Zahir Kazmi
Zahir Kazmi is an M.Phil. candidate at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. He writes on non-proliferation, disarmament and security issues.
DOI: http://DOI Number
Keywords: India, Pakistan, war fighting, ballistic missiles, South Asia, arms race, Prahaar, Nasr, nuclear war, tactical, non-strategic weapons, security, technology, regional stability, rational choice theory
Abstract
The recent shift in policy by Pakistan and India to focus on developing short-range ballistic missiles, often known as tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or non-strategic weapons represents a turn from their commitment of no use of nuclear weapons. On April 19, 2011, Pakistan carried out flight tests for the Hatf-IX — Nasr, whereas India revealed Prahaar through a flying test on July 21, 2011. Consequently, a number of issues have surfaced, many of which are only partially addressed. Why did Pakistan and India decide to build short-range ballistic missiles with the ability to deliver nuclear weapons? Why would India build Prahaar in secret for nearly two years and respond to the Nasr test in three months if it has conventional supremacy to “drag out conflict and destroy Pakistani military capabilities”? Does anyone know how the SRBMs might effect strategic stability and deterrence in the South Asian region? Is the Cold War competition between Russia and the United States over the TNWs and the current situation in South Asia comparable?
First Published
September 2012
How to Cite
Zahir Kazmi, “SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability in South Asia: A Case Study of Nasr and Prahaar,” Regional Studies 30, no.4 (Autumn 2012): 69-101, https://regionalstudies.com.pk/wp/article/srbms-deterrence-and-regional-stability-in-south-asia-a-case-study-of-nasr-and-prahaar/
Issue
Volume 30, Issue 4