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PARTISAN MEDIA UNDER MODI: NATIONALISM A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND FAKE NEWS IN INDIA

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Abstract

In 2014, the media in India became a dominant mode of communication and information during the elections. The victory of Narendra Modi was possible due to the social media campaign that made him the first social media prime minister. Media, considered the fourth pillar of democracy, has undergone politicised pulsations under Modi. The media policy adopted by Modi turned out to be a double-edged governance strategy. This strategy has been used by the BJP government to implement its ideological principles of Hindutva under the garb of nationalism. Besides the personalised dissemination of information through the traditional and electronic media, the Modi government has employed intimidation to silence and control it. Similarly, the forthcoming electoral campaign of Modi and his party has been following the same pattern of playing every card to succeed. The media under the greater nationalistic agenda of Modi has used all kind of measures for his popularity among the general public. This paper explores the way the democratic media has been transformed into a partisan one. Furthermore, it explores how the Modi regime is using its influence to impose its nationalistic and Hindu religious doctrine on Indians.

Key Words: *Hindu nationalism, yellow journalism, Lok Sabha elections 2019, media sensationalism, brand Modi*

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Introduction

Narendra Modi became India's first social media prime minister in 2014. His victory changed the latitude of Indian media. The winning tweet of Modi, "India had won! Good days are coming," at the time became the most retweeted post in the Indian history, with more than 70,000 and counting, confirmed the momentous role social media would be playing. Besides the conventional political campaign, social media for the first time became a dominant medium of communication and information during the elections of 2014. The imminent social media strategy platform provided the local pulse for winning the 2014 elections, amplified its scope under Modi to transfer his ideological notions and policy approach through his governance. Hence, a new style of personalised policy penetration emerged that disseminated messages via the traditional mode of journalism both print (newspapers) and electronic (television and radio networks) as well as digitalised social networks (google, twitter etc.), to pick up instant pointers for the very policy and programmes the government intended to introduce to construct the favourable consensus. "Now we are going to use this [social media] as a tool for listening," said Vinit Goenka, the national co-convenor of the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) IT unit. Did they listen? Was the feedback impactful enough to change the mindset of Modi's belligerent policy orientation within and across the borders? The phenomenal use of different modes of media, which brought Modi in power in democratic India, endured politicised autocratic vibrations under him.¹ The media strategy Modi adopted turned out to be a double-edged sword for his governance, which exposed him and his religious and political partiality to the people. The Modi-led BJP government faced criticisms and challenges through social media and the government used intimidation to control journalism and media outlets.

With the 2019 Lok Sabha elections looming, Modi, once again, is determined to play the game of Brand Modi. With his 2014 landslide win in elections, Brand Modi, a regional brand turned into a national and redefined brand in the Indian politics, capturing the popular imagination. Aspiring a similar victory in 2019 by reasserting his brand has been overshadowed by his decisively wide-ranging policy of nationalism, which he amenable propagated. The two arms of this policy were aimed at netting inland propagation of Hindu nationalism and meddling with foreign policy in the garb of nationalism. In this context, the utilisation of nationalism was mainly practised in its relations with Pakistan under the notion of redefining Indian national security via a media stratagem. Partisan media marked by yellow journalism and fake news played a significant role both at home and across the border. At home in the form of spreading Hindutva and across the border in the form of power projection of superiority against Pakistan. The five years of Modi rule have been nationalism theatre in alliance with Media clout. Whether Modi can triumph over his aggressive policies of the five years by diverting popular criticism from himself to faking Indo-Pak tensions to get away as he did in the past from his tainted governance as Chief Minister of Gujarat state, which saw the ruthless 2002 anti-Muslim riots before winning 2014 elections, is yet to be seen. For now, media in the forthcoming electoral campaign of Narendra Modi has already begun to play every card as a game-changer for Modi and his party to succeed.

Indian Media and Modi

The media, as many political experts claim, is the fourth pillar in a democratic state since it has the power to make and break opinions. It acts as a substantial tool in shaping the national narrative and in realising this responsibility it should report objectively without bias. Their responsibility is to report facts and inform the masses. However, the case of Indian media under the Modi administration has

been different from the traditional mode of responsibilities the institution has. Modi administration exerted its influence and intimidation on media for the political captivation of his popularity in the minds of Indians. Media under Modi became a case of fake news reporting, transforming journalism into yellow journalism for their benefit.

Journalism exists in several forms, print journalism includes newspapers and magazines, broadcast journalism covers television and radio news, and cyber journalism includes the widely used internet. Yellow journalism and fake news paint a picture of today's media under Modi in India. The concept of yellow journalism can be defined as follows:

Yellow Journalism is a term used for the use of negligent and flamboyant newspaper reporting, without regard to facts. With yellow journalism the truth is usually misrepresented or concealed, more often than not, there may be no truth to the story at all.²

Modi government benefited from this kind of yellow journalism to report situational tales and make the people believe them via faking news with the use of digitalised and electronic media. Modi and his government sensationalised news to build his persona as a saviour of modern India. What sensational fake news does is:

Sensational news ... involved people in what was going on in the world and so painted those events in a particular way as to assure that the public took a particular side based upon a specific sentiment regarding [those] events.³

Moreover, fake news, as defined by Neil Levy (University of Oxford) is, *"The presentation of false claims that purport to be about the*

world in a format and with a content that resembles the format and content of legitimate media organisations."⁴

In short, as William Randolph Hearst and his *New York Journal* illustrated, the most skilful harnessing of yellow journalism's power is the power to both maximise profits and fulfil a political agenda.⁵

In the past five years, Modi and his followers made maximum use of news houses to ensure that their nationalism doctrine and ideas get conveyed to the masses, else they were subjected to pressures and interdiction. As it stands out today, media under the government's influence has a position of distorting events with sensational headlines and inaccuracies knowingly at the cost of being labelled as less credible. The media outlets for their interests succumb to government pressures as well and spread false news and propaganda to earn Television Rating Points (TRPs). Speculative reporting for a speculative audience leads to diminishing of reliability of news, as witnessed during the end of 19th century when yellow journalism served leading government agendas rather than delivering factual information. The media in India has embodied these traits to an extent of becoming a meaningless press, characterised by 'prominent headlines' that 'scream excitement' with 'lavish use of pictures', and subdues 'campaigns against abuses suffered by the common people' like in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) by presenting official policy narrative.⁶

Indian Media: Free Expression or Owned to Fake?

Controlling press and media in India has been a practice for some time now because of its politicised nature. Notable Indian press and media houses are either owned by political parties or by business classes affiliated with politicians and their parties. The Radia tapes controversy of November 2010 not only exposed the then ruling coalition of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) but made media limelight for revealing corrupt journalistic ethics, mainly that eliciting information gets primacy with no thought given to the means opted.

Investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), recorded between 2007 and 2009, the tapes included around 5,000 conversations⁷ between Nira Radia, a political and entrepreneur lobbyist, and prominent politicians, which uncovered a wide nexus among businessmen, politicians, and journalists who play a role in manipulating news. Senior and eminent journalists like Barkha Dutt, Prabhu Chawla, and Vir Sanghvi appeared to be a part of the nexus. But with standard media ethics in jeopardy and public trust eroded, they continue to hold high positions, even when public trust eroded in them. The corporate sector has taken over the moral and social aspects of news as paid news has become the norm.⁸ Like business interests, even the Bollywood and sports industry get paid to publicise political news and agendas, as it became very obvious during the India-Pakistan tensions over the Balakot airstrikes that escalated to concerns of a nuclear conflict. Modi urged the Bollywood and other notable celebrities and journalists by tagging them on social media to spread his vote awareness message, '#VoteKar' campaign.⁹

In India, the prominent newspapers, news channels, and publishing and media houses are owned and controlled by politicians belonging to different political parties. *The Tribune*, a centrist newspaper is known for pro-Congress attitude. *The Pioneer* is known for pro-BJP right-wing nationalist ideology focusing more on pro-right movements emerging from urban middle-class sections. The owner and Editors-in-Chief of the paper is a member of the BJP as well. *The Statesman* is highly supportive of left-wing communists and anti-establishment approach. *The Hindu* is open about its communist party affiliation and ideologies. Ramnath Goenka the founder of *The Indian Express* was a member of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Later with the split of the paper group into two, opposite loyalties emerged: *The Indian Express* with support for Congress and *The New Indian Express* continuing to support NDA and right-wing ideologies. *Hindustan Times*, regarded as a worst-case of partisan

media has been a Congress party propaganda pawn. Managed by notable industrialist KK Birla's daughter, who was also a Rajya Sabha member of Congress until 2012. *Times of India*, the leading English-language newspaper has shown bias towards the UPA now and then. Although at times it claims to be a public voice, business gains count.¹⁰

The alliance between the media and influential politicians has massively impacted the quality and independence of news channels. According to the 2012 report of *Business Standard*, more than a third of news channels in India are owned by politicians and political affiliates who exert their powerful position via their channels as 'political vehicles' to sway the course of local elections. Parthasarathy in his article said that "owning a news entity has become a practical necessity for political parties in India." Channels like Sun TV, Kalaingnar, Makkal TV, etc. owned by politicians and their families, broadcast favourable news coverage for the party of their choice. At times these channels refrain from covering issues that may cause criticism. Furthermore, nearly 60 per cent of the cable distribution system is owned by local politicians that block telecasts of channels politically unfavourable. Overall, a practice has been established to stifle independent voices, which has divided the media within itself by becoming a partisan puppet of the funding support they receive.¹¹

Election Fever and Fake Propagation

According to a research study carried out by Oxford Researchers¹² India concluded that cyber-troop activities are particularly tied to elections. The study found evidence of political parties spreading propaganda via social networks during elections. Moreover, WhatsApp was found to be the key source of disinformation spread across the country, besides the popularity of Twitter and Facebook messages. Even hired political campaigners or consulting firms to spread online propaganda through these networks, which facilitate the Indian public to broadly connect as a community,

resulting in the spread of distorted news. The ruling BJP, in the forthcoming 2019 elections, has reportedly set up thousands of WhatsApp groups to reach out directly to their electorate. Amit Shah, the BJP president, is a member of every group. During the 2014 elections, the BJP was accused of starting internet trolls and fake image forwards scheme. Similarly, this year, in some of the state elections, WhatsApp reportedly lodged widespread misinformation from multiple political figures was disseminated through WhatsApp. Twitter, another platform being tested and tried for acquiring successful outreach, has become vital for the politicians and political parties to promote their supportive campaigns and agendas. Recently, Twitter's removal of fake accounts, where Prime Minister Modi lost 300,000 followers and Congress chief Rahul Gandhi lost 17,000, showed the dominant customary attitude among Indian political candidates.¹³

Media Model of Narendra Modi

Modi's Prime Minister's Office (PMO) opted for a social media communication strategy over the conventional method of communication to connect directly with the electorates. While New Delhi's PMO media strategy was new as it retained distance and information dearth, this was Modi's style of media model to function even when he was Gujarat chief minister. Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, author of *Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times*, writes, "[Modi's] media policy now is a national extension of how he dealt with the media in Gujarat." Modi's definition of news is plain information with an absence of analysis and opinion. Mukhopadhyay further elaborates, "He has been escaping dialogue and prefers monologues. He uses media as an amplifier of his achievements. If he had his say, he would not want editorial pages in the newspapers and want them only as a litany of events."¹⁴ It became more visible with television news, primetime news anchors, panel discussants, and speeches of Modi

were all broadcasting Hindu nationalist agendas. In the past years of Modi governance, the media received directions from the PMO. The staff there monitored and devised the media strategy on how media should report on Prime Minister and his government actions.¹⁵

Any office is what the holder makes of it, so Modi made the PMO an over-zealous, micromanaging decision-making body with clear Constitutional deviation, making it look more like a presidential-style PMO. Modi won as the harbinger of change and he altered the media culture and milieu to provide the script suitable to his wider policies. The tailored media approach favourable to the PMO destroyed a cohesive sense of purpose behind media expression.¹⁶ In short, media in the hands of Modi and his party converted the Prime Minister's Office into what Rahul Gandhi called the "Publicity Minister's Office."¹⁷

A Cat and Mouse Game of News Scooping from the PMO

A key pillar of democratic India had always been its free, diverse, and vibrant media industry. It began to crumble under governmental pressures of Modi's media style of controlling information. The upshot for the reporters had been that they became exhausted in getting tuned up with the new media culture, where information got hard to come by. Presumably, the PMO was advised to refrain from spending time with journalists, which made the news hard to be confirmed or verified. In contrast to the previous setup, journalists were fed Modi's speeches, statements, and tweets. Even on foreign trips, Modi chose to travel with reporters from public service broadcasters like Doordarshan and the All India Radio, unlike his predecessors who took more than 30 correspondents with them. A deliberate effort was made to bypass traditional media. The new media model was made to look out for new techniques to get 'the news' to tow their lines. The broadcast was done to make a piece of unverified news into a world of make-believe. For journalists and

reporters, the challenge was to write stories matching PMO's account. Moreover, in the case of a reporter getting the lead but unable to receive concerned branch's confirmation, he/she were left speculating. At times, this unconfirmed news would become a news piece.¹⁸

Introducing Fear of Expression

Modi's resentment towards journalists and distrust towards the media grew in the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots. Hence, Modi and his party never missed an opportunity to degrade them. Government spokespersons would boycott television channels that failed to maintain the dictated lines. The measures to silence media were favourable to the Modi government on marking the limits to freedom of expression. The displeasure of the Modi government had been a reason for many prominent high-profile journalists' exits. One of the reasons *Hindustan Times* editor Bobby Ghosh resigned was government's annoyance over his online feature *Hate Tracker*, that listed reports of hate crimes across India. Since Modi came to power, a noteworthy number of hate crimes and targeted attacks largely against Muslims and Dalits by cow vigilantes increased. Modi chose to remain silent and failed to use his powers to condemn lynching and vigilante violence. The linking of Modi's silence to the regular incidents irked him and after Ghosh's resignation, the *Hate Tracker* disappeared from the newspaper's site. The Modi loyalist media personalities also remained conscious of the limits within which they worked by balancing Modi's sensitivity over public and media criticism and the fictionalised news he wanted to be propagated.¹⁹

In another conspicuous case, the voice of first-rate journalists like Karan Thapar was also silenced for questioning the government. The famous interview Karan Thapar had with Modi, did not last for more than a few minutes as it was terminated by Modi himself, because of Thapar's probing questions about the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat state under Modi's watch. It resulted in finding him out of television and any favourable circle with the BJP. BJP members refused

to give him interviews or attend his panel discussions. Since that interview, Modi's political journey took him to the zenith of power while in contrast Thapar's career as a television show host hit a brick wall. His contract never got renewed once expired in 2014 with the CNN-IBN and in 2017 *India Today*, due to management's fears of being boycotted. Abhisar Sharma, another senior anchor, was taken off-air for 15 days after he questioned the management's decision not to criticise Modi on his shows. Similarly, many more journalists have come under constant attacks from members and affiliates of the larger Hindu-nationalist network. Offices of New Delhi Television (NDTV) were raided by the CBI in an attempt to restrain the network from criticising Modi. Gauri Lankesh, editor of the Kannada newspaper was shot dead because she was reportedly anti-Hindu. The ABP News TV channel came under attack when a fake paid news to a village woman about her increased wages due to Modi policies was fact-checked by the channel. This explains how systematic political pressures under Modi government meddled with journalism.²⁰

Over the past four years, frequent arrests for sharing cartoons, images, messages, memes, and any critical social media post have appeared at alarming regularity since Modi swept to power in 2014. The arrested included students, teachers, businessmen, even police officials on complaints registered by Hindu nationalist organisations like Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, Samajwadi Party, BJP etc. concocted under Section 153-A for 'promoting disharmony'.²¹ Modi made sure he became a supreme face of the BJP and the Union Government. He took ownership of every policy and scheme proclamation. The moment a journalist became critical of Modi's policies or expressed disappointment in his scheme, the temperature would build up for arm-twisting them with a boycott of the channel. Journalists also saw themselves fired or resigned under threats and intimidation or refusal of communication, increasing amount of censorship, etc.²² In its annual World Press Freedom Index, the Paris-based *Reporters Without Borders*

said that Hindu nationalists were trying to purge all displays of anti-national thought from national debate and that self-censorship had grown and mainstream media journalists had become targets of most radical Hindu nationalists.²³ The *de facto* policy of the party's media mechanism has been to build Modi's image, else be labelled anti-national. Unfortunately, the result of this policy projection had been a distrust in India's professional media that erased the distinction between fake news and fact.

Nationalism and Blind *Bhakti*: Election Tactics and Fake News Driver

As a publicity stunt for 2019 elections, under the National umbrella, Modi came up with a 'MainBhiChowkidar' campaign slogan. For this drive, Modi even renamed his Twitter profile account to 'Chowkidar Narendra Modi'. Similarly, as a coordinated campaign launch, the slogan was followed by his party members, also advertisement videos about people being shown as chowkidar were broadcast.²⁴ Modi and his party are all set to fiercely campaign via media for promoting 'Brand Modi' and pulling down any opposition alliance or criticism against them. In 2014, Modi and his party benefited from media connectivity openly supportive of him for economic gains at a larger level similar to his Gujarat model, so that no one dared to question his critical policies against minorities.

Unable to contest on economic and development platform in 2019, Prime Minister Modi and his party are depending on Hindu nationalism and populism cards as an election ploy. Modi failed to implement his policies successfully to bring 'good days' to Indians, he remained a performer rather than a reformer. Hence, new techniques and old tactics of using nationalism and populism to sensationalise sentiments of the majority come into play. Throughout his governance, Modi kept his nationalism doctrine thriving, most crucial

policy to be exploited anytime when needed both at home and beyond borders with Pakistan to scale up popularity ratings.

Modi Doctrine of Nationalism

Nationalism in Modi's India centres on Hindu nationalism at home. The concept of Hindutva, a vital element for the emergence of Indian nationalism is a desire and a political belief to see only Hindu with the highest sense of his or her unique identity to be an Indian nationalist.²⁵ Hinduism, according to hardliners like Modi and the RSS, should replace secularism as the guiding code of Indian society. Hinduism, despite its overwhelming demographic presence after independence, never became India's Constitutional religion and the country officially embraced secularism. The architects of the secular and pluralistic Indian nationhood aimed to embrace their diversified communities of religious minorities, i.e., Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and varying philosophies and sects. However, today a surging wave of Hindutva nationalism has challenged this foundational philosophy of Nehru and Gandhi, by bringing the national political identity of the majority Hindu community in the mainstream national debate. The intolerant debate has pitted traditional pluralism against a narrowly religious-based conception of Indian nationhood.²⁶ Congress leader Shashi Tharoor spoke on the touchy subject and maintained that Hinduism and Hindutva were different from each other. "Hinduism at large vastly encompasses religion with a tremendous amount of choice of freedom within it, while Hindutva is a narrow concept which reduces religion and attaches it to political identity. The issue with Hindutva is that it believes its way is the only way and everyone is either inferior or excluded from it."²⁷

Narendra Modi embodies the past, present, and future of the Hindu nationalist movement. Hindu nationalism plays a crucial role in Modi's constituency. One important wing of BJP focuses on religious loyalty and the other one on economics. While the business and middle class preferably focus on economic reforms facilitating their

businesses, the religious-minded Hindu voters put their ideological interests at the top. Hence, Modi manoeuvred these religious faultlines for political gains and is bent on doing so in the 2019 polls. For example, in early 2015, to win state elections, Modi warned of an increase in the possibility of cattle slaughter, knowing clearly how sacred it is to Hindus. These statements meant to instigate Hindu vote by stigmatising beef-eating Muslims.²⁸

A Hindu nationalist prime minister in a secular India was expected to emphasise its party's traditional ideology to make India an inherently Hindu country from being a secular one. To blanket Hindu religious superiority under the cloak of nationalism, Modi and his government reached out to the Hindu majority through every press and media platform. The ruling party secured hardline Hindu nationalism agendas with their barbaric cow protection laws, the appointment of extremist Hindu nationalists/*Bhakt*s to powerful positions of the highest level, and atrocities against Muslims in the garb of patriotism. The nomination of controversial demagogue Hindu monk Yogi Adityanath for the Chief Minister's position of the most populous state of Uttar Pradesh explained Modi's priority shift from economic to Hindutva for future electoral enticement as a backup policy to contest on. Nativism in the form of reviving Hindu identity has become a strategy to make people believe that failures of Hindu nationalism have been a major cause needs remedy. The volunteers of nativist parent organisation RSS are being compelled to mobilise voters by intensifying their Hindu nationalist agendas for whom it is acceptable to rely on polarisation.²⁹

Personalised Politics of Symbolism

To understand the electoral politics of Modi and his party under the nationalist drive of building a new image of India, Prime Minister Modi constructed the 305-foot statue of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel called the 'Statue of Unity' on a river island in the Narmada River in Gujarat: the native state of Gandhi as well as Modi himself.³⁰ Modi

honoured Patel with his speech laced with symbolism, political hints, and electoral considerations, calling him a national hero who remained true to Hindu roots of keeping the nation united, to overshadow Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Modi's message of standing for united India under the BJP was an unmistakable call to his vote bank ahead of polls.³¹ Another statue under construction in Mumbai is a massive 700-foot memorialisation of the 17th-century warrior king Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. The identity politics of the BJP government with iconography and its linkages with Hindutva ideology is carried out through the monumental buildings. The idea behind such political ambience is to transform the Nehruvian idea of secular India into an image of a homogenous identity representing Bharat Mata (Mother India) emblem with patriotism free from colonial past. The politics of symbolism, greatly covered by the media, is an effort to gain an edge over Congress by devising a different set of heroic symbols, which present Indians with a message of Hindutva and an ideology of Hindu cultural nationalism free from pluralistic and secularist image of Nehruvian ideological inheritance. The symbols in a cocktail of political moves will elevate Modi and his party.³²

The ancient Hindu past has been glorified with a campaign to rebuild Somanath Temple, now located in Gujarat. In the past, the destruction of the temple was given a communal angle and its restoration was associated with the pride of Hindu right. The second important symbolism of Hindutva pride was in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, where the Babri Mosque, built as a 'victory monument' by Mughal Emperor Babur, was located. Hindu hardliners claimed the birth of Lord Ram in the place of the mosque, which was destroyed in 1992 by fanatic Hindu Kar Sevaks. This politics of symbolism through monuments is linked with mobilisation and polarisation of Hindutva constituency.³³ A nationwide agitation campaign and hype has been demonstrated focusing on building the Ram Temple in place of the destroyed Babri Mosque. Even though it is known that the

archaeological evidence does not support this claim of the BJP, Hindu hardliners demolished the mosque to gain populist satisfaction. Furthermore, the BJP assumed power in 1998 despite instigating communal riots and segregating Hindus and Muslims.³⁴

The Indian Supreme Court insisted resolution of Ayodhya dispute through mediation between Hindus and Muslims. Expectedly, the loudest opposition has come from the politicians, religious bigots, communalists, and treacherous communal politicians. The politicians have used the dispute to further their political ambitions to gather votes. Since the BJP failed to construct Ram Temple, the symbol of Lord Ram has returned to electoral politics in 2019, which is why the Supreme Court of India was pressurised to legalise temple construction. Religious bigots and communalists have an understanding to bank on faith for more power without giving a thought to how dangerous the national path for India has become. Aligned with this group of cadres is none other than the Indian media on reporting their voices and inviting them on prime time television to create controversial interchanges for good TRPs.³⁵

In a grand show of Hindutva symbolism, the political and ideological superiority has reached ordinary Indians with the glorification of Hindu leaders through the stage of Bollywood industry. The Hindu mythological and devotional show has taken up a larger than life place with the help of Indian cinema. Just a week before the Lok Sabha polls in April 2019, with the blessings of the BJP, Modi biopic with a poster tagline "My love for my country is my strength" will be released. It will be followed by a trailer of Rahul Gandhi biopic RaGa with his famous wink as well.³⁶ The political nexus with the cinematographic world of Bollywood is known. Throughout the years of Modi government, Hindutva dogmas have been channelling clear policy preferences of Modi and his party affiliates. In a recent movie *Manikarnika*, she saves a calf from becoming a steak of the British, supplementing the ideas of Hindu hardliners who consider the cow

sacred. An integral part of Modi's flagship policy of *Swachh Bharat Abhiyan* (Clean India Campaign) a movie *Toilet* was picturised, admiring the sanitation and social revolution campaign of Modi indirectly. Another Hindi movie *Sui Dhaaga* (Needle and Thread) was released, which upheld Modi's 'Make-in-India' and 'start-up India' campaigns supporting small entrepreneurial ventures, as promised by Modi of creating 10 million jobs for Indians. In general, a noticeable increase in nationalistic films about Hindu political personalities, love stories, sports, and national security themes under Modi has been observed. Moreover, Bollywood celebrities have become directly accessible to Modi gatherings as media keeps covering details of a nexus between cinema and the political world.³⁷ The BJP president Amit Shah also echoed such historical symbolisms in his speeches. Amit Shah equated the Lok Sabha elections of 2019 to the Panipat battle, which in case of their defeat would enslave Hindus. Modi also called Congress rule as Sultanate and blamed them for ignoring India's glorious civilisation. Modi even recently called Rahul Gandhi, Emperor Aurangzeb, a comparison meant to humiliate Hindus.³⁸

Identity Supremacy and the Media Tide

The flurry of statements based on mythical Hindutva philosophies is necessarily interpreted as an important component of the political strategy to transform India's domestic political and constitutional order to Hindu ideological norms. The nationalist move under Modi in India is linked to long-desired early ideologues of Hindu supremacy. Modi and his hardline organisational partners sensationalise people's feelings that India's success on the global stage depends upon the forging of a monolithic Hindu nation.³⁹ One key factor behind right-wing Indians sharing social media content is their desire to express their 'socio-political identity'. This right identity prerogative is often linked to national pride and Hindu pride. The narratives put forth in fake news messages endorse values of 'Hindu power and superiority' and 'preservation and revival', 'validation of

identity trumps verification of facts'. According to researchers, the multiple identities among the right-wingers are bound by common narratives whereas the left endorse 'micro identities' manifested by religion, language, and caste.⁴⁰

Hindu nationalism is a political ideology expressed differently by various groups that are banded together as a Sangh Parivar, i.e., 'the family of organisation', with roots in a 19th-century confrontation between colonial British and Indians who fought for their own national identity.⁴¹ Muslim identity has become a political mobilisation instrument among the Hindutva constituency. The Muslim representation, over the last five years, has been eroded from Indian politics to near invisibility. In 2014, only 22 Muslim parliamentarians got elected to the house of 543.⁴² In a 14.2 per cent Indian Muslim population, a study in 2018 found that there were only 4 Muslims out of 1,418 BJP Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs).⁴³ In the state election of Uttar Pradesh, which has 403 legislative assembly seats, BJP gave no ticket to Muslims in 2017. The message of BJP was clear that they did not need Muslim endorsement, Hindu majoritarian support would be enough.

A BBC research, on the way the ordinary citizens engaged with and got involved in the spread of fake news, reported that the rising tide of nationalism was driving common citizens to spread fake news. The facts have become less important as an emotional desire to augment national identity has taken a higher place. Social media analysis suggest that the right-wing networks are well-organised than the left in pushing nationalistic fake stories further to an extent of having an overlap of fake news sources on Twitter and other supporting media networks of Prime Minister Modi. The series, *Beyond Fake News*, aired on television, radio, and digital media was aimed at examining how disinformation and fake news affected people around the world. The findings were that in India distrust of mainstream news outlets pushed people to spread information from alternative sources

without even verifying and blindly trusting them, believing it to be a sense of duty to spread the real story. These kinds of fake news spread via digitalised systems had increased violence in India.⁴⁴ In a mob democracy, such stunts work well for the political elite.

Hate in the name of religious-based nationalism is one of the easiest and fastest things to sell and, in the 21st century, demand for this phenomenon is rising day-by-day. For years, people's minds have been tainted by indiscriminate usage of terms against Islam and Muslims. The 21st-century journalism is the biggest reason the world has people like Narendra Modi and Donald Trump. The two leading democracies in the world and hand-in-hand with nationalistic supremacist. The rise of far-rightist groups is attributed to mainstream journalism, which created an environment of fear, mistrust, and hatred in one community towards the other. Perhaps, that is why Modi gets accommodated and has low-key support in the international community while following his nationalistic policies at home. The visible concern over the rise of populism and far-right political supremacy in India is perplexing for the left. The spiteful tone used against the non-Hindus, especially Muslims, in India is supported by mainstream Indian media and Modi is only one among many who want to capitalise on the minds corrupted by it.⁴⁵

Indian media helped in wiping away or putting under the blanket what Modi's legacy of communalism and polarisation had been in Gujarat as the state's three times chief minister. The economic part of his ideological organisation helped him pursue his electoral aspirations via pro-business persona. Big business leaders and industrialists like Ratan Tata and Ambani Brothers praised Modi and his administration in the Gujarat state. The right image for Brand Modi was put up as a progressive leader with the ability to deliver economic progress. It allowed Modi to shun secular ideals in favour of caste bias and polarisation. The media marketing opted by Modi and advocacy of corporate world transformed the blood-stained image of Modi into an

excellent orator and face of the future economic boom. Modi's speeches touched the necessities of urban class while blaming the Congress party for all the problems. Once the elections were announced, his marketing team bombarded voters with print, television, and radio advertisements with similar themes. Media campaign reached voters through text messages and his recorded voice sought votes for him. Social media platforms also highlighted his rightful image on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to magnify the impact of the advertising and branding campaign.⁴⁶

Shady *Bhakt* Syndrome

The reality of Hindu nationalism in India other than what the politicians narrate is that the nation is in the grip of 'Blind *Bhakti* Syndrome', which is in contrast to one's dedication to God. The blind *bhakti* is a political hierarchical phenomenon, which gets stronger with the majority political party in power. The government in power tends to act autocratically and even the conventional media hesitates from criticising. Under Modi, the situation for everyone is like either you band with blind *bhakt*s or be ready to become outcast, even labelled as anti-nationalist by anarchists. Due to unjust policies of the Modi government and Hindu *bhakt*s, the radicalisation of society has become a frightening norm. The manner in which Kashmiris are being pushed and freedom fighters are growing is an outcome of Hindu nationalists' radicalised attitude. Yet authors continue to write what the government in power tells them to and show that the government has done nothing wrong.

The rapidly growing insecurity and apprehension among the minorities such as attacks, lynching, violent incidents, threats etc. over the last five years, especially in the India-Occupied Kashmir (IOK), are not reflected in popular discourse. The political parties and government in power have their own cadre of blind *bhakt*s who maintain their hierarchy of knowing and keeping the ground realities to themselves.⁴⁷ While the farmers kept committing suicide and

Muslims were falsely accused of eating beef, media was only talking about how great things happened under Modi.

Modi Doctrine: At an Embryonic Stage in Indian Foreign Policy

At the foreign policy level, nationalistic drive through fake news was seen between India and Pakistan in the recent post-Pulwama airstrike on Balakot. With no official Pakistan policy from the start, the Modi government had an opening to manipulate the situation with Pakistan under the flag of saffron nationalism. Despite having an upper diplomatic hand over Pakistan in the initial phase of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, Modi faltered in the end. Pakistan from terror supporter to supporting Indian political parties remained a dominant element of media headlines in India under Modi. The national security doctrine, underwent a radical change under Modi, reflecting aggressive, unapologetic, and nationalistic tones. Escalation with Pakistan during the forthcoming elections was expected in both the countries. It was just a matter of time. In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack in IOK, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched pre-emptive strikes inside Pakistan after nearly five decades. IAF claimed to target a Jaish-e-Mohammad training camp inside Pakistan, a banned terrorist outfit that had claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Pulwama in which 40 Indian security forces personnel were killed. Experts viewed the situation as Modi's designed strategy to play the Pakistan card for shoring up political support nationally just weeks before the general elections, by showing nationalistic strength and strong leadership.⁴⁸

With the international disclosure, public speeches, official statements, and behaviour of BJP leaders could not enhance the credibility of India. The post-Pulwama strategy of the BJP government for the forthcoming polls became clear to everyone. Demonstrated by several BJP office-bearers like B.S. Yeddyurappa, who claimed to win

22 seats in the Karnataka state after the strike or the Jharkhand BJP president who claimed to win 14 seats in the state. Similarly, Delhi BJP chief tried to flaunt army uniform as a party flag. Efforts are being made to convert the democratic exercise into a nationalism parade where national security is restricted to what the Modi narrative is and where all the rest of the debate is regarded as anti-national: a convenient way for the ruling party to shut public anger mounting against Modi and his fake promises of good days. The satellite media did everything possible to muster support for this strategy of Modi; to stir-up a war hysteria by glorifying forged government claims, and to market lies and fake stories without even the pretence of an independent check. The cross-border clashes exposed the bias of Indian media to the extent of reporting in utter confusion and embarrassment globally.⁴⁹

Amit Shah claimed that 250 terrorists were killed in IAF airstrikes in Balakot, inside Pakistan, while SS Ahluwalia, a minister in Modi government, said that the aim was to precisely avoid human casualties in the Balakot strike, as it was only meant to send Pakistan a message.⁵⁰ Hence, the lying continued. The foreign Secretary asserted that terrorists, their trainers, and infrastructure were destroyed, while the IAF chief contradicted it by stating it was not the job of the armed forces to count casualties. The authenticity of the casualties and damage claims were questioned by the international press as well. However, Prime Minister Modi skipped the meeting of opposition parties and later his government refused to share the information followed by silencing queries with intimidation and bullying. The Indian political discourse got toxic because of the impact of fake news both at the domestic and international levels. The long dramatic talks about combating terrorism by Modi—as he said he would “settle all scores with terrorists” and “*hum unke ghar mein ghus ghus kar maareng* (we will go into their homes and kill them),”—were all presenting the right Brand Modi to the people. Modi targeted the

opposition on their enquiries with accusations of having softness towards Pakistan. He indulged in self-praise by claiming himself to be a man thinking only of his country while ignoring the heavy-handed security tactics applied against Kashmiris during the past five years. Blaming Pakistan has become too easy a tactic to gain voters' attention. However, avoiding disastrous policies in Kashmir based on ideological and political agenda of Sangh Parivar and refusing to open for mediation is not possible. In a written reply to the Lok Sabha, Minister of State for Home Affairs Hansraj Ahir shared that there were 1,708 terrorist incidents between 2014 and 2018.⁵¹

In a cross-border media confrontation, Pakistan blocked Indian media's reporting of Balakot airstrike as the BJP's propaganda machine. Without any verification, the Indian news media reported that 300 terrorists were killed. Pakistan, on the other hand, rejected the Indian claims and responded that the area was mainly deserted and wooded and that no casualties or damage had been inflicted. Hence, the inconsistency created confusion and spread of misinformation among the people. Mass media in India had many contradictory reports, biased, provocative, and unverified as news organisations attributed their information to 'government sources', 'forensic experts', 'police officers, and 'intelligence officers'. No independent investigations were carried out to address the serious questions of intelligence failures. Modi did not bother to address the country directly amid tensions while two press briefings by the foreign secretary and the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson were held without allowing press questions. Sadly, even after the Pulwama attack, no news site rectified the errors in their reporting as a matter of public record. The Indian media self-transformed itself into a propaganda machine of the Modi government, where anchors began to assess military technology and strategy. Speculations were repeated and many journalists even took to social media networks like Twitter to encourage the Indian army. With this media promotion of

government positions on the crisis, other crucial issues dropped out of public attention like the controversial Rafale deal and corruption charges against the government, the plight of Kashmiris, and economic failures of Modi's policies. The whole political drama raised the chances of an election victory for the BJP.⁵²

Truth, as it is said, is the first casualty of war. The stimulating thoughts in the mind of the general masses were: how the media realistically knew, except for the official handout, that there was a targeted bombing in Balakot; or how would anyone come to know of the attempted bombing that misfired; or that Indian planes merely fled with randomly dropping their payload. The facetious and hilarious situation appeared with screaming Indian TV anchors painting a picture of details with confidence as if they were eyewitnesses from the Mirage planes. Hardly any journalist or TV anchor in India compared the narrative from both sides. Even no pictures of the attack on Balakot were shown. Instead, they chose to keep showing patriotic abilities from the newsrooms. What else is expected in such situations under Modi government, especially when the channels are owned by politicians and their affiliated businessmen? Hence, a professionally crafted statement for the media was delivered.⁵³ When the government and the media nourish each other, the result is a nationalist media that takes upon itself to deliver nationalistic ideas and shame, punish, and deter independent thinkers.

In a move of nationalist preservation, Indians from all backgrounds across the globe started sharing Jai Hind hashtag messages via social media networks to show patriotism and solidarity in standing with Modi without any inquisitive debate. National security issues, especially with such dramatic show, tend to benefit the ruling party of BJP against the opposition alliance led by Congress. The sensationalisation of the incident compelled the Indian celebrities to condemn and criticise Pakistan. A celebrity, Kangana Ranaut, even made a show of calling for the destruction of Pakistan⁵⁴ without having

a realistic check of the situation, which was nothing but an election trick. Under national security protection, cross-border cultural exchanges, as well as Pakistani films, TV shows, and artists were banned in India. It was already in the nationalism pipeline to ban Pakistani art and culture spread in India due to their immense popularity among Indians and viewed as undermining Hindu cultural supremacy. All India Cine Workers Association (AICWA) announced a blanket ban on Pakistani artistes working in the Indian film industry and the organisations that aspired to work with them.⁵⁵

A section of 'Arma 2' video game was widely shared along with a clip of flypast on Pakistan's Independence day. ABP journalist Vikas Bhadauria was among those who circulated the clip with a caption saying "something like this must have happened." The clip was circulated on both Twitter and Facebook with the unverified claim of depicting the airstrike. Similarly, Twitter user Ajay Kushwala, followed by Modi on Twitter, posted the video clip on his timeline with the message, "India strikes again. This is new India under Leadership of Honourable PM Shri @narendramodi ji. India's air force destroyed terrorist camps in Pakistan and more than 200-300 militant have been killed according to souces. @ImranKhanPTI how's the josh ??#Balakot #SurgicalStrike2" However, the faint English commentary in the background raised doubts among the sane-minded. Therefore, a thorough search of gaming videos on YouTube by Alt News using different keywords found a 2015 clip of a video game 'Arma 2'. Furthermore, as the video kept spreading, many people started casting doubts and one Twitter user finally showed a side-by-side comparison of the visuals from the two videos, which turned out to be identical where a flypast by Pakistani Air Force on Pakistan's Independence Day was seen.⁵⁶

The media belligerence towards Pakistan and the determination of fuelling the Modi wave of nationalism among the citizens faced a huge setback because of the baseless reporting of the

Balakot incident. The international experts closely monitoring the incident exposed the reality of the Modi government's fake stunts. The opposition joined hands in taking down Modi's electoral tactic with a spread of old pre-poll campaign videos of Modi in which he had questioned the Manmohan Singh government on terrorism. The old speeches came to haunt Modi in the wake of the terror attack at Pulwama by the opposition over his security policies and attacks under his watch. Questions popped up like how 150-200 kilograms of military-grade explosives crossed the border under a 'strong' Modi government and how did its intelligence failed to stop a young attacker from getting explosives. Or while Modi and his ministers and other BJP leaders massively capitalised on this opportunity to make political gains, why Modi remained invisible from party meetings. It exposed the doublespeak of BJP before the logical minds.⁵⁷ On top of this reality, BJP kept its ongoing political schedule of campaigning intact to advertise Modi as the strongest leader India could have to wipe away terrorism and make India a superpower. Modi conducted the largest video conference as part of *mera booth sabse mazboot* program, meaning 'my booth is the strongest' to interact with workers and volunteers in 15,000 parts of the country without getting affected by the possibility of war with Pakistan and Indian pilot being captured in Pakistan.⁵⁸

The inconsistencies between New Delhi and Islamabad on the account of both surgical strikes claimed by Modi government compels one to look into the truth. Back in 2016, New Delhi carried out a 'surgical strike' in Pakistan where Indian troops were sent across the *de facto* border to hit terrorist targets in response to an attack on the Indian military installation in Indian Kashmir though denied any such intrusion across the border other than an exchange of fires between two sides, while India under Modi continued to account the tale to intensify nationalistic fervour at home. The widely spread misinformation led to an intensification of Indo-Pak tensions.

However, this time around, the bold claims of Indian airstrike killing large numbers of terrorists were uncovered by the world.⁵⁹ The international media exposed Modi and his lies for winning votes as well as his blind following by the media without their investigation into such huge claims. To counter the humiliating narrative, Modi and his government presented the whole strike as a show of political symbolism to demonstrate India's actionable strength.

Domestically, showing toughness towards Pakistan helps Modi politically. With unfulfilled promises, and a Pandora box full of sharp drift between the government and people, massive intolerable communal violence, a visible divide between communities, exploitation of religious sentiments, heavy losses at the expense of demonisation policy, Modi had Pakistan card as a last resort to contest 2019 general elections in the name of nationalism. As Modi's BJP suffered heavy losses in a series of crucial state-level polls in December, the macho trick was played as an opportunity to present Modi as a strong nationalist leader on national security front who could keep the country safe from the evil eye of the neighbour. Politically, the fake electoral tactics might give Modi or his party another chance from nationalist supporters but geo-politically the risk of escalation remains real in the minds of people.⁶⁰

Critically looking at the India-Pakistan picture throughout Modi governance, it becomes clear that Modi intentionally kept the analysts wondering about his true intentions overbuilding bilateral ties with Pakistan. While Pakistan constituted a very small part of Modi's campaign of 2014, it was clear that Modi being a hardliner had no sentimental notion about Pakistan. It was expected of him not to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors in developing sociable ties with Pakistan. Generally, mention of Pakistan remains an aspect of Indian political parties' election manifesto while covering foreign policy agendas. The anti-Pakistan sentiments flared from time to time by Modi's nationalism over the past five years on multiple occasions

prompted many of Hindutva and BJP supporters to attack anyone considered anti-national with the slogan of 'go to Pakistan'. Even Shashi Tharoor, over criticising Modi government, was told by BJP Yuva Morcha (the youth wing of BJP) to go to Pakistan. In September 2018, the University Grants Commission (UGC), issued a directive to all higher educational institutions across the country to mark 29 September as the 'Surgical Strike Day', to mark and celebrate Indian armed forces special operation inside Pakistani Kashmir to eliminate militants. Under the political atmosphere, Pakistan's relevance with the uprising in IOK remains alive. If any Indian soldier dies, uprising gets intensified, or an outraging protest is carried out, politicians are quick to point fingers at Pakistan. An average Indian voter's suspicions of Pakistan fed by delusion through political speeches and media coverage are seen advantageous by the politicians.⁶¹

Conclusion

The media displays a sense of power and confidence in its ability to become an instrument in the hands of a few over the rest. Under the Modi government, this sense of control became a matter of concern, as it led to increase in violence and impatience towards other communities and to a level of national security challenges reflecting changing Indian political practices. Both the print and electronic media covered and delivered fake and unverified news ranging from national to regional importance. Yellow journalism of sensationalising the events became a power consolidator of Modi government through selective censorship, manipulation of information by influencing opinions and spreading lies to maintain a favourable status quo. The practice resulted in 'internet bubbles' of the likeminded, ideologically connected to a Hindutva wavelength of supremacy and fighting against opposing thoughts. The loudest voices became the truth setters, making the bubble group assume their opinion is authentic, gradually developing into fake news.⁶²

The nationalism-driven tenure of Narendra Modi as the Indian Prime Minister has been marked by the debatable struggles over who is fit to be considered an Indian nationalist. Modi and his hardline supporters have divided the nation between 'Muslims' and 'Hindus', where Muslims are looked upon as 'infiltrators', while the Hindus as the rightful natives of India who are viewed as refugees if happen to be in the neighbouring countries. Media played a central part in the Hindutva politics at home to unfurl the saffron air to an extent of fuelling caste politics by intimidation via press and media coverage. On the one hand, Muslims were targeted for being non-Indians, Hindus questioning Hindutva's ideological aggression found themselves labelled as anti-national. Modi and his government chose to remain tight-lipped over the assimilationist policies forcefully pursued by the Hindu *bhakt*s. This repression against the Kashmiris has transformed their freedom movement into an Indianisation of jihad in Kashmir. Justifying nationalism by spreading false stories touched across borders and became a routine. As Hindu nationalist leader Subramanian Swamy's claims of Pakistan seeking to break India into four pieces are nothing but fictions for ignorant.⁶³ Modi, the BJP, and the RSS have been the beneficiaries of the communal intolerance to politically consolidate at the risk of undermining national unity.

Another policy under the cloak of nationalism alongside misinformed media, which exposed the Modi government's double face has been Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi, throughout his tenure, kept Pakistan at a non-engaging distance behind multiple excuses of non-cooperation. Strategically, if engaging ties had been built, Modi would not have had a chance to intensify a nationalistic policy at home among his vote bank. The fear of losing his vote bank has been orchestrated in such a way under the nationalistic slogan by Modi that even the opposition parties hesitate to embark on improving relations with Pakistan in their election manifesto. After the panoramic strike show in Balakot at such a prime time, Pakistan will remain relevant to

2019 manifesto in India. Directly or indirectly it is going to impact the vote bank. In the run-up to the 2019 polls, stirring up nationalism through a media campaign is the winning ticket that the Modi and his party are banking on. Despotism has reached its peak, as Modi and his party have got caught in the web of their lies. Silencing all independent voices in the media through misleading propaganda news, with yellow journalism at its peak and media houses closely aligned with the Modi government, displayed the eagerness of the BJP in marching with the nationalist fever of unverified information. In short, the diplomacy of violence, flirting with the cataclysm, and the enemy within in the form of uninformed media is what one can sum up under Modi and his nationalism drive to seek power.

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CHABAHAR PORT: A CHALLENGE FOR PAKISTAN

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Abstract

In recent years, India has shifted its policy to strategically isolate Pakistan at the international level by lobbying against Pakistan on international forums and establishing alliances with countries like Iran and Afghanistan to gain economic benefits and expand its defence and surveillance capabilities by gaining secure access to assets and infrastructure outside its borders. India is also competing with China and Chinese business expansion in the region. A prime example of this rivalry is its funding for the development of Chabahar port against Gwadar port, which is an important element of Pakistan's CPEC project. Through Chabahar port, India has not only initiated a trade war against China and Pakistan but is also contributing to increased terrorism in Pakistan. This paper presents an analysis of how the Chabahar port will create economic, security, and strategic challenges for Pakistan.

Keywords: Chabahar port, CPEC, IOR, RAW, CARs

Introduction

India is setting the stage for a geopolitical hostility and trade competition in South Asia, by assisting Iran in establishing a port in

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Chabahar close to Pakistan's Gwadar port in the Balochistan province. India has always remained averse to the development and building of Gwadar port and its intention to invest in and develop Iran's Chabahar port is in competition with Pakistan.

India is promoting Chabahar as a port of economic importance located on the Makran coast. But it bears immense strategic importance too because it addresses its security needs in the region as well as its trade interests, particularly with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Owing to a longstanding inconsistency in relations with Pakistan, it has been difficult for India to establish a secure shipment route to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan forbids land transit of Indian goods across its territory. To address the problem, Iran and India signed a commercial contract to resolve the market access problem, which is also a part of a trilateral concord signed in May 2016 between Iran, India, and Afghanistan. This agreement is based on the development of the port, railway track, and a road network, which will connect Iran to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). The initial phase of the Chabahar port was completed in December 2017 and this project was the first overseas instance of an Indian state-owned port, which was inaugurated on 3 December 2017 by Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran.¹ India is funding the expansion of the Chabahar port. "This port will connect the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) which presently stretches from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf to Russia, Eurasia, and Europe."² This strategic port is a key transportation route to the landlocked CARs, as well as Russia, and also is expected to smoothen the progress of trade between them.³



This port has provided India with an enhanced ability to monitor activities at Gwadar port and even initiate sub-conventional manoeuvring against Pakistan from Iran. In February 2018, a contract was signed between India and Iran to give operational authority of the Chabahar port to India for the next 18 months. Both sides agreed that they will cooperate in the oil sector and enhance their traditional 'buyer-seller' relationship to develop a long-term strategic partnership.⁴ According to one observer, India has launched a massive media campaign on an international forum to portray that "the real port is Chabahar port whereas Gwadar is a total failure in the future."⁵ This anti-Gwadar campaign by India has given rise to a 'war of ports' in the region.⁶ The trends are changing in the world and if we see recent developments, it seems that Chabahar port is an economic confrontation against Pakistan.

Chabahar: A Port of India

The Chabahar port is at a distance of less than 100 nautical miles from the Gwadar port. It consists of two ports: the Shahid Kalantri and the Shahid Beheshti. Each port is based on 5 berths that handle cargo. Iran has bigger plans to manage the Chabahar port with the assistance of India. Zaranj in Afghanistan is about 883 km from the Chabahar port and the existing road network in Iran links to Zaranj. India has constructed a road from Zaranj to Delaram, which can provide an entry into Afghanistan's Garland highway, linking it to other major cities of Afghanistan like Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar. India is also renovating one berth at the Shahid Beheshti port and a 600-meter-long container handling capability at the port. According to the *Economic Times of India*, India has pledged \$500 million for the project.⁷ Besides, India has already pledged \$100 million for a road that will connect western Afghanistan to the Chabahar port.⁸

The Chabahar port is essential for India to avoid Pakistan and open up a trade route to the landlocked Afghanistan with which it has developed close economic and political ties.⁹ India has always been seeking ways to gain access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. During the 1990s, India partially built the Chabahar port to reduce transportation costs and freight time to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.¹⁰ During the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, an agreement to build the Chabahar port was inked but the deal was delayed during the subsequent years.¹¹ The development process of the project was delayed because of international nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. Iran has constructed a highway from Chabahar to Delaram and the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) of India constructed a highway known as Route 606, which was completed in 2009,¹² connecting Delaram to Zaranj, the border city and capital of Nimruz province of Afghanistan, respectively.

The CARs market is dominated by China, Russia, and Europe. Indian policymakers believe that if they can construct a convenient

trade route, it could rapidly increase their trade with the region. "India's trade with the five key Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—has been a mere \$1.6 billion."¹³ Therefore, in addition to the Chabahar port, India is also looking at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, to advance trade with the West. "In September 2014, India held a trial run of an empty container tagged with a GPS device, from Mumbai by sea to Bandar Abbas and thence by road to Astrakhan in southern Russia, passing through Azerbaijan and found this route substantially reduced transport costs to the region."¹⁴ Plans are to steadily promote it up to the capacity of 86 million tonnes per year, whereas in 2015, the port could handle 2.1 million tonnes of cargo annually. The first phase of development work at the Shahid Beheshti port was completed in December 2017, which has increased the capacity of cargo handling to 8 million tonnes per year.¹⁵

Challenges for Pakistan

A Battleground of Great Powers' Politics

The Indian Ocean, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea are very important transit routes for the world economy. Eight out of ten of the world's busiest container ports are in this region. Mahan, a naval strategist and an author of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, argued that national prosperity and power depended on control of the world's sea lanes. He famously said, "Whoever rules the waves rules the world."¹⁶ China and India continue to struggle for maritime sway, as the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remains both strategically and commercially advantageous. India is concerned about the increasing Chinese foothold in the IOR. The following factors have motivated India to build a powerful blue-water navy:

- Protecting sea lanes for trade.
- Creating and maintaining challenges for its rivals in the region.

- Safeguarding the vital energy lifeline, especially from the Persian/Arabian Gulf.
- Realising its age-old ambition of becoming a great naval power with nuclear capability.

Since the 1970s, India has been actively seeking dominance in the IOR. India has used its navy to prop up its ambition to achieve a great power status in comparison to other small nations within the South Asian region. India has developed maritime security measures in the Andaman Sea and has conducted joint exercises with the Royal Thai Navy to tackle drugs and human trafficking, piracy, and illegal fishing. India also tried to enhance the scope of the exercises to include other IOR countries and sign agreement to consolidate regional maritime cooperation.¹⁷

India, to a certain extent, overtly acted to curtail the role of Pakistan in the region. India has often spent time and resources to deny Pakistan's lead within and outside the region. India always considered Gwadar port a part of the Chinese 'string of pearls' policy, especially its extension from its eastern coast to the Arabian Sea. China having developed ports in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could pose a challenge to India in the IOR. India is concerned about the Chinese control of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), which could be hampered if Pakistan would become a means of Chinese influence in the SLOCs around the Persian Gulf. It is in this context that India is constructing the Chabahar port near the south-western border of Pakistan, which could pose a serious challenge for Pakistan by asserting Indian maritime dominance both on the east and west of Pakistan. Chabahar port allows India to check Pakistani and Chinese maritime activities in the IOR and the Gulf regions. On the other hand, the US is also inclined to counter China in this region and India is gladly playing the proxy for the US. Indian hegemony in the IOR is also a matter of concern for Pakistan.

Challenges in Security Domain

Several international and regional powers are viewing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a challenge to their strategic interests in this region. The Indian opposition to CPEC, in particular, has never been a secret. India is undertaking unconcealed and concealed efforts to sabotage it. India is frightened of growing Chinese stakes in the Gwadar port and this is one of the reasons that India is not in favour of the operationalisation of Gwadar port, which would have serious strategic implications for it. Chabahar port is a launching pad of the Indian sabotage activities inside Pakistan. The low-level insurgency in Balochistan is one of the main stumbling blocks for Gwadar to deliver on its promise. India has been actively provoking volatility and instability in Balochistan by helping the insurgents and sponsoring terrorist activities. Leaders of the Baloch insurgencies have publicly listed India as their sponsor. Brahamdagh Bugti, the head of the banned terrorist organisation the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), accepted that his organisation was getting assistance from Afghanistan and India in furthering their cause. He not only thanked Modi but also hoped that he “would raise this issue at international forums.”¹⁸

Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan will also have negative cascading effects on Pakistan, mainly influencing the development of CPEC. In Balochistan, the simmering insurgency can lead to the weakening of trade. This will be in Indian advantage to use a multi-pronged strategy to delay CPEC, which enhances Pakistan’s economic growth through Gwadar port. India is plotting ethnic violence in Pakistan to sabotage CPEC. India’s indirect meddling in Pakistan is manifested in sponsoring various terrorist groups in Pakistan, like Baloch insurgents and other sub-nationalist outfits especially the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), while speaking at an international conference titled *Regional Dynamics*

and Strategic Concerns in South Asia and organised by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) shared that India had set up a Balochistan operations cell under its spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), for subversion and terrorist activities in the province.¹⁹ In 2016, an agent of RAW named Kulbhushan Yadhav was caught in Balochistan. His interrogation revealed that he was involved in giving naval fighting training to Baloch separatists to target Pakistani ports while operating from Chabahar. Further, he confessed that he had been directing various activities in Karachi and Balochistan on the instructions of RAW since 2013. Gen Hayat further revealed that the arrest of Kulbhushan Yadhav from Baluchistan had been the 'proverbial smoking gun' in the matter of CPEC.²⁰

India is supporting a 'free Balochistan' campaign internationally to portray a negative image of Pakistan in front of the international community. Modi government has signalled zero tolerance for CPEC. Indian involvement in Baluchistan is in-line with its aims of dominating the Arabian Sea. Gen Hayat also revealed that India had set aside Rs.55 billion against CPEC.²¹ The amount India had been investing against this project—which has benefits and advantages for all regional states in Asia upon its completion—shows how much India wants to fail it. India is always against trade corporation between Pakistan and China. Whereas India was invited by Pakistan and China to be a part of CPEC, due to its traditional anti-China and anti-Pakistan attitude in the region, it decided to stay away.

RAW is funding, training, and arming Baloch insurgents in their camps located in Afghanistan.²² They also have several camps in India where they gave training to Baloch insurgents, which was later denied by the Indian authorities.²³ In the past two decades, target killing, organised crimes, and frequent shutdowns of the largest metropolis of the country Karachi have resulted in serious consequences for the country's economy.

Indo-Iranian Nexus

Both India and Iran are ambitious about their common interests in the region. The interests are just not limited to dominance in regional politics and the security of energy resources but to gain access to landlocked Central Asian markets and beyond. These common interests have made them close allies. A smooth flow of trade between India and Iran shows a growing relationship of trust among the two nations. Working together in collaboration with CARs will provide them alternate communication routes through the Russian territory, which will provide more effective and efficient ways to allow the countries of Central Asia to trade and open regional market access. Besides the economic interest, Iran has been actively pursuing its interests in Central Asia and establishing its influence against Western dominance. In recent years, India has made a significant investment in Afghanistan and Central Asia within the power and physical infrastructure sectors and taking part in the development and explorations of the region's energy resources. According to the US Department of Energy's figures, "India is already the world's sixth-largest consumer of energy resources. Its energy consumption will rise to 27.1 quadrillion BTUs by 2025, up from 12.7 in 2000, the largest energy consumption state after China."²⁴ India's domestic natural gas supply has significantly increased and the country has rapidly grown its potential in recent years, but the energy requirement is not likely to keep pace with the growing demand. India can access Central Asia through Iran as Iran is strategically located at the crossroads of Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia controlling the transportation lines that pass between landlocked states and high seas. The common interests in economic, security, and energy sectors have provided a rationale for close interaction and cooperation between Iran and India in this region.

India and Iran are both motivated by their economic interests. India is primarily benefitting from Iranian alliance as it is providing

financial assistance to Iran whose economy is crippled with US economic sanctions. Iran has been under sanctions for many years before, and this is an economic development opportunity for it to have a free trade zone near Gwadar. On the other hand, India is benefitting by competing to be a regional leader along with China. The development of Chabahar helps India boost its regional status and establish new markets for its goods exports and energy imports. However, India not only looks forward to importing Iranian oil; it also wishes to invest in Iranian gas fields so that it can utilise that energy in the future with its industrial and economic needs. India is using Iran's territory for its economic interest to establish dominance in the Central Asian region and to sabotage Pakistan's territory and economy. Since 9/11, cooperation between India and Iran has increased with mutual benefits in Afghanistan. Iran sees India as a strong partner to evade strategic isolation, particularly when Iran is under increased financial stress and had been nominated as a member of the 'Axis of Evil' by former US President George Bush. Indian interests in Central Asia and beyond can only be achieved when it partners with Iran and both of them align their actions to achieve common goals. Iran provides transit for natural gas from Central Asia to India and in gaining access to the markets, energy reserves, and potential client states.²⁵

Pakistan is concerned with the growing economic ties between India and Iran, even though Iran has assured Pakistan that its collaboration with India is not in opposition to Pak-China partnership. Commercial trade through Chabahar port has increased and a high volume of the goods and trade activity has been diverted from Karachi to Chabahar port.²⁶ This trade route offers a strategic pathway to India, effortlessly bypassing Pakistan and allows access to Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, this route reduces the transport costs and freight time to approximately one third to the Gulf States as well as Central Asia for India. The Chabahar port presents a golden opportunity for India to access Iranian, Afghan, and CARs markets,

which will, in turn, lead to establishing political influence on the Afghan government. All of these actions will pave the way for India to get access to Turkmenistan gas and look for future opportunities to develop gas transport infrastructure and pipeline or shipment facilities through LNG/LPG tankers.

Strengthening of Indo-Iranian ties has not only economic but far-reaching security implications for Pakistan. The presence of Indian military personnel on Iranian military bases, even if it is solely to train the Iranians, would allow India a more subtle 'operational' use of an early warning, intelligence gathering against Pakistan.²⁷ Security ties between India and Iran can be determined from the reported existence of an Indian consulate with presumed intelligence duties on the Pakistani border and also at Zahedan in Iran. India had established a new consulate at Bandar Abbas in 2002 to monitor ship movements in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.²⁸ The military presence in Central Asia with or without strike capability would enable India in the event of a war with Pakistan to create a 'holding challenge' along its western borders. Indeed, Indian leverage with Iran has steadily grown with the souring of ties between Pakistan and Iran.²⁹

Challenges in Economic Domain

India's absolute cooperation with Iran towards making the Chabahar port competes with Pakistan's Gwadar port. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has decreased by about 80 per cent in recent years, the bulk of which is snapped up India and Iran, it does seem to indicate that trade with Afghanistan is going to present more challenges with the inauguration of the Chabahar port.³⁰ Political instability in the country is resulting in frequent closure of Torkham, and because of this, the trade diverted through this route is welcomed by the Chabahar port. As a result of this situation, Pakistan's current account deficit increased to an all-time high 37% and the government is facing Rupee devaluation as well.³¹ Resultantly, Pakistan's current \$1.1 billion exports to Afghanistan dwindle further at a time when the

ballooning current deficit does not afford a drop in trade. Pakistan's bilateral trade with Afghanistan stood at over \$2 billion in 2017-18.³²

Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost, while speaking on Pakistan-Iran relations at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad (ISSI), said, "Chabahar would not turn out to be an enemy port to Gwadar but work as a 'friend' port."³³ He further said the recent trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan on Chabahar port was 'not finished' and that both China and Pakistan were welcome to join it. Both Pakistan and Iran are wooing Afghanistan to give trade and fee incentives to support their respective ports.

The objective of India behind the development of the strategically located Chabahar port, road, and rail network is intended to counter Pakistan and Chinese alliance in the South West Asian region. Pakistan through the CPEC is increasingly getting bracketed with China and as a consequence, it has become a softer target for the Indo-US-Afghan geopolitical games against Beijing. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, during his recent Kabul and New Delhi visits, alluded to deeper cooperation with India in the context of growing Chinese influence in Asia.³⁴

For Pakistan, the country's defence is interlinked with the country's economy. In the last decade, Pakistan's economy and infrastructure was badly hit by terrorism. Pakistan is in the rehabilitation phase and looking towards the CPEC as being the Game Changer for this region, especially for Pakistan. China invested around \$57 billion in Pakistan under CPEC and is looking towards additional investments in the country, which will boost Pakistan's GDP and economy. India is looking to counter CPEC, as the Indian government realises that it would be a great transformative factor in their region and the presence of the Chabahar port surely presents a challenge to the Gwadar port.

Indian Presence in CARs

CARs have huge natural reserves (gas and oil) that attract regional states. India has also shown its interest in the natural gas reserves of CARs and is investing a lot in Uzbekistan's oil and natural gas and energy sector as well as in the military sector. Uzbekistan repairs and produces 11-78 MAR transport aircraft for the Indian military. In the security sector, India has signed an Inter-governmental agreement with Kazakhstan for fighting with terrorism³⁵. For membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India lobbied for Russian support. India is interested in developing lasting relations with CARs and for that India will not leave a single stone unturned to pursue a proactive strategy/policy with Iran.³⁶

A new Indo-Iranian alliance based on the convergence interests in Central Asia can robustly influence the interest of Pakistan at both regional and international levels. Not only India, Iran as a neighbour of CARs is also carving for a crucial role in the economic development of the region. Until now, India has been more successful than Pakistan in improving its political and diplomatic relations with CARs. In Central Asia, it is evident that Indian heavy investment with the collaboration of Iran determines its presence and intended dominance in the region. On Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan, India has invested US\$70 million to refurbish the airbase, including 3,200-meter extended runway and installation of navigational and air defence equipment.³⁷ Just because of Indian interests, to gain a strategic foothold in CARs is a serious challenge for Pakistan. This rising coalition of these two leading players in the region in both economic and security fields can pose a serious challenge for Pakistan in the future, particularly if it is not countered well on time.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Chabahar port is the focal point for increasing collaboration between India and Iran in the fields of defence and regional security. Its development presents a serious challenge to trade and commerce

of the Gwadar port as well as to the security of Pakistan. Iran has maintained its stand that the Chabahar port will remain under Iran's management and will not turn into a military port for India. However, providing any sort of logistic support to India by Iran in the Chabahar port will enable the Indian navy to increase its intelligence activities close to Pakistan's borders. This presents a serious security threat to Pakistan. Pakistan must continue to maintain diplomatic pressure on Iran to limit Indian presence and surveillance activities not too far from the Balochistan's border and ensure Pakistan's national interest is protected.

Chinese interest in Iran is also alarming for India. The US has recently imposed sanctions on Iran, which have had serious economic implications for Iran. India and the US are on the same page about the exemption of the Chabahar port because of their mutual interests in this region and both countries do not want Chinese dominance in the South Asian region. Despite serious opposition of the US Senate on India's investment in the Chabahar port, former US president Barack Obama supported New Delhi's investment in the Iranian port. The US coalition with India is also seen from the perspective of the recent agreement between the US and India that validates the reality that emerging China is a challenge to the regional balance of power. They are also concerned about the rise of Chinese economic power in the region. As strategic rivalry escalates between China and the United States, the presence of China in Gwadar will create new conditions in the energy hub. To reduce the importance of Gwadar port, Americans have set their sight on Oman's port of Duqm, an oil dock in the United Arab Emirates' Fujairah port, and Iran's Chabahar port, therefore; they are supporting India's effort. The Duqm port allows India to carry out maintenance on its military vessels opens endless opportunities for the Indian navy. The Indian navy can freely operate in the Persian Gulf without the hassle of going back to its shipyards for maintenance and overhauling. As a result, without establishing a naval base in Oman,

India will be able to hold a strong military presence in the region. The existence of India in the two strategic ports means that India will be able to fortify its maritime presence in the region.

Another apprehension is that India will use its amplified influence in Afghanistan to destabilise Pakistan. India is using the Chabahar port as a base for espionage operations against Pakistan, especially for destabilising measures in Baluchistan province. Kulbhushan was one bead of espionage chain and his arrest does not mean that the chain is broken. In this regard, the provocative statements by the Indian Home Minister Raj Nath Singh and the Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj cautioning Pakistan government about the consequences of Yadhav's conviction for bilateral are quite alarming.³⁸

Afghanistan has already nudged nearly 80 per cent of the Afghan's transit and bilateral trade away from Karachi. The trade switch to the Chabahar port badly impacts the Pakistan economy. Afghanistan now considers the Chabahar port as a more secure and shorter route for Afghanistan than the current transit trade route that crosses through Pakistan. Indian influence in CARS can isolate Pakistan in the region and through Chabahar port, India will use the Iranian route which provides easy access to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asian Republican states. The ability of India to access the CARS and gain influence in Afghanistan depends upon how speedy the projected expansion of the Chabahar port can be completed. As a result, Pakistan's dominance over strategic transit routes in the region will be reduced, thereby giving a significant blow to the national economy resulting in millions of dollars in lost revenue.

South Asia is witnessing the rise of new powers and their strategic, economic, and security interests in the region. India's geopolitical posturing masked in geo-economics exposes several risks/challenges to the national security of Pakistan. To counter these challenges below are some recommendations:

- Pakistan needs to expedite the development process of CPEC. The success and execution of CPEC largely depend on the restoration of peace in Balochistan to assist in the development of essential infrastructure. The central government and the military leadership have been working resolutely on a two-pronged strategy: to restore the writ of the state in the province and end the decades-old insurgency.
- In 2015, a National Action plan was announced by the Government of Pakistan to crack down on terrorism and to supplement the ongoing anti-terrorist offensive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Under the National Action Plan, the army has carried out operations against insurgents and terrorist groups, resulting in a substantial decline in sabotage activities and terrorist attacks in the Balochistan province to suppress the foreign-supported insurgency.
- *Pur Aman* Balochistan (Peaceful Balochistan) plan, which is in progress, has produced results. Several *fararis* (fugitives) and armed men have surrendered before the authorities. This programme has helped them to start new lives. As a result, the province is now more peaceful as compared to four years ago.
- The Pakistan Army has also established initiatives in the education sector. Providing education and training to the youth and unemployed has resulted in employment opportunities for Baloch youth in different fields. Many of them have been recruited in the Army.
- Pakistan Civil Government also put some serious efforts for the rehabilitation of Balochistan and issued various funds for the development and reserved special quota for Balochistan students in Pakistan universities.

- These measures have helped in eliminating the sense of deprivation in the Baluchistan and denying the insurgents of a legitimate cause to mislead the Balouch youth. To sustain continuous peace and stability in Baluchistan, these efforts must be continued, strengthened and supplemented through other steps without any political expediency. Meanwhile, a careful military action based on intelligence must continue against the insurgents to maintain peace and stability as well as sustainable economic growth resulting from the CPEC project and other development initiatives.
- Pakistan will have to establish a strong lobby to confront India's propaganda and strengthen its case in front of the international community about Indian interference in Baluchistan. The recent government efforts to launch a diplomatic offensive and raise the issue at the international forums and the UN is a good start but this needs to be supplemented with the Pakistani foreign office as well as the diplomatic missions abroad to continuously present Pakistan's position in front of the foreign government leaders. This will help to put pressure on India to put off from supporting the insurgency. India's vigorous effort to damaging Pakistan at the international level by projecting its image as a state sponsoring terrorist activity in the neighbouring countries is not hidden. This impression also needs to be erased through effective countermeasures at the international level and Pakistan establishment must come up with a strong counter approach to lobby its position and clarify any misunderstands created by India. Without an aggressive approach and a dedicated team of professionals, this goal cannot be achieved

- The media in Pakistan should also adopt a national image-building strategy and look out for any misleading stories that are either published in Indian publications or presented through written or visual media, such as Television, Internet or Social Media forums, and counter them with facts and figures. Unfortunately, there is no strategy in place to boost the nation's image through effective media cell.
- Actions must be taken to identify the chain which was running under the supervision of an Indian agent Yadhav for terrorist activities. An effective intelligence gathering system should be in place to ensure tighter control over any possible rise of revolt or acts of terrorism. The development of Gwadar is only possible when there will be peace and stability in Baluchistan.
- Actions must be taken to protect the workforce from China and Pakistan on the CPEC projects and the infrastructure being created under CPEC. This has been partially achieved by the creation of a special force comprising of around 15,000 security personnel. Pakistan should be more obvious in its loom and make a strategy that can limit Indian influence in CARS by considering this region (CARS) as an area of strategic importance. Pakistan should also go for an energetic diplomatic and political interface with CARS on a matter of collective concerns that will make sure their presences at all levels in this region.
- Pakistan's economy is interlinked with the defence of a country. Quick completion of CPEC would result in bilateral trade and economic growth that would provide the country much-needed cash to fund not only its defence and development but also to invest in the social sector and human resource development.

- The rapidly increasing cooperation between Iran and India, particularly in the defence field, does have certain impacts on Pakistan. Based on India-Iran Defence Cooperation Agreement, the presence of India's forces in military bases of Iran may not only be for military training/exercise. India may use this opportunity to spy and gather information about Pakistan and its strategic interests. Pakistan should see this factor with deep concern.
- Pakistan ministerial-level delegation attended the inauguration ceremony of the Chabahar port; where the president of Iran said this port will be a sister to the Gwadar port. In Feb 2018; operational control of the Chabahar port is given to India for the next 18 months. In this perspective; Pakistan should ensure from Iran that; the Indian control over the Chabahar port shall not be used against the interests of Pakistan, which is seen obvious in the context of the Indo-Pak relationship.
- Focusing on the importance of the Gwadar port, Pakistan needs to develop a strategic information plan by utilising all mediums on CARS which shall be based on the government's economic, planning, development and trade policy. Because of the geo-strategic location of the Gwadar port, it is a historic and cultural connection between Pakistan and CARS and can serve as an advance contributor in the national growth.
- Lastly, Pakistan can use the case study of Dubai and Singapore which have used their ports as a key strategy to establish trade by establishing tax-free zones and set up megacities to attract foreign investment in real estate and industry by providing key incentives to foreign investors and giving tax breaks. The port of Gwadar can be a source of economic independence for Pakistan.

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LEADERSHIP STYLES AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS

AYESHA SIDDIQUI*

Abstract

The objective of this study is to verify whether there is a positive correlation between leadership and emotional intelligence. For this purpose, a sample of 100 leaders in the management committees of various multinational organisations was interviewed through a battery of tests including the leadership styles indicator developed by Teal Trust UK and the assessing emotions scale developed by Nicola S Schutte, John M Malouff and Navjot Bhullar. Both these scales measures, respectively, the different leadership styles and traits of emotional intelligence as operative in this particular sample of the population. It is purported that there will be a positive correlation between the genre of both leadership and emotional intelligence, as well as their sub-traits.

Keywords: leadership styles, emotional intelligence, management committees, multinational organisation, positive correlation, genre, sub traits

Introduction

نگہ بلند سخن دل نواز جاں پر سوز
یہی ہے رخت سفر میر کارواں کے لیے

علامہ اقبال

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Many previous studies of leadership have analysed what leaders are like and what they do in making plausible decisions at the workplace.¹ Still, a great majority of research undertaken has yet to identify what effects do leaders' emotions have on their subordinates. So George suggests that emotional intelligence plays an important role in the ability to understand and manage moods in oneself and others, hence increasing the effectiveness of leadership.² She further argues that the ability to solve problems and focus on opportunities facing any organisation is highly increased in the leaders because of having emotional intelligence. She even goes on to suggest that a leader who is high in emotional intelligence will influence his/her subordinates' emotions in that they are supportive of and receptive to improving goals and objectives of the organisation; hence being able to appraise with accuracy and use this info about how their followers feel to their benefit, and that of the organisation at large.

Effective leadership also curtails as part and parcel the understanding of emotions because it provides the leaders with the ability to relate with others as well as their own points of view.³ Finally, these authors also believe that handling stress and frustrations, as well as joys and disappointments of the job, is only possible if leaders can manage their emotions successfully.

Leadership, by all means, is one of the most researched and debated-upon topics in organisational sciences. While exploring upon its benefits, some researchers have also explored when it might not be that important, proposing that leadership is more of a creation of the followers' minds than an actual characteristic of people in leadership roles.⁴ Needless to say that where we have learned much about the diversity in approaches to leadership it remains to be an enigma to-date. It is seen that feelings do positively or negatively influence people's judgments that people make.

Creativity, inductive and deductive reasoning, attributions for success and failure, memory recall, all of these things are evaluated

favourably when people are in a positive mood. People are more prone to taking credit for their successes and not blame themselves for failures when they are self-assured; also, they are a helpful part of the community at large., e.g. Bower;⁵ Cunningham et al;⁶ Forgas et al;⁷ George;⁸ Isen et al;⁹ Rosenhan.¹⁰

On the other hand, a negative mood can generate a critical and more comprehensive deductive reasoning.¹¹ Feelings serve an important role in human affairs and feelings likely play an important role in leadership as well. As a pertinent example, emotions that are relatively intense in negativity may redirect a leader's direction appropriately, to an urgent issue.¹² For example, if a leader is angry at a covert harassment issue in his/her organisation, this emotion might serve him/her well, inasmuch that it signals to the leader for an immediate redirection of his/her attention from, say, product development, to confronting the harassment problem and focusing on improving the organisation's efforts to eliminate harassment.

So it can be easily stated that leaders would be well-served by a variety of negative and positive emotions and moods; just as one can easily construct a scenario where a leader's effectiveness may be hampered by his/her frequent angry mood, as then he/she will have a difficult time engendering their subordinates' trust and creating a good rapport with them.¹³

Emotional intelligence is "the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth."¹⁴

So emotional intelligence taps into the extent to which people's cognitive capabilities are notified by emotions and subsequently to which emotions are managed cognitively.¹⁵ During the last two decades, interpersonal skills have become more and more important to effective leadership.¹⁶ Leaders were once viewed to plan and control the overall running of any organisation. Now, more

recently, in the service-oriented industries of today, leadership has more of a motivational and inspiring role for others in creating a sense of contribution and harbouring positive attitudes at the workplace while also creating a sense of contribution and importance with and among employees.¹⁷ As a result of this, contemporary research has been at work in finding out the underlying attributes and behaviours of leaders who are successful in these roles, to identify the training and leadership selection criteria for the recruitment and grooming of effective leaders (Church & Waclawski;¹⁸ Pratch & Jacobowitz;¹⁹ Ross & Offermann;²⁰ Sternberg²¹).

Problem

To investigate the phenomenon of different leadership styles with emotional intelligence dimensions.

Hypotheses

- i. There would a relationship between different leadership styles and different dimensions of emotions.*
- ii. People-oriented styles of leadership would have a positive relationship between positive and happy emotions.*
- iii. Management Style leadership would have a relationship with better emotional management also.*


Methodology

Sample and Data Collection

The sample for this research comprises 100 participants from private sector organisations, including CEOs, Vice Presidents, Directors, and managerial heads. Survey method was used and participants were presented with a demographic sheet to obtain details on age, gender, designation, and socioeconomic status. All subjects were Pakistani-origin with the majority situated in Karachi. The age range was 40-55 years. The following two scales were presented to the subjects simultaneously for assessment:

1. Leadership Style Indicator (LSI) taken from Teal Trust UK (2001), scored on a 5-point Likert Scale, comprise of 20 questions.
2. Assessing Emotions Scale developed by Nicola S Schutte, John M Malouff, and Navjot Bhullar comprise of 33 questions, scored on a Likert Scale.²²

Research Design



Results

For Tables I to IV, the range of data (Minimum and Maximum), Mean, and Standard Deviation are shown.

Mean: The average value of data.

Standard Deviation: A quantity expressing how much the data deviates from the mean value.

Table I

Descriptive of Subscales of Leadership Style Indicator

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Pioneer	10.00	25.00	18.8100	3.07053
Strategic	11.00	24.00	18.8000	2.64766
Management	11.00	25.00	19.0300	3.01998
Team	11.00	25.00	19.3800	3.09702
Pastoral	9.00	23.00	16.9500	2.79384
Encourage	10.00	23.00	17.5000	2.48429

Table I showing descriptive statistics of six sub-scales of Leadership Style Indicator.

n=100

Table II

Descriptive of Subscales of Assessing Emotions Scale

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Positive Affect	16.00	35.00	29.3000	3.61674
Emotion-others	15.00	35.00	27.2900	3.86723
Happy Emotions	8.00	20.00	15.5400	2.67204
Emotions-own	9.00	20.00	15.7800	2.41870
Non-verbal emotions	6.00	15.00	10.4300	1.80490
Emotional Manage	9.00	20.00	16.0700	2.61408

Table II showing descriptive statistics of six sub-scales of Assessing Emotions Scale.

n=100

Table III

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
LSI.TOT	70.00	143.00	110.4700	12.90482

Table III showing descriptive statistics of Leadership Style Indicator.

n=100

Table IV

Descriptive of Assessing Emotions Scale Composite Score

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
AE.TOT	83.00	165.00	128.2300	14.57468

Table IV showing descriptive statistics of six sub-scales of Assessing Emotions Scale.

n=100

Table V

Inter-correlation between Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale

Correlation: Shows the relationship between all sub-scales of Leadership Styles Indicators and Assessing Emotions Scale

Assessing Emotions Scale

Leadership Styles Indicator		Positive	Emotion-	Happy		Non-verbal	Emotional
		affect	Others	Emotions	Emotions-own	emotions	Management
Pioneer	Pearson Correlation	.630**	.613**	.513**	.680**	.645	.785**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Strategic	Pearson Correlation	.624**	.782**	.884**	.756**	.620*	.894**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Management	Pearson Correlation	.702**	.634**	.717**	.511*	.602**	.914**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Team	Pearson Correlation	.804**	.764	.636**	.766**	.858**	.872**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Pastoral	Pearson Correlation	.821**	.835*	.714**	.781**	.851	.661**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Encourage	Pearson Correlation	.822*	.702**	.880**	.711**	.825**	.670**
	Sig (2-Tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

Table V showing inter-correlation between Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale.

n=100

Table VI

Table VI showing Correlation between sub-scales of Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale.

Correlations Between Subscales of Both Variables			
Leadership Styles indicator	r	Assessing Emotions Scale	r
Pioneer	.660**	Positive Affect	.860**
Strategic	.882**	Emotion-Others	.782**
Management	.717**	Happy Emotions	.617**
Team	.766**	Emotions-Own	.566**
Pastoral	.551	Non-verbal Emotions	.751
Encourage	.870**	Emotional Management	.870**

n=100

There is a strong positive relationship between the subscales and a positive and increasing relation between variables.

Table VII

Table VII shows the Correlation between Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale

Correlations "Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale"


		Leadership style indicator
The assessing emotions scale	Pearson Correlation	.695
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

n=100

Table VII shows the relation between the two main scales LS and AE. There is a moderate positive relationship between these two variables.


Bar Chart: Leadership Style Indicator (Total)

The length of each bar is directly proportional to the magnitude of the variable. It shows the variation and normality between data.



Bar Chart: Assessing Emotions Scale (Total)

The length of each bar is directly proportional to the magnitude of the variable. It shows the variation and normality between data.



Coefficient of Variation (CV)

The lower the Coefficient of Variation, the more consistent the data. According to the CVs given below, the data is consistent.

C.V of Leadership Styles Indicator Total:

C.V = 0.11

C.V of Assessing Emotions Scale Total:

C.V = 0.11

Discussion

The link between leadership and emotions is readily apparent, as throughout history leaders have risen to power by influencing their followers through emotions. It is therefore important for leaders to possess a better understanding of emotions not only to influence those around them but to remain collected and rational when it comes to making decisions.

The study was conducted to find out the relationship between leadership and emotions. For this purpose, a sample of hundred leaders in the management committees of various multinational organisations was interviewed through a battery of tests: Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale.

Leadership Style Indicator has six sub-scales:

1) Pioneering Leader: A pioneering leader is defined as someone who introduces new ideas and inspires the group into uncharted territory.²³ They are adventurous, often seeking new products and experiences, recognising opportunities that others may not.

2) Strategic Leadership: Strategic leadership theory is defined as the study of people at the top of the organisation. It is less concerned with leader-follower relations and more focused on how the 'dominant coalition' of the organisation affects the strategic process of organisational learning.²⁴ Per this research, however, the definition of a strategic leader is in line with that of a technocrat: someone who can break down large tasks into manageable chunks and design ways of achieving the vision.

3) Management/Administration: This type of leadership entails managing, administering, and delegating tasks. Managerial leadership does not necessarily entail inspiring others or venturing into new areas such as pioneering leaders. It also does not entail any technical expertise as strategic leaders appear to have. As such, managerial leaders may use any of the three leadership styles discussed above: democratic, autocratic, or laissez-faire. According to Warren Bennis: "Leaders are people who do the right thing; managers are people who do things right."²⁵

4) Team leadership: This entails looking at leadership within a group context, wherein the leader may not necessarily have a formal leadership role within the group but rises to the occasion. The key traits of such leaders would be their desire to work with others and ensuring the team progresses.

5) Pastoral Leadership: Pastoral leadership, like pioneering leadership, may be likened to transformational leadership. Jesus Christ and other biblical figures were transformational leaders.²⁶ According to Carter, the transformational leadership style showed significant correlations with pastoral leader effectiveness.²⁷ This type of leadership is less defined by what it is and more by what it is not; pastoral leaders may not necessarily be pioneers or strategists or managers, but they have a role in supporting the people. Pastoral leadership is often unseen.

6) Encouraging Leadership: Encouraging leaders motivate others. Their followers feel valued and turn to them in times of uncertainty. However, the leader may appear 'less involved' than other leadership styles. Within the task-relations behaviour paradigm discussed above, this style of leadership falls under 'supporting.'

The second measure used in this study was Assessing Emotions Scale which has six sub-scales:

- i. **Positive Affect:** This is defined as the tendency to have a positive outlook on life in general and particularly when faced with challenges
- ii. **Emotion-Others:** This relates to empathy or the respondents' experience of others' emotions
- iii. **Happy Emotions:** This refers to all 'positive' emotions such as joy, good mood, or happiness
- iv. **Emotions-Own:** This refers to the subject's perception of their own emotions
- v. **Non-verbal emotions:** This includes non-verbal messages that a person sends and receives from others, such as body language or facial expressions, and how they are interpreted
- vi. **Emotional Management:** This refers to the degree to which subjects feel that they are in control of their emotions.²⁸

The data was analysed and findings supported the first hypothesis, i.e., there is a relationship between different leadership styles and different dimensions of emotions. The correlation was calculated for the total scales' scores; $r=.695$ (see Table VII) indicated a significant positive relationship exists between the two variables. It establishes that a strong relationship exists between leadership and emotional intelligence. Being emotionally intelligent is a prime attribute of leaders where they are not only supposed to understand and control their emotions but also understand and control the emotions of their followers to influence and hence become a successful leader.

The second hypothesis stated that people-oriented styles of leadership would have a positive influence on happiness. Correlation values were calculated of all sub-scales of Leadership Style Indicator and Assessing Emotions Scale: Strong relationships have been found between people-oriented styles of leadership (team, management, pastoral, and encouraging styles) having r values above .5 with the positive and happy emotions sub-scales of Assessing Emotions Scale

(see Table V). This establishes that people-oriented leaders prefer to spread positive and happy emotions around to further strengthen their influencing power.

The third hypothesis states that Management Style leadership would also have a relationship with better emotional management. The correlation was calculated $r=.914$ (see Table V). This shows a significant relationship between Management Style of leadership and Emotions Management. A leader who prefers Management Style of leadership signifies a strong command over managing emotions of self and others too.

Conclusion

To conclude, it should suffice to say that leadership and emotional intelligence go hand-in-hand in producing an efficient and healthy organisational structure.

The types of leadership styles that are mostly used in Pakistan by the upper-tier managerial structures of private/multinational organisations are managerial/administrative, entailing administration and management of tasks by delegation and/or by motivating the staff to work efficiently by employing a hybrid approach, i.e., using any form of leadership style that is required at that point in time.

Simultaneously, emotional intelligence calls for management of subsequent emotions inasmuch that both the employer and employee are in control of their emotions to a healthy degree of being able to communicate them accordingly.

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