

ENDURING INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY: PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Having kept a neighbouring enemy engaged with another neighbouring enemy, a wise king should proceed against a third king, and having conquered that enemy of equal power, take possession of his territory.

— Kautiliya, *Arthashastra*, Chapter VI, Book VII.

Introduction

India and Pakistan are the most uneasy neighbours who have been entangled in a troubled history—replete with perplexed understanding, suspicion and hostility. This region has experienced more wars and tensions than peace ever since their independence in 1947. A series of wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 with frequent violation of the Line of Control (LoC) and routine border skirmishes have made this region more volatile than any other one. The conflict between the two states is an enduring one and has held the region back from making strides in the field of peace, development and progress. The study refers to T V Paul's categorization of 'enduring rivalry', where he opines that "enduring rivalry is characterized by a persistent, fundamental and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states which manifest itself in the basic attitudes of the parties towards each other as well as in recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time."¹ Holding the common colonial legacy, the two states have set their distinct strategic directions (religious ideas and political goals), which are fundamentally conflicting or

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'Strategically Orthogonal' since their partition in 1947. More broadly, the endemic rivalry can be explained based on certain factors for instance, distinct strategic directions and visions (religious and political patterns), legacy of Radcliffe Award (demarcation of boundaries resulting in territorial disputes); convoluted history (facts and realities clouded by sentiments and politico-religious and ideological narratives, bloodshed as a consequence of Hindu-Muslim riots and partition); the two states' inclination for alignments with extra-regional power and subordinating their policies (external balancing) and their 'nefarious designs'.² Moreover, security-insecurity paradox³ has been based on misplaced suspicion and competition to reduce power differential to maintain equilibrium and maximize security against each other. Even the similarities, though a few, in the most indices (cultural, similar history, language) have been mired with hostility, antagonism and mistrust. Today, these attributes are embedded in the societies of these two countries as a never ending 'vicious cycle.' These realities have made the regional strategic environment and politics enormously complex with a never ending state of affairs. This is why the US President, Bill Clinton, described the region as 'the most dangerous place on earth' in 2004.⁴

This paper argues that distinct visions and strategic directions of adversarial states turn their difference into protracted conflicts and interstate clashes. Accordingly, the genesis of the Indo-Pakistan enduring rivalry lies in the distinct strategic directions (religious and socio-political) of statehood which have put regional peace and stability into a bitter situation. Peace in South Asia is dependent on re-formulation of strategic directions (attitudinal change and political compromises) on both sides. Thus, to translate this argument, the study ponders on a few striking questions: What are the causes which increase differences, mistrust and security dilemma between the two states? How and why rivalry did aggravate over time? How can the two states' divergences be overcome? What are the imperatives and mechanisms for the resolution of this enduring rivalry? The classical realists' theoretical assumptions of balance of power, material power and defensive realists guidance on states' intensions towards 'security maximization' provide the most powerful and valuable explanation in understanding the Indo-Pak *relational paradox* or simply the enduring rivalry. The liberals' assumption offers guiding tools for finding solutions to the conflict between the two traditional adversaries.

Re-assessing the Indo-Pakistan distinct strategic directions

Prior to 1947, there were two leading ethnic groups envisioning distinct ideologies with different religious practices under the British rule: The Hindus constituted the majority while the Muslims were in a minority. The Indian National Congress, under the leadership and guidance of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, which had Hindu majority membership, envisioned the political vision of 'Greater India'⁵ – based on slogans of secularism and liberal democracy. Presumably, guided by the US President Woodrow Wilson's (liberalism) fourteen points⁶, one of the points, that is, through democracy global

peace can be preserved and creation of international organizations and institutions would place relations between states on a firm foundation⁷ — India aspired to build its soft state image through democracy. In parallel, ‘the Greater India Vision’ can be translated and interpreted through the prism of realism — implying that India ‘would play a greater-power role in the world affairs commensurate with its size and power potential.’⁸ Cumulative Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophy, ‘Greater India’, [rise of India as a great power — maximization of power and expansionism] is a concept that derives its power from *Kautiliya’s Arthashastra*⁹ and *Mahabharata* philosophy¹⁰ which is rooted in power based *Machiavellian* realist school.¹¹ The manifestation and latent presence of *Kautiliyan* strategic thought cannot be discounted in Indian policy.

On the other hand, Muslim League headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in March 1940, expressed the merit of ‘two-nation theory’ and desired for the creation of Pakistan as a separate state for the Indian Muslims. This theory became the foundation of partition of India in 1947, which is that the Muslims and the Hindus by every definition were two separate nations. Therefore, the Muslims should have an autonomous homeland — Jinnah sought self-determination on the basis of the ‘two-nation theory’ and fought the struggle for a separate homeland on religious lines. Significantly, the vision of the League and the Congress was divided even in the disposition of the princely states on strategic, military and economic affairs.¹²

Besides the above differences, during the mid-1940s, Hindu-Muslim riots emerged with acute intensity. Within this context, in 1946, Cabinet Mission sent by the Great Britain proposed that a union between British India and Princely States be established and constitution may be drafted.¹³ In August 1947, Britain implemented its earlier decision of partitioning which British rulers realized may bring peace for them. Moreover, when the last British Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten failed to address differences between the two major parties because of their distinct vision (Hindu-Muslim clashes) escalated. The religiously and ethnically diverse Indian empire split into two independent and sovereign states: India and Pakistan in 1947. Subsequently, this participation gave rise to territorial conflicts that have shaped the South Asian regional environment. The most significant aspect of the split in 1947 was the conflict in ideology: a Muslim-majority identity versus a Hindu dominated India.

How was mistrust generated between the two states in the first place? First, it is imperative to review, as what had happened after the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which intensified Pakistan’s fear and created irresolvable mistrust between the two states. During the process of partition, 562 princely states had the option to join either India or Pakistan. Out of these, the three princely states decided to stay independent from both India and Pakistan: Jammu and Kashmir in the north, Hyderabad in the south, and Junagadh in the west. While the rulers of the latter two were Muslims, the majority of their population was Hindu and their accession to India occurred, extensively, through Indian military actions. New Delhi, later, legitimized these accessions through subsequent ‘perverted’ referenda. Only Jammu and Kashmir emerged as the most contentious, given its geographical proximity to Pakistan and a

majority Muslim population. The Hindu ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, first chose to remain independent from both India and Pakistan. In October 1947, however, disturbances occurred inside Kashmir. India claimed that it was the tribal forces from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, which attacked Kashmir, while Pakistan contended that it was the local revolt against Raja's intentions of acceding to India. This conflict turned into a short war between the two states, which lasted until the end of 1948. More so, the riots that followed in 1947-48 left more than a million people dead in six months and displaced over 15 million.¹⁴ Thus, territorial clashes and the overwhelming risk of war in the region greatly affected Pakistani's psyche. Thereafter, Kashmir became a major territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. This event had set a major precedent for enduring rivalry, antagonism and animosity, thus building Pakistani elites' perception and direction against India as an arch-rival.

Moreover, in 1948, India took Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and agreed to conduct a plebiscite on Kashmir in order to address the issue according to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Nevertheless, India did not allow this plebiscite to be held thus bypassing global norms holding that there were substantial interferences by Pakistani military inside Kashmir to incite insurgency. This fact further increased Pakistan's concerns towards India's exceptional lack of sincerity on bilateral issues, thereby giving rise and strength to expansionist and hegemonic designs in the region which were based on realists-guided, 'offensive political pattern'.

Why did Kashmir become an important issue for both India and Pakistan? Both countries have distinct understanding and perceptions of the Kashmir Issue. For Ganguly and Hagerty, India continued to hold that 'incorporating Kashmir was important because Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, would demonstrate India's fundamental commitment to civic, secular nationalism and that a Muslim-majority state could thrive within a secular polity.'¹⁵ This was also central to what Indian believed to be central to the cohesion and integrity of secular India. For India, leaving Kashmir would mean that other states could ask for independence or accession to Pakistan. For Pakistan, the possession of Kashmir signified that 'Pakistan's identity would be incomplete without the incorporation of Kashmir.'¹⁶ First, Kashmir became important for Pakistan for certain reasons: for example, cultural and religious coherence; sources of water – rivers that flow from Kashmir; a valued ecosystem; strategic location – a bridge between Pakistan and China; most importantly, question of human rights and international law. These factors validate that Pakistan's inherited 'strategic culture' became centred on the fear of Indian regional dominance. Here the study refers to Jack Snyder's interpretation of Strategic culture, which means the 'sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that the members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other.'¹⁷ Second, distinct political vision also contributed in aggravating mistrust and rivalry. For example, the Indian leaders such as Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Nehru until 1947 were not in favour of Pakistan's emergence as a separate state. For them, India and the Muslim

majority provinces in the northwest and northeast, which were to make up an independent Pakistan, would have been a more powerful and successful country, had they remained together because of the geostrategic location and the economic potential of these lands. This validates the realists' guided Greater Indian vision. Then reluctantly in June 1947, they accepted the inevitable Pakistan for two reasons: (1) Independent Pakistan would not last long; (2) In order to avoid the communal violence that could ensure British-withdrawal. As Patel expressed it, 'they had 75 to 80 per cent of India, which they could develop and make stronger according to their genius. The [Muslim] League could develop the rest of the country.'¹⁸ This serves to undermine the argument that an undivided – but internally disunited India might have had a greater influence in the world.

Third, elites' statements and behaviour have also substantially contributed to fortify this rivalry. For example, there was a widespread belief among the Congress that Pakistan's independence would be of short duration and that bankruptcy and lack of sufficient national assets for statehood in terms of buildings and institutions would prompt a return to 'Mother' India and a corrective to unwanted 'vivisection' of 1947. Nehru summarized their view point succinctly: 'we expected that partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us. None of us anticipated how much the killing(s) and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relations.'¹⁹ Historically driven radical concepts, like *Akhand Bharat*, and *Hindutva*, populated with anti-Pakistan sentiments. Such ideologies have been extensively used by the political parties and religious extremists in India – apparently to remain relevant in their respective spheres of domestic influence and power. Hindu fundamentalists at the time, further generated extreme anti-Pakistan drive which intensified partition. Cohen confirms that 'Veer Savarkar, then the leader of the militant Hindu revivalist group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), has opposed partition on the ground that India was a cultural and religious entity with a Muslim minority and that did not merit the privileges of becoming a separate state.'²⁰ The postulates of this group have been later adopted by the Indian Jana Sangh Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – leading political parties. Though larger Indian society has not been influenced by such radicals and their ideologues, yet Pakistan has always considered these principles that have motivated the Indian foreign and military policies.

Fourth, the consequences of partition including the distribution of assets also raised fear in Pakistani minds. For example, the first consequence was the recurring sense of Pakistan being discriminated at the time of partition, which stems from the most basic perception: that the country had been treated 'unfairly.' Disputes followed the distribution of military and civil assets between the two states, the precise demarcation of the geographically separated new union of West and East Pakistan, the economic and social imbalance between the two regions, and the poor infrastructure inherited from the Raj. Human rights violations, at the hands of Indians, and the resulting resentment and suspicion between different religious communities, were other consequences. Partition left hundreds of thousands of casualties. The precise figures are not known,²¹ but

perhaps more than a million migrants were slaughtered, while the remaining religious minorities experienced discrimination.²²

A large number of civil servants and military left their families trapped in communal riots and mass migration.²³ 'About 7.2 million Indian Muslims migrated to Pakistan, forming about one-fourth of the population of West Pakistan [whereas] 5.5 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India.'²⁴ An additional phenomenon was the lack of inherited institutional structures. Most of the developed institutions which the British abandoned went to India. For example, India inherited the state buildings in Delhi and the Parliament. Pakistan had to create alternatives for itself in Karachi. Likewise, the training arrangements for the Indian civil services were inherited by India, while Pakistan had to develop its own. The economic heart of undivided India was Bombay, which of course went to India. More importantly, the distribution of the natural resources of Indus River system between India and Pakistan was linked with the issue of Kashmir. Had the water issues been resolved, the Kashmir question might have not existed in such an acute form. Any solution to the Jammu and Kashmir question is still dependent on the fair distribution of river waters. Within this context, Pakistan identified India from the outset as its principal threat and adversary. The struggle for Pakistan in accordance with the two-nation theory was well founded on the basis of the identity and aspirations of the people, and in accordance with the international normative system as endorsed by the constructivists.²⁵

Constructivism advocates influence of ideas, values and norms as a socialization process.²⁶ If constructivism studies norms as a socialization process in which a 'logic of appropriateness',²⁷ not interests or rational expectations matter, then Jinnah's struggle for a separate Muslim state falls within this system.

Nevertheless, partition did not yield favourable dividends, rather erupted into violence and bloodshed. The consequence of partition shifted intra-state rivalry into interstate conflict between India and Pakistan. The Indian hegemonic approach and threat of the Indian army posed mounting challenges to Pakistan, including border security which became an immediate concern after independence in 1947. Pakistan professed India as an arch-rival and a hegemonic player focused upon breaking and dismantling Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan's strategic directions have been guided by these factors: survival as an independent state; Kashmir to be 'an integral part of Pakistan' – i.e., Jinnah calling it a jugular vein of Pakistan; looking outward for bridging the power disparity – focusing on external balancing, and India appeared as a clear, direct and existential threat to Pakistan's security. Whereas in the Indian context, two strands (power maximization and identity) help in understanding Indian strategic orientation and thinking.

New wars and intensified rivalry

Being a smaller state, based on lesser capability vis-à-vis India's pervasive threat, 'security-centricity' became a key component of Pakistan's 'scheme of things.' The pro-west military was firmly in charge of Pakistan's

security policy, relying on military alliances to counter the Indian threat in the 1950s. Thus, Pakistan adopted a more defensive, liberal and cooperative based policy as was guided by the liberal school, which is, 'cooperation is possible through the international institutions and that states could enter into cooperative relations even if one state gains more than another from the interaction'.²⁸ Consequently, Pakistan sought to join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)²⁹ for security guarantees to combat the Indian threat. Pakistan's strong alliance with the US provided enough leverage to consolidate its defence link with the West and to build up its conventional forces to meet any emerging threat from India.³⁰ Based on the liberal's approach, Pakistan believed that it would achieve greater advantage from joining these alliances and would have to pay a higher cost, had it attempted to survive unilaterally. Pakistani state sought in this period to comply with those international rules and norms which were still taking shape and helped guide its behaviour. Pakistan supported global disarmament and arms control in the UN disarmament commission as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1952-54.³¹ It also supported the Irish proposal on nuclear non-proliferation in mid-1958 at the UN.³² Due to lack of political will, Pakistan initially did not opt for nuclear weapons acquisition. The Pakistani establishment did respond to Indian attitudes and policy with regard to domestic, political and military issues on realist patterns but not in the area of nuclear policy.³³ However, despite these efforts, the SEATO and CENTO alliances failed to render Pakistan with any support when the two states fought a second war, in 1965, over the status of Jammu and Kashmir, resulted in heightened domestic unrest. The war left thousands of casualties on both sides and had considerable implications for Pakistan's defence policy. The question re-opened Pakistan's inferiority in conventional weapons vis-à-vis India. Instead of helping Pakistan, the US banned the supply of weaponry and imposed arms embargo on both states.³⁴

As a result Pakistan revisited its policies, first drifting away and later withdrawing altogether from SEATO. This was the time when Pakistan sought to cultivate a firm alliance with China, which later became an important supplier of conventional weapons.³⁵ Presumably, Pakistan-China bond transformed into a strong alliance after China had fought a war with India in 1962. Sino-Pakistan alliance can be interpreted as, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."³⁶ Askari highlights that Pakistan began to obtain weapons and military equipment from China towards the end of 1965 or in early 1966. Since then, this relationship has expanded. China has supplied weapons and equipment for three services and has contributed significantly to building Pakistani defence industry.³⁷ Nevertheless, Ahmed maintains that the Pakistani military did not believe that Chinese help alone was adequate to counter India's advanced conventional threat.³⁸ After this war, Pakistan's policy became entirely India specific, focused on the question of its security and survival which built the perception of Pakistani elites. Thus, this event had strengthened anti-India mind-set at the societal level in Pakistan.

Six year after the 1965 war, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 began as a civil war in the eastern wing of Pakistan and ended up with Indian involvement

resulting in the dismemberment of Pakistan (East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh). This war originated neither from inherited hatred between India and Pakistan, or from dissatisfaction regarding Kashmir but it was instead triggered by open military intervention for reasons of its own. For Khan and Lavoy, the Indian intrusion – ‘blitzkrieg-type operations following a nine months long insurgency and civil war’³⁹ resulted in the breaking up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. Once again Pakistan received no support from its western alliances during this war (as a result of which later Pakistan withdrew from CENTO in 1979). Ganguly and Hagerty confirmed that ‘India’s military plans for an eventual war with Pakistan included the support, training and arming of the ‘Mukti Bahini’ (literally liberation force) composed of disaffected officers from the Pakistani Army and other men of Bengali origin.’⁴⁰ India provided substantial support to this organization, which wreaked havoc across East Pakistan during the late summer of 1971, thus exploiting Pakistani Army’s ability to face an Indian military onslaught later that year.⁴¹ East Pakistan was a valuable strategic asset with which Pakistan could have sought to counterbalance India. But it always proved difficult to manage, given the distances involved and the lack of a land corridor between the western and eastern parts of the federation. Bonney argues that the break-up of the federation had positive implications for Pakistan’s security, as it emerged as a stronger and more stable state which could focus its energies more effectively.⁴² Nevertheless, this partition of Pakistan in 1971 provoked a profound crisis for former West Pakistan. General Ehsan expressed his feelings, ‘ever since the creation of Pakistan we have been faced with an existential threat from India and this threat came to the fore ...with the event of 1971 when Pakistan was divided through an Indian invasion and Bangladesh was created.’⁴³ His further view explains Pakistani military’s understanding and sentiment drove from the above facts. He says:

Mrs. Indira Gandhi said two things which are very instructive: firstly, she said that we have avenged the history of 1,000 years of Muslim rule in India. Secondly, we have proven the two-nation theory wrong, which meant that she was questioning the very existence of Pakistan as a nation. There is something which her father, Nehru, had also said when Pakistan was created: Pakistan is not viable, it’s just a matter of time for this to fall apart and rejoin mother India. So it is this sort of existential threat which non-Pakistanis fail to understand, which drove Pakistan to a security- centric approach in its national policy.⁴⁴

The above concerns of Pakistani elite clearly indicate as to how the 1971 war event reinforced Pakistani perception and belief against India, thus strengthening the anti-India syndrome, which later became a norm inside Pakistan. The disintegration of Pakistan was the consequence of *Indira Doctrine* (the second longest serving Indian Prime Minister 1966-1977 and 1980-1984). Indira Doctrine was a manifestation of Indian expansionism, power maximization and realist’s guided material based interests. Later, based on its power maximization notion – The Greater India – India rejected the nuclear non-

proliferation treaty (NPT), calling it a 'discriminatory treaty' and went for so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) in 1974 with military elements attached to it.⁴⁵ India did so, thus bypassing the global anti-nuclear norms while still accusing the NPT of establishing a form of 'nuclear apartheid.'⁴⁶ For many years, India remained a critic of international order embodied in the NPT, challenging it from outside while developing nuclear devices and keeping the nuclear option open until its second nuclear tests in 1998.

What India called PNEs posed a grave threat to Pakistan's security. These tests raised deep concerns in the Pakistani establishment (military and political) and forced them to invest even more heavily in efforts to acquire nuclear weapons to create balance with the much larger and better equipped Indian Army. Regional semi-anarchic system forced Pakistan to survive via self-help based on realists' interpretation of security maximization of a smaller state against powerful adversary. Pakistan thus modified its cooperation based liberal guided policy into 'open option policy' on realist-guided pattern for nuclear weapons. Realists suggest that international anarchy forces states to go for self-help. Waltz maintains that, in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena.⁴⁷ In an anarchic system, states prefer to deal with their adversaries by building up their arsenals of weapons and gaining allies instead of building cooperation towards a greater degree of arms control based on common interests. Thus, Indian PNEs gave official status to then Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Finally, Bhutto's government officially approved the building of a nuclear bomb at a Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on 15 June 1974, less than a month after the Indian nuclear tests based on its self-help policy. Based on its 'security-centric orientation', Pakistan built nuclear weapons programme, acquired capability and went for Cold Tests in 1982-1983 to address existential threat coming from India.

The hatred and antagonism were embedded when *Brasstacks* – a large scale Indian military exercise began in November 1986 and was followed up till December in the same year with an offensive operation in a mobile battleground environment. This served to heighten Pakistan's fear that India was planning to invade and destroy its nuclear facilities. 'India used *Brasstacks* to provoke Pakistan into war. The real plan was to attack Pakistan's Punjab province and cut off access to Sindh. This operation continued until mid-1987. The largest Indian manoeuvres occurred in the deserts of Rajasthan, a 100 miles (160 km) from the Pakistani border, in the sensitive regions of Kashmir. Indeed, Indian General Krishnaswami Sunderji (who initiated this exercise) had a plan to provoke Pakistan into war.⁴⁸ Sunderji himself stated that 'the *Brasstacks* crisis was the last all-conventional crisis in which India could have used its conventional superiority to destroy Pakistan's conventional and nuclear weapons capability.'⁴⁹ By mid-January 1987 armies of the two states were facing each other on the frontiers. Each state perception regarding the other's intentions reached at dangerous point — mistrust aggravated with grounded misperception about each other. At the height of crisis, Pakistani high profile elites transmitted message that 'we would use the bomb if our existence and sovereignty was

threatened.⁵⁰ It was the nuclear deterrence which had helped the two states to initiate negotiations on 31 Jan 1987 at a diplomatic level. On 4 February 1987, India-Pakistan consultations agreed to pull out their forces deployed on the border.⁵¹ This incident became another setback to the regional complexities and yet again peace had been exploited miserably.

Within these realities, not long after the Brasstacks, the Kashmir dispute re-emerged. Kashmir, openly rebelled India in 1989. India blamed Pakistan for waging an unconventional or asymmetrical war with India by providing assistance to the Kashmiri Muslims, which the Indian called an act of provoking terrorism. In response, Islamabad insisted that it only provided moral support to the Kashmiri 'freedom fighters.' Indians did not believe Pakistani response and thus; these Pakistani freedom fighters were perceived terrorists in India. This assumption on part of India ushered a new dimension into regional threat spectrum. This crisis and both states' aggressive behaviour again brought the region close to war, for the second time since 1971. The deployment of the forces on a large scale around the Line of Control — the controversial demarcation line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir — proves the above argument. To avoid a war (presumably a nuclear warfare) between the two belligerent neighbours, the US, however, played a decisive role as a mediator by sending Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence Agency, on a mission to ease tensions.

Pakistan's policy entered a new phase when the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, gained power in India in March 1998 with an overtly *Hindutva* rather than secular policy. 'The social practices of the BJP elites and decision to go nuclear in 1998 showed the importance of *Hindutva*'s ideology.⁵² This situation turned Pakistan's cautious and restrained policies into one of weaponization by testing its nuclear devices second time in 1998. India's nuclear acquisition was focused towards power maximization, regional dominance and international prominence while security aspects had secondary priority. There was a perception in India that after the nuclear tests, India would gain recognition in the international arena.⁵³ Carranza also argued that 'search for power and international status, rather than security considerations, explained the Indian attitude'.⁵⁴

Turning to Pakistan's response to the Indian nuclear tests, predictable perception regarding India was reinforced by the BJP's electoral propaganda⁵⁵ which was based on firm determination to undo Pakistan and regain its control over Azad Kashmir. The logic of Pakistan's nuclear tests (1998) and response was completely Indo-centric seeking to offset India's conventional superiority. These events show that Pakistan's threat perception remained real and evolved over time. Pakistan maintained its claim that its nuclear deterrence is defensive to address the perceived threat from India, and to nullify Indian perception of undoing the creation of Pakistan. Moreover, analysis of Pakistan's pursuit of maximization of security would suggest that it is based on realists' notion of balance of power to guarantee peace with adversary. Atal Bihari Vajpayee later realized that the notion of 'Refocusing on *Hindutva*' was not workable. He visited Lahore to share prospects of peace and stability with his Pakistani

counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, nonetheless, Kargil War and then Pervez Musharraf's military coup derailed the process.

Tensions did not end up here rather became further acute between 1987 and 2002, when India and Pakistan experienced additional four crises. Nonetheless, none of these slipped into a major war – including Kargil war (1999). Yet the argument that the nuclear weapons states do not fight war and that nuclear deterrence minimizes probability of war was severely challenged as the two states slipped into a major post-nuclear misadventure. This war erupted in May-July 1999, limited in its scale and goals, leaving more than a thousand casualties on each side.⁵⁶ There were two propositions on this conflict. One group of observers considered that this conflict was associated with the Indian intrusion over the LoC at the Siachen Glacier and Pakistan's intention was to secure better bargaining position over this issue. Pakistan also wanted to interdict strategic road linkage between Srinagar and Siachen to counter repeated Indian interdictions of Neelam Valley.⁵⁷ For this group, Kargil was inevitable even in the absence of the introduction of nukes in the region. Whereas, the second proposition is that Pakistan has used nuclear deterrence as a cover or bargaining chip to force India to resume a substantive dialogue on Kashmir,⁵⁸ to internationalize the Kashmir cause and reinvigorate freedom struggle.⁵⁹ However, by any calculation, crafted hastily, this was the most dangerous confrontation which erupted in the nuclearized environment.⁶⁰ Again it was the US' intervention (due to the presence of nuclear weapons in this region) which helped ease the tempers of the two states, thus, pulling the forces back to barracks.

The Kargil conflict ushered a new dimension in the paradigm of nuclear deterrence – the notion of stability-instability paradox⁶¹ and emergence of Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)⁶² the strategy of Pro-Active Operations (PAO), and the construct of Two Front War (TFW). The two states nullified the notion and spirit of nuclear deterrence theory thus sliding into a crisis. This was something which had not happened before. Besides Kargil, the terrorists' attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi in December 2001 was also a dangerous development that brought the two states close to a clash in a post nuclearized environment. India blamed Pakistan that Kashmiri militant such as *Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba* and *Jaish-e-Muhammad*⁶³ were involved.⁶⁴ This event led India to launch 'Operation Parakram' on 18 December 2001 by mobilizing its forces for another war. Presumably, the US intervened to diffuse tension. The irrational move was initiated by Pakistan at Kargil and India's 'Operation Parakram' put the regional peace and stability at enormous risk with international consequences attached to it. India in 2008 further intensified regional security milieu in the form of another border standoff that created a war-like situation in the region and alarmed the US. The US was strongly relying on Pakistan for legitimatizing its mobility in Afghanistan against terrorism. It was unmanageable for the US to allow Pakistan to shift its focus from the Afghan border to the eastern one. Thus the US' diplomatic intervention eased tensions between India and Pakistan.

New political doctrines and more complexities

Furthermore, the event of 9/11 dramatically transformed the international security environment. After the 9/11 terrorists attack on the US, Pakistan became a frontline state in the war on terror in Afghanistan. The 9/11 event favoured New Delhi as it abruptly aligned Pakistan with the Taliban and terrorism, and projected itself as an innocent actor and victim of terrorism. More so, the efficacy and status of Kashmir was considerably marginalized in the light of these developments without creating distinction between freedom struggle and terrorists' activities.

In the post-9/11 environment, Manmohan's era had witnessed better relations with Pakistan for two main reasons: first, Pakistan was busy in fighting war against terror with the US forces in Afghanistan; therefore, it was not an appropriate time for India to initiate any confrontation with Pakistan, Second, Manmohan was also busy in concentrating on domestic political issues and forcefully harnessed Indian economy with global outreach. At the same time, extensive literature contributed by the Indian scholars at home and abroad positioned Pakistan on corner thus aligning it with terrorism phenomenon, building strong alliance with Afghanistan and promoting proxy against Pakistan through the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. To sum up this argument, indeed the post 9/11 developments and the role of Non-State Actors and terrorists' cross border activities had further exploited the two states prospects for peace and hence, intensified mistrust and derailed the peace process for more than a decade now.

A Hindu extremist, Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014 in India. Modi's foreign policy agenda remained focused on three priority areas for until today: improving India's international ties with key states (especially in East Asia) in ways that will aid its economic development; bolstering India's security with regard to both Pakistan and China, thus pressurizing Pakistan through disengagement; and 'leveraging India's 'soft power' in the West and the developing world to increase New Delhi's global standing and influence.'⁶⁵ He introduced Modi doctrine,⁶⁶ that postulates forceful maximization of political influence through greater maritime power thereby re-invigorating partnerships from the Indo-Pacific to the Asia-Pacific and hence transformed the Indian "Look East" policy to the "Act East" Policy. India has forcefully re-defined bilateral security partnerships with Japan, Australia, and the US-centric alliances, which are the salient features of this doctrine. Modi has been professing phrases like peaceful development and expansionism in the contemporary environment. Based on its expansionism notion, this doctrine seems more domineering, dangerous and aggressive in the regional context, which is likely to exert enormous pressure on Pakistan.

In the recent past, India did not restrain itself from constructing a global narrative populated with strong anti-Pakistan sentiment alleging Pakistan for harbouring and promoting terrorism inside India. Pakistan responded consistently that 'India has provided material support, through Afghanistan, to the insurgents in Baluchistan and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal areas in the north-west and is now unhappy that instead of a responding to peace

overtures, India is ratcheting up the anti-Pakistan rhetoric.⁶⁷ Thus, Pakistan had been categorically denying such allegations referring to rendering enormous sacrifices in the war on terror along with the US and global forces since 2011. Empirical record indeed shows Pakistan's recent renewed efforts in reformulating stringent border security policy against terrorists in form of operation Zarb-e-Azb.⁶⁸ The political and military leadership has pronounced this year – 'a year of great victory against terrorists.'⁶⁹ Indeed, the successful dividends resulted in reduced attacks, domestic stability, improved relations and intelligence sharing with Afghanistan and the US.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has made efforts and aspired to build peace and warmer relations between India and Pakistan. However, Indian provocative behaviour fortifies uncertainty and complexity. The Indian Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Rajyavardhan Rathore recently stated that Indian strikes in Myanmar (Indian army conducted cross-border strikes on two insurgent camps in Myanmar)⁷⁰ were a message to all the countries, including Pakistan and groups harbouring 'terror intent' that India would strike at the 'place and at a time' of its choice. He highlighted that, 'a terrorist is a terrorist and has no other identity. We will strike when we want to.'⁷¹ Modi, during his two-day visit to Bangladesh in June this year not only accused Pakistan of spreading terrorism (revealing no evidences) in India but also confirmed that India had played a part in the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, while presenting the 'surrender picture' of General Niazi signing the Instrument of Surrender with General Arora.⁷² Indian leaders' provocative statements of this kind have increased Pakistani masses' anti-Indian sentiments. At the political level, in response to Indian recent aggressive statements, both the Houses of Parliament in Pakistan passed unanimous resolutions thus 'vehemently condemning the irrational behaviour and hostile statements against Pakistan from the Indian ruling leadership. Such statements confirm Pakistan's belief about the past and present Indian involvement in destabilising Pakistan.'⁷³ The members in the resolution re-affirmed Pakistan's firm resolve to never allow any country to violate its territory under any pretext.⁷⁴

While Pakistan is pointing fingers at *Research and Analysis Wing* (RAW – Indian intelligence agency) for spreading, sustaining and supporting terrorism in the country,⁷⁵ India is restating its allegations that Islamabad is doing little to prosecute the November 2008 Mumbai attackers.⁷⁶ These ideas, misperception based on misplaced suspicion, and attitudes of the elites are further undermining the peace process and complicating regional politics. This is how Pakistan-India rivalry is enduring and it is not going to fade in the next few decades. Though, India has shifted its focus from Pakistan to a more globalized form, but Pakistan's security calculus is still strongly hinged upon the Indian threat.

Mechanism for peace and conflict resolution

The paper has highlighted some previous models and constructs that could help resolve current problems in this region to which the present study has called 'modelling history for finding solutions of contemporary problems'. For

example, the agreements such as Indus Basin Treaty (1960), Tashkent Peace Agreement (1965), Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968), Shimla Agreement (1972), and Lahore Declaration (1998), were significant arrangements based on liberal framework to build cooperation and peace between arch rivals. Nevertheless, all the agreements and peace mechanisms failed except the Indus Water Treaty, which was concluded with the help of the World Bank. The Tashkent peace agreement was initiated with the Soviet support following the 1965 war. It stipulated that relations between India and Pakistan should base on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other. The Shimla agreement was initiated in 1972, which renounced the use of force as a means of settling outstanding disputes and both states agreed to resolve their issues bilaterally. However, implementation of these agreements remained poor. The agreements failed because of the two main reasons. First, powerful India had never demonstrated political will to negotiate on the final status of Kashmir and did not allow third party mediation. Second, the revisionist India always desired to exploit peace and vulnerabilities of a smaller adversary to maximize its own hegemonic gains and political influence in the regional security construct and global political affairs based on its realist guided Greater Indian vision.

The significant questions which lingers are: How can these two states overcome their enduring rivalry and develop normal neighbourly ties? How can mistrust be reduced, conflicts be resolved and peace be secured between India and Pakistan? First, this study has found that the fundamental problem lies in the distinct strategic and political directions of the two states, which preserve asymmetric relationship. Powerful and hegemonic India works on realist guided revisionist motives based on its 'Greater India Vision' to dominate the regional securitization order. In pursuit of these goals, India has demonstrated hard power and intrusive approach with its immediate neighbourhood mainly Pakistan. Pakistan has considered India as an existential threat and has been trying to maximize its security to outweigh the Indian threat, regional imbalance and Indian hegemonic designs. This process has generated and intensified security dilemma and security-insecurity paradox with increased suspicions, mistrust and anti-state sentiments. It has been argued that India as a larger country with strong regional economic and so called democratic credentials, needs to modify its Kautiliya guided realist learning curve from its policy against Pakistan to initiate steps towards normalization of its relations with Pakistan.

Indeed, the chequered history of Pakistan-India relations is mired by unresolved territorial issues. Thus the rivalry would persist unless the two states demonstrate serious efforts to initiate a peaceful and workable mechanism towards the resolution of their territorial issues. Sir Creek and Siachen are not complicated conflicts when compared to Kashmir. The Indus Water and Rann of Kutch Model offer guidance towards the resolution of these disputes. Nevertheless, India is not ready to accept third party involvement, which is the major stumbling block in this context. The study strongly assumes that bilateralism failed to yield any favourable dividends in this region. Therefore, liberal framework offers a strong security mechanism towards the resolution of

these conflicts through third party mediation. Liberals believe that 'the international system and peace and stability are not dependent on the balance of power between states but on international law and institutions.'⁷⁷ They rightly claim that 'institutions settle distributional conflicts, assuring that gains are equally distributed.'⁷⁸ Thus third parties, such as the United Nations, the European Union and stronger states like the US through their diplomatic efforts and direct intervention can help resolve these issues.

The issue of Kashmir is the most complicated one with no end in sight. The most plausible and relevant approachable solution for Kashmir was Pervez Musharraf's four-point agenda – a gradual withdrawal of troops, self-governance, no changes to the region's borders and a joint supervision mechanism.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Indian elites abandoned the whole idea. India's cold responses showed that it was not ready to compromise or accept any solution for Kashmir. The greedy and revisionist states generally do not aspire to cooperate, negotiate on resolution of the territorial issues or go for peace mechanism while they aim at engaging a smaller adversary in crises or war like situations. It makes logical sense that India may not be able to attain its greater India status until it resolves the issue of Kashmir under the framework of international law — considering the aspirations, will and status of the people of Kashmir. The people of Kashmir should be given the right to decide their destiny in a fair and free plebiscite under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions of 1948. . Without the help of international institutions and the US, the issue between the two states will aggravate further mistrust and exploit peace in the nuclearized region. Any effort towards peace process would remain fruitless unless the issue of Kashmir is addressed seriously based on self-determination.

To facilitate the above process such as resolution of enduring conflicts, there are certain areas, which indicate 'implicit ways of convergence' for both India and Pakistan. Bilateral integration and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) would reduce mistrust and modify intensified behaviour of the two states against each other. How would this process be materialized? The bottom up model approach would help build graduated trust and minimize differences. For example, sincere focus on the developmental goals through areas such as trade, poverty alleviation, joint education mechanisms, sharing of health practices and facilities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief management, freedom of the seas – suppression of crimes like piracy in a joint manner — can help mitigate mistrust between the two states. Indeed, the enablers for conflict resolution that could bring both states close on areas of shared concerns could be: Social factors contributing to the genesis of both states' rival identities which led to such intractable security disputes in the first place, which can play a vital role in conflict resolution Cultural perspective may provide ways to integrate history, memories and elites' constructed perceptions in both the countries. Peaceful normative framework would help the two states in lessening their tensions and eliminating the trans-national terrorists' activates who could threaten the region. Terrorism is a common threat, which demands combined efforts and spirit to be rooted out from the region. The trust deficit in addition to the incongruity of material power has an equal important socio-cultural aspect

that is often neglected and seldom gets enough recognition. The states' elites and leaders have to choose more rational and diplomatic way of transmitting political messages or communication and avoid blame-games. In addition, geographical contiguity, interdependence on natural resources such as water and food resources would help lessen the tensions and reconcile old wounds.

It is argued that the interests of Europe, the US, Russia and other countries are going to make their presence permanently visible in the Asia-Pacific region (because Asia is considered as a strategic hub as the 21st century economy lies in this region) in this century which offers new avenues for cooperation to these two rival states. The US with its centric alliance in the Asia Pacific may continue to encourage India towards the resumption of a dialogue between India and Pakistan. Instead of creating imbalance by rewarding India (a non-NPT nuclear weapon state) with material support through the Indo-US nuclear Deal, armaments and naval platforms, new delivery and surveillance means,⁸⁰ the US can help construct a security mechanism to address the two states, insecurity and political complexities. Track-II diplomacy can help reinstate official talks. Nevertheless, Track-II holds no significance in the absence of governmental dialogue. Presence of nukes and democratic rule in both the countries offer an environment that could be conducive to reinstate CBMs and trade links. The two states have to modify their strategic behaviour and attitude to learn from each other's strengths and best practices. Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons would continue to play a role in the national security policy of these two states as these weapons did maintain fragile peace and prevented outbreak of a conventional or total war since 1983. Introduction of nuclear weapons, advancements in nuclear delivery mechanisms and rising arms race, instead, do not stabilize the region, but contributes to the escalation of these states insecurities in the absence of dialogue and CBMs. However, both states need to clearly establish understanding, neither use of total force is feasible nor is the concept of total victory achievable in the nuclear domain.

Conclusion

This paper has revealed that the root causes of divergences between the two states lies in the disputed territorial issues and distinct directions demonstrated in their different political and religious goals, ideas, elites' perceptions, statements and convoluted history. The study has validated the adequacy of realists' assumption in the context of India that is the powerful actor, which has focused on attaining a global status through forceful maximization of political influence and material power thus undermining the bordering state's security concerns. Pakistan's security environment has been defined clearly by Indian status quo oriented behaviour (historic rivalry, defence expansion and its hegemonic role). The regional strategic environment, in which Pakistan has perceived India as an existential threat to its security and survival has defined Pakistan's strategic thinking and culture. The leaderships' aggressive behaviours and divergent attitudes which are based on misplaced suspicions are closely tied to the respective identity discourse of the two states. The security dilemma and divergence has been created predominantly at the

elites' level which has shaped the strategic culture of the two states thus creating impediments that impede the formation of 'security communities' in South Asia.⁸¹ For Pervaiz, 'the elites have manipulated socio-cultural myths to spread animosity between the populations of both states.'⁸² It is imperative for the elites of the two countries to stop demonizing each other and start cooperating for the mutual benefits of the people and towards resolution of the territorial conflicts.

The territorial conflicts, mainly the issue of Kashmir, are a fundamental one that deepens security dilemma, increases mistrust and probability of war between the two states. The most plausible and relevant approachable solution on Kashmir is based on the liberal framework that favours international institutions and law. The liberal framework offers a strong security mechanism towards the resolution of these conflicts through third party mediation. Finally, both India and Pakistan should talk about their future, not wars and must devise strategies to avoid uncertainty that could lead to fateful conflict. To avoid conflict between the two states, a bottom up approach should be followed, re-open all areas of cooperation, build deeper economic integration and cooperation in the present globalized environment for the people inhabiting in both states.

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