eventually fade away.

### **Assessing deterrence and strategic stability**

In a classic sense, deterrence is ‘absence of war’ and a stable condition. Over 65 years of the nuclear age shows that it would be impossible to validate that nuclear weapons prevent war.<sup>(53)</sup> From South Asian perspective, the Kargil War of 1999 is a unique example in which two nuclear-armed states fought a limited war yet were deterred from using nuclear weapons. Hence ‘absence of nuclear war’ would realistically define the environment to judge stability in South Asia.<sup>(54)</sup> However, accepting the fact that nuclear weapons only prevent a nuclear war creates the stability-instability paradox. Hence it would be difficult to quantify what constitutes deterrence and strategic stability between Pakistan and India and what role would their so-called TNWs play.

In this paper, deterrence would constitute absence of nuclear war and it is assumed that deterrence would hold if both Pakistan and India develop an assured second-strike capability. It is difficult to quantify strategic stability because the literature on this variable is vague and concerns East-West competition from the Cold War period to this day.<sup>(55)</sup>

For South Asia, strategic stability would be a situation between South Asian nuclear powers, in which Pakistan has the confidence that India is serious in resolving the territorial disputes and that Indian strategic partnerships with the developed world are not at the cost of Pakistan’s security. Likewise, India’s confidence in Pakistan’s willingness to resolve bilateral disputes without alleged indirect strategy. The paper attempts to test both variables in the subsequent sections.

### **Factors affecting deterrence and stability**

Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, in his seminal work, has addressed the nature of South Asian deterrence at length. He argues that Pakistani officials and analysts claim that an elementary form of nuclear deterrence between India and


Pakistan has been operative since 1988.<sup>(56)</sup> He identifies six factors that contribute to instability in deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan. These are: existence of outstanding disputes, existence of low-intensity conflict, occasional outbreak of crises and conflict situations, geographic proximity and [low] early warning time and divergent perceptions about nuclear and security doctrines.<sup>(57)</sup> The following section amplifies these findings, links these with the perceptions of other experts and seeks to establish correlation with the TNWs.

### Correlation of SRBMs, deterrence and regional stability

The development-time of Nasr and Prahaar would be the first factor that would affect deterrence and stability in South Asia. As analysed earlier, Prithvi-I's development and induction took almost seven years. Both India and Pakistan have not tested their weapon systems in salvo-firing role. Additionally, India has indicated that it intends reducing the weight of Prahaar. Depending on how many units ultimately get these SRBMs missiles, the numbers of weapons needed would be certainly more than the medium-range missiles in the current inventories.

During this period three other factors would continue to influence the future of deterrence and stability in South Asia. These can be broadly classified into political, economic and military factors and can be tested against the 'Three Cs' — capability, credibility, and communication — of deterrence. It is worth noting that these factors have no absolute value and impinge on and interact with each other in complex ways. (See the figure below).

**Figure I:**  
**Factors Affecting Deterrence and Strategic Stability**



### Impact of political factors

A segment of British strategic thinkers considers the need to change status quo and resolution of political grievances underlying conflict as significant for stability. India-Pakistan animus over territorial issues falls in that category of regional instability. Hanwee et al argue that during a crisis the leadership would face the dilemma of maintaining a balance between assertive

and delegative control over nuclear weapons. An assertive control could be fatal and a delegative control irreversible, thus destabilising.<sup>(58)</sup> To achieve political stability, they suggest steps beyond “freezing the status quo”<sup>(59)</sup> with the following argument:

An enduring political stability... must allow for the resolution of grievances and conflicts by changes to forms of political organisation and ultimately to the boundaries and legitimacy of current nation-states. But while states hold each other under threat with nuclear weapons, it is hard to see how such change could take place. This system of stability, in other words, may be self-defeating.

The political stability between Pakistan and India rests on three territorial disputes (future of Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek). These apparently ‘territorial’ issues are really about water. J&K and glaciers including Siachen are a source of water for the entire subcontinent and Sir Creek’s small territorial boundary has implications on marking of exclusive economic zone. From Pakistani perspective, Indian ingress in Afghanistan and alleged involvement in fanning instability in Balochistan and elsewhere would be of particular concern. Likewise, for India the prospect of a Mumbai-II and alleged militant activities in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) would compel it to operationalize its Proactive Defence Strategy. The prospect of limited war would, in turn, induce Pakistan to ostensibly rely on short-range ballistic missiles. India would also feel justified to continue to develop Prahara to balance Pakistan’s capability. Interestingly, India eschewed (the so-called) TNWs earlier.<sup>(60)</sup>

Weighed against the Three Cs of deterrence and the rational behaviour of both states during the post-Kargil crisis, the credibility of nuclear deterrence would hold. The communication of willingness to use nuclear weapons would continue as well. While hiatus over these long-standing disputes may exist, the likely wild card would be a terrorist activity in Pakistan or India that the affected side would view the other to have given covert state-patronage. In that case the crisis behaviour of both states and ensuing instability would be difficult to predict.

Hence, from the political perspective, development of SRBMs would have little impact on deterrence and regional stability, at least until 2018. Once Prahara and Nasr have been commissioned in the land forces, the risk of a nuclear exchange during a crisis would only enhance if either side considers the other’s willingness to use these weapons a bluff. It can be argued that the domestic political stability indirectly contributes to regional and strategic stability.

### **Impact of economic factors**

The international media’s spotlight on Pakistan has three hues: domestic instability due to militancy, proliferation record and the dismal economic situation. In marked contrast, India’s internal instability and its proliferation record — that is the mother of nuclear proliferation in South Asia



— is overlooked by the West because India has a buoyant economy and it is a haven for investors. The Western experts consider “India has an interest in regional as well as domestic stability and space to maximise its economic growth,”<sup>(61)</sup> implying that Pakistan has marginal interest in regional stability.

The Aman ki Aasha (Hope for Peace) joint initiative by Pakistan’s *Jang Group* and *Times of India* holds that economy has a *Yin-Yang* relationship with strategic stability in South Asia.<sup>(62)</sup> In their view, if Pakistan and India develop their trade and economic relations, mutual interests could become serious incentives for peace and friendship and a point may arrive that they have a serious disincentive in starting or escalating crises. The Cold War history shows some merit in economic factor as a disincentive to escalate crises to the point of nuclear war.<sup>(63)</sup> However, owing to South Asia’s peculiarities this desire here may remain a pipedream for several reasons.

Pakistan’s economy is not likely to jumpstart for domestic and external reasons. Rife corruption, poor tax regime, circular debts, inconsistent economic policies coupled with lack of political will, investor-hostile security environment and the dire energy crunch are some of the major reasons for Pakistan’s poor economy. There is growing discontent with the dismal economic situation. In a departure from issuing only security-related statements, Pakistan’s apex National Command Authority (NCA) expressed its concerns about economy and the strategy to resolve these problems in the following words:

As part of energy security strategy, the NCA also reviewed and approved the futuristic, self-sustaining Nuclear Power Program – 2050, to meet the existing energy shortfalls and to respond to the future requirements of a growing population and economy. The NCA emphasized the need to focus on socio-economic development of the people as a foremost priority.<sup>(64)</sup>

Though the onus of improving its economy lies on Pakistan, there are two areas where the international community has to make its contribution. First, Pakistan needs a level playing field in international trade. For instance, Pakistan’s textile industry does not get the same incentives in the American market as the Indian or Bangladeshi industry does.<sup>(65)</sup> Second, a more serious matter is the energy sector. For instance, the US offers assistance in improving existing energy infrastructure but refuses offering civil nuclear technology to Pakistan — in open contrast to the cooperation it has with India in this field. There may be three possible reasons behind the denial. One, Pakistan is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but so is India. Two, Pakistan cannot afford to invest in the nuclear energy sector and economy’s uplift is nurtured over a long time. Three, Pakistan’s proliferation record is not considered ‘as clean as India’s,’ despite the fact that New Delhi diverted material from its safeguarded facility (CIRUS Reactor) to test its first nuclear device in 1974 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created the following year as a reaction. Pakistan’s steps to punish the chief perpetrator in the A.Q. Khan private network and its export control measures after 2004, such as the Export Control Act 2004, are generally disregarded for political reasons.



Both lines of above reasoning have flaws. Pakistan took credible measures after 2004 and its cooperation in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is commendable as Pakistan plugged all holes that could be manipulated by non-State actors for proliferation.<sup>(66)</sup> Also, the safeguards required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would cover civil nuclear energy cooperation and the mechanism is effective enough to prevent proliferation.

Incentives similar to those offered to India could be offered to Pakistan — Islamabad has been a major non-NATO ally and the key country that supports international efforts in the fight against terrorism. Actually, what prompts discrimination is Western geo-politico-economic imperatives that see India as a larger market and a possible bulwark to contain rising China. Pakistan, therefore, does not fit in the immediate or mid-term Western interests in the region.

The above trend of selectivity against Pakistan encumbers its meagre efforts to give a fillip to its economy. That in turn increases discontent in Pakistani society, thus contributing to the propensity for violence and resultant instability that affects the region. Like several other states, Pakistan gives its security concerns a higher priority thereby affecting the investment in public sector development, which consequently gets lower priority than the defence expenditure. Even with greater expenditure in the defence sector, Pakistan finds it difficult to address the growing conventional weapons asymmetry with India.

If India and Pakistan's decision to develop short-range ballistic missiles is judged purely against 'expense factor,' both would face difficulty in footing the bill for the number of weapons that would be required for deployment on the multiple fronts that India or Pakistan could open up against each other, in a future conflict in line with their new war-fighting doctrines. Economy factor would impinge upon India more if it decides to cover its Chinese front with Prahaar or other SRBMs. According to Dyer:

TNWs [would] not play a sufficiently significant role in the deterrence of Soviet aggression against Europe to justify their expense. With each individual atomic artillery shell costing perhaps \$ 400,000 this weapon system is not cheap.<sup>(67)</sup>

Dyer posited that the [TNWs] only "complicated [Soviet] plans for overrunning Europe."<sup>(68)</sup> The security and control of these weapons [consumed] the equivalent of over one full division of American troops who could be used more profitably in another role."<sup>(69)</sup>

From the above discussion, it can be inferred that even India would be reluctant once it decides to make 'enough' SRBMs to deter both Pakistan and China. The lesson for Pakistan is somewhat different. While Pakistan needs bolstering its security through credible, minimum deterrence, it must offer "credible economic assurance"<sup>(70)</sup> to the investors in the developed countries.

The West may reconsider its policy of de-hyphenating Pakistan and India and use an evenhanded approach with Islamabad, especially in the energy sector. Until progress is made in these areas, the South Asian region would continue to be strategically unstable and nuclear deterrence between the two

states would continue to be fragile. Considering the state of its economy, there is also the risk that an arms race may exhaust Pakistan.

### **Impact of military factors**

To establish a causal relationship between the SRBMs, regional stability and the credibility of deterrence, an overview of security paradigms and drivers that dictate nuclear doctrines and the force postures in South Asia, has been taken. Their cumulative relationship with these missiles has been established to assess the effect on strategic stability and the credibility of deterrence.

Pakistan considers India as the sole external threat to its security and its security policies and the nuclear doctrine appear to be driven by this paradigm. This India-centric security approach may be myopic and can be termed “Indyopia.”<sup>(71)</sup> Post-1998 security environment of Pakistan shows that the list of its external security challenges seems to be expanding and requires taking into consideration other entities or states. While national security policy, defence and nuclear doctrines, and consequent strategies account for India, potential adversaries must also be factored in.

Pakistan maintains ambiguity about its nuclear weapons employment policy and its nuclear doctrine. However, both can be discerned from several policy statements and positions taken over the years in arms control and disarmament affairs at domestic and international forums. The decision to develop short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is considered a major development relating to Pakistan’s credible deterrence policy. Previously, both Pakistan and India eschewed the so-called TNWs,<sup>(72)</sup> but the situation has now changed. While the possible Pakistani in developing the 60-km-range Nasr are documented subsequently, it is unfathomable why India has been developing Prahaar since 2009<sup>(73)</sup> once it is considered to have “an interest in regional stability.”<sup>(74)</sup>

Besides countering India’s proactive defence strategy that seeks to punish Pakistan by fighting a limited war, remaining below Islamabad’s nuclear threshold, another contributory factor behind development of Nasr would be to address the growing conventional weapons asymmetry<sup>(75)</sup> between the two countries. Pakistan army’s Azm-e-Nau III — roughly means: renewed will — and the PAF’s High Mark exercises were concluded successfully in April 2010.<sup>(76)</sup> These exercises were tests of Pakistan Army’s new war-fighting concept<sup>(77)</sup> and PAF’s new air strategy that were developed in response to India’s proactive defence strategy.<sup>(78)</sup>

It is fair to question why would Pakistan develop Nasr once it claims to have developed a credible conventional strategy to deter India? Also, why Pakistan would readily accept that it is a conventionally weak state compared to India? Is Pakistan not confident about its nuclear deterrence? Development of SRBMs can be considered adding ‘another layer of deterrence’<sup>(79)</sup> providing redundancy to the new war-fighting concept. Like India’s proactive defence strategy, Pakistan’s new war-fighting concept would also take some time to come into effect. Like India, Pakistan’s policy of minimum deterrence “is not a

fixity.”<sup>(80)</sup> Considering that India was already developing Prahaar, Pakistan would have followed suit through a Nasr-like project in any case.

Some experts interpret Nasr’s development as Pakistan’s willingness to initiate or fight a nuclear war. Their rationale is that the nuclear weapons are supposed to deter nuclear war and SRBMs ostensibly increase that risk. Command and control<sup>(81)</sup> issues and risk of an inadvertent nuclear war are considered inherent to these missiles. Similar concerns exist to this day about the so-called TNWs of the US and Russia in their European initiative. This fear factor is best expressed in an excerpt from a 1998 paper:

[TNWs] might have to be deployed rapidly out of their storage ‘igloos,’ [short-circuiting] the normal PAL codes and procedures. Decisions to use such weapons might devolve to low-level military officers, highly decentralised and subjected to immediate threats of being overrun by hostile forces. Even if someone on ‘our’ side did not initiate the use of nuclear weapons and subsequent ‘progress up the escalation ladder, the threat of such decentralised and largely inadvertent escalation might well produce a supposedly [pre-emptive] strike by the Soviet side.’<sup>(82)</sup>

Dyer dispels the fears about the command and control of short-range ballistic missiles in these words:

...that the [‘fail safe’] system for TNWs, sometimes referred to as Permissive Action Link (PAL), is at least as effective as it is for strategic weapons. Thus, at the present time, it is unlikely that a field commander on his own initiative could overrule the president’s decision. One further assumption underlying this discussion is that there will be a certain degree of rationality exercised by decision makers even after hostilities start.<sup>(83)</sup>

While developing new weapon systems, states make a rational choice based on cost-benefit analyses and risk calculation. Presence of the so-called TNWs in Europe to this day and Russia’s unwillingness to dispense with them vindicates this assertion. Hence, if Nasr forecloses India’s dangerous option to fight a limited war under nuclear overhang, it contributes to the regional stability and makes Pakistan’s deterrence more credible.<sup>(84)</sup>

The problem of deterrence would, however, arise if India considers Pakistan’s will to use Nasr incredible. In an interesting development, India has started distancing itself from this perilous proactive strategy.<sup>(85)</sup> While this may be an expression of Indian intent, Pakistan must nevertheless base its force posture and anchor its nuclear doctrine on India’s capabilities. Another reason for India re-styling its Cold Start Doctrine as Proactive Defence Strategy could have been that the former is inherently aggressive in nature, tending to tag India as an aggressor state. The latter term is a more benign formulation that can be related to the reference to India’s ‘inalienable right of self-defence.’

As discussed in the first part, the warhead and missile technology used in Nasr could be mutated for nuclear submarine platforms. It would, however,

be a challenge to make a naval version since the missile would have to be fitted into conventional submarines, and then there is the bigger technological challenge to navigational mechanism before the missile surfaces. Once developed, it would give Pakistan a second-strike capability and hence improve deterrence against India and contribute to regional stability. An assured second-strike capability would develop if and when Pakistan has a nuclear-powered and armed submarine and has the finances to do that. Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US ambassador to Afghanistan, said in 1976, “Given the poverty of Pakistan, it will be very difficult for it to acquire a second strike capability in the foreseeable future.”<sup>(86)</sup> Khalilzad appears to be supporting the point that possession of second-strike capability would be stabilizing.

Similarly William Walker, a noted analyst — also points to the stabilizing nature of second-strike capability when he says, “Pakistan and India face each other across contested borders and zones, and neither has established a second-strike capability, thereby making Islamabad and New Delhi more fearful of pre-emptive attacks.”<sup>(87)</sup>

Such arguments indicate that Pakistan and India did not develop the SRBMs in reaction to other’s similar capability; only the flight-testing of Prahaar was a reaction to the Nasr test. The development of short-range weapons systems capability hence, was a well-considered rational choice and both states seem to follow the same course that NATO and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact did in the 1960s.<sup>(88)</sup> If strategic stability sustained with the so-called TNWs in East-West relationship, the rational actors in South Asia would also remain similarly deterred. The history of crises between Pakistan and India is a proof that de-escalation occurs below the nuclear threshold. However, as the stability-instability paradox shows, that should not be the source of overoptimism.

It is also important to evaluate the effect of Prahaar on deterrence and strategic stability. Presence of Prahaar in the same theatre as Nasr should ideally deter both states from crossing the Rubicon. If rationality is at play during a conflict, both states would go for a “tit for tat”<sup>(89)</sup> response involving SRBMs only and the fear of horrific fallout would deter them from massive retaliation. Cold War literature indicates that the adversaries would be deterred from using the SRBMs.<sup>(90)</sup> However, the heat of fighting can quickly erode rationality and war could spiral out of control. This “confusion argument” about short-range ballistic missiles is best understood from the following narration:

The deterrent value of TNWs is the “confusion argument” which suggests that even [if] all the objections raised against TNWs are true, the weapons would still have sufficient deterrent impact precisely because of the ambiguity surrounding them. Neither the first user of the TNW nor the retaliator would be able to control the course of events.<sup>(91)</sup>

The corollary of the “confusion argument” is that both the Soviets — now Russians — and the NATO did not fight a war even after the SRBMs were introduced; the deterrence held despite the change in doctrines, weapons system

advancements and relative conventional forces balance that shifted in NATO's favour.

Since India projects China as its adversary, therefore deploying Prahaar against China, at some point, cannot be ruled out. This can lead to an arms race and the instability would not remain limited to the region.<sup>(92)</sup> Another related factor that would destabilise the region and may force Pakistan to rely heavily on SRBMs is India's pursuit of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield in collaboration with the US and Israel. Even a basic BMD capability may encourage a first-strike and pre-emptory tendency in Indian thinking. This suggests that Indian pursuit of BMD would affect the minimum deterrence levels and would nudge India towards a pre-emptory policy. A recent analysis provides the following opinion:

In the final outcome, the minimum deterrence levels currently exhibited could quickly disappear as the two sides enter a tit-for-tat upgrading system...[India] could adopt a more aggressive posture...and even [contemplate] pre-emption against Pakistani nuclear assets.<sup>(93)</sup>

William C. Potter also considers a state's no-first-use doctrine incredible and mere lip-service until it possesses short-range ballistic missiles. According to him:

It is very hard to see how, under no-first-use doctrine, short-range nuclear weapons in [arsenal would] serve a useful and legitimate purpose...If a no-first-use agreement is to be more than mere lip-service to a popular objective, it should be reflected in nuclear postures. A NWS subscribing to a no-first-use will have a hard time, justifying the continued possession of TNWs.<sup>(94)</sup>

Russia's reliance on the so-called TNWs despite conventional force advantage offers a lesson. The American-led BMD shield in Europe has forced Russia to rely more on SRBMs and it is unwilling to negotiate reductions in this genre of weapons until the US addresses Russian concerns over BMD. Russia has hinted that short-range missiles could be used to neutralize deployed US antimissile systems in Europe and threatened to deploy Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad.<sup>(95)</sup> Some argue that the so-called TNWs, owing to short time of flight, would render the BMD less effective.<sup>(96)</sup> However, there are competing claims that ABM systems — like the American PAC-3 — are also effective against tactical ballistic missiles.<sup>(97)</sup> If the former contention were true, Nasr would offer similar advantage to Pakistan through its short-range and possibility of saturating the BMD shield by firing multiple missiles at a target.

The above discussion shows that short-range ballistic missiles would have a direct impact on strategic stability and nuclear deterrence.<sup>(98)</sup> No one can be certain if short-range ballistic missiles would ever be used. In this sense, Pakistan-India situation mirrors that of the Cold War competition between 1960s and 70s. Dyer's following comments may be equally appreciable to South Asia, "It is very difficult to see under what combat conditions, especially in Europe, these weapons would ever be employed."<sup>(99)</sup>

Nasr was produced to deter India from pursuing its Cold Start Doctrine, which has recently been re-styled as Proactive Defence Strategy. India evolved this strategy to punish Pakistan for attacks like the one on Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001 and Mumbai in November 2008. Pakistan maintains that these attacks were not State-sponsored and was forthcoming in cooperation to investigate the despicable attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice. Nasr's development is also linked to the growing conventional force asymmetry between Pakistan and India. Prahaar was not developed in reaction to Nasr but its flight test was a reaction. Since Prahaar can be deployed or used against China, it would reduce the strategic stability of the region. The military imperatives of Pakistan raise the question about the limits of dynamism in its policy of credible, minimum deterrence. Can Pakistan sustain an arms race in the longer run? If the answer is no, then Pakistan would have to set a limit on the size of its nuclear arsenal. The Cold War model shows that an assured second-strike capability offers credible deterrence. Hence, economy permitting, Pakistan needs developing a triad of nuclear forces with a credible submarine-based nuclear missile capability. Nasr's warhead design may be the first technological step in that direction.

### Conclusion

Deterrence, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.<sup>(100)</sup> Notwithstanding their earlier claims of eschewing the so-called TNWs, both Pakistan and India have started developing these for different reasons. Once substantially operationalized and inducted into the forces in the next few years, Pakistan is likely to exercise assertive control over their deployment and the ensuing decision to use them. In contrast, India may delegate control of these weapons to junior field commanders if it inducts these into the artillery corps rather than the strategic forces. Deterrence between India and Pakistan would constitute absence of a nuclear war and may become incredible if either of the adversaries believes there is a lack of political will to use these weapons.

The Cold War model and the existing East-West competition shows that an assured second-strike capability is the true guarantor of the credibility of deterrence. India is moving fast in that direction due to its robust economy and due to Western arms industry's eagerness to sell and transfer technology. Such circumstances require that Pakistan endeavour to achieve a balance by internal economic reforms and by convincing the West that it is equally eligible for a similar preferential treatment by resetting its relations with the US on terms that offer a win-win situation to both.

South Asia can have a semblance of strategic stability if the "neo-apartheid"<sup>(101)</sup> against Pakistan in the nuclear realm is lifted and it is provided an opportunity to benefit from civil applications of nuclear technology and improve its economy.

The Cold War terminologies – like definitions of strategic stability and TNWs – are irrelevant to South Asia. Even the West does not have a standard formulation for these terms. Hence there is a unique 'South-Asianess' to the nature of deterrence and stability between Pakistan and India.

## Notes and References

1. The then Indian external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, in an interview in 1999, said, “Regarding [TNWs], let me remind you that we do not see nuclear weapons as weapons of war fighting.” See, “India Not to Engage in N-Arms Race: Jaswant,” *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 29 November 1999. Text of Singh’s interview available on Indian Embassy web page at [http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/indianews\\_dec\\_99.pdf](http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/indianews_dec_99.pdf), accessed 29 December 2011. This policy was echoed on 11 January during the 2002 crisis. Then Indian army chief, General Sunderajan Padamanabhan, said, “Nuclear weapons are not meant for war fighting. It’s very foolish for us to even think of nuclear weapons in war fighting.” See “India is ‘ready for war’,” *The Guardian*, London, 11 January 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/11/kashmir.india1>, accessed 1 November 2011. Former president General (ret’d) Musharraf made a similar statement in an interview to CNN in June. He said, “Any sane individual cannot even think of going into this unconventional war, whatever the pressures.” See, “Musharraf tries to quell nuclear war fears,” *CNN World*, 1 June 2002, [http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-01/world/pakistan.india\\_1\\_indian-controlled-indian-administered-pakistan-and-india?\\_s=PM:asiapcf](http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-01/world/pakistan.india_1_indian-controlled-indian-administered-pakistan-and-india?_s=PM:asiapcf), accessed 1 November 2011. Other statesmen expressed similar views and Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh said on the sidelines of Army Day parade and a day before Nuclear Security Summit in January 2012: “Nuclear weapons are not for war fighting... They’ve got a strategic significance and that’s where it should end.” See, “Nuclear weapons not for war: Army Chief Gen. V. K. Singh,” *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 15 January 2012, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/nuclear-weapons-not-for-war-army-chief-gen-v-k-singh/articleshow/11497755.cms>, accessed 15 January 2012.
2. In this paper, the missile system has been referred to as Nasr (Arabic for ‘victory’) only. Hatf is the Arabic word for ‘vengeance.’
3. See for example, Rodney Jones, “Pakistan’s Answer to Cold Start?” *The Friday Times*, Lahore, 13-19 May 2011, <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/13052011/page7.shtml>, accessed 30 May 2011.
4. Prahara is the Sanskrit word for ‘strike.’
5. Western argument holds that “nuclear capabilities are no guarantee of sensible national security policy.” See Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, “The stability-instability paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia,” Report No. 38 (June 2001), Henry L. Stimson Center, vii, <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NRRMTtitleEtc.pdf>, accessed on 9 October 2011.

6. Ashley Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture," (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 133.
7. A view often expressed by Naeem Salik, former Director of ACDA, Strategic Plan Division, Pakistan, and author of *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009. Also see, Zahir Kazmi, "Nasr: A bane or a boon?" *The Frontier Post*, Peshawar, 30 April 2011, <<http://www.thefrontierpost.com/?p=8176>>, accessed 30 April 2011.
8. Jones, ref.3.
9. See ISPR Press release No. PR94/2011-ISPR of 19 April 2011, <[http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&id=1721&search=1](http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721&search=1)>,\_accessed 7 October 2011.
10. ISPR Press release of 21 April 2011.
11. ISPR Press Release.
12. "Thursday's N-tests measured 5.0 on Richter scale," *The News, Special Edition*, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 31 May 1998.
13. ISPR's Press Release, ref.9.
14. "Thursday's N-tests measured 5.0 on Richter scale," ref.12.
15. The US conducted 1,032 nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992. See, "The United States' Nuclear Testing Programme," *CTBTO, Nuclear Testing*, <<http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-states-nuclear-testing-programme/page-1-the-united-states-nuclear-testing-programme/>>, accessed 13 December 2011.
16. Pakistan conducted the cold tests on 3 March 1983. The design tested was large and unwieldy. Pakistan developed 5-6 more designs between 1983 and 1998 and successfully tested these. The most advanced design was hot-tested on 30 May 1998 at Ras Koh, 150 km from Chaghai. In a TV interview Dr. Samar Mubarakmand said, "...this bomb is very small in size and is very efficient and powerful in yield and... is fitted on to many of our delivery systems such as missiles and aircraft." (This is transcript of the interview in Urdu). "Geo TV Capital Talk Special: Interview with Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman, NESCOM, on 5 March 2004, <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gr3ocLUR\\_9M](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gr3ocLUR_9M)>, accessed 12 December 2011.
17. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand in a speech following the May 1998 tests claimed that Pakistan had indigenously mastered numerous designs and could produce state-of-the-art weapons. He said, "...if you give them the specifications: 'we want this much yield, this much size' and they would be out with an actual bomb in two months..." [The quoted text slightly altered because the transcript had some errors]. See, transcript of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand's speech on 30 November 1998 at Khwarzimid Science Society, Punjab University, Lahore. "A science Odyssey: Pakistan's Nuclear Emergence," *Pakistan Military Consortium*, <[http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/nuclear/science\\_odyssey.html](http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/nuclear/science_odyssey.html)>, accessed 1 December 2011.
18. ISPR Press Release, ref. 9-10.



19. Usman Ansari, "Pakistan Tests 'Nuke-Capable' Short-Range Missile." *Defense News*, 20 April 2011, <<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6282326&c=MID&s=TOP>>, accessed Sunday, 9 October 2011.
20. Jones, ref.3.
21. The missile flight test photographs and videos show that it is a two-tube adaptation and not "four", as contended by Jones, (ref.3).
22. Jones, ref.3.
23. "Prahaar hits the target," *DRDO Newsletter*, Vol. 31, No. 8, August 2011, <[http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/nl/2011/NL\\_Aug\\_web\\_25\\_8.pdf](http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/nl/2011/NL_Aug_web_25_8.pdf)>, accessed 21 September 2011.
24. The missile has a sophisticated inertial navigation, guidance and electro-mechanical actuation systems. See T.S. Subramanian and Y. Mallikarjun, "Prahaar missile successfully test-fired," *The Hindu*, 21 July 2011, <<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2279166.ece>>, accessed 21 July 2011.
25. Ibid. Some DRDO scientists said that there could be attempts to reduce the weight of the missile. For details see <<http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1092.htm>>, accessed 12 November 2011.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. *The Times of India*, New Delhi.
30. "India test fires short range 'Prahaar' missile," *The News*, 21 July 2011, <<http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=19090&title=India-test-fires-short-range-Prahaar-missile>>, accessed 22 July 2011.
31. "India successfully tests new short-range missile 'Prahaar'," *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 21 July 2011, <[http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-21/news/29798426\\_1\\_single-stage-missile-range-missile-defence-base](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-21/news/29798426_1_single-stage-missile-range-missile-defence-base)>, accessed 12 December 2011.
32. DRDO statement, ref.23.
33. India established its Strategic Force Command after the announcement of its Nuclear Command Authority in 2003. Prior to that all ballistic missile brigades and Prithvi were under Corps of Artillery's command. There is no clarity on command and control. Indians maintain Prithvi-I is not of nuclear missions but has a variety of conventional warheads. See "India – Missile," *NTI* (November 2011), <<http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/delivery-systems/>>, accessed 12 December.
34. The 'Live Fist' blog post carries an email conversation between two persons, one of whom had knowledge about the test schedule. The following correspondence took place, see <<http://livefist.blogspot.com/2011/07/prahaar-test-postponed.html>>, accessed on 23 October 2011): "The test of India's new tactical missile Prahaar, scheduled for today, has been postponed to later this week for unspecified reasons.

- Detail later. [@1722hrs]: The Prahaar test-firing is scheduled for tomorrow morning, weather permitting. [7.22 am/July 18] Nope, not happening. Sometime this week, likely Thursday (July 21). Sent on my BlackBerry® from Vodafone.”
35. “Geography — China,” *The CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>>, accessed 1 December 2011.
  36. Abantika Ghosh, “Nuclear-boost: Uranium mine in Andhra could be among largest in world,” *The Times of India*, 19 July 2011, <[http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-19/india/29790250\\_1\\_uranium-mines-uranium-reserves-largest-uranium](http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-19/india/29790250_1_uranium-mines-uranium-reserves-largest-uranium)>, accessed 20 July 2011. According to the report, the Indian Department of Energy discovered that the mine has close to 49,000 tonnes or up to 1.5 lakh tonnes of uranium – three times the original estimate of the area’s deposits. This would make it among the largest uranium mines in the world.
  37. For instance, Prithvi-I’s flight tests began in 1987 and lasted until 1993. Subsequent to user trials with the Indian army in 1994, the missile entered serial production. See “India: Current Development/Operational Status of Strategic Missile Programs – Prithvi,” *NTI*, last updated November 2011, <<http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/delivery-systems/>>, accessed 10 December 2011.
  38. “Nuclear Weapons: A guide to British Nuclear Weapon Projects, a website by Brian Burnell, <<http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/tna-avia-65-1050-e81c-p2-3.jpg>>, accessed 30 December 2011.
  39. Richard A. Muller, *Physics and Technology for Future Presidents: An introduction to the Essential Physics Every World Leader Needs to Know* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 146.
  40. The author questions the notion of nuclear weapons considered as “tactical,” as generally used in the Western lexicon and unwittingly used in South Asia. A simpler term — short-range weapons — would suffice.
  41. The term ‘strategic stability’ has been used in theoretical sense and is synonymous with the term ‘regional stability’ used for Pakistan and India in this paper.
  42. Harald Muller and Annette Schaper, “Definitions, Types, Risks and Options for Control: A European Perspective,” Part II, in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control*, Eds. William C. Potter et al, Vol. 119 (New York: UNIDR, 2000), 21. Also see, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe — Fact Sheet,” *The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*, January 2011. <[http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/US\\_Tactical\\_Nuclear\\_Weapons\\_Fact\\_sheet/](http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/US_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons_Fact_sheet/)>, accessed 30 October 2011. The definition is, “...it is generally characterized by a lower yield and shorter range than a long-range (strategic) nuclear weapon. [TNWs] are also sometimes referred to as battlefield nuclear weapons.” A similar

- assertion is made by Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, *Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons — Part I: Background and Policy Issues*, Swedish Defence Research Agency (November 2003), 7, <<http://www.cisssm.umd.edu/papers/files/thorntonrussia.pdf>>, accessed 30 October 2011. This article defines TNWs as, “All sub-strategic forces not covered by the INF Treaty.”
43. NATO's ground-launched TNWs in Europe during the 1970s consisted of “artillery, surface to surface rockets and missiles. The artillery [included] the 155 mm and 8 inch howitzers... The nuclear shells for these weapons [were] engineered to fit the conventional artillery piece without modification, thus making all 600 or so of these weapons [then] in Europe nuclear-capable... The range of weapons was [up to 17 kilometres] and yield [varied] from less than [one KT] to more than 10 KT.” See, Phillip W. Dyer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92, No.2, (Summer, 1977), 249-250, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148352?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011. Also see, David E. Hoffman, “The Little Nukes that Got Away,” *Foreign Policy*, 1 April 2010. <[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/01/the\\_little\\_nukes\\_that\\_got\\_away](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/01/the_little_nukes_that_got_away)>, accessed 11 December 2011. According to Hoffman, *Davy Crocket* was the smallest nuclear weapon ever produced by the US. It weighed 76 pounds and had a range of 2-4 kilometres.
44. Arbman and Thornton, ref.42, p.9. They posit, “Trying to define TNW by range only, i.e. encompassing weapon systems with some maximum delivery capability — 500 [km], for example — have invariably failed in spite of early attempts by the U.S. and NATO to do so during the Cold War period.” Hence, there is a problem in defining TNWs from the criteria of ‘range’ because by the Western standards, Pakistani and Indian MRBMs would be TNWs.
45. Ibid. As per the paper, “Attempts to define [TNWs] by (low) yield, intended for battlefield use only, have fared no better than trying to define them by range. For example, in the U.S. arsenal, the highest yield of weapons considered to be non-strategic nuclear weapons are a variant of B-61 bomb at 170 KT and the nuclear SLCM with a yield of 150 KT. By contrast, U.S. strategic weapons have yields as low as 5 KT for ALCMs and 100 KT for ballistic missile.”
46. Muller and Schaper, ref.42, p.25.
47. Jacques S. Gansler, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future,” *Center for Technology and National Security Policy*, National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 2010, p.ix. <[http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/BMD\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/BMD_2010.pdf)>, accessed 18 May 2012.
48. Ibid, p.60.
49. In an informal discussion, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division recently said that the

- peculiar South Asian situation, especially geographical contiguity, suggested that the Cold War definitions of missile ranges were not applicable in Pakistani terminologies. This may imply that an IRBM in Pakistani jargon may be of 1000–1500 km range.
50. Nuance of using a comma between “credible” and “minimum” introduced by the author in order to remove the ambiguity created by the oft-misused “credible minimum deterrence” and “minimum credible deterrence.” The latter term is the least acceptable in strict reference to clarity.
  51. Liddell Hart coined this term. Bhumitra Chakma has traced evolution of the term from Liddell Hart to Glenn Snyder, then Robert Jervis and later a host of other authors. See Bhumitra Chakma, “Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South,” in *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), ed. Chakma, 215. Paul Kapoor captures the spirit of paradox unique to South Asian dynamic by, “A very small probability of lower level conflict escalating to the nuclear threshold has not encouraged aggressive conventional behaviour in the region. Rather, on-going violence has resulted from a significant possibility of subnuclear conflict escalating to the nuclear threshold. Thus, a substantial degree of *instability* at the strategic level has encouraged lower level South Asian violence.” See, Paul Kapoor, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 34.
  52. D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 1991), 305, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111365?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
  53. “When [nuclear weapons] were invented, [they] were designed to be weapons of war. Now decision-makers believe they are weapons to prevent war by means of stable deterrence.” See, John Hanwee, Hugh Miall, Scillar Elsworth, “The Assumptions of British Nuclear Weapons Decision-Makers,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (November 1990), 371, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/424261?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
  54. The decade of the 1980s and the pre-1998 period of the 90s was that of “recessed deterrence” (Perkovich and Tellis). Nuclear deterrence was established once Pakistan successfully cold-tested its weapons. The stability in relations was maintained at the level of crisis at best. The Kargil conflict disturbed the equilibrium and the phenomenon that nuclear weapons prevented nuclear war but left room for limited conflict appeared. The paradox lies in the risk that neither of the two States can guarantee the crisis escalation behaviour once a limited war begins. The empirical evidence of the Kargil War, the 2002 and 2008 crises show that nuclear weapons would ideally keep “intra-war deterrence” in place.

55. Strategic stability is defined as “a situation between adversaries, in which they are unlikely to fight a strategic war involving attacks against industry, population or strategic military forces.” This vague definition does not fit into South Asian complexities. See Paul Stockton, *Strategic Stability between the Super Powers* (London: IISS, 1986), Adelphi Papers-213, 3.
56. Z. I. Cheema, “Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” *SASSU*, 2004, 2, <<http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Cheema.pdf>>, accessed 12 November 2011.
57. Ibid. p.14.
58. Hanwee, Miall, Elsworthy, ref.53, p.371.
59. Ibid.
60. George Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (California: University of California Press, 1999), 485.
61. Jones, ref.3.
62. “Trading for Peace: Partners for Peace and Progress,” *aman ki asha*, <[http://www.amankiasha.com/news\\_cat.asp?catid=8](http://www.amankiasha.com/news_cat.asp?catid=8)>, accessed 17 May 2011.
63. Dyer, ref 43. Dyer opined that the major reason why the Soviets or the NATO did not fight a nuclear war or did not escalate a crisis to a level that called for a nuclear exchange was the economic disincentive. Eastern Europe continues to be a source of immense natural resources both for NATO and states that were part of the erstwhile Soviet bloc. A nuclear exchange would destroy those resources. His main thesis is that the economic cost-benefit analysis had a major role in deterrence than the prospect of mutually assured destruction (MAD). For instance, he thought the Russians would not find the use of nuclear weapons feasible for the seizure of an intact Western Europe.
64. ISPR Press Release No PR166/2011-ISPR, of 14 July 2011. Available online at <[http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&id=1796](http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1796)>, accessed 15 July 2011.
65. Imran Rana, “Textile industry: ‘Give me electricity or I will move to Bangladesh’,” *The Express Tribune*, 18 August 2011, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/233698/textile-industry-give-me-electricity-or-i-will-move-to-bangladesh/>>, accessed 1 December 2011. The report reads, “Another huge attraction in Bangladesh is the lack of tariffs in major markets such as the United States and the European Union...”
66. Pakistan has submitted four reports to the 1540 Committee, showing its progressively increasing measures.
67. Dyer (ref.43) has quoted Senator Stuart Semington’s testimony in 1970s in the US Senate Hearings over proposed modernization of small nuclear weapons.
68. Dyer, ref.43, p.257.
69. Ibid.

70. Zahir Kazmi, "Neo-nuclear apartheid," *Dawn*, 31 December 2010, <<http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/31/neo-nuclear-apartheid.html>>, accessed 31 December 2010.
71. Ibid.
72. "Pakistani experts say the country has been forced to develop [TNWs]," reported *Dawn* shortly after the test. See "Pakistan builds low yield nuclear capability," *Dawn*, 15 May 2011, <<http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/15/pakistan-builds-low-yield-nuclear-capability-concern-grows.html>>, accessed 10 October 2011. India also denied any interest in TNWs. See Jaswant Singh's statement, ref.1.
73. DRDO statement, ref.23.
74. Jones, ref.3.
75. Ashley Tellis argues that even in the event of a Pakistani first strike employing [TNWs], India's conventional supremacy should enable it to draw out the war, steadily mass its forces, and eviscerate Pakistani military capabilities..." That argument would hold true if India had not developed Prahars. Indian pursuit of TNWs shows that it is probably not sure of its conventional supremacy against Pakistan. See Ashley Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture," (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 133.
76. ISPR Press release of 21 April 2011.
77. ISPR Press Release No. PR149/2010-ISPR of 10 April 2010, available online at <[http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&id=1241](http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1241)>, accessed on 24 December 2011.
78. Jones, ref.3.
79. Rodney Jones questions Pakistan's rationale to develop TNWs once its Azm-E-Nau exercises suggest that its "conventional defences alone are fully capable of repelling or flaying the quick but shallow penetrations Cold Start envisages." See Jones, ref.3.
80. In an excellent review of three books on South Asian strategic stability, Michael Krepon quotes Jaswant Singh, "Yet...Singh likes to say [minimal is not a fixity]." See Michael Krepon, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," *Arms Control Today*, April 2010, <[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\\_04/BookReview](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_04/BookReview)>, accessed 1 December 2011.
81. As argued earlier, it is safe to assume that the decision to deploy TNWs during crises would be taken by Pakistan's National Command Authority and the safety codes in the warheads would prevent their accidental or unauthorized use. In addition, the Tri-Service Strategic Force Commands would most likely handle these weapons. The relevance of Pakistan's redundant strategic communication systems becomes imperative to avoid the "use it or lose it" dilemma. The same logic holds true for India.
82. Bruce Martin Russett, "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How acceptable?" *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 50, No.



- 2 (Spring, 1988), 294, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407651?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
83. Phillip W. Dyer, "Will Tactical Nuclear Weapons Ever Be Used?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No.2, (June 1973), 225-226, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149108?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
84. According to Dyer, NATO's policy to introduce TNWs was based on four assumptions; the first being that they would "be able to stop Soviet onslaught." See, Dyer, ref.43, p.254.
85. Manu Pubby, "No 'Cold Start' doctrine, India tells US," *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 9 September 2010, <<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-cold-start-doctrine-india-tells-us/679273/0>>, accessed 23 November 2011. The report said, "While the US has been assured that no such doctrine exists, the Army has now come on record to say that 'Cold Start' is not part of its doctrine. Army Chief General V K Singh has told...that India's basic military posture remains defensive."
86. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Making of a Nuclear Power." *Asian Survey* Vol. 16, No. 6 (June 1976), 592. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643521>>, accessed 26 October 2011.
87. William Walker, "International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 3 (July 1998), 526.
88. Naeem Salik, "India-Pakistan Nuclear Competition: Implications for Regional Stability," *Centre for Muslim States and Societies/Political Science and International Relations*, University of Western Australia, 4, <<http://law.anu.edu.au/COAST/events/APSA/papers/248.pdf>>, accessed 22 December 2011. The online paper was presented at APSA Annual Conference in mid-July 2011 and that is why no reference to Prahara has been made.
89. Ali Ahmed, "Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative," *IDS*, October 3, 2011, <<http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/TitforTatANuclearRetaliationAlternative031011>>, accessed 4 October 2011.
90. The British faced a dilemma over the use of the so-called TNWs against Germans. See, Hanwee, Miall, Elsworth, ref.53, p.361.
91. Dyer, ref.43, p.254.
92. Geller, in his examination of the implications of possession of nuclear weapons for war between India and Pakistan, concluded that their bilateral competition "may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the [U.S.]. See Daniel S. Geller, "Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle," *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics/Cycle de pouvoir et politique mondiale

- (January 2003), 137-150. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601335?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
93. Moeed Yusuf and Khalid Banuri, "India's Quest for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Slippery Slope," in *South Asia at Crossroads: Conflict or Cooperation in the Age of Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Space Rivalries*, Subrata Ghoshroy/Götiz Neuneck (eds.), Democracy Security, Piece No.197 (Hamburg: Nomos, 2010), 106-7. Also see, Khalid Banuri, "Missile Defenses in South Asia: The Next Challenge," *South Asian Survey*, Vol. II, No.2, 2004.
94. William C. Potter and others, eds. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control*, (Geneva: UNIDR, 2000), 49.
95. Acting Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, on 10 May 2012, renewed warning that short-range missiles could be used against the US BMD in Europe. See, "Russia may use Iskander missile system to neutralize US missile defense elements – minister," *Interfax*, 11 May 2012, <<http://www.interfax.co.uk/russia-cis-general-news-bulletins-in-english/russia-may-use-iskander-missile-system-to-neutralize-u-s-missile-defense-elements-minister-part-2/>>, accessed 13 May 2012.
96. Michael Krepon, "Missile Defense Phobia" *Arms Control Wonk*, 5 December 2011, <<http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3291/missile-defense-phobia>>, accessed 17 May 2012. He posits that TMD systems are only fractionally effective, and only against the bottom rung of cheap, short-range...missiles without countermeasures.
97. Jacques S. Gansler, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future," *Center for Technology and National Security Policy*, National Defense University, Washington D.C., April 2010, 46. <[http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/BMD\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/BMD_2010.pdf)>, accessed 18 May 2012.
98. "NATO thinking in the Cold War laid an emphasis "on tactical nuclear weapons to contain an anticipated massive Soviet conventional attack; later, as Soviet forces also acquired large numbers of [TNWs] Defence Secretary McNamara and others in the Kennedy-Johnson administration urged greater reliance on building up conventional deterrence, with the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort...the European allies vigorously resisted that shift in emphasis, preferring the deterrent effect of reliance on nuclear weapons to the risk that non-nuclear deterrence would fail and result in the massive destruction of another conventional war on European soil." See Bruce Martin Russett, "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How acceptable?" *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), 284, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407651?origin=JSTOR-pdf>>, accessed 2 October 2011.
99. Dyer, ref.83.
100. Zahir Kazmi, ref.7.
101. The term refers to the trends of selectivity and discrimination by the West against Pakistan and specifically denial of civil nuclear



technology by not letting Pakistan participate in export control cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

***Appendix-I*****COMPARISON – NASR AND PRAHAAR**

Specifications	Hatf-IX (Nasr)		Prahaar	
Meaning of name / Photo	Hatf: vengeance Nasr: victory		To Strike	
Type	Short-range, surface to surface ballistic missile		Surface to surface missile	
Range	60 km		50 to 150 km	
Time of Flight / Velocity			150 km in 250 seconds (4 minutes 10 seconds) / 6 m/sec	
Diameter	300 mm (11.8 inches)		420 mm (1 foot 4 inches)	
Launcher	Two-round system on Chinese origin 8x8 high-mobility truck chassis. Pakistan Army uses AR1A/A100-E MLRS System		Launched from a road mobile system – carries 6 missiles at a time – can fire a salvo in all directions covering azimuth plane. Dr. Saraswat claimed in an interview, “Can be launched from canisters.”	
Warhead Type / Payload	HE and nuclear (boosted fission device)		200 kg / carries different types of warheads	
Fuel Type	Single-stage solid fuel		Single-stage solid fuel	
Navigation	Not specified		H (high accuracy navigation, guidance, and electro-magnetic actuation system, latest on-board computers	
Circular Error Probable (accuracy)			< 10 m	
Other characteristics	Quick response system			
Use	Battlefield use			
Similarities	Russian Iskander		American ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System)	
Date of Test / Number of tests	Tuesday, 19 April 2011 / first test		Thursday, 21 July 2011 at 8:15 AM / first test	
Length	20 feet (6.096 m) approx..		7.3 m	
Weight			1280 kg / 1.3 tons	
Apogee			35 km	
Miscellaneous			Cost-effective, quick reaction, all weather, all terrain, highly accurate battlefield support tactical system. Dr. Saraswat claimed, “...can [also] be deployed in snow-bound areas or jungles.” Hence, not ruling out the possibility of its deployment in border areas with China.	
Source			DRDO News Letter, Vol. 31 No. 8, August 2011	
Development Period			Less than two years	
Take-off Type	Angular		Vertical	
Purpose	To add deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development program at shorter ranges...quick response system addresses the need to address evolving threats...consolidation of deterrence capability at all levels of threat spectrum		To fill the gap between unguided multi-barrel rocket system ‘Pinaka’ with 40 km range and guided missile like ‘Prithvi’ with 250-350 km range	
Launch Time			Few minutes	
Future Plans	First flight test ~ more to follow		Scientists said that there would be attempt to reduce the weight of the missile in future tests	
Manufacturers	NESCOM		DRDO and Larsen & Toubro, and MSQAA	

**Appendix-II****CORRELATION OF SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH DETERRENCE & STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA**

Factors		Deterrence			Strategic Stability
		Capability	Credibility	Communication	
<b>Political</b>	Territorial Disputes	Unresolved political disputes > limited war doctrines > reliance on TNWs to counter limited war doctrine > deterrence credible if both states believe that the political will to employ TNWs exists			<b>South Asian region is highly unstable in political, economic and military domains</b>
	Afghanistan's future, Balochistan insurgency, terrorism in India				
<b>Economic</b>	Trends of selectivity	Conventional weapons asymmetries growing and hence seeming reliance on nuclear weapons > Deterrence maintained but would wear out if Pakistan's economy gets weaker			
	Energy security				
	Trade barriers				
<b>Military</b>	Limited war doctrine	Kargil > Cold Start Doctrine > Mumbai attacks > Cold Start Doctrine restyled Proactive Defence Strategy > Growing asymmetry with India > Nasr > Prahaar > China dragged into deterrence equation > arms racing > deterrence credible if actors remain rational > credible deterrence if assured second strike capability developed.			
	Conventional forces asymmetry				

**Note:**

The above chart is a rough – basic – model to graphically show the assessments. In a detailed study an attempt to quantify above elements can be made by giving values to each variable. The limited scope of this paper does not allow that level of analysis.