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CONTENTS

- Explaining the Current India-Pakistan Stalemate:
How can they Move Ahead? 3-17
— *Saeed Ahmed Rid*
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Harmony 18-35
— *Sadia Tariq, Asif Iftikhar,
Puruesh Chaudhary,
and Khurram Khurshid.*
- Mahsa Amini And Anti-Hijab Protests in Iran:
A Post-Truth Analysis 36-57
— *Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi
and Ammara Zaheer*
- Aam Aadmi Party: Evolution, Challenges,
and Future Prospects 58-79
— *Kashif Ali*
- Indian Military's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018
and its Implications for Pakistan 80-107
— *Allah Nawaz*

EXPLAINING THE CURRENT INDIA-PAKISTAN STALEMATE: HOW CAN THEY MOVE AHEAD?

SAEED AHMED RID*

Abstract

*As confirmed by the then foreign minister of Pakistan Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in his book *Neither a Hawk, Nor a Dove*, India and Pakistan were close to resolving the Kashmir dispute and signing a treaty of peace, security, and friendship in 2007 on the lines of Elysée Treaty signed between Germany and France. But then Mumbai happened in 2008. Since then, despite several efforts, both countries could not come back to the negotiation track which was termed as a stalemate by many observers of South Asian politics. On top of it, the Modi government in India unilaterally revoked Articles 370 and 35-A of its Constitution in August 2019 and converted the autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. This step has further deepened the stalemate. In this paper, tracing the developments from 2008 onwards, the nature and scope of the stalemate between India and Pakistan are studied. An attempt is made to identify the conflicting issues that have caused this stalemate and where exactly they are stuck. Moreover, the paper also discusses how the two countries can move forward and what can the possible way out is if both parties are willing to move forward.*

Keywords: *India-Pakistan relations, Kashmir conflict, Article 370, peace process, terrorism*

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Introduction

Since their independence in 1947, there have been several ups and downs in India-Pakistan relations. The two countries fought three full-scale cross-border wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971, and have faced several mini-war-like situations. But during the peace process (2004-08) that was started by the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in January 2004, hopes were high that the process of ups and downs would end and, finally, a durable peace would be achieved. In 2005, the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, standing next to Pakistan's then President Pervez Musharraf, had issued a joint statement declaring the peace process 'irreversible' after a round of talks in New Delhi.¹ But sadly it was reversed within three and half years as one terrorist incident in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 shattered the whole peace process. Since then, several attempts have been made to revive the peace process and start the bilateral negotiation process, but the stalemate has survived one way or the other.

Now, the stalemate is more than a dozen years old, but it never felt like a stalemate before 5 August 2019 when Modi revoked Articles 370 and 35-A of the Indian Constitution to change the status of the Indian-occupied territories of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir from an autonomous state (although only in name) to two union territories of India. Before that, there was always hope that the peace process could be revived at any time. But with that step in Kashmir, the stalemate has deepened and the revival of the peace process appears a distant reality.

What is the nature of this stalemate, how is it different from the previous stalemates, why has it survived so long and how much longer it may take Pakistan and India to come back to the negotiation table? These are the kinds of questions that have puzzled many a mind. This paper is an attempt to make a better sense of the current stalemate and answer some of those questions. The main research

question of this paper, thus, is to explain the nature of the current India-Pakistan stalemate and explore what Pakistan and India can do to come out of the stalemate.

From the above-mentioned research question, it is obvious that qualitative research methods would suit this kind of research the most because an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon is required. The quantitative research methods would not be helpful to answer that kind of question as it is impossible to measure the stalemate quantitatively. All possible primary and secondary sources are used to conduct this research. So much is written about India-Pakistan relations in the past and all kinds of current developments are covered in national and international media extensively. Therefore, this is desk research as there is abundant data available on the topic to conduct this research without involving any primary data collection methods like interviews, etc.

The History of Stalemates and Negotiations between India and Pakistan

In the early phase of the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, United Nations was actively involved in conflict resolution and conflict management processes as all negotiations were held from that platform until the mid-1950s. But when Pakistan joined the Western alliances: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954-55, India stopped talking to Pakistan and backed out of its promise of a plebiscite in Kashmir according to the UN resolutions.² This could be rightly considered the first stalemate in India-Pakistan relations which continued until 1961-63 when two rounds of talks were held between foreign ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh under the auspices of Britain and the United States. These talks proved fruitless and in 1965 Pakistan and India fought a war over Kashmir which ended with the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. Bilateral relations were further strained as a result

of the 1971 war which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Under the Simla Accord 1972, India and Pakistan agreed to resolve their disputes amicably through bilateral negotiations but no serious dialogues were held until the 1989 Benazir-Rajiv talks.

Shekhar Gupta in *India Today* headlined his story as “Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto talks signal new era.”³ Though these talks could not achieve anything concrete in terms of the overall bilateral relations between the two countries, the atmosphere in which these negotiations were held and the nostalgia they had created was not experienced before. In the past, the bilateral negotiations at the highest level were only held in very tense situations—Tashkent and Simla had happened after two wars.

But this euphoria could not survive long as the Benazir government was removed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan the next year and a mass resistance movement started in Indian-occupied Kashmir in the wake of fraud in the 1987 elections.⁴ The stalemate came back once again as the path of negotiations remained mainly stalled apart from a one-off Secretary-level meeting in 1994 where Pakistan enforced ‘Kashmir first’ which broke the negotiations on the question of agenda for talks.

Finally, the stalemate was broken at the 1997 Male Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) where Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and IK Gujral had established a hotline between the Prime Ministers of the two countries and the proposal for the bus service between Lahore and New Delhi was approved.⁵ PM Atal Behari Vajpayee had come to Pakistan on the same bus when it finally materialised in February 1999 to sign the famous Lahore Declaration which had resolved the agenda-setting problem through an agreement on the ‘Composite Dialogue Framework’ involving all issues including the Kashmir conflict.⁶ But then came Kargil in May 1999 which destroyed all the hopes of peace and the stalemate

became worse after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001.

Hence, in the last seventy-three years, it was only in 2004-08 that a sustained peace process and a continuous negotiation process at different levels could be observed between India and Pakistan. Apart from that, mostly stalemate has been normal and negotiations just come and go in between. Hence, the current stalemate is nothing new as far as India-Pakistan relations are concerned.

The Nature of the Current Stalemate

So, what makes this stalemate different from past stalemates? What makes the current stalemate different is that it had come at the back of a historic sustained peace process from 2004 to 2008. The peace process during which as per the details of the 'backchannel formula', India and Pakistan had come the closest to resolving the Kashmir dispute and were going to sign a treaty of peace and friendship on the model of France and Germany.⁷

What difference does it make? The four-year-long peace process had brought an overall change in people-to-people relations between the two countries and there was goodwill at the official level there as well. For the first time, as a result of the continuous efforts of the peace activists, there existed a peace lobby on both sides of the border which kept insisting on a revival of the peace process and had kept engaged at different levels despite the problems at the top.

Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIFPD), an umbrella platform for the promotion of peace between India and Pakistan, was launched in 1994.⁸ With its more than two decades-long work, PIPFD provided the core on which peace narrative and peace lobby are created in South Asia. In 2010, a new initiative *Aman ki Asha* (AKA) was launched by two leading media conglomerates of India and Pakistan: *The Times of India* and the *Jang* Group of Publications. *Aman ki Asha* provided a new platform for

peace activists and played a vital role in the 2012 trade liberalization agreement between India and Pakistan. AKA had got the largest representative bodies of the business community, the Pakistan Business Council (PBC) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), involved as direct stakeholders in AKA's business and trade-related activities from the very beginning.⁹ Under the trade liberalization agreement, Pakistan pledged to complete the transition towards the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status for India by the end of 2012, while India would reduce the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement sensitive items list to one hundred items only by April 2013.¹⁰ Unfortunately, tensions escalated between India and Pakistan in January 2013 along the Line of Control (LoC) as the firing started in Kashmir and this process was scuttled.

Hence, because of the efforts of the peace activists, even during the stalemate such agreements were reached. Another such agreement was the relaxation in the visa regime on 8 September 2012, under which for the first time, the two countries allowed tourist visas for each other's citizens.¹¹ Moreover, the agreement included visas on arrival at the Wagah/Attari border for senior citizens, businessmen could get multiple-entry and police-reporting free visas, and visitors could enter and exit from different points using different means of transport.¹² Earlier, visitors were restricted to the same entry and exit point and mode of transport. Like if you go by train or plane to India you must use the same mode and the same exit and entry port.

The presence of an active peace lobby was a new factor in India-Pakistan relations, and they made their presence felt whenever problems arose between them at the highest level. Thousands of peace activists had gathered in Mumbai on 12 December 2008 to form a human chain for peace and denounce the war cries in Indian media.¹³ Similarly, the peace groups jointly helped the two governments to tone down the rising tension in the wake of the alleged beheading of Indian soldiers in January 2013 along the LoC.

This incident caused serious violations of the 2003 ceasefire from the Indian side. This development had halted the progress on MFN status and the implementation of the newly agreed visa agreement, as the Hindutva groups in India were pushing the Manmohan Singh government to take a hard line on Pakistan. At this point, peace groups came openly to the rescue. The peace activists had issued several joint statements condemning the incidents, whilst calling for immediate implementation of the MFN and visa agreement. AKA had brought the main peace groups together on one platform and sent a strong message to the two governments and the opposition parties by organizing the India Pakistan Peace Now global vigil with the help of PIPFPD and other peace groups in India, Pakistan, and globally in more than twelve countries. The role of the peace constituency in Pakistan was recognized by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Manmohan Singh was reported as saying in one public gathering that there existed a peace constituency in Pakistan, therefore, while sending a strong message to Pakistan, the Indian government must take the peace process forward keeping the peace constituency in mind.¹⁴

The peace activists on both sides have kept engaging with each other even in the post-August 2019 situation when India-Pakistan relations touched their lowest ebb because of the extreme step taken by the Modi government in India. It should be noted here that the peace lobby in India, like the PIPFPD's India chapter and other groups, openly condemned the revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A. The PIPFPD India chapter ran a year-long social media countdown with a painted poster each day displaying #StandWithKashmir, #Justice4Kashmir, #KashmirBetrayed, #EndOccupation hashtags and at the end of the year published a scathing report titled, *The Siege-A Year Since Abrogation in August 2020*.¹⁵ Apart from this, an eleven-member team comprising advocates, trade unions and human rights activists, and a psychiatrist visited the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and

Kashmir in October 2019 and published their report, *Imprisoned Resistance- 5th August and Its Aftermath*.¹⁶

Even a new peace initiative is launched by peace activists despite all the tensions which rose high after 5 August and the pandemic also made it impossible to meet physically. The pandemic provided a new opportunity to connect through webinars from different parts of the world. During one such webinar on 28 March 2020, South Asia Peace Action Network (SAPAN) was formed to bring 'peace-monger' groups and individuals working towards peace and stability between India and Pakistan under one umbrella.¹⁷ So far, SAPAN has organized a series of webinars on issues of human rights, gender-based violence, sports, etc., under the SAPAN series 'Imagine! Neighbours in Peace'.¹⁸

All this peace activism during the stalemate was surely a new phenomenon in the context of the history of India-Pakistan relations. Though this could not revive the peace negotiations, it made the current stalemate characteristically different from the past stalemates. Before the birth of PIPFPD, during stalemates, almost everything used to stop between India and Pakistan because there was only one channel and that was the official channel. With PIPFPD, Aman ki Asha, and now SAPAN, several new channels have become operational between India and Pakistan which work at multiple levels all the time. Thus, a stalemate at the top does not mean a complete shutdown of all kinds of contact between the people of India and Pakistan now. Things keep happening even during the worst of times.

Moreover, another major difference during this stalemate is that at least in Pakistan, since the times of President General Pervez Musharraf, there is a political consensus over the normalization of relations with India. The Pakistan People's Party government (2008-13), the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) government (2013-18), and the current Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) government have followed the same policy and always offered an olive branch to India. Nawaz

Sharif, even in his electoral campaign before the 2013 election, was promising normalization with India which was so unprecedented in the context of India-Pakistan relations. In electoral campaigns, normally the political leaders go for the rhetoric and say bad things about the enemy country to secure more votes. This shows that Nawaz Sharif knew his statements regarding normalization with India will not hurt him electorally. This was even more important because Nawaz Sharif had his stronghold in Punjab and the mostly anti-India sentiment is considered strong in Punjab. This shows that in Pakistan anti-India rhetoric does not have as many takers.

Sadly, however, this is not the case in India. In India, anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim rhetoric has gone berserk during the last two decades after 9/11. Especially since 2014, when Bhartiya Janata Party's (BJP's) Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India, anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim hatred in India is on the rise. In India, no political party can dare talk about normalization with Pakistan during election campaigns. Rather the BJP has always come into power based on Pakistan bashing in its electoral campaigns. Nonetheless, a sizeable peace lobby has also survived in India.

There had been a strong desire among the political leadership of Pakistan to revive the peace process. As an expression of such a desire, the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif went on a trip to India to attend the inauguration ceremony of Narendra Modi in May 2014, despite receiving strong opposition from his critics at home. This was later responded to in kind by Narendra Modi, who visited Pakistan during a surprise stopover in Lahore on 25 December 2015, en route to Delhi from Afghanistan. The goodwill trip of Modi was the continuation of the 9 December Islamabad visit of the then Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj to attend the Heart of Asia Conference. During that trip, Sushma Swaraj announced that peace negotiations would resume in February 2016 under a new dialogue framework, which was named the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue

(CBD), to cover both the issues of Kashmir and terrorism. The Modi visit in December 2015 meant to confirm that, finally, the peace process was back on track after the 26/11 Mumbai incident. However, the CBD dialogue process was scuttled by the terrorist attack on an Indian airbase in Pathankot on 3 January 2016. India later blamed the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) of Maulana Masood Azhar for the attack. Any hopes for the early revival of the peace process through the CBD framework died after the terrorist attack on the Indian army camp in Uri along the LoC in September 2016. This attack was once again blamed by India on Masood Azhar's JeM.

Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, on assuming the charge as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, had also offered Modi that if he moved one step forward, PM Imran Khan would move two steps forward. But Modi took the worst steps as for electoral gains he launched unsuccessful airstrikes in Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 26 February 2019, and later revoked article 370 on 5 August 2019. Hence, despite the serious efforts to revive the peace process and peace negotiations with India, terrorist incidents like those in Mumbai, Pathankot, and Uri, and ceasefire violations from time-to-time along the LoC, which each side blamed on the other, made it impossible for the peace negotiations to take off despite all the peace efforts.

Even after 5 August 2019, there were reports of secret contacts between India and Pakistan facilitated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government to revive the dialogue process. In January 2021, Reuters reported top intelligence officers of the two countries met in Dubai to calm down the military tensions by implementing the ceasefire along the LoC and reviving the backchannel dialogue.¹⁹ However, the backchannel dialogue was scuttled when the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the federal cabinet announced a decision to allow the import of sugar and wheat from India, but the very next day the cabinet did not approve the decision.²⁰ Later,

Pakistani military and political leadership took a tough stance, "No talks with India until August 2019 steps undone."²¹

How can They Move Ahead?

Before August 2019, India was unwilling to talk with Pakistan invoking the 'terrorism first' policy and blaming Pakistan for whatever happened in India or the occupied Kashmir. Now, it is Pakistan which has revived the 'Kashmir first' by putting the precondition of reversal of the August 2019 situation in Kashmir before they could talk again.

In a stalemate situation, pre-conditions for talks are always a non-starter because they would ensure no progress possible. If India and Pakistan want to move ahead with the peace process, they must put to rest all kinds of preconditions for the talks. Everything can be settled on the negotiation table but if you place a precondition for the negotiations then negotiations cannot be held. Hence, no progress can be made and the stalemate continues which is neither in the interest of Pakistan nor India and not even the people of Kashmir. The people of Kashmir need relief and some improvement in their situation as they are the ones who suffer the most if the stalemate continues.

If the willingness is there on the Indian side, then progress is very much possible. We know India wants to discuss terrorism first, which according to confirmed reports Pakistan has no objection to because Pakistan also wants to jettison the militant organisations and dismantle their networks in Pakistan for internal peace and to come out of the grey list in Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Controlling the militant groups and normalizing relations with India is in tune with Pakistan's newly announced national security policy as well. Under the new national security policy launched by former Prime Minister Imran Khan on 4 January 2022, Pakistan wants to prioritize economic security and human security by focusing on domestic issues that require external and internal stability.

But Pakistan cannot de-escalate the conflict unilaterally. India must show its willingness by providing immediate relief to the people of Kashmir. To provide relief to the people of Kashmir, two points of the Musharraf formula need to be implemented immediately. Pakistan and India both had agreed in principle in the 'backchannel formula' also known as the Musharraf formula to provide self-rule to the parts of Kashmir under their control and demilitarize both regions of Kashmir under their control. If these two points could be implemented that will immensely help normalize the situation in Kashmir and bring immediate relief to the people of Kashmir.

Moreover, Pakistan and India must also start the negotiation process for formalizing the 2003 ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire violations along the Line of Control are a constant irritant in India-Pakistan relations which must be addressed if a durable peace process is desired. In the past, these violations have often been the reason behind the reversal of the peace process. It is in the interest of both sides to find an amicable settlement of this issue as soon as possible.²²

As mentioned above, India and Pakistan had already agreed on the agenda of the peace talks and had decided to cover both the issues of Kashmir and terrorism under the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD). Therefore, if the willingness is there, no more time should be wasted and the CBD process should be revived as soon as possible. Both India and Pakistan are going to go to elections soon, therefore, 2022 is the last chance for them if they want to do anything concrete for peace between their nations as in 2023, they will not be able to concede anything.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) FOR HARMONY¹

SADIA TARIQ, ASIF IFTIKHAR, PURUESH CHAUDHARY,
AND KHURRAM KHURSHID*

Abstract

Given the present dominant negative social use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), this paper introduces a new concept of social power, i.e., social harmonious power, as a much-needed and more stable foundation for ensuring positive and harmonious co-existence and collaboration between humans and AI, including autonomous AI of the future. It also proposes the idea of a new neural network as a possible contribution to the domain of AI safety and a practical tool in the hands of humans who subscribe to the concept of 'social harmonious power'. Through employing the classical method of philosophical inquiry and alternative scenario building, it explains how this new approach and its concepts can help us better understand and address the present negative, unethical, and conflict-ridden social applications of AI and also lends support to the optimistic scenario and efforts to actualize a more integrated and congruent future of human species and AI.

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Keywords: *Artificial Intelligence (AI), AI safety, Neural Networks, social power, the human mind, futures, intellect, harmony*

Introduction

While thinking about the possible future(s) of our intellect's most advanced creation, i.e., AI, and its capabilities, interaction, and co-existence with our species, one unnerving imagined scenario is of autonomous artificial agents gradually replacing or even eliminating us. Whether this scenario becomes a reality or not remains to be seen. For the present, as Rhemann says, "Artificial intelligence holds the promise of human reasoning and creativity but, at least for now, has fallen short. Perhaps, with no known sense of longing, compassion, and 'human emotion', the knowledge of digested libraries may not result in an inner metaphor or a narrative."²

Searle, in his criticism of computationalism, suggests two imagined scenarios: a 'society of robots' and a 'society for robots'.³ He correctly views both as deficient and unworkable. A more plausible future scenario would be a society of socially mature humans and collaborative/friendly/unambitious AI. In this society, all possible levels of tasks, works, motivations, and goals, ranging from simple to complex and computational to non-computational would be handled much more smoothly and peacefully with no constant threats of disruption, conflict, and contradictions between adversarial positions, worldviews, and ambitions. Positing and realizing such a future for humanity and the whole of the world is a preferable aspiration to host.

Co-existing and cooperating amidst diversity and differences is a basic trait embedded in all living systems and, in our case, it is imperative and more demanding not only due to our highly developed, sensitive, and social mental makeup but also the variety of products and processes we created in our external environment which was only possible through extensive and multi-layered collaboration. The way we have learned to co-exist with all varieties of phenomena

(living and non-living) in nature, we need to practice the same with artificial life and systems. While recognizing the numerous differences and some similarities between us and AI, we need to proactively create a stable and efficient system of peaceful and harmonious collective existence and functioning with AI. Kasabov, while elaborating on the distinct capability spectrum of brain-inspired (BI) AI systems and the human brain, echoes a similar aspiration when he states:

The human general knowledge, the understanding of the complexity in nature and human societies, that have evolved for millions of years of evolution, will be impossible to be surpassed by AI, thus the leading role of the HI in a future symbiosis. And it is up to the HI to decide what BI-AI to create to complement and to enhance the human knowledge.⁴

This paper argues for a new approach and conception of social power in our minds which can potentially be more capable of concretizing the vision of a stable and harmonious coexistence with AI. This new mental direction will initiate the transition from the existing essentially adversarial (superficially collaborative) conception of social power in humans to 'social harmonious power' as a new foundation for social interactions and structures.

Why Human Intellect needs to Revise the Present Concept of Social Power

During the last decade or so, human intellect has created myriad positive and beneficial social applications of AI. In the coming years, these are bound to grow exponentially as AI gets properly integrated into all social aspects (cultural, economic, and political) of human society. All these efforts and works need to be acknowledged, appreciated, and supported. However, there is another side of the intellect which is constraining and putting fetters on the positive and optimum progress that is logically inherent in AI as a powerful technological tool with a massive potential to radically change human

life and society. The creative intellectual process is also responsible for creating harmful and negative uses of AI and one such highly lethal and extremely harmful use is the contemporary individual and group mind's sophisticated exploitation of advancements in AI for military strategy and warfare to achieve political domination. Creation of concepts like 'intelligentized war' and 'algorithm confrontation'⁵ by political leaders, the development of lethal AI-based autonomous weapon technologies (AWS), killer robots, offensive AI, etc., and the AI arms race that has begun between the supposedly 'civilized' nations like China, East Asia, Europe, Russia, and the US are evidence of the dangerously negative use of AI by the contemporary human mind.

Seeing the mind-boggling display of creativity and intellectual focus in this sphere to create non-stop innovations despite evident knowledge of their harmful and destructive consequences compels one to question the core paradigms of the 'rational' and 'civilized' human thinking and action. The reason is that this thinking is taking the core adversarial agenda of the human mind to another level of sophistication which in reality is a distortion and perversion that can become the mental and physical nemesis of the human species. The equation in the minds of the top most 'civilized' nations (China, Russia, and the US), between AI-based sophisticated warfare tools, especially autonomous weapons, and winning future wars or ruling the world, is nothing short of a mental perversion and delusion. Therefore, the destruction of the world is a possibility if autonomous weapons and killer robots become a reality.

The cultural and habitual inertia and domination of the adversarial mindset prevent contemporary humans from re-examining and recognizing the clear irrationality of the above equation and rigorously scrutinizing and halting the development of AI-based warfare tools. According to Haner and Garcia, "Global military spending on AWS and AI, narrowly defined, is projected to reach \$16 and \$18 billion⁶ respectively by 2025."⁷ And there is neither any proper

accountability nor any public scrutiny or debate on AWS and killer robots.⁸ It is also being suggested that while at present only rich countries are developing AI-based military technologies, as the cost of production lowers many other states and non-state actors will be able to procure these lethal tools which will further exacerbate the problem of accountability.⁹ These statistics are showing the inertia and domination of the adversarial mindset of humans which breeds a variant¹⁰ of insensitivity that stops them from actually carrying out what they intellectually and emotionally know to be correct, valid, and necessary while perpetuating the existing motivational and intellectual patterns that are known to be harmful, wrong, and anachronistic. If this was not so, humans would have succeeded long ago in either halting the R&D and practical work in this area or strictly and strategically channelizing and transferring the knowledge generated from this R&D work into some other beneficial domain.

If it were not for the domination and insensitivity of the perverted adversarial mind and its web of social imperatives why would France, Germany, and other countries talk of drawing up 'possible guiding principles' for AWS development instead of 'clear and necessary' guidelines and rules. Why would China agree to "ban the battlefield use of AWS, but not their development and production."¹¹ These actions inform us that the adversarial human mind remains dominant in our social decision-making. This means that the intellect needs to rethink and re-conceptualize social power so that it can decide to create harmonious AI and halt work on AWS, killer robots, offensive AI, lethal AI, etc.

Social Power and the Adversarial Mind

The social adversarial mindset subscribes to a certain concept of 'social power' that produces, determines, and controls their social relations, interactions, and the creation of special purpose (social pressure generating) groups, structures, and institutions. This means it would also be permeating the social applications of technology,

including the social use of AI in different arenas. The present harmful and negative use of AI in different areas is rooted in the current concept of social power that exists in individual and social minds. So, if any serious and stable change of trajectory in the social use of AI is desired, there is a need to critically examine and reject the prevailing concepts of social power in the minds of people and impart a new meaning to it so that an alternative AI modelling of social power can be undertaken.

There are various reigning concepts and definitions of social power. For some, social power “combines diverse and complex decision-influencing social factors, such as formal/informal norms, resource/action dependencies and social status...”.¹² According to McClelland’s Human Motivation Theory, ‘power’ in an organizational context is “the need to control and influence others, or to enjoy status and recognition.”¹³ Then there are ideas like social power emerging from “the inter-agent dependence of individual powers.”¹⁴ Individual powers are both internal and external; the former based on skills, capabilities and the right to do something and the latter consisting of material or physical resources. Some bases from which the social power of one individual over another stem have also been identified. These include the prerogative and ability to give rewards and punishments, internalized values which authorize an individual to influence another person or a group of people, identification or close connection with an individual, and perception of some person’s expertise or specialized knowledge which gives that person power over other people.¹⁵

What the above definitions and concepts bring to light is that social power in humans is a very elaborate phenomenon operating primarily at the mental level with the help of various psychological tools and methods. The physical plane of social power is also very much there but it works alongside and many times in aid of the mental plane. The mental plane of social power emerged at a certain stage of

human mental and social sophistication in the period of civilization. The highly developed and complex mental processes of intelligence, intellect, emotional, sensitivity, and pleasure/pain processes in humans created their complex social formations and interactions and both have been developing as a spiral, reinforcing and channelizing each other. An individual's ever-increasing emotional and intellectual dependence on others including all that he or she values or rejects plays a major role in creating, determining, and controlling of social power that he or she has over others or vice versa.

Since artificial agents at present do not have elaborate emotional and intellectual processes, they cannot experience social power in all its subtleties, nuances, and dimensions. So, any modelling or representation of this phenomenon in artificial agents is and will remain a huge challenge till the installation of emotional and experiential processes within them become a reality. Since the core character of a person's emotional and intellectual processes is adversarial, the dominant character of any social power that he or she wields or is subjected to is also primarily adversarial. This can be seen in the abovementioned dominant trends in the social uses of AI. Despite thinking and knowing better and despite the kind, collaborative, and empathetic dispositions of individuals, the adversarial, self-centric and conflict-generating component of social power remains in the driving seat of cultural, political, and economic thinking and the models based on it. The deep-rooted, convoluted, and perverse desire in humans to dominate and manipulate specimens of their species, both mentally and physically, is so deeply etched in their individual and social minds that they fail to recognize the different garbs in which it continues to unconsciously infiltrate and control the working of their rational intellects. And what cannot be identified or recognized cannot be decisively and strongly rejected and replaced with a better desire. Until that is done, the dominant character of social power will remain adversarial, and devious and its

modelling in artificial agents will inherit this character and will continue operationalizing and perpetuating its existing concepts.

Creating the Alternative: ‘Social Harmonious Power’

We would like to suggest an alternative concept of social power, social harmonious power, in which the core conception and understanding of ‘power’ is not rooted in the motivation of domination, and/or manipulation of individuals or groups based on various underlying advantages but in socially purposeful harmonious interconnection and interaction amongst individuals. It is about a qualitatively different kind of power which connects and integrates humans with each other and the rest of nature and does not require domination, manipulation, or negative exploitation. In fact, these are contraindicated in this form of social power. So, here the modelling and representation of this socially harmonious power in artificial agents will also have the same character. Any neural networks or other approaches and methods that are used to emulate this phenomenon will have this new character and concepts embedded in their source codes, meta-languages, training data sets, etc. Thus, artificial agents embedded with this concept of ‘social harmonious power’ will behave and act very differently from the present agents operating on the basis of existing concepts of social power.

Imagine a high-level critical government meeting in the US which has to take some important decisions on whether to allow the making of lethal AI, autonomous weapon systems, or killer robots, or not. If this meeting were to be attended by individuals whose intellects and sensitivity processes are infused with the concept of social harmonious power instead of conventional social power conception and they are accompanied by AI assistants who are also modelled on social harmonious power, the quality, clarity and efficiency of the discourse and decision making in that meeting can be imagined. The usual frictions (verbal and nonverbal), habit patterns of

thinking, familiar emotional and intellectual positions, and conflicting unintelligent motivations which dominate most meetings of today would not surface there. And even if they do they will immediately be scrutinized and held accountable by the intellect. Disagreements and differences in opinions and ideas will emerge amongst individual participants but they will be tackled on a different plane and easily resolved because shared motivation and maturity of emotional and intellectual processes will be in the driving seat and will not let any derailing or disruption to take over the process of social interaction and communication. So, deciding and acting upon decisions will be a smoother and non-conflicting process. This means stopping research on killer robots or lethal AI or any such harmful projects will not require any elaborate debate or justifications.

Such alternative scenarios can be imagined in the tackling of numerous other social issues and problems that are presently stalled and remain either unresolved or partially resolved due to the present adversarial social power relations and dynamics which predominantly control human feeling, thinking, and doing.

The present harmful social uses of AI are a logical concomitant of the core concepts of social power in human minds which are essentially adversarial in nature. It is these concepts and not the theoretical and practical superstructures built on them that are the actual problem which needs to be recognized and addressed. These are the real cause of why despite hundreds of think tanks working on conflict management, disintegration, conflicts, and contradictions in the social lives of people remain unabated and are in fact on the rise all over the world. So, these underlying implicitly controlling core concepts of social power which are the basis of present social interactions and institutions and also underlie the social uses of AI, need to be reconsidered and ideally replaced with some new concepts like social harmonious power and its possible applications.

The HI-AI Harmony Neural Network: A Tool of 'Social Harmonious Power'

We propose the idea of HI-AI Harmony Neural Network (HAHNN), as a tool in the hands of individuals subscribing to the new concept of social harmonious power. People who will use this tool to create and construct new AI agents and AI-based social applications and solutions which can be seriously and sustainably beneficial and useful for human society. This tool will be existing parallel to Generative Adversarial Nets (GANs), where the term 'HI' refers to human intellect (as discussed in this paper) and not human intelligence. Its essence and spirit will be of hybrid intelligent systems¹⁶ displaying both symbolic and sub-symbolic characteristics. The GANs improve, self-correct, and learn through competition while HAHNN will upgrade itself through integrative collaboration. HAHNN will be an emulation of the Human Intellect's future and its capability of integration while GANs are about a specific capability of the present adversarial intelligence.

The bigger philosophical and more futuristic purposes of HAHNN are to contribute to existing works on AI safety and augment and assist the work of the human intellect and ensure harmonious working with it for the betterment and progress of human society; to be a highly effective tool for creating new AI systems and social applications. The first step is to clearly define the core concept of 'harmony'. In the proposed NN the basic or parent concept of harmony means conflict-free, stable, and harmonious functioning between human intellect and AI. Any additions or subtractions to the core concept of 'harmony' will be installed by the human intellect. Some algorithms (machine language instructions) can be written to ensure this. This neural net can be based on a hybrid of NARS architecture using 'experience-grounded semantics', and the 'model-theoretic semantics'¹⁷ using some core concepts (like harmony) and knowledge as a kind of constant reference, and criterion against which the

conclusions of data processing can be checked, apart from just the experience of the system. This hybrid architecture will bring it closer to human mental architecture which uses both immediate local experience and the reference of some 'larger model' or 'world view' for both thinking and doing.

To move in the direction of its core purpose, it will need to get trained on some preliminary elementary tasks like identifying those inputs which conflict with the larger goal of achieving harmonious interaction and working with humans. Another task will be to develop the capability to identify and classify the tasks that it can do better and the ones that humans are good at and should do. So, it develops the capability of harmonious task partitioning between itself and humans.

In the case of the first task, to identify conflicts with the core goal of harmonious interaction, the concept of harmony and some concepts (single and compound) connected to it, like, shared stability, collective well-being, co-existence, synthesis, and no conflict, can be used as referents and criteria against which the conflicting inputs can be checked. The built-in meta-level 'inference rules' and 'control strategy' used by this NARS-based NN can be made in accordance with these concepts embedded as referent statements, definitions, facts, knowledge, and relations in its memory system.

The second task of harmonious task partitioning can be illustrated through the following examples. If this NN is given the task of interpreting complex poetry then it can pick up and perform some mechanical prerequisite tasks necessary for carrying out interpretation, like gathering all relevant references connected to the topic of the poetic piece or the dictionary meanings of some words, etc., and then pass on the actual creative interpretation to humans. It can also dig out any already existing human interpretations of that piece also if they exist. Similarly, the interpretation of complex emotions or sensitivities in audio-visual and text inputs can use this NN for carrying out the preliminary steps of any interpretation. This

idea of AI recognizing what it can and cannot do, and then passing onto humans what it cannot do, is not new. Anderson, while proposing the development of programs which can give AI systems the ability to act as 'ethical advisors' to humans, mentions how these agents would be able to recognize the fact that there are no correct answers to all ethical dilemmas and thereby pass on difficult decisions requiring action to humans.¹⁸

HAHNN is being conceived as a generic network to be used alongside specialized NNs. It can act as a general sieve through which a complex task is passed and partitioned and then made available to the human intellect to work upon. The range and types of tasks it can be used for can be worked out by AI developers and other thinkers and philosophers. It can be used as the conduit for those complex intellectual tasks which cannot be directly handled by any specialized NN. These can be broken up and partly achieved by this generic NN. The memory bank of this NN will contain all precedent task processing results and specifics (facts and knowledge in various formats) of harmonious and collaborative functioning between AI and HI. Its training dataset can be based on samples of those complex intellectual products which require this clear and harmonious task partitioning.

Some characteristics of NARS¹⁹ that it can employ are parallel processing of multiple tasks at varying speeds, using both short-term and long-term considerations depending on the task, and using the function of revising its conclusions or decisions in some instances. There can be others also but that would be for the developers of this Neural Network to determine.

Since the core concept of 'harmony' is a complex, broad and abstract concept which cannot be demarcated, it also falls under the fuzzy concepts characteristic of NARS. But like Wang says such concepts are also "not arbitrary or random, but relatively stable, bounded by the system's experience."²⁰ Nevertheless, it can be viewed

as flexible and open in the sense that it can also incorporate other features within it if required; some more definitions, facts, connections or relations with other concepts. The meaning of this concept, like the concepts in NARS, is not determined by an interpretation linking it to some fixed 'external object' as in axiomatic and semi-axiomatic reasoning systems.²¹ It is determined by its relations to other connected concepts (mentioned above). And also, some relatively constant reference facts, knowledge, contexts, and relations contribute to its meaning. In HAHNN, its meaning has been reduced to detecting and rejecting inputs which are conflicting with the core concepts and goal, and for carrying out harmonious task partitioning between human intellect and AI. But this reduction does not restrict or inhibit any additions to the concept. There can be additions not only to its knowledge and tasks but also to the main concept, as and when human understanding and knowledge improve.

In NARS the basic inheritance statement is " $S \rightarrow P$ " where S is the 'subject term' while P is the 'predicate term'. And both these terms denote specific concepts. So, the meaning of this basic statement is that S is a special case of P, whereas P is a general case of S. Another way of putting this is: S is included in the extension of P and P is included in the intension of S.²² Following from this, one of the basic inheritance statements of HAHNN will be: $AI \rightarrow HI$, i.e., Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a special case of Human Intellect (HI) and HI is a general case of AI. And AI is included in the extension of HI while HI is included in the intension of AI. There are two implications of this which can also be implicitly coded in the source code. Since AI is included in the extension of HI so its operation has to remain within the parameters set by HI. Moreover, as it is integrally connected to HI so its actions and decisions will affect HI and it has to logically take inputs from HI.

This basic statement along with the priority and usage values or weights of each term can be a part of HAHNN's 'innate knowledge'

or its meta-level control strategy. In addition, this basic statement and a few others can also be connected to the Self of HAHNN and embedded at the meta-level within the system as innate belief. For example:

Input: AI is a part of HI

< AI→HI>

Input: I am an AI

< {SELF}-- > AI >


Derivation: I am a part of the HI

< {SELF} → HI >

To reiterate, since the knowledge and tasks of any concept (core or branches) in NARS are flexible, the concepts in HAHNN will also be open concepts to which new aspects, knowledge and questions can be added. So, if other researchers find it of use then they can develop and take it forward. The aim is to see if it can contribute to the primary goal of enabling a harmonious coexistence between AI and Human Intellect, as a necessary imperative for humanity and the integrated process of Nature.

HAHNN can also become a part of the work on declarative languages and programs which are about writing what any machine should be doing instead of how it should be done. For instance, the following (there can be many more that AI researchers, social scientists, philosophers, and futurists can come up with) declarations can be installed in AI systems:

- The AI system must work harmoniously with humans and other AI agents.
- AI has to avoid coming into conflict with humans.
- AI must recognize or identify its limitations and carry out a smooth task division on that basis.

Figure 1**Elementary meta-level of HI-AI Neural Network (HAHNN)**

Conclusion

AI and the human intellect have their separate domains of existence and operation, which need to be observed and preserved. However, since they have to co-exist, and collectively create the future(s) of humanity, a better and more beneficial option is to develop a stable harmonious collaboration instead of conflicting and unhealthy competition between them. AI, both as a tool or a mature and developed species (if that becomes a reality in future) has to work efficiently and optimally alongside humans. But this has to be ensured and designed by humans by employing a new concept of social power and a new neural network. Because as Kanaan says “At the end of it all, and as has always been the case, people—and the specific uses to which we put our machines—are and will remain the principal problem. It’s what we will do with AI that matters . . . and, yes, the potential for human misuse, intentional and otherwise, is worthy of great concern.”²³

This research questions the present concept of social power and suggests a better alternative in the form of ‘social harmonious power’ and its idea (later practical) tool ‘HI-AI Harmony Neural Network’. These can be further developed and used by AI researchers, thinkers, and philosophers. They are aimed as contributions to the existing works focusing on the role and use of AI for creating more harmonious co-existence and collective future(s) alongside humanity.

Notes and References

- ¹ In this paper, the term 'harmony' refers to the integrated and dynamic nature of reality wherein all its interconnected and interactive phenomena/processes/forms, keep progressing towards qualitatively new levels of integration, productivity, efficiency, and stability. In other words, it is about minimizing conflicts, contradictions, obstructions, while increasing harmonious interaction, and collaboration within and amongst the various forms and processes in Nature. We propose such a preferable future scenario of harmonious interaction and relationship between the two very advanced forms/phenomena of integrated reality; humans and AI.
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human pain, misery and the process of Nature and its requirements.

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MAHSA AMINI AND THE ANTI-HIJAB PROTESTS IN IRAN: A POST-TRUTH ANALYSIS

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Abstract

The issue of Hijab has gained significant attention globally for the past few years. While in one corner the movements lay emphasis on Islamic identity and observation of Hijab, in many other parts of the world, Hijab is seen as repressive. Most of the anti-Hijab campaigns find support in Western capitals that has caused a reaction from the Muslim world. The criticism on Hijab is seen as Islamophobic. The states in which Hijab is a compulsion also include Iran. The protests inside Iran against Hijab have been a common feature since 2018. In 2022, the death of Mahsa Amini and the subsequent outcry has once again brought the issue of Hijab into limelight. Nonetheless, more than Hijab, the domestic agitation against the government entails various factors while the global coverage of anti-Hijab protests inside Iran depict a visible anti-Iranian rhetoric. This paper evaluates the role of media and the shaping of perception with regards to anti-Hijab protests inside Iran and attempts to decipher the factors that made Hijab a political symbol instead of being taken up as a social issue.

Keywords: Mahsa Amini, Anti-Hijab Protests, Post-Truth, Hybrid Warfare, Islamophobia, Iran

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Introduction

The 2022 anti-hijab movement in Iran started with the death of a 22 years old Iranian Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini. The alleged cause of the death, as reported by the Western media, was torture during the custody of the Iranian Moral Police for not wearing the modest hijab. On the other hand, Iran denied the claims of any torture during detention and adopted the line of a sudden heart attack as the leading cause of death.¹ Nonetheless, the family of Mahsa rebutted the Iranian state's stance by claiming that she was in the best of her health.² Protests that started in the home town of the girl on her funeral overtook the entire country and since then generated momentous coverage across the globe. Iran witnessed the mass protests in which women came on the streets with their heads uncovered, swaying their scarfs in the air and burning them in the fire as well, symbolizing their discontent with the current Islamic regime. The wide scale of the protests remained unprecedented since the Green Movement of 2009. According to international media, during the protests and the crackdown of the security forces, 402 people died along with 328 members of the security forces.³ While according to Iranian sources, 200 people and 328 security forces died during the protests. Moreover, Iranian media referred to the protests as riots.⁴ The Supreme Leader, on the occasion of the passing out parade of the police force cadets, blamed America and Israel for instigating the protests to weaken the Iranian regime. During his speech, he praised the role of security forces including the Basij Militia, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the police for their role in dealing with 'rioters'.⁵ The primary reason for blaming the West was the coverage provided by the media and the sympathies that it amassed in Western capitals, including the US and the EU. The event was led by people from all segments of society, especially women, to show their solidarity with Mahsa and her family. In this regard, women throughout the world cut their hair as an anti-regime gesture. While such incidents were not

new, the significance of those mass demonstrations lies in the media coverage that shaped the opinions of millions globally. The media was used as a weapon of fifth-generation warfare. Through the use of conventional and social media, very effective propaganda was spread against the Iranian regime. The Western media successfully created an environment and built a notion of regime change in Iran throughout the world. The news which had the reputation of a social issue became news with political objectives in no time.

Theoretical Framework

The theory that has been used in this paper is Post-Structuralism. It is a theory of post-positivist tradition, which emerged in France in the 1950s during a literary movement. Eminent scholars of this theory are Ronald Barthes, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Lacan. As the name suggests, the undertones of the theory are embedded in structuralism. Like structuralism, the niche post-structuralism takes is theorizing that belongs to philosophy, literary theory, and critical theory.⁶ The main tenets of post-structuralism are that reality is embedded in perceptions and is generated through discourse by commissioning several discursive techniques. There prevails no objective reality but a constructed one.

The role of hegemonic power, moreover, is very important in the construction of reality. This is because, among various discourses, the hegemonic discourse is readily accepted by different people throughout the world. This conditions the minds of people in the construction of reality. Post-structuralists are staunch believers in the fact that language has political and social undercurrents and functions. Language plays a pivotal role in the generation of political and social realities. In simple words, post-structuralists define reality as the intelligent deployment of language. The bedrock of reality is how intelligently it is framed through political rhetoric and propagated through the help of mass media, especially through the media of

hegemonic power.⁷ Due to the aforementioned tenets, post-structuralists give special attention to the role of media.

According to the scholars of post-structuralists, the role of media is embedded in discourse generation, securitization, and the construction of reality.⁸ Media disseminates political rhetoric and paves the way for public opinion in favour of the government's foreign policy endeavours. For example, during the Iraq war, there was resentment in the American public about fighting the war. Therefore, the American government deployed journalists with American troops stationed in Iraq. Since the media personnel were living with the troops and were stationed alongside them, the journalists saw the plight of soldiers fighting there. Along with that, the US government made them see the plight of people from an angle that legitimized the government's intervention in Iraq. The journalists reported the spectacle they saw in Iraq, hence reshaping public opinion in favour of the US government. This phenomenon is known as embedded journalism.⁹ The circle goes in the reverse direction as well, where the media acts as the mouth piece of the people for putting pressure on the government.¹⁰

The role of media in the case of Mahsa Amini has been very crucial in influencing narratives. From August to October, three women across the world died tragically. In Baghdad, while working in her fields, a girl named Zainab was shot dead by the bullet of American troops stationed near Baghdad airport. In Mississippi, on 22 August, Mable was shot dead by the local Biloxi Police in front of her children. Hardly a few people would have heard about these two deaths.¹¹ Since Mahsa belonged to Iran, which is an arch-rival of the US, the news to date is in the limelight. The Western media is portraying the subject as people's demand for regime change. The Western media was found reporting that Ibrahim Raisi, Iran's President, was chanted at 'Get Lost' by the protesters, especially the women

protesters, but instead, it was reported lately that the President was welcomed by the female students with their presence in hijab.¹²

Furthermore, on social media, nearly 52 million tweets have been posted in solidarity with Mahsa for regime change in Iran and against the hijab.¹³ Even a Persian Twitter handle run by the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs Tweeted in solidarity with Mahsa.¹⁴ The media has certainly altered the way people are thinking in the case of Mahsa Amini. People residing outside Iran certainly view the government as oppressive and Islamophobic sentiment has increased among them. The hijab is portrayed as a symbol of suffocation and oppression. The government of Iran, responsible for the application of shariah law in the country, is seen as the oppressor and the need for salvation from the regime is being inculcated into the minds of the people. The Western media has efficaciously constructed a narrative against the Iranian regime which in-turn has proved beneficial for the US government.

Therefore, this paper analyses all these trends using the tenets of post-structuralism and addresses the query related to the hijab Law in Iran and how the media plays a pivotal role in shaping and reshaping perceptions for political purposes.

Incorporation of Compulsory Hijab in the Iranian Law

Right after the revolution in 1979 as the theocratic forces managed to dominate the post-revolution political structure, Iran, to reproduce an ideal Islamic society, incorporated the compulsory hijab laws in the 1980s through a referendum.¹⁵ Educational institutes were especially kept in focus by the government to assimilate them with the culture. According to the hijab laws within Iran, anyone found violating religious obligations was to be subjected to 74 lashes initially. One striking feature of the law was its universality which required both men and women to dress modestly. Nonetheless, since the punishment criteria for violating the dress code was unclear in the

Sharia, Ayatollah Abdul Karim Mousavi Abedili gave the justification for its legalization which would allow the state to intervene as the flagbearer of Islamic values.¹⁶

The incorporation of hijab laws held a symbolic importance for the revolution that adopted the anti-Western rhetoric. At the time of pro-Western Reza Shah Pahlavi, the hijab was considered a matter of legislation. In 1935, in an incident famously known as Goharshad Mosque Rebellion, the monarchy forced women to remove the veil in public and men to follow Western-style dressing.¹⁷ In addition, heavy consumer taxes were levied on the public by the monarch. In response to these restrictions, the people, including merchants, women, and locals poured onto the streets and took refuge in the Goharshad shrine. For nearly four days, the security forces refused to violate the sanctity of the shrine but eventually, on the orders of the Shah, broke into the shrine and killed hundreds of people. Furthermore, during 1941- 79, there were no strict laws that would dictate women's attire in Iran. But many women opted to wear hijab and used to cover their heads.¹⁸ The women covered their heads at that time mainly because of two reasons: one was to show their discontent with the monarchic setup and the other was to observe the societal norm, i.e., the issue of 'honour'.

After the revolution, however, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the willingness to observe the hijab increased even more. In his speech in 1979, he declared hijab compulsory in the workplace for women. From 1985 onwards, wearing a hijab in public became obligatory, even for foreign female visitors.¹⁹ Over time, more and more social and legal restrictions were put in place as a part of the law. Criminal punishments, ranging from as low as fines to as strict as imprisonment, were announced for the offenders.²⁰ From 2000 to 2018, no significant legislation on the matter of hijab was passed. The only worth mentioning development was the formation of the morality policy or *Gasht-e-irshad* in 2005.

2018 saw a new facet opening for hijab laws. The government from 2018 onwards, no longer imprisoned or fined women for wearing the hijab properly rather Islamic educational classes were conducted for women, especially for those who were seen dressing ostentatiously in public. Tehran's police announced that women would be fined and taken to detention centres. According to Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code of Iran, the penalty for the abrogation of the hijab laws ranges from a \$20 fine, 10 days to up to a month in jail⁶ and *tazir*, known as the discretionary punishment. Any act depicting public indecency could lead to 10 years in jail.²¹

Formation of the Morality Police

The history of morality police supervising the dress code is controversial in Iran. At the time of Reza Shah Pahlavi, as the society was undergoing enforced modernization, the police were used for the first time to remove hijabs publicly.²² Similarly, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, no such institution or force was present to supervise and execute the adaptation of hijab laws in society. Therefore, these responsibilities were given to the 'volunteers' that resulted in the *Basijification* of the Iranian society and subsequently the police department.²³ The Basij militia was formed during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.²⁴ Volunteers were encouraged to be a part of the force during the war. The Basij militia had its presence in every Iranian university to manage the moral conduct, behaviour, and dress code of the students. However, it was during the tenure of the former hardliner president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that the morality police, also known as *Gasht-e-Irshad*, came into existence and the formal institutionalization to enforce hijab laws was carried out after its establishment.²⁵ Being a part of the Iranian National Police, it has access to arms, authority, and detention centres.²⁶ The operational requirements of the force are keeping an eye on the public to ensure proper and modest dressing explained in Iranian law. In the past, the police had made sure that

men would wear green uniforms while the women would cover themselves through *chadors*. It has both male and female members along with approximately 7,000 undercover agents.²⁷ These forces usually supervise crowded places like subway stations, shopping centres, and roads to prevent immodest dressing. Nonetheless, the interpretation of immodest dressing varies significantly, i.e., from wearing a loose hijab to body-fit dressing. Once a woman is found violating the laws or being explicit in the public, she is taken either to the police station or an Islamic educational and counselling centre where she is equipped with the knowledge and teachings of Islam, especially on the matters of hijab and modest clothing. Usually, the woman is released on the same day provided that any family member would bring her proper clothing.²⁸

Provided the strict implementation of hijab laws by the morality police, several controversies have emerged regarding the misuse of power. The government, with the help of the morality police, also tightened its grip on dress-code violations. Moreover, the government arrested the intellectuals who initiated a scholarly and cultural dialogue between Iran and the West. Among them was an eminent Iranian historian Haleh Esfandiari, who was detained while visiting her mother in Iran.²⁹ In August 2019, the Iranian government cracked down on the activists affiliated with the UN who were protesting against the prison sentence for women opposing the hijab laws. Some of these women were sentenced to 5 years of jail by the 28th Chamber of the Revolutionary Court and some were sentenced to 10 years on the charge of promoting prostitution and assisting moral corruption.³⁰ In the year 2022, the death of Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini was the biggest controversy that the morality police faced. The girl, as mentioned above, died in the custody of the morality police thus morality police was faced with the allegation of her murder.

Hijab Protests

Hijab protests inside Iran can be differentiated into two categories: the pro-hijab movement and the anti-hijab movement. During the time of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the unveiling rules were commissioned by the monarch, drawing its inspiration from Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. This decree issued by the monarch was known as *Kashif-e-Hijab*.³¹ During his visit to Turkey, the monarch expressed his delight over the Westernization in the country. The main motive behind this movement was to incur more Westernization in traditional Iranian society. Shah thought that the installation of Western ideals was the only thing that could pave Iran's road towards development. The unveiling movement, however, was met with resentment from the Iranian women because, rightly so, they were the ones effected the most by these laws. Among these protesters were also the clergy of the country. This was the time when the hijab was worn by women as a sign of opposition to the monarch's orders.

After the revolution, as the clergy managed to dominate the political system and had a wide array of supporters, the hijab was made compulsory. The striking feature was the support to clergy from the rural religious class of the society, the women of which used to observe hijab already without any compulsion. Nonetheless, the imposition by the state was considered outrageous. In 1979, on Women's Day, i.e., 8 March, thousands of women alongside men gathered in the streets of the country and showed their discontent about these laws. Their slogan was "in the dawn of freedom, there is an absence of freedom."³²

In 2009, during the presidential elections, Mir Hussain Mousavi derived overwhelming support from women belonging to the age group of 20-30. It reflected public support for his reformist stance and discontentment of the women with hijab laws. The women extended the Green Movement of Mousavi to the Muslim hijab. The women came on the streets with green attires, headbands, shawls, and

manteaux symbolizing their hope for change which they expected from Mousavi.³³

Later, in 2017, the White Wednesday movement was popularized as 'My Stealthy Freedom'.³⁴ This movement aimed to invite both men and women to dress up in white veils, bracelets, and scarves to record their protest against the mandatory hijab laws. This movement was also addressed to the women who were willing to wear hijab but were opposed to the idea of it being imposed on other women. Masih Alinejad, the pioneer of this movement, is an Iranian-born activist and journalist residing in the US. Later that year, another movement named 'Girls of Revolution Street' started. It was started by a girl named Vida Movahed. She stood on the top of a platform on Enghelab Street in Tehran without her hijab on. She raised her white veil which symbolized salvation from the compulsory hijab laws. The girl was later arrested by the police. The video of her went viral which fuelled similar protests in other parts of Iran as well. In the following months, at least 35 women were arrested under the charges of promoting prostitution and sinful acts.³⁵

The aforementioned movements were very short-lived and did not have much impact. However, the alleged death of Mahsa Amini under torture sparked unprecedented protests in Iran. This movement not only encompassed reservations against hijab laws but other shortcomings as well like that of economic turmoil, inflation, and unemployment. The impact of the movement was such that even voices of regime change echoed within Iran. This movement was unique in the sense that it was a leaderless movement. The protests that started at the funeral of Mahsa in her hometown further stoked the dissent in the other parts of Iran like a domino effect. Not only nationally but also internationally, people recorded their protests in their respective countries. Activists and journalists like Masih Alinejad and celebrities from the entertainment business like Angelina Jolie, Britney Spears, Nazanin Boniadi, and many more supported the

protests in Iran. The voice of Alinejad sparked more interest in the international media because of her history of standing up against the Iranian regime on hijab and the fact that she belonged to the Iranian diaspora.

Media: A Major Tool in Shaping and Reshaping Perceptions

The news of Masha's death was broken by two Iranian journalists named Nilofar Hamedi and Elahe Mohammadi. Mohammadi who worked with the *Sharaq Daily* posted the picture of Mahsa's funeral through her Twitter handle. This turned out to be her last project before she and her fellow journalists were arrested by the Iranian police. After this Twitter post, the entire global media was inundated by the news.³⁶

Both Iranian and international media have different takes on the news. The international media, especially that of the West, promulgated the anti-regime rhetoric that completely reshaped the focus from being taken up as a social issue to a political one. The reports of the Western media had 'regime change' features. For example, headlines like *Iranian women fighting for freedom*,³⁷ *Mahsa Amini: Students in Iran chant 'get lost' at paramilitary visitor*,³⁸ *Iran's 'women's revolution' could be a Berlin Wall*,³⁹ *Iran protester: 'You know that you might never come back, Study: Majority of Iranians want regime change as country's protests continue to grow*⁴⁰ and much more substantiated the aforementioned claim. Instances, where the protesters were found guilty of attacking the police, were not reported in the international media. Moreover, clips of protestors knocking off the turbans of religious clerics were completely unheard of in the mainstream Western media.⁴¹ Despite the casualties of both security forces and the protestors, Western media entirely ignored mention of the violence inflicted on the former. Instead, the miseries of protestors and their discontent were widely dominant in Western news coverage. For example, *'How Iran's protests transformed into a national uprising'*⁴²,

*'Iran's protest movement: The tipping point isn't far away'*⁴³, and *Iran protests: Alarm at crackdown by security forces in Kurdish city*⁴⁴ depicted the bias in the reporting of the Western media. News of 15,000 protesters being executed inside Iran was also falsely floated in the international media. Even Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was deluded by this false media reporting and Tweeted the fake news which upon realization was deleted by him. On the contrary, the pro-hijab movement in India did not get any significant mention in the international media as the anti-hijab movement. The pro-hijab movement in India was depicted as solely a social issue without having any political objectives but such was not the case in the Iranian anti-hijab movement. It was portrayed as an issue with political objectives. International media interpreted the symbolic acts of cutting hair and taking off the hijab as a protest against Islam, depicting their prejudice against Islam and Islamophobic mindset.⁴⁵ Radio Farda which is run by the US agency for global media also disseminated the same narrative. Alinejad, who is also a part of the Farda group, is amongst the most popular journalists being interviewed globally.

Iranian media on the other hand propagated the official narrative along with the opinion and demands of the protesters. The news of Mahsa's death was not as much of a frenzy in the Iranian media as it was in the Western media. Along with the anti-hijab protester, pro-hijab protests were also covered in the Iranian media. Incidents which included the government standing in sympathy with the Mahsa family were not mentioned in the international media but were covered by Iran's local media. For example, the post-mortem report was also published first in the local media. According to the autopsy report, the death was not caused by the blow to the head but rather because of multiple organ failures. The girl had gone through surgery for a brain tumour at the age of 8 years and due to this underlying disease of hers she was on multiple medications.⁴⁶ These underpinnings of the autopsy report were not heard of in the

international media as it advocated the stance of the morality police. The Supreme Leader and President Ibrahim Raisi, according to Iranian media, expressed their grief over the death of Mahsa. Furthermore, the Iranian media reported about the phone call the Iranian Prime Minister made to the family of Mahsa Amini and wished them patience and expressed his sympathy over the demise of their daughter.⁴⁷ This significant conversation, however, was not mentioned in the international media.

Analysis

Before the tenure of Mohammad Khatami, hijab laws were strictly implemented in the country. Since Khatami was a reformist, during his period from 1998 to 2005, the implementation of Islamic and hijab laws was relaxed.⁴⁸ This period saw the least protests from women against the hijab. Mohammad Khatami was then succeeded by a hardline Islamist President Mohammad Ahmadinejad. This is also the time of the formation of the morality police. The main reason for such institutionalization of Islamic laws by the hardliners was a reaction to the ultra-liberal policies of Khatami. The formation of the morality police was not, however, welcomed by the people especially the women and the youth. A report by Iran's parliament's research centre in 2018 showed that the popularity of hijab from the 1980s to 2018 had seen a staggering decline from 85 per cent to 35 per cent.⁴⁹ The economic turmoil fused with the incident of Mahsa led to the outbreak of protests on such a grand level. Most of the protests before the death of Mahsa encompassed the economic instability in Iran along with other domestic problems people were facing.⁵⁰ As the importance of youth in the Middle East rose after the event of the Arab spring, the hijab movement was also led by the youth in Iran. Youth wanted the government to give as much attention to their economic plight as much as it focuses on the implementation of the hijab laws.

Nonetheless, more than the ground reality, the role of media in depicting it can't be overlooked especially when the media is regarded as one of the major tools of fifth-generation warfare. The same happened in the case of Mahsa Amini as the Western media, particularly the US media, was successful in prompting the issue towards the political cause of regime change rather than a social cause. Mahsa's incident is not the first time in which the media's role was influential. Media played a persuasive role after the cold war in foreign engagements of the US. The CNN effect was quite visible in this connection.⁵¹ The CNN effect influenced the government to respond to foreign policy issues which the media showed as real-time events which compelled the government to go for humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan amongst others by using the camera power.

Nearly half of Iran is composed of women. Contrary to what western media portrays, Iranian women make up more than 55 per cent share in university-going students and graduates.⁵² The literacy rate of women in Iran is 85.5 per cent.⁵³ The life expectancy of women in Iran from 1991 has increased from 63 years to 79.1 years in 2020.⁵⁴ Moreover, the employment rate of women back in 1990 was 10 per cent however in 2021 it was estimated as 14.35 per cent. As of 2020 18.9 per cent of women work in managerial positions inside Iran and 19.9 per cent work in senior managerial positions.⁵⁵ Among these employed women only 19 per cent are those who are religiously trained and employed as religious professionals.⁵⁶

Despite these facts, the answer to western media depiction lies in the tenets of post-truth. Post-truth says that perceptions prevail over reality. The objective facts in the given circumstances are less influential and effective in shaping public opinion as compared to perception, personal belief and emotions.⁵⁷ Post-truth suggests that in the common world, the factual truth loses its relevance in the public discourse. The same happened in the case of hijab protests. The facts

mentioned above were not known to the common masses because the layman does not relate to the facts stated in the books or the paper. The masses relate to what is shown in the media and what they listen to. That is why media is such a lethal and pivotal tool in fifth-generation warfare especially for engaging the masses. The international media very effectively created a narrative or regime change out of the social issue which was bought by the masses as well and Iran had to face the music of such propaganda.

Conclusion

The compulsory hijab laws in Iran have indeed generated a lot of controversies as well as a debate between the different social and political elements of the country. More than hijab, the conduct of morality police along with the incidents attached to its legacy has remained in the highlighting feature for over a decade. The hijab laws were incorporated nearly four decades ago and even if at that point it amassed the support of the masses, there is a pressing need to reanalyse the essentiality of such laws. However, it is also true through facts that hijab is not an obstructing factor for women in terms of pursuing their careers, education and status in society. On the contrary, women in Iran are empowered both in their personal and professional spheres as depicted by the aforementioned figures.

Nevertheless, when it comes to Iran, it is often seen that any event which would entail negative implications for Iranian external relations, regional role or internal dynamics, the reporting of it is highly exaggerated. It can be seen in the Western coverage of the 2017-18 protests which first erupted in the city of Mashhad—the stronghold of the clergy—against the economic policies of moderate president Hasan Rouhani. However, the Western media depicted it as an indigenous uprising against the Iranian Islamic system. Such negative reporting with an overt bias often leads to false analysis which eventually results in miscalculated Western policies towards

Iran. In the era of hybrid warfare in which perceptions take lead over the reality, it is imperative to scrutinize the news. Relying only on any single faction of media outlets won't bring any objective findings. Precisely due to such exaggerated hue and cry on women issues in Iran and depicting the anti-hijab campaign as an unfolding revolution initially, the western media later realized that such an objective is not achievable as the protests gradually died down. However, it is also necessary for the Iranian side to take concrete actions regarding the controversies around the morality police. A suitable solution would be to reassess the role of the morality police and transform it into some other force to ensure people's rights to liberty in the public.

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AAM AADMI PARTY: EVOLUTION, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

KASHIF ALI*

Abstract

Indian politics has been largely dominated by identity politics: issues of castes and religion. In the last decade, a pan-India anti-corruption movement led to the establishment of a party in the national capital of India known as the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). This party has stirred Indian politics with its surprising landslide victories, governance model, and fierce campaigns. The AAP is the latest entry into the national arena after a fruitful campaign in the Gujarat elections. The Party has emerged like a start-up but has defied all the odds and is now all set to become the national political party. The AAP, relatively a young party, has faced many challenges and achieved many milestones. This study analyses the evolution of the AAP, its trajectory, challenges, its ability to challenge the larger parties, and strategies for upcoming elections.

Keywords: Arvind Kejriwal, Aam Aadmi Party, Bhartiya Janata Party, Indian National Congress, Hindutva, Lok Sabha, India Against Corruption, Delhi-Model, national alternative

Introduction

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) has become eligible to become India's ninth national political party. The AAP is a post-ideological populist party that was established in the wake of the India Against Corruption movement of 2011-12. It has been focusing on issues of corruption, governance, and urban development. It has portrayed

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itself as an alternative to the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC). The AAP, which has established a stronghold in Delhi with two straight clean sweeps, a stunning victory in Punjab, and fierce campaigns in both Uttarakhand and Goa, is a surprise. Over the last ten years, the AAP has had heydays, surprising electoral outcomes, and growth in the national political landscape. The party's capacity to remain in the scholarly and political conversation has been its most significant strength and one of the primary reasons for its rise. The AAP's significance in Indian politics stems from the fact that it is the only new political organization in a long time to break the blockade of the electoral mechanism without caste-, religion-, or ethnicity-based mobilization. Nevertheless, it is a known fact that Delhi's distinction as a city-state has aided this development.

The AAP is a growing challenger for existing Pan-India parties. Around a decade ago, it entered the political arena as a political start-up. The AAP's leaders have projected Arvind Kejriwal as a national leader and the next prime minister several times. Mainstream media and political experts view the AAP as a serious challenger to the BJP and the INC. With that arise three questions: one, does the AAP have the potential to pose a serious challenge to the hegemony of the BJP and become a national alternative? Two, why is AAP considered as a potential alternative on the national front but no other party is discussed as a contender and, three, how can the AAP become a major party in the next general election when it is absent in the current 17th Lok Sabha? This study analyses the trajectory, electoral campaigns, and performance of the AAP and its strategy for the upcoming elections.

Anti-Corruption Movements in India

Demand for Lokpal

In the 1960s, corruption stories were heard for the first time in Indian politics. The demand for a *Lokpal*—an anti-corruption

ombudsperson—was first tabled in the Nehru era. Dr LM Singhvi proposed the ombudsman for the first time in Lok Sabha in 1963. A committee was formed under the chairmanship of Morarji Desai for recommendations. The *Lokpal* Bill was passed in Lok Sabha in 1969 but could not get the approval of the Rajya Sabha. The Indira Gandhi government introduced the bill for *Lokpal* and *Lokayukta*—a parliamentary ombudsperson—in 1971, the Charan Singh government introduced it in 1977, and the Rajiv Gandhi government presented the bill in 1985. However, none of them was passed by the Indian parliament. Besides that, the *Lokpal* Bills were also introduced on the floor of parliament in 1989, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008, but just like before, they never reached the approval stage.¹

The JP Movement

Jayaprakash Narayan, an independence activist, is remembered for his opposition to the Indira Gandhi administration. He had given a clarion call for *Sampooran Kranti* (total revolution) against the authoritarianism of the Congress government, bad governance, and increasing systematic corruption. He started agitation alongside the youth of Gujarat and Bihar. Many current leaders of various parties that broke away from the Janata Dal consider themselves products of JP Narayan's movement. Raj Narain sued Indira Gandhi for electoral malpractices in her constituency elections and the Allahabad High Court found her guilty. She imposed an emergency and took all the movement's leaders into custody. However, the movement did not stop, and Congress lost the 1977 election. The Janata Party which was the product of the movement came into power but could not survive and Congress returned to power in 1980.²

India Against Corruption

The continuity of civilian governments in India has developed a culture of democracy. After the liberalization of the economy in India, a new generation of the middle class has come into existence

that is well-educated and settled in urban areas. Democracy has issues as it has been linked with the free market. There is a general perception that people who are not sponsored, lose elections. The elite is, thus, perceived to dominate the system, maintain the status quo, and offer very little to the middle class. Moreover, corruption is also a predicament in India, like any other post-colonial state which, at times, pushes ordinary people to exert pressure directly on the political system. India Against Corruption is an example of such a demonstration when people from all walks of life marched against corrupt and autocratic governance.³

India saw a series of nationwide protests against corruption in 2011-12. The nation was united under a loose coalition named India Against Corruption. The one unified demand of the movement was the establishment of Jan *Lokpal* (Public Ombudsman) through an Act of parliament. The movement was based on *Gandhi Giri* as it was non-violent and consisted of hunger strikes, rallies, general strikes, and civil disobedience. It was a completely non-partisan movement, as they were marching against every corrupt politician. Kisan Baburao Hazare, a social activist and devoted Gandhian, was the public face of the movement. He was popularly called Anna Hazare and the movement was also known as Anna Andolan (Anna's movement).

Anna Hazare went on a hunger strike on 5 April 2011 at Jantar Mantar¹ to pressure the federal government to pass the bill establishing the Jan Lokpal. He announced that the hunger strike would continue until the bill was passed. Anna's hunger strike gathered support from civil society, opposition parties, and the masses. Anna declared his movement was completely apolitical, so people appeared in large numbers at Jantar Mantar to support him, calling themselves 'Team Anna'. Thousands of people rallied in anti-corruption marches in Delhi, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad, Chennai, and Mumbai. Anna's close companions were N. Santosh Hegde, a former

¹ A heritage park in New Delhi.

judge; Prashant Bhushan, a lawyer in Supreme Court; Swami Agnivesh, a social activist; and Arvind Kejriwal, a former bureaucrat and social activist. Usually, people from the film industry do not show their political affiliation. However, the movement was at such a peak that prominent actors like Amir Khan and Anupam Kher supported the anti-corruption cause. The Prime Minister appointed a panel of senior ministers to discuss the draft of the bill with Anna, along with his team of legal experts. Anna succeeded in keeping ministers facing corruption allegations out of the committee.

On 8 April, the Ministry of Law and Justice issued a notification of a committee comprising five ministers and five representatives of civil society. Pranab Mukherjee (Chairperson), P. Chidambaram, Salman Khurshid, Kapil Sibal, and Veerappa Moily were from the government side. Five civil society representatives were Anna, Shanti Bhushan (Co-chairperson), Arvind Kejriwal, Prashant Bhushan, and Santosh Hegde. Anna ended his fast after the formation of the committee. He declared 15 August as the deadline for the passage of the *Lokpal* bill. The draft prepared by the joint committee was sent to the Union cabinet for approval. Team Anna quit the committee in protest upon excluding the Prime Minister and CBI from *Lokpal* jurisdiction. Union cabinet gave its approval on 28 July. Anna accused the government of sending a weaker bill to parliament. He sent a letter to the prime minister to withdraw this bill and propose a stronger one. Despite Anna's protests, the bill was approved by the Lok Sabha.

Anna gave a call on 16 August of fast-unto-death at Jantar Mantar. However, police refused to permit a protest at Jantar Mantar. Upon not surrendering to the police, Anna, Arvind Kejriwal, and hundreds of his supporters were taken into custody and sent to Tihar Jail. People showed their solidarity with Team Anna, brought them food, and paid them visits to Tihar Jail. Even the families of jail staff provided food and water to supporters of Anna. This kind of gesture of solidarity was unprecedented in India. Anna's supporters organized a

peaceful march from India Gate to Jantar Mantar on 17 August. This demonstration pushed the government back and allowed Anna to fast at Ramlila Maidan. Anna left Tihar jail and went to Rajghat (now Kartavya Path) to pay tribute to Mahatma Gandhi and then to Ramlila Maidan with his followers. Arvind Kejriwal appealed to the government to withdraw the *Sarkari* (government) bill and include their recommendations. Anna started his fast in front of thousands of people at Ramlila Maidan. Team Anna staged sit-ins outside MPs' and ministers' houses across the country.

On the fifth day of the fast, Anna's health began declining. Congress sent Pranab Mukherjee to negotiate. He negotiated with Arvind Kejriwal, Kiran Bedi, and Prashant Bhushan for two hours but failed to generate consensus. Anna's health was a matter of great concern. However, he remained strong despite old age and sickness. The UPA government stated that Anna's demands would be included in the bill. Anna ended his fast and suspended his movement. However, when the government presented the bill in parliament, it only met the demand of bringing the prime minister under *Lokpal*. Anna called the entire government and political leadership cheaters.

After that, Anna announced holding a fast on MMRDA grounds in Mumbai from 27 December. However, people did not gather as per the expectations of Team Anna, so they had to call off the movement. Public interest in movements started declining as the bill had already been presented in parliament. After a gap of six months, Anna and his companions decided to demonstrate another fast at Jantar Mantar in Delhi in July 2012. Anna could not fast due to his health issues. His deputies, Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, and Gopal Rai, took charge and started a hunger strike. Noticeably, public turnout was not as strong as expected. Kejriwal ended his fast after ten days on 3 August. He thanked all his supporters and stated that systematic change is required and that we must fight this war inside the legislature. Anna disagreed with him and remained stuck on his path of protests and

public awareness. Whereas, Kejriwal chose to establish a political party. On this contradiction, Anna disbanded his team on 6 August and the movement formally ended.⁴

The Birth of the AAP

All revolutionary movements have a limited lifespan. From a political sociology perspective, when a movement starts fading out, the possible ways to revitalize it are either to change the leader, change the demands, or change the nature of the movement. The first two methods were not possible in the case of India Against Corruption, but the last one was adopted by Arvind Kejriwal. The movement suffered a split when Arvind Kejriwal asserted the option of entering electoral politics. Anna, who had struggled throughout his life in peaceful and apolitical ways, was reluctant to join politics. Arvind Kejriwal argued that they had tried everything, but nothing worked with these political leaders. It was when most of the political parties lost their credibility and politics was criminalized and monetized. Arvind Kejriwal conducted an online survey to find people's opinions on forming a political party; 76% voted in favour of a political party.⁵ Arvind Kejriwal laid the foundation of the Aam Aadmi Party on 2 October 2012, the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi. The Party was launched in a public rally on 26 November 2012, the Constitution Day of India. AAP's foundation was laid on issues of governance and corruption but it lacked the base of ideology or identity politics issues.

Delhi Conquest

Chalegi Jhadu, Udegi Dhool; Na Rahega Panja, Na Rahega Phool

The Aam Aadmi Party debuted in the Delhi Legislative Assembly elections in 2013. The party arose to challenge both the BJP and the INC. The Congress Party had ruled in Delhi for three consecutive terms. AAP's slogan was *Chalegi Jhadu, Udegi Dhool; Na*

Rahega Panja, Na Rahega Phool (The broom will clean up the hand and the lotus—the electoral symbols of the AAP, INC, and BJP, respectively). The campaign was based on corruption, governance issues, electricity prices, and education. The AAP won 28 seats, the BJP 31, and the Congress 8. However, the BJP failed to form a government despite having a majority in the assembly. Whereas, the AAP formed the government with the external support of eight MLAs of Congress. Arvind Kejriwal became the Chief Minister of Delhi and took oath at Ramlila Maidan. Nevertheless, the AAP government resigned after 49 days when they failed to introduce the *Jan Lokpal* Bill because Congress and the BJP both opposed the *Lokpal* legislation. In these 49 days, the AAP announced half-billing for those who consumed less than 400 units, free electricity for those who consume less than 200 units, 700 litres of water for a household without charges, and established helplines for reporting corruption and power cuts.⁶

The AAP enjoyed enormous media coverage throughout its campaign because the party was a product of a nationwide movement. The statistical significance of Delhi is limited as Delhi's population is only 1.4 per cent of the total population of India and has only seven seats in the Lok Sabha. Delhi, however, is the national capital territory, the biggest economic hub in North India, and hosts the headquarters of several media houses, so it added to the significance of the AAP.⁷

Paanch Saal Kejriwal

AAP's slogan in the 2015 Delhi state elections was *Paanch Saal Kejriwal* (Kejriwal for five years). They wanted to assure their voters that the AAP would complete its tenure this time. Arvind Kejriwal apologized to voters for quitting after only 49 days. The AAP swept the assembly by winning 67 seats out of 70 and got votes from all the communities. To counter Arvind Kejriwal, the BJP appointed Kiran Bedi—a former Anna Hazare associate—as the CM face, but the strategy backfired. This portrayed Kiran Bedi as an opportunist who

was not committed to fighting corruption. It was a victory that stunned everyone because the AAP was a young party and had defeated the BJP, which had won the general elections a year before and four state elections that year. The party presented a 70-point manifesto after consultation with voters from every constituency.⁸

Delhi's economy saw a certain increase after the AAP took over. Delhi's budget, which was in deficit, turned into a surplus. In the education sector, the AAP promised to build 500 new schools to give children from all sections of society an equal opportunity for quality education. They could build only 30 schools due to land shortage but added around twenty thousand classrooms to the existing ones. The education budget of Delhi had gone up every year. The AAP made education free up to the 12th grade, increased scholarships, and regulated private school fees. In 2020, the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra Ajit Pawar praised Delhi's school education and decided to adopt the same model in his state.⁹ The Aam Aadmi Mohalla (neighbourhood) Clinic was the government's flagship project in the healthcare sector. It was the lowest tier in the three-tiered healthcare system promised by the AAP. Mohalla clinics are delivering at the grassroots level. 83 per cent of their patients come from families with annual incomes lower than INR 250,000.¹⁰ Madhya Pradesh government decided to adopt the Delhi Mohalla Clinic in its cities.¹¹ Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and former Norwegian President Gro Harlem Brundtland visited the mohalla clinics in Delhi and were deeply impressed.¹² The AAP government has given a full subsidy to a household that consumes electricity of fewer than 200 units and a fifty per cent subsidy to those who consume less than 400 units. They had also promised 20,000 litres of water for every household per month and around 1.3 million households are provided free water 24/7. Public transport is free for women now and will be free for students in the next phase.¹³

Achhe Beete Paanch Saal, Lage Raho Kejriwal

In 2020, the Aam Aadmi Party was re-elected with a resounding majority in Delhi. The AAP clinched 62 seats out of 70. The BJP won the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, while the AAP failed miserably, even from Delhi. However, Modi's charisma could not work in the Delhi state elections, but Kejriwal's did. The elections showed that state elections are always contested on issues of locality and governance, unlike the general elections. As the Delhi model was a huge success for the AAP, the slogan the AAP chanted in campaigns was, *Achhe Beete Paanch Saal, Lage Raho Kejriwal* (we had good five years, keep up the good work Kejriwal).¹⁴ The AAP also ended the BJP's win streak in the Delhi Municipal Corporation elections. It secured the majority in the MCD polls in 2022.

Victory in Punjab

Punjab is a state where two of the oldest parties, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and the Congress, have been in power for a long time. Even in its most muscular electoral wave, the BJP could not get significant votes in Punjab. The AAP clinched an overwhelming victory in Punjab by winning 92 seats out of 117 in the 2022 state elections. Earlier in 2017, the AAP could win only 20 seats in Punjab, which granted it state party status in the state. Farmers in Punjab marched towards Delhi over the farm laws and forced Narendra Modi to repeal them. The INC won the 2017 elections but it failed to capture anti-BJP sentiments in its favour in 2022. The people of Punjab were desperately looking for a third option for better governance and development. The primary factor that led to the huge victory of AAP was the 'Delhi Model'. Other factors that pushed public opinion in favour of the Aam Aadmi Party were unemployment, economic disillusionment, and dissatisfaction over health and education.¹⁵ Arvind Kejriwal promised 24-hour electricity, education for all, free healthcare, drug control, maintenance of law and order, and

employment. However, unlike Delhi, there is a tough road ahead for the AAP in the state. Punjab was once one of India's wealthiest and most prosperous states, but its economy has declined for the last two decades. The Delhi Model can only be implemented if the economy of Punjab is fixed.¹⁶

Elections in Goa and Gujarat: Gains for the AAP

The Aam Aadmi Party contested elections in Goa and Gujarat in 2017. It could not win any seat in either state. It participated again in the 2022 elections. It got a 6% overall vote percentage and two seats in Goa, which made it eligible to be recognized as a state party in Goa. Gujarat elections were concluded on 8 December 2022 and the BJP registered its highest margin victory by winning 156 seats out of 182. Congress dropped to 17 seats from 59 and the AAP won 5 seats, securing an overall 12 per cent vote share. The ratio of these results fulfils the requirements of the AAP becoming a state party in the fourth state and ultimately getting the label of a national political party. Gujarat is the home state of Narendra Modi and the fortress of the BJP. The AAP had run a fierce campaign in Gujarat to showcase its presence in the state. The AAP had moved all its focus on the Gujarat elections despite contesting in Himachal Pradesh at the same time because challenging the BJP and Narendra Modi would catch more attention nationwide.¹⁷ The AAP had no presence in Gujarat before, but Kejriwal made it look like a BJP versus AAP election in the media.

Turn towards Hindutva

Hindus make up 80 per cent of the population of India. In almost every constituency, they are in the majority and if not they have a significant vote share. The Hindutva ideology is based on naïve and simplistic principles that allow no questions and no doubts. It is like a straitjacket, the hardest form of ideology. Hindutva has become the strongest factor in Indian electoral politics. The BJP has been winning elections by targeting Hindu voters and marginalizing

minorities. It has been the basic ideology of RSS, the parent organization of the BJP, since its inception. Congress has been firm on its founding principles of secularism. Therefore, in the BJP's Hindutva wave, Congress fails to acquire votes. However, the AAP appears unafraid to follow the BJP's blueprint to woo Hindu voters.¹⁸ Arvind Kejriwal declared himself a 'Hanuman Bhakt' (a devotee of Lord Hanuman) before the elections in 2020. Similarly, the AAP refrained from discussing the repeal of Article 370 concerning the special status of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), Bilkis Bano, and Citizenship Amendment Act. The Delhi government also installed a temporary replica model of Ram Mandir Ayodhya in Delhi, where Arvind Kejriwal and his cabinet celebrated Diwali.¹⁹ Arvind Kejriwal has also once demanded that goddess Lakshmi's and Lord Ganesh's pictures are on currency notes. The politics in India has turned right as the BJP's saffron wave is at its peak and it turns out to be the biggest factor in electoral politics. The AAP is following the Hindu majoritarian footprints of the BJP to extend its political power.²⁰

AAP: A Potential Contender

India claims to be the largest democracy in the world, as it is home to 1.2 billion people. Political parties are the backbone of the democratic system. The Election Commission of India (ECI) currently recognizes only eight national political parties in India. Those are the Indian National Congress, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), the National People's Party (NPP), and the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC). All others are state political parties. To attain the status of a national party, it must win 3% of total seats in Lok Sabha from four states or must be recognized in four states.

The Indian National Congress (INC), which led the movement for independence, has dominated Indian politics for almost six

decades after independence. Many state parties came into existence after the splits in national parties. When Congress split in the late 1960s, its breakaway factions were united against the Indira Gandhi administration. Later, the Janata Party was formed by merging all those political parties that had broken off from the INC. The Janata Party went on to win the 1977 Lok Sabha elections and Morarji Desai, a former senior member of Congress, became the Prime Minister. However, the party could not survive due to internal splits. Bhartiya Jana Sangh was one of the parties that merged into the Janata Party. When the Janata Party was dissolved, Bhartiya Jana Sangh succeeded in founding a new party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which has held the office of Prime Minister since 2014. In 1988, the Janata Dal was built from the ashes of the Janata Party under the leadership of VP Singh. With the support of the Bhartiya Janata Party, VP Singh became prime minister in 1989. However, the government lasted only two years after the BJP withdrew its support. The Janata Dal eventually split into several factions. In June 1996, HD Deve Gowda of the Janata Dal (Secular), a faction of the Janata Dal, became India's 11th Prime Minister.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a state party based in Tamil Nadu, was founded in 1949 and inherited the Tamil nationalist ideology from the South Indian Liberation Front. The DMK is the third-largest party in the 17th Lok Sabha with 24 seats. The All India Trinamool Congress is the fourth-largest party in the 17th Lok Sabha with 23 seats. Mamata Banerjee's AITC has been the ruling party in West Bengal for the third consecutive term since 2011. AITC has been recognized as a national political party by the Election Commission, but it has not won any state other than West Bengal. The Yuvajana Shramika Rythu (YSR) Congress Party, a Congress breakaway faction, based in Andhra Pradesh, has 22 seats and fifth-largest in Lok Sabha. Shiv Sena is a Hindu and Marathi nationalist political party, currently

the sixth-largest in the Lok Sabha with 19 seats. Shiv Sena could only spread within Maharashtra.

Talking about current national parties, the Bahujan Samaj Party has only ten seats in the Lok Sabha. The BSP is based in Uttar Pradesh and focuses on the rights of scheduled castes and backward classes. Despite holding the office of Chief Minister Uttar Pradesh for a brief period, the party has failed miserably in the last two state elections. Other national parties in Lok Sabha include the NCP, CPI-M, CPI, and NPP have only five, three, two, and one seats, respectively. Oddly, many state parties have more Lok Sabha seats than many of the national parties. The major difference between state and national parties lies in their manifestos. Most state parties are confined to states because their agenda is based on language, ethnicity, or nationalism, like the DMK, which has never stepped outside the Tamil region.

The AAP is now all set to be recognized by the ECI as a national party and is also standing on zero in Lok Sabha. However, with its landslide victory in Punjab, the AAP has emerged as a strong contender in national politics. Political experts wonder if the AAP could seriously challenge the BJP's hegemony. Except for the BJP, the INC, and the AITC, all other national parties have consistently failed in general and state elections. In the case of AITC, it is obvious that the AAP has nationwide appeal due to its background of India Against Corruption which the AITC lacks. Arvind Kejriwal has a better image as CM than Mamata Banerjee. Moreover, the AITC, despite having national party status, has never won outside West Bengal.²¹ The AAP is distinct from other parties in terms of its origin and evolution. Mostly parties were formed from broken factions of the INC and the Janata Party, veteran politicians became their heads but these parties have been failing in state and general elections consistently. The AAP emerged from a mass movement, headed by social activists and has won in two significant states of India. Thus, the AAP appears to be a stronger party than any other.

The Challenge of Lok Sabha

The Aam Aadmi Party has done well in state elections in the last decade but failed miserably in general elections. Arvind Kejriwal and the AAP have gained popularity across India since the anti-corruption movement of 2011-12. Despite their popularity, attractive manifestos, and achievements of the Delhi Model, they have failed in the Lok Sabha elections. The AAP contested 432 seats in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections but could win only 4 seats. In 2019, AAP could win only one seat after contesting 35 seats.

The BJP is at its peak and Congress is campaigning all over India. To counter them, the AAP needs resources and enthusiastic workers for the Lok Sabha elections in 2024. The AAP is yet to develop as an institution because the grassroots structure is non-existent. Arvind Kejriwal laid the party foundation a decade ago and since then the party has been revolving around his personality. The party had volunteers initially but could not transform them into a political cadre.²² Contesting more than five hundred seats on freebies and urban development agenda without enough resources and political workers looks impossible on paper. The AAP's leader Sanjay Singh said after the Gujarat polls that 2024 would be Narendra Modi versus Arvind Kejriwal. It sounds quite over-ambitious because the ground realities do not favour them. The AAP has always twisted the media with these statements because it is critical to remain relevant in the media to stay in electoral politics. Kejriwal's strategy would be targeting more state elections for the party's expansion, taking on Congress in 2024, and his ultimate target would be the BJP in the Lok Sabha elections of 2029.²³

Arvind Kejriwal's Leadership and Strategies

Arvind Kejriwal is a former income tax department official who became a social worker. He was disillusioned over corruption in government departments. He launched an NGO, 'Parivartan', to raise

his voice over corruption issues. He also participated in the 2001 'Right to Information' campaign. When Anna Hazare launched India Against Corruption movement, he joined it and became a close and trusted companion of Anna. Kejriwal decided to establish a political party when the movement could not achieve the desired outcomes after trying every peaceful protest option. Arvind Kejriwal laid the foundation of the Aam Aadmi Party and led the party to a minority government after its very first election. Kejriwal influenced Indian politics by highlighting corruption and governance issues and making them a national agenda. His narrative represents a populist approach, resonating with the common people and their interests.

Arvind Kejriwal was neither a politician nor had any background in politics but under his leadership, the party has won Delhi three times. It won in Punjab, and now it is all set to get recognized as a national political party. Kejriwal's leadership has an institutional base inside the party. He has been central to formulating and implementing strategies for the AAP. He contested elections consecutively for the party's growth and the strategy proved useful. He achieved his ambitious objectives in Delhi and rose like a game-changer. He branded himself as an ordinary citizen, wearing a muffler and a Gandhi cap. Arvind Kejriwal utilized social media for party promotion and his branding. Arvind Kejriwal and the party's connectivity with followers is very strong due to its active website and social media team. The AAP's social media strategy was unique and the first of its kind in Indian politics.²⁴

Arvind Kejriwal has become the face of the AAP. He has led the party successfully, but his centralized leadership is one of the biggest hurdles the AAP would face to expand nationwide. The party has been transforming into a cult. The AAP's former members have labelled Arvind Kejriwal as an autocrat. The party's ambition to become a national alternative will be achieved if the leadership is decentralized.

Other parties are restricted to a state or two only because of their identity politics agenda or their autocratic leadership.

Conclusion

Congress has dominated Indian politics for almost six decades. It started declining after it peaked. Several parties have challenged the domination of Congress, but those parties ultimately diminished. The BJP overtook the Congress and now looks like the only formidable national-level political player. The AAP, a relatively young but ambitious player, is now challenging the dominance of the BJP. Looking at the present political landscape, the AAP appears to be emerging as a significant candidate, filling a gap on a national scale. The performance of the Congress and the Trinamool has given the party an excellent political chance to grow. The AAP is popular due to its Delhi Model, especially in North India. However, its organizational structure and network beyond North India are very weak and the party needs a long-term strategy to develop an organization to fight older parties.²⁵

It is crucial to clarify that the Aam Aadmi Party will not usher in a revolution. The party, which resigned in just 49 days over failing in the basic agenda on which they got elected, has transformed into an orthodox player of power politics. A party that received overwhelming support from Dalits and a sizeable number of OBCs in 2015 and 2020, is dominated by higher castes among its leadership and legislators. Similarly, despite strong female support, just about 13 per cent of the elected MLAs are female. More shockingly, for a party that purports to represent the 'ordinary man' and new methods of doing politics, the character of its spokespeople has shifted dramatically.²⁶

The AAP concentrates on civic issues. It emphasizes services and delivery but has been silent on rights violations, civil liberties, and political issues. It has never taken a stand on democratic values and rights. It has never condemned communal violence. Arvind Kejriwal

has criticized Modi and the BJP for economic policies several times. However, he has never criticized Modi's Hindu supremacist policies like Rahul Gandhi. Arvind Kejriwal and his team members have never spoken for democracy. They only talk about governance, corruption, and freebies. A party without an ideology can be instrumental. It can go either this way or that. The AAP needs ideology so that its members know what they stand for and what they stand against. As long as the AAP keeps itself from taking a stand on democratic values and rights, its position will remain that of a service provider, not a political party. The approach that the AAP can go left or right wherever its interest lies should be abandoned.²⁷

As the BJP's saffron politics pivot on its narrative of Hindutva and remain fashionable, Arvind Kejriwal has come up with a strategy of soft Hindutva. Kejriwal wants to make hay while the sun shines. However, Kejriwal cannot break the hegemony of the BJP using these tactics by going on a solo ride. Opposition parties need to partner with each other to defeat the BJP. The AAP and the INC are major parties after the BJP, and both are poles apart. Their alliance is out of the equation for now. As a result, despite AAP's possibilities, it is too soon to declare it a national alternative. Time, performance, and collaboration will determine the future. Becoming the country's main opposition rests primarily on the party's ability to create an accessible and performing political paradigm.²⁸

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INDIAN MILITARY'S LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE 2018 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

ALLAH NAWAZ*

Abstract

Since its inception, Pakistan is under threat from India. The Indian pursuit of hawkish ambitions in the South Asian region is not only compromising the already fragile security environment but also bringing three nuclear-powered states at loggerheads. Although Indian policymakers point towards China as their main adversary, a close examination of their strategic policies indicates that primarily Pakistan is on their radar. From the Nehru doctrine to the Indira doctrine, from Sunderji to the Cold Start doctrine, and from hybrid war to land warfare doctrine India left no stone unturned to harm Pakistan surreptitiously or explicitly. The study is aimed to investigate the latest Indian new land warfare doctrine of 2018. It will also briefly highlight the previous transformative trends in Indian military doctrinal transformations. Furthermore; the study will be concluded by highlighting the major impacts of the new land warfare doctrine on Pakistan.

Keywords: *Cold Start Doctrine, integrated battle groups, command and theatre, electronic warfare*

Introduction

Soon after its birth as an independent state, India found the non-alignment policy best suitable for the pursuit of her interests but later this thinking transformed into offensive postures keeping in view

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the changing South Asian strategic milieu.¹ The Indian strategic arch rivalry on two fronts pushed India to bring necessary transformations in the military strategic setting to play a role in regional politics. Indian strategic setting revolves around both China and Pakistan but the tilt is more towards Pakistan. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, New Delhi propagates China as its main rival but the current military modernisation and doctrinal shift exposes its hegemonic ambitions to bring Pakistan to its knees.

The strategic shift in Indian thinking started in the Nehru era when Nehru proposed to bring economic stability to India and further aimed to resolve bilateral issues with immediate neighbours with political and diplomatic wisdom rather than military means. Nehru doctrine was aimed to dominate the Indian Ocean and keep other powers away from expanding tentacles in this strategically important region. But the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pak war exposed their internal weaknesses as India requested the US for military assistance and later concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR in the early 1970s.²

To overcome these flaws, Indira Gandhi took strategic steps and brought a more aggressive doctrine to pursue Indian hegemonic ambitions by strengthening its military muscles. K Sunderji proposed a 20-year plan for the army by focusing on mechanised infantry, three strike corps, and sophisticated armour divisions.³ The explicit objectives of these initiatives were to hit Pakistan deep down in its territory. But Pakistan's successful cricket diplomacy and the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons kept Indians away from any military adventure.

The decade of the 1990s was mired with Kashmir's agitation but the Kargil conflict of 1999 opened new doors in Indian strategic thinking and the concept of 'limited war under a nuclear overhang' emerged. This concept gained more popularity in Indian strategic circles after the failure of the Indian-initiated operation Parakaram⁴ in

aftermath of the 2001 parliament attack where Indian forces took 27 days to mobilise towards the western border,⁵ causing many casualties even before any war.⁶

These failures and the substantial mobilisation time motivated Indian strategists to formulate more viable policies aiming to cut short the mobilisation time to 72-96 hours (in response to Pakistan's 72 hours) to retain the element of surprise for Pakistan through swift and blitzkrieg-type actions without provoking Pakistan's nuclear threshold. The explicit objectives were confined to capturing small-scale territories by taking Pakistan's military outposts.

This doctrine was termed the cold start doctrine (CSD) in 2004. The Indian forces somehow failed to operationalise the cold start doctrine because Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons for swift retaliation and to destroy their planned Division-size forces near the border. For successful implementation of the CSD, India needed more synergy between the land and air forces through advanced equipment and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities which they lacked due to structural and operational weaknesses. This was evident after Indian failure to operationalise CSD after terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008.

The nuclear atmosphere, long border, huge cost of military actions, and Pakistan's timely retaliatory measures restricted Indian ambitions of military manoeuvres. After the Mumbai attacks, India shifted the battlegrounds to hybrid fronts and introduced the renewed hybrid warfare doctrine in 2008. The establishment of a technical services division⁷ under the supervision of V K Singh and the deployment of spies to create agitation against the state of Pakistan from the inside are proof of these Indian initiatives.

This strategic military doctrinal transformation is not limited to tackling only Pakistan but growing Chinese power in the Indian Ocean as well. In October 2015, India came up with a new maritime strategy under the title, *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*

to exert dominance in the Indian Ocean. Indian collaboration with the US, China's arch-rival, through agreements like Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA),⁸ the Logistic Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA),⁹ and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and joint military exercises in the Indian oceans hints at growing Indian hegemonic interest in the Indian Ocean. These conventional capabilities are strengthened by the provision of sophisticated Israeli defence systems such as BARAK-1 and BARAK-8. Similarly, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines from Russia are enough to disturb the balance of power equation in the South Asian region.

The concept of sub-conventional warfare strategy was introduced by the Indian air force in 2012 and further this was introduced in the joint armed forces doctrine of 2017 which focuses on preserving the Indian integrity, sovereignty, unity, democratic and secular institutions, economic and maritime trade routes, and most importantly the military modernity for securing territorial waters and air space. Subsequently, by merging the previous doctrines, India produced the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* to meet new emerging challenges in the region. The *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* provides for small integrated battle groups to ensure their agility and swiftness to launch shallow manoeuvres remaining under nuclear thresholds.

For the successful implementation of the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018*, India carried out strategic deals with the US, the Russian Federation, and Israel for necessary logistics and resources. The strong backing of the US for Indian military modernisation against China and Pakistan and support in the United Nations Security Council for permanent membership¹⁰ made India more aggressive and raised Indian morale to become the US's policeman in South Asia. These Indian strategic doctrinal shifts and alliances with major powers are raising grave concerns for Pakistan and regional peace.

Pakistan is pushed to seek a strategic alliance with China and other like-minded states to procure sophisticated technologies and electronic warfare systems to counter growing Indian offensive ambitions. The study, with the help of in-depth interviews and secondary data collection methods, elaborates on the Indian Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018 and highlights its implications for Pakistan.

Indian Military Land Warfare Doctrine 2018


Indian military's continuous doctrinal transformation even after the advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia is aimed to achieve its hegemonic and hawkish ambitions against Pakistan. The contemporary border skirmishes with China pushed India to deploy an effective number of troops at the northern border to counter Chinese military prowess. Indian military failed to operationalise the cold start doctrine due to a hard-hitting response from Pakistan. Later the Indian Air Force doctrine on sub-conventional warfare also failed when Pakistan gave a befitting response in February 2019.

Pakistan's timely measures led Indian strategists to think again about their military posture and bring new necessary transformations in the military-strategic setting. In December 2018, the Indian military introduced its latest doctrine commonly referred to as the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018*. The new land warfare doctrine explains Indian threat perceptions and military response in case of a limited war. Keeping the failures of the cold start doctrine view, the Land Warfare Doctrine focuses on quick and limited operations by reducing mobility time and operational obstacles.

Main Features of the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018*

The *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* is produced by amalgamating all main components of the previous military doctrines.¹¹ Concepts of integrated battle groups, hybrid warfare, network-centric warfare, surgical strikes, and military modernisation are taken from previous doctrines and after fine-tuning these concepts and modernising them

according to new challenges, land warfare doctrine was finally launched.



Important tenets of the Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018

Source: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

Multi-Front War Scenario: The Concept of Integrated Battle Groups

The main concept on which the Indian military devised their strategies after the advent of nuclear weapons is the limited war concept. To pursue the goals of the limited war, the Indian military needs to cut short their mobilisation time for swift, sharp, and limited manoeuvres. For limited actions, India needs force multipliers to deploy them on borders in case of war or operations on both war fronts: northern and western. While India does face challenges from China,¹² full-scale war is not possible with the latter as both have huge conventional and non-conventional disparities and the nature of conflict is not a serious cause for the escalation of any major war. Therefore, the Indian tilt is more towards Pakistan.

The changing dynamics of regional security, especially regarding a collective approach of Pakistan and China towards South Asia, have alerted Indian strategists. To cope with emerging security

challenges on both fronts, India came up with more innovative military strategies.¹³ The introduction of integrated battle groups (IBGs) is significant for all. The idea was first coined in the 2004-05 period when the Indian military introduced its cold start doctrine.

The cold start doctrine, an older version of the Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, also predominately focused on limited, sharp, shallow, and swift military actions across the border to seize a small chunk of the enemy territory which can later be used as a bargaining chip on different issues. During the cold start doctrine, the pivot corps were introduced along with the restructuring of the defence corps. The size of one battle group in cold start doctrine was kept around 20,000-25,000 personnel per IBG. But the Indian army failed to achieve the required target regarding mobilisation time.¹⁴

Learning from the failures of the cold start doctrine, Indian strategists reduced the size of IBGs in the Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, where 8,000 to 10,000 personnel were included in one IBG. These IBGs are well-equipped with modern and sophisticated weapons. For aerial support during close combats, a strong air defence and fighter jets are included in each IBG along with advanced personnel carriers. The composition of each IBG varies depending on terrain, target, and mission, but the common elements in all IBGs are infantry battalions, artillery regiments, engineering and signal corps, fighter jets, and gunship helicopters.¹⁵

The main theme of the land warfare doctrine is to launch limited and quick military actions. For this purpose, the Indian army requires the latest and modernised weaponry.¹⁶ Former army chief applauded the inclusion of modern gunship helicopters such as Apache which are better known for their performance during American wars and are commonly called 'tank killers'. All IBGs are not the same but divided as per the requirements of terrain and the nature of the target. The former Indian army chief (late) Bipin Rawat clarified

that there would be two types of IBGs: smaller ones for mountainous regions and bigger ones for plains and deserts.¹⁷

These IBGs are designed to cut short the mobility time and enhance agility for launching limited action to retain the element of surprise for Pakistan. India carried out approximately 10 military exercises after introducing the cold start doctrine in 2004. Indian military claims to have achieved the targeted mobility time of approximately 48 hours, which is the deployment time of Pakistan, in military exercises code-named Vijayee Bhava in 2011. The modified composition of contemporary IBGs in land warfare doctrine was also tested and examined during exercises in 2019.

Indian army commanders are advised to create IBGs in their respective areas keeping the terrain, threat, task, and resources (TTTR) in focus.¹⁸ In the first phase, the Indian army hinted at creating 2-3 IBGs in the western command, which will be Pakistan-specific. These IBGs will be further divided into two categories: one is designed to take out targets across borders and will be equipped with more offensive weapons and the second is defensive. Keeping in mind the future developments and war scenarios, it is assumed that future IBGs will be different as Pakistan is also coming up with timely responses.

The significant difference between the IBGs of the cold start doctrine and the land warfare doctrine is that the latter also deals with mountainous terrains unlike the previous one. The mountain terrain-specific IBGs are created by taking elements from 17 Corps. The main objective is to prepare the selected IBGs for intense mountainous warfare. Indian military carried out exercises at almost 10,000 ft altitude, where they tested to make bridgeheads and crossing rivers for any possible military action against Pakistan and China. These mountainous exercises were mostly carried out in areas adjacent to the Line of Control (LOC) where the chances of escalation of a limited conflict are already high.¹⁹

The reports depict that the Indian military, since 2016, is stockpiling essential weaponry including missiles and artillery ammunition to remain prepared for launching a ten-day intense war across the LOC. The DG military operations are seen visiting areas along the LOC and the international border with Pakistan. The consistent efforts to launch the land warfare doctrine are slowly and gradually enabling India to go for any limited military manoeuvres.

Indian army's western command is looking after all the IBGs aiming at Pakistan in their command areas stretching from Punjab, Delhi, and Haryana to Himachal Pradesh. The IBGs are deployed according to command areas under the command of Major General rank officers. For instance, the IBGs deployed in Punjab and Rajasthan desert will be equipped with modern tanks while those deployed in mountainous terrains will be equipped with long-range modern artillery.

To successfully launch land warfare doctrine India needs to procure modern and latest technologies which will enable its troops to reach the target location, launch assaults, and quickly exit within a short period. India needs modern cargo planes such as Global Master or Hercules to carry a large number of troops in one go, Apache gunship helicopters for deadly air support, and modern signals and engineering units along with the latest intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance technologies.

Pakistan always gave a befitting response to Indian offensive doctrines. Pakistan came up with exercises Azm-e-Nou where Pakistan also tested quick swift and limited war tactics. It has become difficult for India to launch its land warfare doctrine because Pakistan has also got some modern capabilities in the field of airborne early warning systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and modern updated fighter jets.

Military Modernisation and Military Diplomacy

The second most important tenet of the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* is to upgrade military technology with the help of like-minded states like Israel, Russia, and the US.²⁰ Sometimes states modernise their military forces to retain deterrence against their adversary and later use this military muscle to secure political gains. The other obvious reason is to strengthen the defence lines of the state. In the case of the South Asian strategic milieu, the arms race and military competition can intensify the security dilemma. The delicate strategic fabric of the region is already facing continuous hard blows as three nuclear powers share borders.²¹

The land warfare doctrine introduced new tactics and concepts: IBGs, integrated command and network command centres, tri-services collaboration, etc. The Indian army needs more sophisticated and latest military technology to successfully implement these war tactics as these tactics demand more agility, swiftness, sharpness, and firepower. The Indian military, to procure the latest arms and weaponry, is strengthening strategic ties with the US, Russia and Israel. Indian along with the US, its main defence supplier, shares a common strategic threat and that is the rise of China. The US enhanced its military support to India after the signing of the pact which is commonly referred to as the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative 2005. Currently, the US is supplying C-130J Super Hercules, C-17 Global Master, Chinook heavy weightlifter helicopters, and tank killer Apaches to India.²² The modern air lifters are used to carry a large number of troops from strike corps and to drop them near the border where they can operate in the shape of IBGs, the heavy weightlifting helicopters are used to carry artillery weapons and even tanks within a short time. The Apache helicopters are used to provide close air support.

The second major weapon supplier to India is the Russian Federation. The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is rooted in the cold

war period when India adopted the policy of non-alignment and hence enjoyed partnerships with both blocs. The Indian partnership with Russia got a new dimension in the 1970s after the signing of the friendship treaty. After adopting modern military doctrines, India needs more advanced weaponry and technology to pursue its hegemonic interests in the region. Currently, India got an aircraft carrier from the Russian Federation which would be deployed in the Indian Ocean ultimately giving an upper hand to the Indian navy over Pakistan in the Arabian Sea region. Apart from this, India got a nuclear engine-operated submarine Akula-2 on lease from Russia.

Table 1:
Indian Strategic and Defence Collaborations²³

	Aircraft	Main Battle Tanks/AT GMs	Air Defence	Spy Satellites /UAVs	Advance Artillery	Gunship Helicopters	Weapon Locating Radars
1	SU-30 MKI	T-90S MBTs	Russian S-400	Risat-II	American M777- Ultra Light	Apache helicopters	Long-Range Reconnaissance & Observation Systems
2	Rafale	Modern APCs	Israeli Barak-8	GSAT-7A Satellite	Dhanush Artillery Guns- 1&2	Chinook Helicopters	Swathi Weapon Locating Radars
3		NAG ATGMs		GSAT-6	South Korean- K9 Vajra Howitzers		Battlefield Surveillance Radars
4		Israeli Spike ATGMs		Heron TP UAV			
5				Harpy UAV Missile			
6				Harop UAV Missile			

The Russian Federation is known as the real developer of the Indian conventional military capabilities. Russia provided advanced tanks to India; T-90S which are the backbone of the Indian army. The Indian air force also got modernised with help of Russia. Modern fighter jets such as SU-30MKI are supplied by Russia. Russia also provides refurbishment services to India as well. The latest hypersonic

missile technology BRAHMOS is being developed with the combined efforts of India and Russia.²⁴ The strong and sophisticated air defence system worth \$5 billion called S-400 is supplied to India by Russia. The S-400 can detect the coming missiles and UAVs at a distance of 600 km and can shoot at a distance of 400 km with a speed of 7,000 km per hour by locking 36 targets simultaneously.

The third major defence trading partner of India is Israel. Indo-Israel defence collaboration can be of grave concern for Pakistan. The Israeli defence ties with India date back to the early 2000s, including network-centric warfare and electronic warfare weaponry. In the army domain, Israel is providing refurbishment facilities for the Indian army's T-90 tanks along with fighter jets. Modern infantry vehicles and sophisticated guns such as Galil sniper and Tavor Tar guns, for close combats. In the air force domain, Israel is providing air defence systems (short and medium) with the refurbishment of the old Russian fighter jets. EHUD AACMI training simulators and long-tracking radars are also part of Indo-Israel defence collaboration in the air force domain. Another important measure taken by both states is to combine the training of their fighter pilots.²⁵

In the naval domain, Israel provided a defence shield comprising of Barak-1 and Barak-8 missiles which can provide a defence shield to naval assets from any Pakistani missile or UAV attack. For close naval combat, super Dvora and INFAC T-82 special boats are supplied by Israel along with helicopters for surveillance and detection of submarines.

In the domain of space, Israel and India jointly launched several projects to secure Indian space as Israel has done against her enemies. Cooperation in TechSAR, GSAT-6, GSAT-7, and RISAT-2 spy satellites are some significant examples.²⁶ Israel is providing special assistance in the development of Indian network-centric and electronic warfare systems. Defence shields like the Iron Dome and Israeli Arrow-2 systems are installed at the Indian military installations.

Special drones such as Heron, Harop, and Harpy are provided to India which are capable of carrying small warheads and destroying Pakistani radars.²⁷ Apart from weaponry, Israel is extending her support to India in counter-terrorism measures by providing night vision goggles, long-range reconnaissance and observatory systems, and special training to RAW agents.

Surgical Strikes: Punitive Response

The Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 was formulated by combining important elements of all previous doctrines. In 2012, the Indian Air Force introduced its doctrine of non-conventional warfare which was based on the surgical strikes option. The aim was to carry short, limited, and quick air strikes inside Pakistani territory to destroy the purported launching pads of terrorist outfits. The same element was reintroduced in the land warfare doctrine. This time the aim was not only to destroy the perceived terrorists' safe havens in Pakistani territory but also to maintain deterrence against Pakistan along the international border and the LOC.

The possibility of a full-scale war is diminished as both possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, surgical strikes option at a limited level is possible.²⁸ Renowned scholars such as Harsh V Pant and Gurmeet Kanwal support the idea of surgical strikes.²⁹ A significant example is from 2016 when Indian Air Force claimed to have carried out successful surgical strikes, but Pakistan denied the Indian claim. In February 2019, the Indian Air Force carried out a misadventure near the LOC area and claimed to have achieved the objectives. But according to various international media sources and think tank reports, India lost two fighter jets, one crashed into Pakistani territory and the pilot was captured.

The possibility of Indian surgical strikes is diminishing as Pakistan is showing response preparedness. Pakistan has adopted countermeasures to contain Indian aggression. Upgrading of JF-17 thunder and purchase of an air defence system from China along with

new fighter jets is making Pakistan's defence stronger. Pakistan has successfully maintained its area dominance against India.

Hybrid Warfare Strategy


Indian strategists lost all options against Pakistan as Pakistan was coming up with appropriate and timely responses. Modern warfare, which has been included in the land warfare doctrine of 2018, is a hybrid warfare strategy. The hybrid warfare strategy deals with non-declaratory and covert operations which are aimed at weakening the adversary from the inside rather than launching an attack across the international border.³⁰ The hybrid warfare strategy is composed of a few basic elements such as covert missions by spies, spreading of disinformation, manipulation of ethnic and religious divisions, targeting marginalised segments of society, carrying out terrorist activities in enemy states, sponsoring anti-state elements and isolating the state at international platforms by adopting offensive diplomacy.

Deterrence through Military Exercises and Joint Operations

Sometimes states carry out military exercises to demonstrate their military capabilities to deter the adversary. The other core objective of military exercises is to prepare military equipment for the successful execution of doctrines. The Indian military, after introducing the cold start doctrine, carried out approximately 10 exercises in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan. These areas were chosen because of their geography, and their possibility as war theatres in case of any conflict or war between Pakistan and India.³¹ In military exercises, the Indian military focused on preparedness of their defensive and strike corps formations, positioning of their weaponry, operations from helicopters, night vision capabilities of their tanks, IRS capabilities, network-centric warfare capabilities, electronic warfare systems capabilities, formation, and deployment of IBGs.

Figure 1:

Indian military exercises from 2004-2018



Source: Islamabad policy research institute

Implications for Pakistan

The military doctrinal transformation drive of India may bring serious implications for Pakistan as it is intensifying the security dilemma in the region. The growing conventional asymmetries between the two hostile neighbours are already disturbing the fragile peace of the region. Currently, India is pursuing a land warfare doctrine which is prepared by combining the main elements from previous doctrines. The simmering tensions due to hybrid and shallow actions may lead to full-scale war which will be devastating as both states possess nuclear weapons.³²

Indian hawkish ambitions to become regional hegemonic power are leading to an arms race in the region.³³ Pakistan's economy is not sufficient to bear the growing burden of the military budget. Hence, Pakistan has to depend on non-conventional capabilities. These growing asymmetries may become a prelude to any major war. To pursue modern war doctrines, India has to procure modern weaponry and ammunition such as modern fighter jets, long-range artillery guns, refurbished tanks, modern air defence systems, etc.

Creation of IBGs: The Threat of a Limited War

India and Pakistan share a long border, divided into many segments, such as the international border, the working boundary, and the line of control. Silent Indian moves after the introduction of the cold start doctrine, hybrid warfare doctrine, and the new land warfare doctrine may threaten the security of Pakistan.³⁴ India is dividing its large strike corps into smaller IBGs for quick action. While on other hand Pakistan's military is stretched. After 9/11 and the war on terror, the western border is as dangerous as the eastern border. More than 200,000 troops are deployed on the western border which is not only costly but also diverts Pakistan's resources and attention.

Pakistan has always supported the Kashmir cause on all forums. In response, India accused Pakistan of backing terrorist outfits operating in Kashmir and carrying out attacks in India. The incidents of the parliamentary attack in 2001, the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Pathankot in 2016, and the Pulwama attacks in 2019 sparked tensions between both states. India often threatens Pakistan with severe consequences.³⁵ Keeping all these developments in view, we can assume how Indian military aggression and doctrinal transformation can be dangerous for Pakistan. On the other hand, the Indian aggression is forcing Pakistan to adopt a quid pro quo plus response.

Two Front Dilemmas

Pakistan's military is deployed on the western and eastern borders. Both are equally volatile. Indian spies have frequently used Afghan soil for planning terrorist activities against Pakistan. On the eastern front, Pakistan is facing threats of IBGs which are deployed all along the international border at various locations. These IBGs are equipped with modern tanks and fighter jets which can carry out deep thrusts inside Pakistani territory.³⁶

After introducing the cold start doctrine, the reformation was carried out in defensive or holding corps by adding some offensive elements in them. The purpose was to make the holding corps capable enough to divert the attention of Pakistan's military and this time would be utilised by the strikes corps to attack at different locations. Pakistan's military is mostly depending on conventional capabilities but new deals with China are underway which will provide Pakistan with modern air defence systems. To cope with emerging challenges at the border, Pakistan needs to improve its economy which can later be used to procure the latest military weapons.

Growing Conventional Asymmetries Leading to Security Dilemma

The biggest challenge that may hit Pakistan is the growing arms race in the region.³⁷ India, since independence, has pursued offensive ambitions against Pakistan by procuring more and more military hardware. During Indira Gandhi's tenure, India launched an offensive doctrine, the results of which can be seen in the 1971 war. Later, Sunderji introduced a new doctrine based on tank warfare. India at that time procured the latest tanks from Russia.

After the introduction of the cold start doctrine and the land warfare doctrine of 2018, India procured weaponry which is suitable for the execution of limited, quick, short, and shallow manoeuvres. India procured defence systems such as S-400 and Barak-1 and 8 from Russia and Israel, respectively. Also, India acquired nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier from Russia. Moreover, India is adding modern

jets, tanks, UAVs, and spy satellites to its military, which can create a security dilemma for Pakistan. Pakistan, on other hand, is also coming up with appropriate measures. When India introduced IBGs in the cold start doctrine, Pakistan came up with the development of tactical nuclear weapons, Hatf and Nasr, which are capable of delivering warheads at a short distance and destroying the Indian division-size force. Similarly, in response to the Indian S-400 missile defence, Pakistan developed the Ababeel multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which are capable of carrying multiple warheads at the same time.³⁸

This arms race initiative by India against hegemonies in the South Asian region may bring serious implications for the whole region. New Delhi's behaviour is compelling the neighbours to increase their military spending. This will result in cutting the development budget of states where a huge population is living below the poverty line.

Politically Motivated Surgical Strikes: Threats of a Limited War

The concept of a limited war under the nuclear overhang emerged in the early 2000s, which was included in the cold start doctrine. Indian military and policymakers always denied the possibility of a limited war concept in the Indian military doctrines but later in 2017 the then army chief (late) Bipin Rawat accepted that such strategy did exist in the Indian military thinking. The new land warfare doctrine put great emphasis on limited manoeuvres. One of the basic tenets of land warfare doctrine is surgical strikes. The Indian military under Modi's regime largely blamed Pakistan's government and state institutions for backing or supporting terrorist activities in India by extending their support to Kashmiri mujahideen.

It could be argued that Modi's government, to gather sympathies from the public, may launch politically motivated false flag surgical strikes.³⁹ These strikes would aim to malign Pakistan for its alleged terror-sponsoring activities on international platforms and to

diplomatically isolate Pakistan through offensive diplomacy, which is another important tenet of the land warfare doctrine.

Renewed Hybrid Warfare

After facing humiliating defeats on all platforms, India changed its strategy to weaken Pakistan internally. This strategy is often referred to as hybrid warfare which was launched in 2008-09 after the Mumbai attacks. Under the supervision of the Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval a Technical Services Division Cell was established to monitor anti-Pakistan activities. In land warfare doctrine this concept is again included by modifying its execution strategies. This time renewed hybrid warfare is aimed at two important objectives: to destabilise the economic, political, religious, and ethnic fault lines of Pakistan; and to isolate Pakistan on international platforms by spreading disinformation and offensive diplomacy.

According to Zubair Mahmud Hayat, the Indian spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has established a covert wing worth \$500 million to carry out attacks on CPEC and related economic projects by funding anti-state actors in Pakistan.⁴⁰ The attacks on the Mehran air base where terrorists attacked Naval surveillance air crafts, the arrest of Kulbhushan Yadav, and terrorist activities of BLA, BLF and TTP are signalling Indian interference in Pakistan's internal matters.

In recent times the tactics of war have changed from conventional to nuclear and from nuclear to hybrid warfare which is also commonly termed fifth-generation warfare. Brussels-based NGO "EU Disinfo Lab" exposed the Indian groups Srivastava and Asian News International which were spreading false information against Pakistan by resurrecting dead NGOs, famous personalities, and media outlets by publishing its Indian Chronicles report.

Options for Pakistan

Pakistan has faced Indian aggression since 1947 and all the time proved itself a resilient state. Whether it is the 1965 war, the 1971

military debacle, the Indian Brasstacks war games of 1986-87, or the nuclear tests of India, Pakistan always gave a befitting response. The Indian military in 2001, during operation Parakram, failed to achieve the element of surprise against Pakistan because of Pakistan's appropriate response. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, India accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorists but could not achieve anything. The same thing was repeated in the shape of fake and politically motivated surgical strikes of 2016 after the Pathankot incident. Pakistan retaliated with a crushing response when the Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control in February 2019. On the other hand, Indian policymakers are continuously making the Indian military stronger and stronger with each passing day by bringing new doctrines and war strategies. Pakistan has, until now, successfully repelled Indian threats of limited war but by closely examining Indian growing military might and hawkish ambitions Pakistan may get into hot waters in future.⁴¹

Improve Electronic Warfare and Network-centric Warfare Systems

After the nuclear weapons, the nature of war changed in South Asia. Former Indian army chief VP Malik argued in his writings that Pakistan first introduced us to the limited war concept in the shape of the Kargil conflict. Later, Indian military doctrines like the cold start doctrine, land warfare doctrine, etc., were aimed at limited, shallow, and quick military manoeuvres remaining under the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. These doctrines required new advanced electronic and network-centric weaponry to collect real-time information about the enemy which could help commanders in making good decisions without confusion. Indian network-centric capabilities include suicidal drones, UAVs, spy satellites, and the IRS system, most of which is supplied by Israel. Pakistan, as compared to India, is lagging in this field, which has given India an upper hand in information collection. In modern times, wars are won and lost because of information about

the enemy. Pakistan should develop its network-centric capabilities by extending strategic relations with China and the Russian Federation.⁴²

Change in Military Posture

Indian policymakers introduced a couple of changes in their military postures to divert Pakistan's attention. After the cold start doctrine, offensive elements were introduced in the holding corps, the purpose was to engage Pakistan's military at the time of war at different locations. This time will be consumed by strike corps to launch attacks on different locations. Pakistan should adopt similar changes by bringing necessary transformations in a military-strategic setting. Pakistan can also introduce IBGs and position them at different locations to repel Indian threats of limited incursions.

Military Diplomacy and Strategic Alliances

In this globalised world, states cannot survive by isolating themselves from the rest of the world. The prosperous states enjoy cordial relations with other states. India extended its relations with major arms suppliers, which helped it strengthen its military backbone. Currently, India is procuring arms from France, Germany, Israel, Russia, and the US. India's successful military diplomacy has helped it in getting modern warfare weapons. Pakistan can also procure the latest arms by deepening strategic ties with these states.⁴³ The China-Pakistan partnership is an attempt at filling the gaps but more efforts are required to compete with India.

Conclusion

Every state in the world adopts different military strategies to gain supremacy against enemies. After the end of British rule, the sub-continent became a war-prone region of the world. Relations between India and Pakistan have remained strained since the emergence of the two as independent and sovereign states. Both states perceive each other as the enemy. In these circumstances, to create and retain

successful and credible deterrence, both states transformed their militaries. Indian military doctrinal transformation is mainly aimed at making the Indian military an offensive force which should be capable of carrying out offensive attacks against their main adversary, Pakistan.

This analysis given in the above lines points towards the trends of Indian military doctrinal transformation particularly focusing on the Indian new land warfare doctrine of 2018. The main findings of this study are, first, the Indian military doctrinal transformation is mainly geared towards Pakistan. India perceives Pakistan as her main rival even though in its latest warfare doctrine India also highlighted China as a rival on the northern front. Second, the theory of limited warfare is turning into a reality over time. The Indian preparations witnessed in their military exercises from 2004 to 2018 manifest their intentions and objectives. The former Indian Chief of Defence Staff, in 2017, accepted that limited war strategy did exist in the Indian military strategic thinking. Third, a close examination of the Indian military doctrinal transformational trajectory shows that soon India may bring renewed and modified warfare systems to tackle Pakistan and China at the same time. The Sunderji doctrine introduced concepts of mechanised infantry along with tank warfare, but the Indian military could not operationalise it because of Pakistan's response preparedness. Afterwards, the cold start also failed to yield the expected outcomes. Therefore, the Indian military came up with the *Land Warfare Doctrine 2018* aimed at carrying out limited strikes. But Pakistan also developed multiple independent re-entry vehicles to counter Indian offensive warfare strategies. Fourth; the process of theatrisation and creation of IBGs indicate that India wants to manipulate Pakistan's operational gaps. This change in the Indian military force posture may prove threatening for Pakistan as Pakistan's economy is unable to bear the burden of a growing military budget. Fifth, the transformational trajectory also illustrates that Indian strategic thinking is shifting from conventional to electronic warfare and network-centric warfare. India

is procuring the latest electronic warfare equipment from Israel and the US to enhance its defensive and offensive capabilities.

A closer study of Indian military doctrinal transformation indicates that, in the near future, India may introduce a new doctrine in which the possibility of changing its military posture is expected. Before this, the Indian military failed to implement IBG and limited warfare tactics. On other hand, Pakistan is also coming up with appropriate and timely responses. Recent reports and data show that Pakistan is lagging in the arms race with India as the latter is acquiring modern warfare systems and capabilities because its economy can bear such a burden while Pakistan has to depend on conventional and nuclear deterrence.

Pakistan, in the recent past, has successfully deterred India through its timely response. In retaliation to the cold start doctrine, Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons, capable to take out forward-moving strike corps and IBGs. The Indian transformational trajectory entered a new phase after the Mumbai attacks when the Indian military failed to implement CSD. Indian policymakers at that time shifted to hybrid warfare but once again Pakistan's secret agencies proved their best and gave a befitting response. To counter Indian aggression, Pakistan needs to develop new strategies. The modern age of warfare is shifting to hybrid and electronic warfare. Therefore, Pakistan should procure and develop electronic warfare and network-centric warfare systems with help of strategic partners.

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